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THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS



TROTZKY AT THE FRONT

THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

A HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

by
LOUIS FISCHER



IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

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AT END OF VOL II

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

Start with Afghanistan, Albania, or Algeria – the threads from their capitals lead to every other country in the world. To study the affairs of one of these nations means to probe into the whole realm of international politics. How much more must this apply to the Soviet Union which, by its geographical position in Europe and Asia, and its natural wealth, stands out as one of the six or seven Great Powers, and whose social and economic principles are a challenge to the rest of the world? To examine its foreign relations, the author has found it necessary to expose a cross-section of the post-war history of Europe, Asia, and America, and to fit Moscow into the larger pattern. This book, therefore, deals not only with Bolshevik foreign policy but with the foreign policies of Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, America, Japan, and of many smaller states. It was felt that wider treatment yielded a better understanding. The author modestly hopes that he may have been able to cast some new light on the history of the last, decisive year of the World War, of the Versailles Peace Conference, and of the period of chaos, strife, and gradual stabilization which followed it. He has included a lengthy study of the Chinese revolution, a sketch of the Turkish revolution, a detailed discussion of post-war developments in Afghanistan, Persia, and Mongolia, and considerable reference to the events of the last decade in most European countries, particularly Germany. The Ruhr invasion, the Locarno treaties, and the Kellogg Pact, for instance, were treated not only in their application to Russia but in their larger world aspects. The same is true of the disarmament question and of the problem of international peace.

For the purposes of comparison and a fuller grasp of the present, much attention has been devoted to Russian views on India, to Czarist efforts in China and Turkey, and, briefly, to Czarist foreign relations in general.

In like manner, the author considered that Soviet foreign policy is largely a function of Soviet internal conditions and of Bolshevik principles. Frequent reference has been made to both.

The book traces in detail the course of Soviet foreign relations from the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution to the present.

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The struggle between Lenin and Trotzky and Bukharin on the signing of the Brest Litovsk treaty with Germany was studied from Bolshevik archive material. The Civil War and intervention period became clearer after a perusal of Kolchak's archives captured by the Red Army in Omsk and Irkutsk, and placed at the disposal of the writer by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Litvinov showed the author his private archive of 1918. Papers and details will be found here revealing for the first time the fact and character of secret Soviet-Polish negotiations in 1919. There are also new data on Moscow's relations with Bela Kun's Communist regime in Hungary. Soviet officials and generals shared with the author their information on Enver Pasha's last mysterious adventure in Central Asia, whither he went to re-establish the empire of Tamerlane.

Chicherin, Litvinov, Rakovsky and German diplomats reconstructed the story of the Genoa Conference and the Rapallo Treaty for the author's benefit. Chicherin and Rakovsky, and lesser Soviet officials, gave him important and new material on the Lausanne Conference with Turkey in 1922-3. Soviet negotiations with England in 1924, with France in 1925, 1926, and 1927, and with Japan between 1922 and 1925 are recounted on the basis of the unpublished protocols which are quoted at length, and of conversations with the participants. The writer made a special and protracted visit to Rakovsky's place of exile, and received from him an interesting correspondence with British Labour leaders and prominent publicists, and significant side-lights on Anglo-Russian relations.

Karakhan told the author of his negotiations with China and Japan, Rothstein of his activity as Soviet minister in Persia, Aralov as Soviet ambassador in Turkey, Krestinsky in Germany, Kerzhentsev in Scandinavia, etc. Karakhan permitted the use of an unpublished correspondence with Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

A long chapter on Russia's rôle in the Chinese revolution was compiled on information from the best possible Russian authority and from Chinese.

The writer discussed the subject of the book in regular meetings with Chicherin, Litvinov, Karakhan, and Rothstein. He received much assistance from German diplomats and writers, especially

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from Dr. Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Moscow, Ministerial Director Gaus, the legal expert of the German Foreign Office, and Herr Hilger, the economic counsellor of the German Embassy in Moscow. He talked informally on Russian questions with Mr. S. Parker Gilbert, British M.P.'s, and German, English, and American business men.

The whole manuscript or parts of it were read by Chicherin, Rothstein, Colonel John Ward, C.B., C.M.G., Borodin, Rakovsky, E. A. Adamov, keeper of archives in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, H. Bruce Lockhart, Dr. Von Dirksen, John C. Wiley of the United States Embassy in Berlin, Walter Duranty, Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times*, Paul Scheffer, Moscow correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Frederick R. Kuh, Berlin correspondent of the United Press, Charlotte Kuh, Kenneth Durant, New York correspondent of *Tass*, and Sanford Griffith. All made important corrections and suggestions. To all of them, and to those many friends and colleagues and to his wife who helped him in the preparation of the volume, the author now publicly expresses a gratitude already communicated personally.

Apart from the many books, pamphlets and magazines mentioned in the notes and text, hundreds of publications were consulted. The author likewise examined the complete files of the Moscow *Izvestia* for the last twelve years, and of British, French, German and American dailies for the same period. He wishes to thank the skilled librarians in Moscow, Paris, Berlin and New York, who gave him of their advice and time.

An only appendix reproduces a secret Anglo-French Convention for the division of South Russia into 'zones of influence.' It was supplied to the author from a British source.

LOUIS FISCHER

THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

THE BOLSHEVIKS MAKE PEACE

The Bolsheviks came to power in November, 1917, promising 'bread to the workers, land to the peasants, and peace to all.' The end of the World War, they believed, would bring all three. Therefore almost the first act of the Communist Government was to take steps towards a cessation of hostilities.

Immediate peace was demanded by the internal situation. The country was weary of fighting; the soldiers were tired of the trenches. The quick success of the Bolsheviks is explained, to a large extent, by their ability to exploit this circumstance.

'Long before the destruction of the Czarist regime (March 12, 1917),' wrote A. F. Kerensky in the *New York Times* of May 22, 1927, 'the army at the front had developed acute indications of disintegration. By January, 1917, more than a million deserters were roaming about in the rear of the army. In the first weeks of the March revolution the Russian army ceased to exist as a fighting force.'

The Russian army, in 1917, simply commenced to demobilize itself. Not even the gilded oratory of Kerensky could stem the tide. 'You, Mr. Minister,' said one common mujhik-soldier to Kerensky on the Riga front, 'tell us that we must fight for land and freedom. Of what good will land be to me if I am killed? All I will get will be three yards for a grave.'

Kerensky did not reply to the argument. There was no reply. The peasant knew that back home his folks were expropriating the owners of large estates. That to him was more pressing business than fighting Germans, Austrians, and Turks.

A Czarist general tells how he tried to persuade his peasant soldiers to remain at the front. If you open the front, he told them, the Germans will march in. 'Oh,' said one mujhik, 'I am from the province of Pensa. They will never get as far as that.' Yes, argued the general, but you will have to pay tribute. 'How much' inquired the soldiers. The general suggested an approximate

THE BOLSHEVIKS MAKE PEACE

figure. 'That isn't much,' they maintained. 'We are losing much more at home now.'

¶ THE POPULAR WILL FOR PEACE

The biggest factor in the Russian situation was the people's and the army's all-pervading wish for peace. So that, when Kerensky said to the soldiers, 'I summon you not to a feast but to death,' they smiled, and the next day quitted the trenches. 'The army voted for peace with its legs,' Lenin declared. It ran away.

In November, therefore, when the Bolsheviks seized the ship of state, the Russian army was no longer an effective weapon. There could be no war because there was no army worthy of the name. 'Since we could not engage in war,' as Trotzky said, 'we had to conclude peace. . . .'¹

There were other factors. The Bolsheviks had opposed the World War from the very start. They considered it iniquitous and unjust. Caused by economic rivalry, aiming at ruthless aggrandisement, they believed that it would neither end wars nor destroy imperialism *unless* 'the international war of the capitalists is transformed into a civil war against the capitalists.'

Late in the evening of April 16, 1917, Lenin, Zinoviev, and thirty other revolutionary *émigrés*, of whom seventeen were Bolsheviks, arrived in Petrograd from Switzerland after a trip through Germany in partially sealed cars.² Lenin spoke from the top of an armoured auto when the train pulled in. The next day he addressed a meeting of Bolshevik members of the All-Russian Soviet. 'It is impossible,' he submitted, 'to end war with a truly democratic, non-annexationist peace except through the overthrow of capitalism. . . .'

What interest, the Bolsheviks asked, could the workers and peasants have in the struggle? None whatever, came their own reply. And having taken over the government, the first duty of

¹ *The Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference*. Complete Stenographic Record of Plenary Sessions and Session of Political Commission. Edited by A. A. Joffe. Introduction by L. D. Trotzky. Moscow, 1920. Page vi.

² Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, Zinoviev, and Radek, who accompanied Lenin on this trip, have written articles about it which are reprinted in *Die Reise Lenins durch Deutschland im plombierten Wagen* by Fritz Platten. Berlin, 1924.

THE POPULAR WILL FOR PEACE

the Workers' and Peasants' regime was, logically, to establish peace. On November 8, therefore, just one day after the Bolsheviks came into power, the Government issued a decree offering peace to all the world. 'The Workers' and Peasants' Government,' reads the first sentence, '... proposes to all belligerent nations and their governments to commence immediately negotiations for an equitable and democratic peace.' Definition follows. 'An equitable and democratic peace ... is, according to the Government, an immediate peace without annexation (that is, without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible annexation of foreign nationalities) and without the payment of indemnities.'

These words were penned a year and three days before that momentous November 11, 1918, on which the Armistice was signed. Yet Winston Churchill agrees that the war might have ended at this juncture. 'This was undoubtedly a favourable opportunity for peace,' he wrote regarding the period immediately after the Bolshevik revolution.¹ 'Russia down, Italy gasping, France exhausted, the British army bled white, the U-boats not yet defeated, and the United States 3,000 miles away, constituted cumulatively a position where German statesmanhood might well have intervened decisively.' He outlines the practical possibilities of such a peace; it would have been attained at the expense of Russia, the ally. And then, 'Such were the elements of this great opportunity. It was the last. But Ludendorff cared for none of these things.'

Strangely enough, Ludendorff talks in the same tone. In an estimate of the position of the Central Powers at the end of 1917, he says, 'The Austro-Hungarian army was tired. ... Its fighting power was small; it practically sufficed only against Italy.' The political situation was serious for 'only the army kept the Dual Monarchy together.' Of Bulgaria the generalissimo wrote, 'The nation and the army were tired of war. ... Bulgaria would remain loyal as long as all went well with us.' In Turkey conditions were no better. 'She was at the end of her tether,' and the strength of the whole chain suffered by reason of the extreme weakness of the weakest link. Even Germany, the strongest link,

¹ *The World Crisis*, 1916-18. By Winston Churchill. London, 1927. Vol. II, page 404.

THE BOLSHEVIKS MAKE PEACE

the body and trunk of the Quadruple Alliance, showed signs of extreme fatigue. 'In Germany the spirit was better than in the countries of our associates, but it had obviously sunk quite appreciably, and the general atmosphere had become worse.'¹

Nevertheless, no reply was made to the Russian peace offer of November 8.

§ THE ALLIES' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET REGIME

The Allies assumed an unfriendly attitude to the new government from the very beginning. Buchanan noted in his diary for November 13 that the Bolsheviks² 'want to stand well with the Allies' and expressed fear lest German agents 'cause friction between Great Britain and Russia.' Yet he would not treat with Trotzky, the Foreign Minister of an entente country. Ambassador Francis, of the United States, likewise assumed a hostile position. 'The day after the fall of the Provisional Government,' he tells us,³ 'I wrote in a letter to Consul-General Summers at Moscow . . . "It is reported that the Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldiers has named a cabinet with Lenin as Premier, Trotzky as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Madame or Mlle. Kollontai as Minister of Education. Disgusting. . . ." ' Later he wrote, 'Of course, we would not, or I would not recognize any Ministry of which Lenin is Premier or Trotzky Minister of Foreign Affairs.' He had not had any communication with Washington on the views of the State Department. The Bolsheviks had not as yet annulled their international debts or shown any intention of negotiating a separate peace or given any evidence of disloyalty to the Allies.

This attitude contrasts sharply with the kindly concern evidenced by Francis for the Provisional Government.

'On March 19th,' reads his diary, 'one week after the (Kerensky)

¹ *Meine Kriegserinnerungen*. 1914-18. By Erich Ludendorff. Berlin, 1920. Page 433.

² *My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs*. By Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to Petrograd, 1910-18. London, 1923. Vol. II. Page 213.

³ *Russia from the American Embassy*. April 1916 - November 1918. By David R. Francis. New York, 1921. Page 186.

THE ALLIES' ATTITUDE

Revolution began, and the day after I sent my cable to the (State) Department (reporting conversations with Miliukov and Rodzianko on conditions in Russia), I called on Goutchkoff, the Minister of War. . . . I asked him if recognition by my Government would strengthen the Provisional Government of Russia. He replied with alacrity that it would and asked if it could be done on the following day. I told him "No," and that I had only sent the cable the preceding evening and could not expect a reply before the 22nd or 23rd. With much agitation he expressed doubt as to whether the Provisional Government could survive till that time. . . .'

The United States ambassador urged recognition of a government whose own members thought it might fall in a fortnight. Yet the day after the Bolshevik regime came into power he knew that it was a 'disgusting' affair, and declined to deal with it. Moreover he interfered in internal Russian affairs by making a public appeal over the heads of the Bolsheviks. This unusual step was taken on November 19. In an address printed and distributed in thousands of copies, he discussed such purely domestic questions as the Constituent Assembly, and then declared, 'It may be true that you are tired of war and desire peace, but what kind of peace can you expect from a government not only imperialistic in form but the greatest enemy of democracy?' Mr. Francis broadcast this statement on the excuse that 'there is no official in the Foreign Office with whom I can communicate.' But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been taken over by the Communists and re-organized with Trotzky as its chief.

Two days later, November 21, 1917, Trotzky forwarded a note to all Allied ambassadors in Petrograd (Russia was still one of the Allies), which he asked them to consider as a 'formal proposal of an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations.' The same note was sent to all other belligerent countries.

On the previous day, a communication was sent to 'Citizen Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin,' generalissimo of all the Russian armies, instructing him to conclude an immediate armistice on all fronts. Dukhonin refused. In a conversation over the direct

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ticker-telegraph between Lenin, Stalin, Commissar of Nationalities, and Officer Krylenko in Petrograd, and General Dukhonin at Staff Headquarters in Moghilev, lasting from 2 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. November 22, Dukhonin questioned the authority of the new government to take steps leading towards peace. Thereupon, the three commissars at the other end of the wire informed him that he was discharged from his post and would soon be relieved by the new Commander-in-Chief, Krylenko. (The tape of this conversation has fortunately been preserved.)

November 23, a proclamation signed by Lenin and Krylenko called on all army units to enter into armistice negotiations. Simultaneously, the Bolshevik press commenced the publication of the secret diplomatic archives of the Russian Foreign Office.

That same day, Lord Robert Cecil, speaking for the British Government, declared his opposition to the Russian peace moves.

‘The action taken by the extremists in Petrograd,’ he said, ‘would of course be a direct breach of the agreement of September 5, 1914, and . . . if adopted by the Russian nation would put them practically outside the pale of the ordinary council of Europe. . . . There is no intention of recognizing such a government.’¹

The Allied representatives in Petrograd took a similar position. Dukhonin had been superseded by Krylenko and the newspapers had announced the change. There was no doubt that his dismissal was final. Nevertheless, on November 23, the Allied military attachés delivered a note to Dukhonin protesting vigorously against the proposed armistice on the ground that it violated the treaty of September 5, 1914, ‘by which the Allies, among them Russia, agreed not to conclude a separate peace, nor to suspend hostilities one without the other. . . .’ Subsequently Major Kerth, the United States Military Attaché who had not signed this note, made a similar protest ‘against any separate armistice that might be concluded by Russia.’

A proclamation to the forces, dated ‘Smolni, November 24th, 6 a.m.’ contains Trotzky’s reply.

¹ *Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk. A Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations.* By Judah L. Magnes. New York, 1919. Page 14.

THE ALLIES' ATTITUDE

'The representatives of the Allied governments protest against a separate Russian armistice with Germany, but at the same time they do not respond to the proposal made to them by the Council of People's Commissars for an armistice on all fronts. . . .'

Moreover, said the Commissar, an appeal by foreign agents to a deposed general was tantamount to '*interference in the internal affairs of the country with the object of provoking civil war.*' (Italics mine. — L.F.)

The Russian people, Trotzky insisted, had no intention of shedding more blood in order to effect those secret, annexationist treaties which the newspapers were then publishing. They would not be bound by the dead letter of the 1914 agreement. With respect to the threat, contained in the letter of the military attachés, that the Allies might undertake punitive measures against Russia if she concluded peace with the enemy, the workers and peasants had no fear. Their comrades in other countries, Trotzky imagined, would prevent the imperialist governments from attacking Russia simply because she 'desired peace and the brotherhood of nations.'

This is the first hint of Allied intervention. It was based on information from General Headquarters to the effect that the British had warned of a Japanese offensive against Russia in case of her default. Buchanan, too, admits that the allied military representatives told Dukhonin that Russia's defection

'might have the most serious consequences. The veiled threat contained in the last words,' the envoy continues, 'has been interpreted to mean that we are about to call on Japan to attack Russia. It was an ill-advised step that has done us any amount of harm.'

The break between the Bolsheviki and the Allies was growing wider. Not only had Lord Robert Cecil manifested his government's hostility to the Red Government, but Paris likewise, in a telegram to Berthelot, its military attaché at the Roumanian front, asked that general to inform the Russian authorities that it 'would recognize no government in Russia that proved itself capable of entering into an agreement with the enemy.'¹

¹ Petrograd *Izvestia*. November 27, 1917.

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At home, also, political opponents of the Bolsheviks agitated against peace. The *Izvestia* of November 25 takes them to task. Addressing the 'war patriots,' an unsigned article says:

'You speak of a peace at the expense of Russia. But there is no peace at the expense of Russia that would be worse than a war at the expense of Russia. . . . You, sirs, are opposed to a separate peace and a separate armistice. So are we.'

The same thought recurs in a note from Trotzky to the Allied military attachés,

'asserting that his government desired not a separate but a general peace, but that it was determined to have peace. It will,' the note concluded, 'be the fault of the Allied governments if Russia has after all to make a separate peace.'¹

The Bolsheviks wanted peace for themselves, but at the same time they wished to end the world war everywhere and for everybody in all countries. If the Allies joined them in a peace conference with the Central Powers, Russia would receive far more favourable terms than in the event of separate discussions. But, if the Allies were unwilling, the Bolsheviks had no alternative to meeting the German alliance alone.

§ BUCHANAN FOR A SEPARATE PEACE

That a separate peace was indeed the undeniable need of the hour is conceded by Sir George Buchanan himself. Anti-Bolshevik to the extreme, protagonist of a war to the bitter end, he – and some of his most important advisers – nevertheless saw eye to eye with the Communists on this crucial problem. On November 27 the ambassador telegraphed his Foreign Office as follows:

'I share the view, already expressed by General Knox, that the situation here has become desperate, that we must reconsider our attitude. In my opinion, the only safe course left to us is to give Russia back her word and tell her people that, realizing how worn out they are by the war and the disorganization inseparable from a great revolution, we leave it to them to decide whether they will purchase peace on Germany's terms or fight on with the Allies . . .

¹ *My Mission, etc.* . . . Buchanan.

GERMANY ACCEPTS

‘For us to hold to our pound of flesh and to insist on Russia fulfilling her obligations, under the 1914 agreement, is to play Germany’s game. Every day we keep Russia in the war against her will does but embitter her people against us.’¹

This message not merely reflects the unpopularity of the war in Russia. It is an admission of the wisdom of the Bolsheviks’ course even if it led to a separate peace. Allied policy, however, was too inflexible to permit of the move suggested by the British ambassador.²

¶ GERMANY ACCEPTS

The Central Powers, however, accepted the Bolshevik armistice offer. On November 28 the Soviet Press announced that the Northern German command had, on instructions from the German Government, sent into the Russian lines a written acceptance of the Bolshevik invitation to negotiate an armistice. The date fixed was December 2, the interval to allow the Bolsheviks once more to ‘apply to our allies with the proposal to identify themselves with our peace platform and enter into common negotiations with the enemy for the conclusion of an armistice on the fronts of all belligerent nations.’

Thereupon, Krylenko issued Order No. 3 ordering ‘Firing and fraternization to cease immediately on all fronts.’ Strict military discipline must be observed, and the line maintained. To be sure, ‘the front is starving,’ as the new Commander-in-Chief states in a published telegram, ‘the front is without clothes and boots, there is no fodder; horses are dying; there is no transport.’ But ‘peace is drawing nearer.’ ‘Yet a bit longer and we will achieve a general peace.’ All attention was to be concentrated on the men in the trenches. Perhaps, after all, no armistice would be signed. Russia could not remain altogether defenceless and at the mercy of the enemy.

Blindfolded Russian plenipotentiaries had entered the German trenches where the military authorities of the enemy agreed to a

¹ *Ibid.* Page 225.

² Colonel House relates the reaction which Buchanan’s telegram created in Allied diplomatic circles. See *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, by Charles Seymour. London, 1928. Vol. III, p. 289.

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conference beginning December 2. In doing so they were acting in harmony with the civilian government in Berlin, whose point of view was announced a day later in the Reichstag speech of the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Hertling. Hertling, amid the applause of the German Parliament, not merely agreed to engage in pourparlers with the Russians *on the basis of the principles laid down by the Bolsheviks*, but added, 'I hope and wish that these efforts may soon assume more concrete form and bring us peace' (November 29). Similarly, on November 30, the Austrian Premier, Count von Seidler, stated in the Austrian Diet that the Government desired to negotiate a general peace with 'all those states which would declare their readiness to conclude peace on the basis of the Russian invitation.'

Churchill had told us that the Allies at that time were prepared for peace; it 'was undoubtedly a favourable opportunity for peace,' he wrote. 'But Ludendorff cared for none of these things,' Churchill charges. Yet the fault, perhaps, was more his than Ludendorff's. For the Germans and their associates were committed to the conference scheduled to begin at Brest Litovsk on December 2. They had accepted the invitation without knowing whether the Allies would come or not. Had the Entente sent representatives, a universal peace conference would have been inevitable and the World War might have ended then and there.

On November 30 Trotzky informed the Allied mission in Petrograd that

'military operations on the Russian front have been stopped, and asked the diplomatic representatives of the Allies in Russia to state in reply whether they desire to participate in the negotiations which will be opened on Sunday evening, December 2nd, at 5 o'clock.'

The Allies returned no reply.

§ ALLIED TACTICS IN PETROGRAD

They had decided to boycott the pourparlers at Brest Litovsk. Meanwhile, however, neither the Allied nor the American Governments officially broke off relations with the Soviet authorities. The various embassies, including the British, maintained connec-

ALLIED TACTICS IN PETROGRAD

tions with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs through so-called 'unofficial' agents, and Maxim Litvinov was recognized by Downing Street as the representative of the *de facto* Russian Government. Trotzky himself saw Noulens, the French ambassador, and was 'quite civil and correct,'¹ but Buchanan wrote, 'He [Trotzky] has not honoured me with a visit for fear that I should decline to receive him.' Sir George refused to meet one of the highest officials of the government whose hospitality he still enjoyed.

In their relations with the Allies, the Bolsheviki remained 'civil and correct' – at least for a time – but when strict measures were required, Trotzky did not hesitate. Thus, for instance, he had early demanded the release of Comrades Chicherin (Ornat-sky), Petrov, and others interned in Brixton Gaol, London, on the charge of pacifist propaganda, but when the request was not satisfied he issued the decree of November 30, 1917, interdicting the granting of outgoing visas to British subjects until the Chicherin episode was settled. Thereupon, the British Government assented and the prisoners left London on January 3, 1918, for Petrograd, where Chicherin immediately took up the duties of first assistant to Trotzky, and Petrov of first assistant to Chicherin.

Likewise, Trotzky demanded that Russian diplomatic messengers be granted the usual privileges. London at first demurred, but

'in consequence of the reprisals which Trotzky threatened British subjects if his couriers were not at once accorded diplomatic passports, we have had to acquiesce,' writes Buchanan, 'and I have been authorized to give the necessary visas unconditionally. In informing him of this, Captain Smith expressed, in my name, the hope that he would in the future try to seek an amicable adjustment of any debatable question that might arise without having recourse to arbitrary measures. Trotzky replied that he was always ready to adopt a conciliatory attitude, but he had found by experience that such a policy did not pay and only led to protracted discussions.'

Colonel Raymond Robins and, for a short while, General William B. Judson, served as go-betweens for the American Em-

¹ *My Mission, etc.* . . . Buchanan.

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bassy, and in that capacity had numerous interviews with Lenin and Trotzky. Mr. Francis, the ambassador, like Buchanan and others, adopted the position of not 'speaking' to the Bolsheviks while permitting responsible subordinates to engage in far-reaching negotiations. And the French refused to use the word 'people's' in addressing soviet commissariats until the Bolsheviks began rejecting all correspondence that did not include it.

This child's play, unimportant in itself, reflects the Allies' indecision *vis-à-vis* a situation on which another year of war depended. Generally speaking, their attitude was hostile, yet they refrained from breaking off all connections in the hope that something could still be retrieved.

§ ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

Parallel with this dilly-dallying in Petrograd, significant developments were taking place at Brest Litovsk. On December 2 the Bolshevik delegation, consisting of Adolf A. Joffe, chairman, Leo M. Karakhan, secretary, Leo B. Kamenev, Gregory Sokolnikov, Madame Bitzenko, Captain Mstislavsky, a working man, a sailor, a peasant, and eight military experts, arrived in the neutral zone to meet the German plenipotentiaries. (The Russians were thirty minutes late.)

The chief Russian delegates knew little if anything about military affairs. The German negotiators, on the other hand, were exclusively army men headed by Prince Leopold of Bavaria but dominated by General Max von Hoffmann. Representatives of Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria also participated.

'Our delegates', reads a Russian Government proclamation dated December 5, 10 a.m., 'began with a declaration of peace aims with a view to which the armistice was being proposed. The enemy delegation replied that that was a matter for statesmen whereas they, as soldiers, were authorized to discuss only the military terms of the armistice and therefore could add nothing to the declarations of Czernin and von Kuehlmann [on the attitude of the German and Austrian Cabinet, respectively, to the original Russian peace proposals. — L.F.] . . . Our delegation proposed to the enemy that they ask for the necessary authority . . .

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

(and) introduced a draft armistice agreement on all fronts . . . the chief points of which were, (1) prohibition of any transfer of troops from our front to the front of our allies, and (2) the evacuation of the Moon Sound Islands (in the Gulf of Riga) by the Germans.'

The Germans replied that such terms could only be proposed to a defeated country.

'In answer to the categorical affirmation of our plenipotentiaries that for us the chief point of interest was an armistice on all fronts with a view to the establishment of a universal democratic peace on the well-known lines laid down by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the enemy delegates again replied evasively that such a formulation of the question was unacceptable to them since they were authorized at the moment to conduct negotiations for an armistice only with the Russian delegation *because delegations from Russia's allies were not present.*'

The Germans desired an armistice only on the fronts between the Baltic and Black Seas and looked with disfavour on the interdiction of troop transfers to the Western war theatre. But the Russians insisted that 'the armistice cannot serve the interests of one militarism against the other.' At a second session on December 5, a truce was finally signed for the period between December 7 and December 17. Hostilities could be renewed by either party after three days' notice. Fighting was also suspended on the Moon Sound Islands, from which Petrograd could be threatened. During the ten-day truce, army units numbering a division or more could be moved only if the order therefor had been given prior to December 5.

It was agreed that armistice discussions would be resumed in Brest Litovsk on December 12. The Russians thereupon returned to their capital, leaving Karakhan behind to hold the diplomatic fort.¹

The Bolsheviks still hoped that the Allies would join them on the reopening of the negotiations. Trotzky, as Commissar of

¹ Karakhan has shared with the writer his reminiscences of the Brest period.

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Foreign Affairs, communicated immediately upon the conclusion of the temporary truce with the embassies of Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, China, Japan, Roumania, Belgium, and Serbia, to the effect that

‘the negotiations . . . were suspended at the initiative of our delegation for one week in order to give an opportunity during this time to inform the peoples and the Governments of the Allied countries . . .’

‘Thus,’ he went on, ‘between the first decree of the Soviet Government regarding peace (November 8) and the time of the coming renewal of the peace negotiations (December 12), a period of over a month will have elapsed. This time limit is considered, even with the present disorganized means of international communication, absolutely sufficient to give an opportunity to the Governments of the Allied countries to define their attitude to the peace negotiations ; – that is, to express their readiness or their refusal to participate in the negotiations for an armistice and peace, and in case of a refusal to openly state before the world, clearly, definitely, and correctly, in the name of what purpose must the people of Europe bleed during the fourth year of the war.’

§ COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Meanwhile the Russians inaugurated a fiery propaganda crusade against Prussian militarism in the enemy lines and behind them. Special newspapers in the German language were printed in Petrograd and distributed in tens of thousands of copies. The Reds were trying to undermine the war patriotism and loyalty of their opponents’ Western front.

Anti-militarist, anti-imperialist agitation was not, however, aimed only at the Central Powers. On December 7, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a proclamation to the ‘Labouring Moslems of Russia and the East,’ signed Lenin and Djugoshvili (Stalin), Commissar of Nationalities. Apart from appeals to the faithful to rise against their ‘oppressors’ and put an end to foreign domination of Asiatic colonies, the document contained important statements on Soviet foreign policy.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

‘Constantinople,’ it said, ‘must remain in the hands of the Mohammedans’; ‘We announce that the agreement on the partition of Persia [August 31, 1907, between Great Britain and Czar’s Empire] is torn up and annulled’; ‘We announce that the agreement on the partition of Turkey and the seizure of Armenia is torn up and annulled.’¹

Sir George Buchanan did not enjoy this essay of the Bolsheviks.

‘Mr. Lenin,’ he wrote, ‘. . . incited our Indian subjects to rebellion. He placed us on a somewhat lower level than the Turks. . . . It is an unheard-of thing for a man who claims to direct Russian policy to use such language of a friendly and Allied country.’

England, and other ‘friendly and Allied’ countries, seem at this stage to have harboured their first thoughts of intervention in Russian political and economic affairs. The Paris *Temps*, quoted by the *Russkoye Slovo*, a bourgeois daily (non-Communist papers continued to appear for months after the revolution) suggested that the regime of the Bolsheviks would soon collapse, and that, to prevent anarchy, the Allies ought to undertake the economic reorganization of Russia.

To which the official *Izvestia* declared: ‘But the magnates of finance are wrong in their reckoning. Russian democracy did not overthrow Czarism and then Capitalism in order to succumb to the bondage of the Anglo-Franco-American money bag.’

These little passages-at-arms contributed towards the increasing estrangement between Russia and the Allies. ‘Friendly and Allied’ began to sound somewhat obsolete. The press of the western world was fuming and foaming against the Red usurpers – and prophesying their disappearance in six weeks or six months. Why, then, recognize or treat with them?

The attitude of the Central Powers was different. Germany desired an agreement with the Russians for obvious reasons; such an agreement would weaken her enemy, strengthen her military

¹ *International Politics in Modern Times. Treaties, Notes and Declarations.* Vol. 2, page 94. Publication of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Compiled by Prof. Kluchnikov and Sabanin. Moscow, 1926.

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position, and tend to fortify the spirit of the civilian population at home. She had accepted the Russian invitation to negotiations with alacrity and could not possibly, in view of public opinion, have retired from such pourparlers had the Allies put in an appearance. But in the absence of such a development, a separate peace with the Russians offered innumerable practical, tactical, and political advantages which Germany would be quick to exploit.

§ A SEPARATE TRUCE

The separate nature of the Russian-German conversations was now no longer deniable. Trotzky blamed it on the Allies. 'The responsibility for the separate character of the armistice,' he declared, 'rests entirely on those governments which have hitherto refused to announce their armistice and peace terms.'

On December 13 armistice conversations commenced in Brest Litovsk, and centred around three questions, (1) the transfer of troops, (2) naval matters, (3) fraternizations between opposing forces.

The Russians were uncompromising on the first point, and the Germans soon agreed not to move any troops from the Eastern front to the Western front for a whole month until January 14. The Central Powers likewise made considerable concessions with respect to fleet operations, and, finally, 'organized' fraternizing was officially countenanced by the representatives of German militarism to whom the very idea was revolting. 'The exchange of views and newspapers is to be permitted.' To be sure, 'there must not be present at any one time more than twenty-five unarmed persons from each side,' but twenty-five was enough for the Russians' anti-war propaganda purposes.

Furthermore, Turkish and Russian troops were to be withdrawn from Persia; immediate exchange of civil and military prisoners was provided for; both parties pledged to open peace negotiations without delay. . . . The armistice would remain in force at least until January 14, but continued operative unless seven days' notice was given by either contracting party.

While these events were progressing, Winston Churchill delivered a vehement 'no peace without victory' address at Brad-

A SEPARATE TRUCE

ford, England, which produced a bad effect in Russia. And the Allied policy of non-recognition of the Soviet state continued unchanged.

Fighting had commenced in the South between Red forces and Dutov, Kaledin, Kornilov and other insurgent generals. Relations between Petrograd and the Ukrainian, bourgeois Rada government were highly strained. Anti-Bolshevik parties were lifting their heads and sabotaging Bolshevik efforts to establish order. On December 19, Petrograd was declared in a state of siege so as to permit the police to cope with rowdies who sacked wine, whisky and vodka stores, and drank their contents as a preliminary to riotous conduct throughout the town. In the provinces, the extension of Communist authority met with resistance from the *bourgeoisie*, the Social revolutionaries, etc. The internal situation made peace imperative.

The armistice was a fact. Russia was on the eve of the peace conference. The Bolsheviks wished it to be a general meeting for the re-establishment of peace throughout Europe; some Germano-Austrian diplomats inclined favourably towards the same eventuality. Throughout 1917 Austria had engaged in secret peace negotiations with France and England.¹ In Germany the desire for victory was still strong, but the confidence in success had slightly waned, and reserve strength was diminishing. Before departing for Brest, both Kuehlmann and Czernin made statements which reflected a desire for universal peace. It soon became clear, however, that the peace with Russia would be a separate peace. The Allies would be absent.

The refusal of the Allies to attend made it incumbent on the Germans to conduct the conference with an eye to Germany's future military tasks and thus confirmed the control over German foreign policy exercised by the Ludendorff-Hindenburg organization. The civilians had enjoyed a short period of ascendancy that reflected war-weariness and wavering. Even the militarists, for that brief moment, might have rejoiced in the prospect of drop-

¹ *L'Offre de Paix Separée de l'Autriche* (Decembre 5, 1916 - Octobre 12, 1917) avec deux lettres autographes de l'Empereur Charles et une note autographe du Comte Czernin. Par Prince Sixte du Bourbon. Paris, 1920. Also *Czernin und die Sixtus-Affaire*. By August Demblin. Munich, 1920.

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ping their heavy burdens. But now they proposed to use Russia's collapse as a lever to break through in France and Flanders. This was the guiding star of the Germans, and the three minor members of the Alliance said 'Amen.'

PEACE POURPARLERS

The Bolsheviks went to the Brest Litovsk peace conference in a revolutionary mood. Trotzky gave the delegates a 'send-off' in his famous 'Appeal to the Workers, and the Oppressed and Bled Peoples of Europe.' Soviet Russia's dominant motives in Brest, he advertised, would be first, 'the quickest possible cessation of the shameless and criminal war which was murdering Europe,' and, secondly, 'to give every possible aid to the working class of all countries to destroy the rule of capitalism and to seize the government with a view to a democratic peace and the socialist remoulding of Europe and all humanity.'

Propaganda and appeals over the heads of governments now became the order of the day. In fact, almost in the very hour of the opening of the Brest Litovsk peace conference – December 22, 1917 – Trotzky announced in Petrograd that 'yesterday a freight car full of propaganda for peace and socialism was dispatched to Germany.' 'Although we are negotiating peace with Germany,' declared the Foreign Commissar, 'we continue to speak our usual revolutionary tongue.' The next day, he announced, a new Hungarian Communist daily would commence to appear.

These were the activities of the so-called 'German agents.' Sir George Buchanan gave Trotzky a bill of relative health when he said 'even if he does take money from the Germans for his own purposes he is not their agent.' The unproved accusation that Lenin, Trotzky, and the Bolsheviks generally were paid or unpaid accomplices of the Germans played its important rôle during the war, but it need scarcely occupy us at this late day. Those were days when to be pro-German was to be worse than Satan, and the bogey of 'German agent' was the easiest anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Of course, Lenin and his party came across Germany with the aid of Ludendorff, but they would have taken help from the devil to get back to Russia for revolutionary work. The imperialists may have expected the Communists to serve

STRANGE CONTRASTS AT BREST

them; the revolutionists were actually exploiting the friends of the Kaiser for their own ends. We have seen that Petrograd aimed its verbal broadsides against all capitalistic governments. We shall see that the Soviet authorities were thoroughly opportunistic in relation to the bourgeois powers; they asked for and received support from the Allies. They would have taken it from the Germans, but it was against their principles to modify their policies in return for such assistance. Certainly the stenographic record of the Brest Litovsk peace conference contains no proof of Bolshevik sympathy for Germany or Austro-Hungary.

§ STRANGE CONTRASTS AT BREST

Two worlds met in the citadel town. The most perfect representatives of law and *ordnung* sat across the green table, and occasionally the dinner-table, from men who only a few months previously had stolen through Germany on false passports. Groomed diplomats to whom a prison sentence was the blackest badge of degradation negotiated with Bolsheviks with long records in Russian jails as well as German, and some of whom (Kamenev and Radek) were fated, a few months later, to suffer foreign incarceration again. The spokesman of the most disciplined and apparently most permanent government on earth broke lances here with the leaders of a child republic whose lease of life was uncertain.

Militant Communism faced organized militarism at Brest Litovsk; the tempest of revolt encountered the rock of conservatism; the rough spirit of the lowest masses came into contact with the arrogance of the highest classes. It promised to be an interesting battle.

The Russian delegation consisted of Joffe, Kamenev, Madame Bitzenko, Professor Pokrovsky, the 'court' historian of the Bolsheviks, Karakhan, M. P. Veltman-Pavlovich, and four military specialists, as well as a worker, a sailor, a soldier, and a peasant who were there as useless exhibits of the new Russian democracy. The visitors were housed in barracks within the Brest fortress and ate with the Germans in the officers' mess.

'I shall never forget the first dinner with the Russians,' writes

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General Hoffmann,¹ 'I sat between Joffe and Sokolnikov, the present Commissar of Finance. Opposite me sat the worker who was obviously embarrassed by the large quantity of silver-ware. He tried to catch this and that with the various utensils, but he used the fork exclusively for the purpose of cleaning his teeth. Diagonally opposite, next to Prince Hohenlohe sat Madame Bitzenko, and next to her the peasant, a thoroughly Russian phenomenon with long grey locks and a tremendous, primeval-forest beard. On one occasion, the orderly could not refrain from a smile when, asked whether he wanted red wine or white, he inquired which was stronger, for it was the stronger brand that he would want.'

'Joffe, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, above all the first,' writes Hoffmann, 'made an exceptionally intelligent impression. They spoke with enthusiasm of their task of leading the Russian proletariat to the peak of happiness and prosperity.'

The Bolsheviks, according to the general, even confided to him their plans for world revolution.

The leading German delegates were State-Secretary of Foreign Affairs von Kuehlmann and Major-General Hoffman; the chief of the Austro-Hungarian representatives was Foreign Minister Count Czernin; the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, had come from Constantinople with his Foreign Minister Achmed Nessim Bey; last, the Bulgarians with Minister of Justice Popov and two ambassadors – a first-class party.

§ THE DISCUSSIONS

The peace conference opened at 4.24 p.m., December 22. The first word from a Russian was the demand for public sessions. Trotzky had promised that 'they would meet in conference under a bell-glass.' No more secret diplomacy. A little opposition was beaten down – little because the Germans could not afford to make a plea for secrecy – and Russia had won the first skirmish.

At the initial plenary session lasting only forty-nine minutes the Russians read a declaration of principles on which a general world peace was to be based. On Christmas Day, von Kuehlmann for

¹ *Der Krieg der versaeumten Gelegenheiten.* By Max von Hoffmann. Munich, 1924.

THE DISCUSSIONS

the Quadruple Alliance, identified himself with the Russian programme. Before the thirty-three minutes' sitting was closed, Joffe deftly criticized the limitations which the German statement sought to put on the Russian principles, agreed however that a basis for further negotiations was already available, and proposed a ten-day recess in order to give Russia's Allies an opportunity to join the pourparlers. On the 28th, after a half-hour session devoted largely to high-sounding phrases by a Bulgarian and a Turk, the conference adjourned for a week.

The interval between this initial exchange of views and the body of the conference is of outstanding interest. Bolshevism had its ears to the ground listening for the sounds of a popular will to peace. In a speech in Petrograd, Trotzky had stated that there could be no real peace without the help of the workers of the Central Powers. They were negotiating with the Kaiser as with a foe; he was a 'tyrant' towards whom they 'preserved their irreconcilable enmity.' Unless the masses forced the German militarists to concessions, perhaps they would have to fight. Could Russia fight? 'I think we could,' replied the commissar, and the audience applauded wildly.

The *Izvestia*, on the other hand, turned its attention to the peoples of the Allied countries. The Bolsheviks doubted the sincerity of the Central Powers' acceptance of the Russian peace principles. Therefore, 'the refusal of our Allies to participate in the peace pourparlers ties the Russian revolution hand and foot in its struggle for a general, democratic peace.'¹ Likewise Krylenko, in an order to the army dated December 27, announced that 'we are giving the bourgeois governments of our allies ten days'; Russia would not sign a 'shameful peace dictated by the autocrats of the German *bourgeoisie*.'

Obviously, the Russians were afraid of the terms the Germans would force on them if they returned to Brest Litovsk alone. There is a tremor of uncertainty in the voices of Petrograd and a fear that their hope in the Allies would not be fulfilled. For on December 28, M. Pichon, the new French Foreign Minister, in addressing the Chamber, gave expression to sentiments of which the Bolsheviks had not been in complete ignorance. He said:

¹ *Izvestia*, December 27, 1917.

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‘Germany is trying to involve us in her Maximalist (Bolshhevik) negotiations. After suffering as we have, we cannot accept peace based on the *status quo*. . . . Russia may treat for a separate peace or not. In either case the war will continue for us.’

Though all remained quiet on the front, and German soldiers had invited Russians to join them in parties around their Christmas trees in the trenches, Petrograd was agitated. For the first session of the peace conference had shown that without the participation of the Allies, the position of Russia must be highly unfavourable. The Germans, moreover, were being suspected of duplicity.

§ GERMANS SUSPECTED OF DUPLICITY

The spirit in Petrograd reflected the first encounter at Brest. In the Christmas session, the Germans had agreed to the Bolshevik principle of self-determination with certain reservations; they maintained that in Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Livonia – then under German military occupation – the will of the people had already been expressed. The Russians, however, called such expression a travesty of the principle, for there could be no free self-determination under the shadow of the rifles and machine guns of a foreign army. Pokrovsky had said at Brest Litovsk that there was no use the Central Powers talking about non-annexation when they were in control of eighteen Russian governments where they tried to ‘persuade’ the populace that it desired Kaiser rule.¹ Self-determination? – Yes, said General Hoffmann. But when one of the Russian military attaches asked him at dinner just what territory the Germans would evacuate, Hoffmann replied ‘Not one millimetre.’² That was December 28. Germans consider it a black-letter day.

‘On December 28, 1917,’ writes Prince Max von Baden, ‘we committed an irreparable mistake; we aroused in the whole world and in the German masses the impression that, in contradistinction to the Russian attitude, our agreement to the principle of the

¹ *Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten*. Hoffmann.

² *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*. By M. H. Pokrovsky. Moscow, 1926. Page 74.

COLONEL ROBINS

self-determination of nations was insincere and a mere shield for annexationist designs. We refused the Russian demand for free, unconstrained plebiscites in the occupied territories on the ground that Courland, Lithuania, and Poland had already voted. Never should we have spoken of the arbitrarily created or arbitrarily enlarged national councils as organs of popular representation.’¹

The *Izvestia*, discussing the same problem, speaks of the Germans, as ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing,’ and the atmosphere becomes more and more electric. Trotzky makes a last appeal to the Allies to enter the conference, even promising that pre-war annexations – Ireland, India, Egypt, Indo-China – would not be subjected to revision.

When the Russians asked themselves why, on December 25, the Central Powers had solemnly and publicly accepted the Bolshevik peace principles only to declare in private conversation two and three days later that they had no intention of putting those principles into effect by evacuating forcibly occupied territories, the answer was much to this effect: the Germans know the world is watching them at Brest. They want to win favours by high-sounding words. Also, they believe we are only playing a game. They believe that we are ready to ‘sell out’ to them, and that their avowed identification with our programme will make it easier for us to do so. They think we want to throw sand into the eyes of our supporters, and wish to lend us some sand in the form of public declarations.

COLONEL ROBINS

Colonel Raymond Robins of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia believed that this distrust towards Germany which prevailed in Petrograd could be exploited by the Allies for their own ends. He was in contact with the leaders of the Red regime together with his secretary, Alexander Gumberg, who was well recommended. During December he had

¹ Prince Max von Baden, *Erinnerungen und Dokumente*, Berlin, 1927. Page 191. Karl Helfferich, Vice-Chancellor of Germany during the War, likewise testifies to the insincerity of Germany’s ‘Self-determination’ policy in his *Der Weltkrieg*. Vol. 3. Berlin, 1919.

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'been working under the verbal instructions of the ambassador of the United States in conference with Lenin and Trotzky and other officers of the Soviet Government seeking to prevent the signing of a German peace at Brest Litovsk.'¹

Robins' fundamental idea was expressed in a suggested communication to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, dated January 2, 1918.

'At the hour,' it reads, 'the Russian people shall require assistance from the United States to repel the actions of Germany and her allies, you may be assured that I will recommend to the American Government that it render them all aid and assistance within its power. If upon the termination of the present armistice Russia fails to conclude a democratic peace through the fault of the Central Powers and is compelled to continue the war I shall urge upon my government the fullest assistance to Russia possible. . . . I may add, however, that if Russian armies now under command of the people's commissaires commence and seriously conduct hostilities against Germany and her allies, I will recommend to my government the formal recognition of the *de facto* government of the people's commissaires.'

This document was drafted by Robins and approved and initialled by Ambassador Francis, but never sent. Another paper, likewise approved by the envoy, was to inform Washington of the break in the negotiations at Brest – if and when such break occurred – and suggest immediate aid. That, too, was never sent. It would be idle to speculate now on the eventualities had American aid really been proffered to the Bolsheviks. But there can be no doubt that the sympathy and clever political strategy which prompted the drafting of the Robins papers could have done no greater harm to the Allied cause than the policy of pushing the Bolsheviks out of the 'pale of civilization.'

Meanwhile, things were doing in the German camp. When the Russians had objected to the German interpretation of self-determination as formulated in Brest at the Christmas session and

¹ *Bolshevik Propaganda*. Hearings before a Sub-committee of the Committee of the Judiciary. United States Senate, February 11, 1919, to March 10, 1919. Washington, 1919. Page 1009.

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on the 27th and 28th, a split seemed imminent in the ranks of the Central Powers. Czernin was under orders from the Emperor Karl to bring home a peace under any circumstances, for only peace could save the Dual Monarchy. The Russians' stern opposition to the Kuchlmann-Hoffmann attitude on Poland, Lithuania, etc., endangered the future of the conference, and, to impress his Berlin colleagues with the seriousness of the situation, Czernin threatened to conclude a separate peace with the Bolsheviks. Hoffmann's nervous system was stronger and he laughed, but the matter was most important and the Germans felt obliged to define their stand – first of all, among themselves. Accordingly, the delegates repaired from Brest to Berlin and took counsel with their chiefs.

On January 2, a Crown Privy Council discussed the Brest Litovsk conference. Von Kuchlmann reported; then the Kaiser talked on Poland and echoed Hoffmann, the last man who had spoken to him on the matter. He objected to the General Headquarters' plan for pure undisguised annexation. 'General Ludendorff contradicted these objections in a somewhat vehement manner.' Ludendorff completely lost control and yelled at the Kaiser. In the face of this attack, Wilhelm acted like a schoolboy in the presence of a bully. He grew white. He grew quiet. He would wait for the Staff's report. Later 'the Chief War Lord' suggested meekly that Ludendorff himself might go to Brest for a while. But the general was no 'babbler.' He rudely rejected the idea. (Hindenburg supported Ludendorff, though a bit more politely.)

At this meeting, Hindenburg and Ludendorff

'advised more rapid and energetic conduct of the negotiations at Brest so that the fate of the Border states already in the possession of Germany would be settled by their being definitely separated from Russia and awarded to the Central Powers.'¹

The next day, the Kaiser, under threats of resignation from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, approved their policy. Kuchlmann, however, was cynically instructed to effect the ends desired by the militarists 'by the more amicable way of the Right of the Self-Determination of the Peoples.'²

¹ *Krieg der versäumten . . .* Hoffmann.

² *Ibid.*

THE BOLSHEVIKS MAKE PEACE

§ THE FOURTEEN POINTS

While the Russian delegation was returning to Brest after the recess, President Wilson made his famous speech to the United States Congress in which he enunciated the Fourteen Points. During the summer of 1917 and immediately after the Bolshevik revolution Colonel House had attempted without success to persuade the Allies to make a statement of their war aims that would placate Russian public opinion and perhaps win the sympathy of German Liberals. From these efforts probably sprang the President's wish to formulate a liberal statement of World War aims. But it is not generally known that Wilson's address on the Fourteen Points was provoked by the proceedings at Brest Litovsk and, indeed, inspired from Petrograd. Colonel Robins, we recall, was 'working' against the separate Russo-German peace. He had practically convinced Mr. Francis. He also talked to Edgar G. Sisson, later the sponsor of the notorious 'Sisson documents.' Sisson was the Petrograd representative of George Creel's Committee on Public Information, the official American propaganda bureau. On January 3, Sisson, probably acting on the suggestion of Robins (who subsequently disavowed him as a distributor of forged papers) wired to Creel urging that Woodrow Wilson 'restate anti-imperialistic war aims and democratic peace requisites of America . . .' in brief, 'placard' paragraphs. These he would 'get fed into Germany.' 'Need is for internal evidence that the President is thinking of the Russian and German common folk . . . and that he is talking to them. Can handle German translating and printing here' through the Bolshevik agencies which were distributing revolutionary propaganda in Germany and the German army.¹

Wilson complied on January 8.

'Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Powers have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible bases of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest Litovsk between Russian representatives and

¹ *Russian-American Relations (R.A.R). March 1917 - March 1920. Documents and Papers.* Compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming and W. W. Pettit. New York, 1920.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.'

After declaring that 'the Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest,' the President expounded the view that while the earlier statements of Central Power principles has been made by liberal diplomats, the German side at Brest now expressed the spirit and intentions of those who 'insist upon conquest and subjugation.'

Then, answering the challenge to define Allied war aims, President Wilson gave the world his celebrated Fourteen Points. Points VI and XIII referred directly to the subjects under discussion at Brest Litovsk:

'VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining the unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.'¹

'XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which shall include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations.'²

The President's speech was placarded on the walls of Petrograd. It was printed on a hundred thousand Russian posters and

¹ How Russia's sister nations passed this test is related in the following chapters dealing with foreign intervention on Soviet territory.

² *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, by H. W. V. Temperley. London, 1920. Vol. 1, page 433.

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three hundred thousand Russian handbills. The American Y.M.C.A. availing itself of Bolshevik aid, distributed one million copies throughout the Russian lines and another million, in German, within the German trenches on the Eastern front. All the papers published the statement in full. Its contents were wired to Trotzky at Brest who radioed them to 'ALL, ALL, ALL.'

The Bolsheviks, to be sure, distrusted Wilson's 'empty phrases.' They suspected in fact, and the official *Izvestia* aired these suspicions, that the Allies were prepared to let Germany satisfy her appetite in the East and consume Poland, Lithuania, etc., in order to make the peace in the West easier. Nevertheless, Wilson's message was good propaganda and the Russians exploited it.

There is absolutely no proof, however, that the Fourteen Points address ever had the remotest effect on Allied policy towards Russia. There is no indication that the Fourteen Points ever played any rôle at Brest Litovsk. It was a voice of peace crying in a wilderness of shot, shell and blood, and slogans of 'no peace without victory.' It was a series of words unaccompanied by acts. Ludendorff and Hindenburg loomed like large black shadows over the discussions in the citadel town; the spirit of Wilson was vague and unavailing.

THE BATTLE OF WORDS

This was the stage setting for the resumption of negotiations. Nothing since the first act of the Brest drama had improved the Russians' position. The Allies had not changed their views, and no revolution had developed in the Central countries. The Bolsheviks were discouraged. If they went to the conference in December hoping vaguely that home pressure would force the Germans to grant them an honourable peace, the enemy delegations' cynical hypocrisy had disillusioned them. Von Kuehlmann's friendly phrases were neither as decisive nor important as Hoffmann's interpretation of non-annexation and self-determination. This was the prospect that faced the Communists on their return to Brest. What, then, was the sense of bargaining or negotiating? The Germans would not surrender their spoils. This had been made clear by the first session of the conference. Now only one trump remained in the hands of the Russians — propaganda.

THE BATTLE OF WORDS

As the train bearing the men from Petrograd drew into Brest Litovsk, Karl Radek commenced throwing pamphlets in German to the German soldiers who lined the tracks. This action was a sort of adventurous announcement of the intentions of the Bolsheviks. They were bent on propaganda.

Now commenced the famous and historic battle of words. Brest was a podium. From it the Bolsheviks issued their multitudinous, fiery appeals to 'ALL.' If they talked little to the frock-coated diplomats or be-medalled generals who sat opposite them at the green table, they talked much, very much to the workers, soldiers and peasants of the entire world. The Germans protested. The Russians noted the protests and continued their agitation. Hoffmann stormed against attacks on German militarism, the Kaiser, etc., in the Russian Press and at Russian demonstrations. Trotzky told him, in effect, to mind his own business. Politeness was gone. Friendly relations were gone. Trotzky, who now headed the Russians, gave instructions for the Bolshevik delegation to take its meals separate from the enemy representatives. There were no more little discussions *à trois* or *à quatre* as there had been in December to thrash out knotty problems in personal, unrecorded conversations. Von Kuehlmann suggested ironically that Trotzky would soon put the Russian delegation in a monastery. Cordial intercourse of an unofficial nature was strictly forbidden.

Sentences exchanged at public sessions were frequently curt and sharp. Pourparlers were proceeding, on one occasion, about the evacuation of neutral Persia by Turkey, Germany's ally. Von Kuehlmann suggested that Russia might urge similar action on her 'friend' England. Whereupon Trotzky flashed back: What about Belgium, whose neutrality had been violated? . . . The Germans drafted a preamble for the German-Russian peace treaty. It contained the usual formula 'In order to establish peace and friendship.' Trotzky objected to the second word. He was no moth-eaten diplomat and didn't care about hollow phrases. They were not in Brest to establish 'friendship' but only to make peace. . . .

Hoffmann was insisting in rude tone and terms that the question of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland had already been

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settled. The Kaiser's army was in control and wouldn't get out. Von Kuehlmann tried to justify this violence by reference to 'the more amicable way of the right of self-determination.' Are there, then, two German governments, Trotzky inquired, one in Berlin represented by Kuehlmann and the other at General Army Headquarters represented by Hoffmann which really determines the policy of the country? Everybody knew this was so: Ludendorff could not only defy Chancellor Hertling, he could overawe and shout down the Kaiser himself. If that were the case, Trotzky proposed, why not call a spade a spade? 'We are revolutionists,' he said, 'but we are also realists. We prefer to speak of annexations rather than use a pseudonym for the real thing.'

The issue was Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Esthonia, and other parts of the former Russian empire under German occupation. The Bolsheviks laid no claim to these districts. They could become independent. But the resolutions of hand-picked Landtags meeting under the muzzles of German rifles was not to be internationally recognized. The Russians proposed evacuation, the construction of a national government by the co-operation of all political parties, finally a plebiscite.

Hoffmann felt outraged. With a studied effort to offend, he said, 'I must, first of all, protest against the tone of these remarks. The Russian delegation talks as if it represents the victor who has occupied our country. I want to point out that the facts are just reversed.'

The Russians answered this in their radios. So it is might that determines right? they asked. Hoffmann was re-occupying his place in the hearts of Ludendorff and Hindenburg by these tactics, but his mailed-fist speeches which Petrograd took pleasure in broadcasting as far as possible did not aid the German cause in the minds of the liberal world. They were the best Allied propaganda.

In the oratorical and dialectical contest which raged for weeks, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were no match for the quick-witted soap-box Russians whose chief business in life had been polemics. Count Czernin ailed too much to cut a great figure. Von Kuehlmann handled a difficult job well. Yet Trotzky towered far above him, Even Hoffmann, all his hate notwith-

THE BATTLE OF WORDS

standing, must certify to Trotzky's versatility, culture, energy, industry, eloquence, and determination. The Germans did not like him; he was dictatorial and irritating. 'His (Trotzky's) tone became more and more provoking although no real power stood behind him. He always appeared in the rôle of the one who demands,' wrote Ludendorff. 'I sat in Kreuznach as if on coals,'¹ the Quartermaster-General adds, for he wished to settle the situation in the East, and commence active preparations for the great March offensive in Flanders. Yet neither Hoffmann's gruffness nor Kuehlmann's suavity could force Trotzky to accelerate the tempo at which he wished the conference to move forward. The Germans respected him, and, I am tempted to say, feared him.

Kuehlmann,² born at Constantinople into a prominent family, was a brilliant statesman with a fine mastery of social theory, law, and history. He was readily drawn by Trotzky into long, abstract discussions which led to no practical results and thus played into the hands of the Communists, who were trying to prolong the conference in the hope that revolutionary developments in Germany and Austro-Hungary might improve their position.

While they negotiated with the Central Powers, therefore, the Bolsheviks openly strained every nerve to provoke uprisings on the territories of those Powers. Three and a half years of suffering had fertilized the soil and prepared it for the propaganda of the Russians. It was the Central Governments' realization of the dangers of their internal situation, as well as their fear of the most unfavourable effect a breakdown of the conference would have on world opinion and, more particularly, on their military position, that forced them to tolerate Trotzky's oratory and Bolshevik procrastination. The failure of the peace negotiations would have had a bad press at home and was sure to cause popular disfavour. The state of affairs was volcanic. Even passively this circumstance reacted to the advantage of the Russians at Brest and gave their time-killing strategy a longer lease of life. The Bolsheviks, however, desired to establish an active relation-

¹ *Meine Kriegserinnerungen*, by Eric Ludendorff. Berlin, 1920. Page 443.

² *The Real von Kuehlmann*, by Thomas Rodes. London, 1925.

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ship to conditions in the enemy countries. They wished to provoke rebellion against the militarists.

Soon enough the seeds scattered from the wireless towers at Brest and Petrograd began to sprout on the friendly soil of peoples dragged down by years of hopeless contest. On January 16, Czernin noted 'desperate cries for food from Vienna.' The next day's entry in his diary reads, 'Bad news from Vienna and vicinity. Big strike movement . . . reduced flour ration.'¹

Large and important political strikes broke out in Berlin on January 28, and about the same time in Hamburg, Kiel, Dortmund, Mannheim, and Munich. These took place 'against the wishes of the majority of the German Labour leaders and seemed to presage important results for the Bolsheviks at Brest and elsewhere.'² A general strike movement likewise started in Austria, while the food situation in Hungary began to grow serious. Austro-Hungary's heart was not in the war, and when its stomach became empty trouble loomed. Frantic telegrams were exchanged between Vienna and Brest. Without peace, the Dual Monarchy was doomed. The Germans, too, were not altogether certain that the strikes would not develop into rebellion.

These events within the Central Powers undermined the morale and resistance of the civilian populations of these countries and hastened the final collapse, but the development was too slow to bring any very significant advantage to the Bolshevik position at Brest.

§ THE UKRAINIAN ISSUE

The catastrophic grain situation in Austro-Hungary, on the other hand, proved to be the most important external factor in determining the fate of the Brest Litovsk conference. Austria needed bread more than anything else.

'In order to prevent a state of famine,' writes General Hoffmann, 'Berlin had to be asked for aid. Notwithstanding its own

¹ *Im Weltkriege*, by Count Czernin. Berlin, 1919. Page 323.

² *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley, Vol. 1. Published under the auspices of the Institute of International Affairs. in six volumes. London, 1920.

want, Berlin assisted, but in consequence Count Czernin naturally was deprived of the possibility of threatening to conclude a separate peace with Trotzky, or even try to do so. On the other hand, the separate peace with the Ukraine which I had looked upon as a measure that might force Trotzky to sign a peace, now became, as a means of obtaining bread, a vital necessity for Count Czernin.'

Hungry Austro-Hungary thus sold its independence at Brest for the flour Berlin could spare. But in the final analysis, famine could be staved off only with the help of shipments from the Ukraine, the 'granary of Europe.' The Ukraine now became the chief issue of the conference.

The Ukraine had been proclaimed an autonomous, separate republic in accordance with the Bolshevik declaration that any part of the former Russian empire could exercise the right of independence even to the extent of secession. A 'Rada' government was thereupon established at Kiev in which the outstanding figures were Vinnichenko and Simon Petlura. It was from the first anti-Bolshevik, received aid from France, and aroused the ire of Petrograd by giving succour to Kaledin's counter-revolutionary forces in the Don while obstructing the progress of Red forces sent against him. Nevertheless, when a delegation from the Rada appeared in Brest Litovsk on January 9 in reply to the Bolshevik appeal to all belligerent nations to join in the pour-parlers, Trotzky recognized that delegation's authority to speak in the name of an independent Ukraine.

The Ukrainians messed with the Germans, and maintained friendly relations with the Central Powers' representatives whose greatness awed them. They were unskilled in the dangerous diplomatic game. Besides, the tenure of their government was insecure, and they wished to conclude a hasty peace and thus gain German support for the crumbling Cabinet at Kiev.

Kuehlmann and Hoffmann would have been happy to meet the desires of the Rada. They wanted a peace with the Ukraine as a threat over Petrograd's head. But Austro-Hungary objected. A separate treaty with the Ukraine would involve the Dual Empire in territorial difficulties with a new national unit which,

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as neighbour, was sure to be a source of incessant irritation. As a matter of fact, when Hoffmann, despite Czernin's demurrer, entered into private conversations with the Ukrainians, they laid claim to the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) portions of East Galicia and Bukovina and to the Kholm district, between the Bug and Wieprz Rivers in south-east Russian Poland. To concede Kholm would have involved Austria in a conflict with the new Poland that seemed likely to emerge from the war.¹ Hoffmann roundly scolded the Ukrainians for their designs on the Austro-Hungarian territory in Galicia and Bukovina, but was inclined to support their claim on Kholm at the expense of Poland or Russia. Still he could extract no acquiescence from Count Czernin. Then the bottom fell out of Austro-Hungary's bread-basket. Vienna was ready even for a peace with the Ukraine.

Czernin authorized Hoffmann to negotiate with the Ukrainians, for he could not bring himself to do it. In reply to a query, the Rada declared that Kholm was a *sine qua non*, but with respect to Galicia and Bukovina they proposed popular referendum and self-determination. Self-determination was a fine principle for other peoples, but in that ethnographical tangle that called itself the Austro-Hungarian Empire such a principle would spell ruin. Austria's need, however, was Kiev's strength, and Kiev knew it.

At this juncture, Trotzky and Kamenev left for Petrograd. The Third Congress of Soviets was meeting in the capital and the commissar would be asked to report not only on the proceedings at Brest but as well on the revolutionary situation in enemy lands. Moreover, the Communist Party had to take its definite stand on future policy at the conference.

A document from the archives of the Central Committee presents details of a session on January 22 which discussed the problem of Brest Litovsk. Lenin said:

'At a former meeting (on January 21st) three points of view were advanced: (1) sign a separate, annexationist peace, (2)

¹ The Austrians, according to Karl Helfferich, Vice-Chancellor of Germany during the War, still hoped that Poland could be won for the idea of becoming a part of the Dual Monarchy. An Independent Ukraine, however, would prejudice the Poles against a dependent Poland, especially if the former rounded out its frontiers at the expense of the other.

wage a revolutionary war, (3) declare the war ended, demobilize the army, but do not sign the peace. . . . The first (Lenin's) proposal was supported by 15 votes, the second by 32, the third (Trotzky's) by 16.'

Lenin was in favour of signing a German peace.

'The position of the Germans on the islands of the Baltic is such that in an offensive they could capture Reval and Petrograd with naked hands. By continuing the war under such circumstances we strengthen German imperialism. We will have to conclude peace in any case, but the terms will be worse if they will not be signed by us.'

Lenin was out-voted.

Lenin saw matters very clearly. He called Trotzky's formula 'No war but no peace,' an 'international political demonstration' which they could not afford. 'If the Germans begin to advance,' he argued, 'we will be forced to sign any peace presented.' Nor could they put their trust in the German proletariat. 'Germany, you see,' was his plea, 'is only pregnant with revolution, but here in Russia a perfectly healthy child – the socialist republic – has already been born, and we may kill it if we start a war.' Or, as one Russian said, the second month must not be mistaken for the ninth.

The ballot taken at this meeting of the Central Committee produced the following results: For a revolutionary war 2, against 11, not voting 1. For dragging out the negotiations 12, against 1. For Trotzky's formula 9, against 9.

The instructions Trotzky was to take back to the Brest conference accordingly amounted to this: there was to be no war, and the pourparlers were to be prolonged as much as possible. No other definite instructions for future tactics were given. Under the circumstances, Trotzky was free to put his own policy into effect if and when the occasion arose. Lenin did not favour that policy, but did not energetically oppose it. He was ready to give it a trial.

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§ A SECRET ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT AT RUSSIA'S EXPENSE?

The three alternatives which presented themselves to the minds of the Bolsheviks: an annexationist peace, a revolutionary war, and 'no war, no peace,' indicate that as early as January 18, when Trotzky quitted Brest for Petrograd, the Russian Government considered the conference situation critical. The Germans had dropped their mask and were appearing as frank annexationists and militarists. They had agreed to the principle of non-annexation and then insisted on the indefinite occupation of the Russian border states. They had accepted self-determination as one of the bases of the pourparlers and then submitted that self-determination had already taken place, though the expression of 'popular' will was in reality the voice of Baltic-German land barons and of German agents. They had consented to the formula of no indemnities, but at Brest they were preparing to present a bill to the Russians which, as Trotzky estimated in his address to the Third Soviet Congress, would amount to between four and eight billion roubles, this under the guise of compensation for property confiscated during the war, etc. It was a 'Shylock' account, Trotzky complained, and he believed, and with him most of the Communists, that it, as well as the other hard terms were 'tacitly approved in London.' This idea of the Bolsheviks that the British and Germans had an agreement whereby the latter would be permitted conquests in the East in order to make them 'more conciliatory in the negotiations with their British and American fellow-capitalists' had gained much ground in Petrograd.

At the time this sounded like pure Bolshevik phantasy. There is, indeed, no proof that an 'agreement' had taken place between the two mighty opponents on a peace at the expense of the revolution. But that the idea was entertained in London and perhaps elsewhere can now no longer be doubted. We have the testimony of Churchill, British Secretary of State for War, and of Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the British General Staff. Churchill is discussing the conditions which made peace with Germany possible towards the end of 1917.

SECRET ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT?

‘The immense conquests,’¹ he writes, ‘which Germany had made in Russia, and the hatred and scorn with which the Bolsheviks were regarded by the Allies, might well have made it possible for Germany to make important territorial concessions to France, and to offer Britain the complete restoration of Belgium. [*Sic.*] The desertion by Russia of the Allied cause, and the consequent elimination of all Russian claims [after she had contributed 3,000,000 lives to the Allied cause.—L.F.] created a similar easement in negotiations with both Austria and Turkey.’

This is a fine example of Churchill’s *realpolitik* mind, but we pass to his fellow-countryman. It was early in 1918. Sir Henry Wilson was in England engaged in important conversations with the diplomats.

‘Wilson afterwards saw Bonar Law,’ writes his biographer, basing himself on copious diaries,² ‘who was thinking about peace terms and believed that Germany might be disposed to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France and to make other concessions if given a free hand on the Russian side. . . .’

H. Wickham Steed refers to the same subject in his *Through Thirty Years*.³ And we may some day come in possession of facts to show that secret Anglo-German peace pourparlers actually took place in The Hague in 1917 and early in 1918. Sir George Cave and Herr von Kuehlmann could have interesting things to say on the subject. Chicherin recalls how on January 2, 1918, Arthur Henderson visited him with much pomp in Brixton Gaol. He would be released the next day and go to Petrograd. Would he not tell the Bolsheviks, Henderson suggested, that if they delayed the separate peace six weeks or two months, the Allies would conclude a general peace with Germany? Lenin laughed when Chicherin transmitted the message. He regarded it a naïve attempt to mislead. Yet perhaps Mr. Henderson knew of the

¹ *The World Crisis*, 1916–18, by Winston Churchill. London, 1927.

² *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell. London, 1927. Page 49.

³ *Through Thirty Years*, 1892–1922, by H. Wickham Steed. Vol. 2. London, 1924.

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secret negotiations in The Hague without being informed of their anti-Russian character.

The Russians were convinced that a 'deal' at their cost had actually been reached. This certainly did not contribute towards a feeling of confidence.

§ A SEPARATE GERMAN PEACE—WITH THE UKRAINE

The Communists at the end of January no longer hoped for a favourable peace. The Russian revolution had tried to break through the 'charmed circle of fire and blood,' but they had predicted, had they not, that a truly democratic peace was possible only in the event of the victory of the proletariat in enemy countries. That had not yet eventuated. Therefore there was no possibility of signing only a general, all-European and democratic peace, as the Internationalist Party and other opponents of the Bolsheviks demanded. To conclude only a just peace would mean to wait, and to fight, and they could not fight, for the army was melting away faster and faster. It refused to remain in snow-bound trenches.

Trotsky was returning late that night (January 26) to rejoin his colleagues at Brest, and resume the sittings of the German-Austrian-Russian Political Commission which had been adjourned on his departure on January 18. Some circumstances, he thought, had improved their position. The Bolsheviks had won victories in the struggle with Kaledin and other Russian counter-revolutionaries. In the Ukraine, the bourgeois Rada had been overthrown, Kiev entered by Bolshevik troops and an Ukrainian Soviet set up. Moreover, there were labour troubles and food riots in Austria, Hungary, and Germany. Nevertheless, he could make no fiery promises. The delegation would work for an honest peace; the government would continue to demobilize the army and form a Red Guard. Germany could not undertake an offensive against them, because her soldiers would disobey. If that proved not to be the case, however, they would call to the World Proletariat. 'Do you hear?' the Communist would shout, and the answer would come, 'I hear.' (It proved to be a sorry illusion, this faith in the solidarity of the non-Russian workers.)

GERMAN PEACE-WITH THE UKRAINE

Parallel with the discussions and deliberations in Petrograd, proceeded discussions and deliberations in Berlin and Vienna. Czernin went to see his Kaiser and to talk to the Austro-Hungarian Parliament. Speaking on January 24, he said, 'I demand not a square metre nor a penny from Russia.' Poor man, he may have been telling the truth. He did not want territory or tribute, but his German ally did, and he was too weak to resist. The condition of his country was such that he could no longer oppose the separate peace with the Ukraine urged by General Hoffmann. Though somewhat disturbed by telegraphic messages from Brest to the effect that most of the Ukraine had been captured by Soviet Ukrainian troops and a new Red Government established in Kharkov which disputed the right of the Ukrainian delegation then at Brest to negotiate in the name of the Ukrainian Government, Czernin now enthusiastically advocated a 'wheat peace' with the Kiev Rada. Flour was the prime requisite.

In Berlin the next day, Kuehlmann addressed the Reichstag. His statement was preceded by a long address of Hertling, who replied point by point to Wilson's Fourteen Points. With respect to No. 6, which called for the 'evacuation of all Russian territory,' the Premier declared that, in view of the Allies' refusal to participate in the peace negotiations, they had no right to intervene. But he made no promise of evacuation. In fact, he indicated that Russian territory would not be evacuated. Hertling's speech as well as the debate that followed showed clearly that the militarist clique was firmly in the saddle. Among other orators, Gustav Stresemann, later Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported the tactics of General Hoffmann and defended the fictitious self-determination of Lithuania on the ground that '70 to 80 per cent. of her inhabitants were illiterate.'

Now the German ministers and the Soviet plenipotentiaries entered on their return journeys to Brest, and on the 30th of January the sessions were resumed. Trotzky, however, did not come alone. He brought with him, as he announced the moment the conference reopened, Medvediev and Shakhrai, representatives of the new Soviet Government of the Ukraine. Two Ukraines now had delegations at Brest, a bourgeois Ukraine and a Bolshevik Ukraine. The former was fast losing territory and

power. The rooms they occupied in Brest, Trotzky declared, were the only space over which the plenipotentiaries of the Kiev Rada had any right to dispose – and those rooms they were assigned by the German commandant. ‘Judging by the reports from the Ukraine that I had before me,’ writes General Hoffmann, ‘Trotzky’s words seemed unfortunately not to be without foundation.’ For the Rada Government had lost Kiev and fled, and it no longer possessed even a shadow of authority. Nevertheless, the Germans considered these ‘difficulties’ as merely temporary and transitory, since ‘we,’ according to Hoffmann, ‘could support it with arms and establish it again.’ What difference what the Ukrainians did or decided? At any moment a few German divisions could give the Ukraine ‘self-determination’ *à la* Ludendorff and Hoffmann. This is indeed what subsequently happened. On February 9, the Central Powers signed a separate treaty with the delegates of the defunct Rada. Then, without much delay, the Rada Cabinet, which had escaped to the town of Zhitomir, ‘invited’ the Germans to its rescue, and the German army complied with this expression of ‘popular will’ by setting up an anti-Soviet Government.

February 9 saw a crucial historical session. The Russians, of course, knew of the negotiations with the Rada. They told the enemy delegates that there was no sense in signing a treaty with a non-existent government. To which both Kuehlmann and Czernin replied that their information from the Ukraine did not conform with Petrograd’s. We know now, from General Hoffmann’s memoirs (‘the Rada Government . . . no longer possessed even a shadow of authority’) that it did. The statesmen were lying. Moreover, Czernin has to his credit this remarkable syllogism: ‘We have recognized the government of the Ukrainian Rada. For us, therefore, it exists.’ Accordingly, Kuehlmann announced the signing of a separate treaty between the Ukraine and the Central Powers as of that day.

This coup having been consummated, the Germans were ready to press Russia for a decision on the peace treaty. On January 18, the Central Powers had presented a map showing their proposed new Russian boundary in the West. They likewise declared that they could not evacuate the occupied territories (Poland, Lithu-

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ania, Courland, and parts of Livonia and Esthonia) on account of strategic considerations in the World War, and, at the same time, even refused to give any promise that these territories would be liberated at the end of the hostilities between the Quadruple Alliance and the Western Entente.

When these demands were announced, in rather ultimative form, Trotzky had left for Petrograd. The impression in the capital, it will be recalled, was a painful one, and the Communists, though divided on a definite programme, instructed their delegation at Brest to 'kill' time but prevent war. From January 30, when he returned to the conference, till February 9, Trotzky killed time beautifully but not without help from the Germans. They were anxious first to come to terms with the Ukraine and to suppress revolutionary outbreaks at home. So the conversations dragged on with interest yet without result; Trotzky even introduced the philosophy of Hegel into the debate.

Finally, on February 9, it was no longer possible to postpone detailed deliberation of the boundary proposed by Germany. A Territorial Commission was thereupon appointed. The yellow line on an official German military map made it clear that the Central Powers were insisting on the renunciation by Russia of all the Baltic States, Poland, and of the Moon, Dago and Oesel Islands in the Baltic Sea from which Petrograd could easily be attacked. Admiral Altvater, the Russian expert, protested that such a frontier could be desired by Germany and Austro-Hungary only for purposes of military offence against Russia. (This General Hoffmann denied. He required districts hundreds of miles from the pre-war German boundary for defensive purposes, he said. But the proof was more difficult than the assertion.) Moreover, while the Russians were asked to give up these territories, Germany undertook no responsibility for the future. She might give the states real independence, she might offer them 'self-determination' with bayonets, and she might annex them. She refused to be bound by the suggested treaty. The Germans would make not the least emendation.

The German militarists did not want peace with Russia. They wished to dictate the conditions of surrender, but, since that was impossible, they did not want peace. The proof is Ludendorff's.

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'At our meeting on the 4th and 5th of February (in Berlin),' he writes,¹ I got State Secretary von Kuehlmann to promise that he would break with Trotzky twenty-four hours after the signing of the peace treaty with the Ukraine.' Now the peace with the deposed Rada Government had been signed. Ludendorff accordingly telephoned to Brest asking Kuehlmann to keep his promise. Kuehlmann, however, refused.

That very day, Kuehlmann received a telegram from the Kaiser. It had come to the attention of the General Headquarters – which informed the 'Chief War Lord' – that a radiogram from Petrograd to the German army called upon the soldiers to disobey their officers, according to Ludendorff, and to murder their officers, according to Hoffmann. Enraged, the Kaiser demanded that Kuehlmann present an ultimatum to the Russians insisting on a settlement within the next twenty-four hours. Kuehlmann again refused.

Kuehlmann hoped that under the impression of the Ukrainian treaty and with the aid, perhaps, of one or two minor territorial concessions, he could persuade the Russians to sign a treaty in the near future which would satisfy German expansionist designs as well as Germany's World War requirements. He therefore urged Wilhelm to desist, but if the Emperor would not change his mind, he, Kuehlmann, would resign. If no reply were forthcoming until 4.30 that afternoon, the State Secretary, as he wired Berlin, would keep the Kaiser's ultimatum in his pocket. Kuehlmann waited till 4.30. There was no reply. There was no ultimatum.

On the next day, the 10th of February, however, Trotzky brought the historic Brest Litovsk Peace (?) Conference to a close.

Immediately on the opening of the session of the Political Commission, consisting of representatives of Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary, von Kuehlmann referred to the alleged summons to insubordination sent out by the Russian High Command. Trotzky said he knew nothing about such an order; he did know that Germany was distributing Russian newspapers among Russian soldiers which agitated against the Soviet Government. The meeting then passed to the business of the day: the report of

¹ *Meine Kriegserinnerungen*, by Erich Ludendorff. Berlin, 1920. Page 445.

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the Boundary Committee. But there was no report because the Committee had not agreed.

¶ NO WAR AND NO PEACE

Obviously, the Germans would insist, sooner or later, on Russian acceptance of their territorial demands. In view of the Ukrainian treaty and of the ruthless suppression of the German labour strikes, such insistence was likely to come soon. Trotzky wished to anticipate it. Before taking the decisive step, however, the Soviet delegation consulted Petrograd. On the morning of that day Karakhan went to the telegraphic apparatus and called the capital. Stalin answered the summons. He was told of the impending move and gave his approval.

Trotzky therefore arose and said:

‘The hour of decision has arrived. The peoples wait impatiently for the result of the peace negotiations at Brest Litovsk. . . . If the war was ever waged for self-defence, it has long ago ceased to be that for both sides. When Great Britain conquers African colonies, Bagdad and Jerusalem, it cannot be a war of defence; when Germany occupies Serbia, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, Rumania, and the Moon Islands it cannot be a war of defence. This is a war for the division of the world. Now it is clear; clearer than ever.’

‘We,’ he continued, ‘no longer wish to participate in this purely imperialistic war where the designs of the propertied classes are being effected with human blood. Our relation to the imperialism of both camps is equally irreconcilable. . . .’

Further, ‘In expectation of the hour, which we hope is near, when the oppressed working classes of all countries will seize power as has the proletariat of Russia, we are taking our army and our people out of the war. . . . We are retiring from the war. . . . At the same time, we declare that the terms offered us by the Governments of Germany and Austro-Hungary are in fundamental contradiction to the interest of all nations. . . . The peoples of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Courland and Esthonia regard these conditions as a violation of their will for Russia; these terms mean a permanent menace. . . . We refuse to sanction the

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conditions which the imperialism of Germany and Austro-Hungary is writing with the sword on the bodies of live nations. We cannot place the signature of the Russian revolution under terms which carry with them oppression, sorrow, and misery for millions of human lives.'

'We are out of the war but we refuse to sign the peace treaty,' said Trotzky.

This was the end. The Brest Litovsk peace conference between Russia and the Central Powers had failed to produce a peace treaty. The delegations packed their bags.

THE OFFENSIVE

Ludendorff and Hindenburg were now bent on subjugating Russia. Without waiting, therefore, the expiry of the agreed seven-day notice period, the German armies on the Eastern Front commenced to advance into Russia.

The decision to do so was arrived at in a special conference held on February 13 at Homburg, the country home of the Kaiser. Dramatis personæ: Wilhelm, the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, von Kuehlmann, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Navy. The military wanted 'clarity' in the East. 'No war but no peace' was too vague a situation to satisfy them. Besides, they wished to prevent any renewal of warfare by Russia with the help of her Allies. Then, according to Ludendorff, Germany was anxious to safeguard the integrity of the Ukraine against the menace of Bolshevism (but the Ukraine had already succumbed to the 'menace'). The fact is that the Ukrainian Rada, holding court in a private dwelling in the town of Zhitomir, had wired for assistance, and both Germany and Austro-Hungary were only too ready to respond in view of the food situation of the Central countries. But to march into the Ukraine when the Ukraine, as General Headquarters knew, had established a Soviet Government which recognized Petrograd as the capital of a federative republic, would in any event involve Germany in a war with Russia, and so Ludendorff preferred a 'swift, powerful blow' which might also yield them large supplies of captured war materials.

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The blow had to be swift in order to prevent Russian recovery, no matter how slight. From the strategic point of view, the military clique was undoubtedly right in arguing at Homburg that though all forces were needed in the Western theatre, uncertainty in Russia would require them to maintain a sizeable army to watch events there, whereas a quick move to paralyse the Bolsheviks militarily and compel them to sign a peace treaty might be expensive for a while but highly profitable before long.

These considerations notwithstanding, the German diplomats opposed the discontinuation of the armistice between Russia and the Central Powers. They feared the unfavourable reaction at home and abroad. Ludendorff and Hindenburg, however, stressed the necessity of occupying the Ukraine in any event in order to feed Austro-Hungary. Besides, the generals did not debate very much. They would instruct the armies to march. Under this pressure, the Chancellor and his first assistant expressed their agreement; Kuehlmann stuck by his guns to the very last, but his opposition was of no avail or significance. Count Hertling reported his approval to the Chief War Lord, and the Kaiser sanctioned the advance.

German divisions immediately began occupying more Russian territory. On the 15th, Berlin had announced that the armistice would terminate on the 18th. The Germans regarded Trotzky's last declaration at Brest on February 10 as an automatic notice of the end of the armistice and therefore held that hostilities could begin, legally so to speak, on the 18th. But Petrograd was not aware of this interpretation and was first apprised of the impending renewal of the war on the 16th, only forty-eight hours prior to the commencement of the offensive. More time, however, would have meant little to the Bolsheviks. As the Germans came on, the Russian troops turned and fled. There was no resistance; there was only panic.

Two hours after the beginning of the advance, the Germans had crossed the strategic Dvina and proceeded in the general direction of Petrograd. Soon large sectors of Livonia and Esthonia were occupied. Simultaneously an Austrian army penetrated into the Ukraine.

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LENIN'S POLICY

It was time for Petrograd to fight or otherwise act. On February 17, when the capital had already been informed that German aeroplanes had flown over Dvinsk and German divisions received marching orders, the pivotal Central Committee of the Communist Party was summoned to the Smolni Institute. When it convened on the 18th, information was at hand of the general German advance. This was no time for talk. Even the Russians realized that. Each fraction was limited to two speakers and each speaker to five minutes. The question was: 'Shall we wire the Germans and sue for peace?' Zinoviev and Lenin spoke for the affirmative; Trotzky and Bukharin for the negative. After twenty minutes, the vote was taken, and Lenin's motion to dispatch an immediate telegram to Germany was defeated by six ballots against seven. Trotzky and Bukharin had won.

The Central Committee re-convened that same evening. Trotzky reported the capture of Dvinsk and further incursions into the Ukraine, and proposed an inquiry to the Central Powers on their demands. A debate followed. First Lenin spoke. They could wait no longer. They were losing equipment and territory. You cannot jest with war. The revolution was not coming yet in Germany, and the Germans would not stop – their offensive meant acquisitions and bread. If the Germans were insisting on the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, resistance would be the only alternative. But that was not the case, and so to wait meant the surrender of the revolution, for the enemy would not halt before it had taken the capital and points inland.

Lenin was followed by Uritzky, Trotzky, Stalin, and Bukharin. The leader then undertook the rebuttal. He criticized Bukharin first. Bukharin who had originally favoured the Trotzky 'no war, no peace' programme, now stood for a revolutionary war. Lenin ridiculed the notion. They were not ready for it. A 'permanent peasant war' against Germany was a 'Utopia.' That was possible in civil warfare but not in a struggle with a mighty foreign power. 'If we give up Finland, Livonia, and Esthonia, the revolution is still not yet lost.'

After Lomov had spoken in support of the revolutionary war,

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a vote was again taken on the Lenin motion of an immediate offer of peace to Germany. Ballots cast *for* were those of Lenin, Trotzky, Smilga, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, and Zinoviev; *against*: Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Joffe, Lomov, Uritzky, and Krestinsky. Seven to six. Lenin had won the day by the passing of Trotzky to his side.

Early the next morning, a radio was broadcast from Petrograd to Berlin. It protested against the offensive and against the unannounced suspension of the armistice; and finally declared Bolshevik readiness, under constraint, to sign a dictated peace.

This message was received at the German wireless station of Koenigs Wusterhausen at 9.12 a.m. that very day and immediately acknowledged by General Hoffmann. Nevertheless, the German army continued to advance. On February 21 detachments had pushed forward to within 70 miles of Riga; German cavalry was approaching Mohilev, the former Russian General Headquarters, and a Turkish army was driving into the Caucasus.

The Bolsheviks were supremely alarmed. They were convinced that the Germans and Austrians would not stop till they had taken Petrograd and Kiev and overthrown the revolutionary government. Accordingly, the orders were issued for the waging of a holy revolutionary war 'for the defence of the republic against the *bourgeoisie* and imperialists of Germany.' Instructions were issued for the destruction of supplies, railway rolling stock and bridges, and for maximum resistance to the enemy invasion. Still the Germans were in no hurry to conclude peace. They were improving their military position and occupying territory which would permit the maintenance of the Eastern front with a minimum of men and materials.

The telegram suing for peace had been dispatched without, however, retarding the speed of the German advance. On February 22 the Central Committee met again for a sitting of extraordinary interest. Were they to permit the Germans to take the capital and ride rough-shod over the workers' soviets? What alternative presented itself to the Bolsheviks?

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§ TROTZKY'S SOLUTION

Trotsky offered a solution. He proposed that the Bolsheviks ask the Allies for aid against the Germans. The Bolsheviks wished to retain complete freedom of foreign policy but would otherwise accept Allied conditions. At the same time, Trotsky tendered his resignation as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Bukharin opposed the acceptance of Allied terms. Lenin could not attend the session but sent a rough slip of paper on which he had scribbled in ink: 'Please add my vote *in favour of* the receipt of support and arms from the Anglo-French imperialist brigands. Lenin.' Trotsky's recommendation was approved by 6 votes against 5.

Trotsky had been conferring with Captain Sadoul of the French Military Mission, with Colonel Robins of the American Red Cross, and with R. H. Bruce Lockhart, the British High Commissioner. He wished them to help organize a Red Army and to assist in building up a new front against the Germans. In fact, conversations with this in view had been proceeding for several weeks, ever since it had become clear that the Central Powers would agree to none but an annexationist peace.

Chicherin tells the writer that Sadoul and Ruggles of the French and American armies came to him at the height of the German offensive. Chicherin went with them to Lenin, where it was agreed that if the Germans advanced beyond Pskov, Allied military units would blow up the bridges and destroy all war materials along the line of the enemy's march. Subsequently the Bolsheviks suggested the transfer into the interior of large stores of steel and other metals in Petrograd and Petrozavodsk in Karelia. This second arrangement, however, was frustrated by the vacillating and many-sided policies of the Western Powers.

Above all, the Bolsheviks wished to keep alive the revolution. If a special train from Ludendorff or financial aid and advice from the Allies serve this end, the Communists felt justified in accepting them. It should be remembered that the Bolsheviks were not certain of their tenure in office. Lenin experienced the joy of a child when the Soviet Government broke the record of the Paris Commune in 1871 by living through its seventy-first day. Help from the outside would strengthen the regime. German assistance was

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no longer thinkable; the Germans were driving a hard bargain at Brest and later German armies were driving hard at Petrograd. Support could come only from the Allies. In return for such support, the Bolsheviks would under no condition have re-entered the war. But had the Germans threatened the very existence of the Red state by invading its heart and centre, and had the Allies come to the rescue, the Western Entente would have been aided immeasurably by the very fact, for such a development, even without active Russian participation in the war, would have forced the Germans to maintain heavy forces on the Eastern front. Merely by taking something from the Allies, the Bolsheviks would have been giving much more to the Allies. Sadoul, Lockhart and Robins grasped this point and worked incessantly towards co-operation between their countries and Petrograd. They did so not out of sympathy for the revolution but out of their understanding of the revolution, their national patriotism, and their pro-war spirit.

The French Military Mission in the Russian capital, with the exception of Sadoul, had always been extremely objectionable to the Bolsheviks. General Niessel was publicly accused of participating in anti-Soviet conspiracies and, on one occasion during a very stormy interview, Trotsky simply put him out of his office. After the January 30 break at Brest, however, this relationship changed. The French were persuaded that there was no pact between the Communists and the Hohenzollerns. Conversations proceeded between the French and Trotsky as well as between Lockhart and Robins and Trotsky. Robins had gained the support of Sisson, and of Major T. D. Thacher and Major Allen D. Wardwell of the Red Cross Mission who joined him in urging 'prompt recognition of Bolshevik authority and immediate establishment of *modus vivendi* making possible generous and sympathetic co-operation.'

All these efforts came to naught. Perhaps, had time permitted, even Allied officials at home might have been persuaded of the wisdom of a friendly course, but on February 23 the Germans finally reacted to the Bolsheviks' urgent plea for peace.

On the morning of the 23rd, the German terms, sent from Berlin on the 21st, arrived in Petrograd by courier. They stipu-

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lated the acceptance of the German territorial settlement proposed at Brest, plus modifications at the expense of Courland; the complete demobilization of the Russian army and of the newly-formed Red Guard; the retirement of the Russian fleet to Russian harbours, the renewal of the Russian-German commercial agreement, and the free export, without tariff, of ores, the interdiction of all propaganda against the Central Powers, recognition of the German treaty of peace with the Ukraine, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ukraine and Finland, 'assistance' to Turkey to re-establish her Anatolian frontiers, indemnities that would amount to several billions, and the support by Russia of German commissions for war prisoners and war refugees.

These conditions, the message concluded, must be accepted within forty-eight hours. Russian plenipotentiaries were to start for Brest without delay and there, after three days, sign a peace which must be ratified within two weeks.

The demands precipitated a bitter fight in the Communist Party and in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government, for opposition to the signing of the peace persisted, despite Lenin's formal victory. The discussions that shook the party are not only of historic importance; they throw welcome light on the psychology of the Communists.

Could revolutionists, Bolsheviks, accept such terms? The Central Committee of the Communist Party met that day to decide the crucial question. Its vote would affect not only the future of the Soviets, but also of Russia, and would determine the outcome of the World War. Lenin arose first. He demanded the acceptance of the terms. He demanded that the 'policy of revolutionary phrases' and of revolutionary war be dropped. Otherwise he would resign from the Government and from the Central Committee. This was his ultimatum. He would not withdraw it.

Trotsky followed Lenin and argued that a revolutionary war was inconceivable in the absence of unity within the party. Bukharin insisted on such a war. Lenin again flayed the Bukharinites, though he conceded the necessity of preparing for a revolutionary war. He, of course, wanted a Red Army and would defend the regime whenever the need arose, but at that moment the best defence was capitulation.

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It was a lengthy discussion. Finally the vote which would determine not only matters of policy but also whether or not Lenin would remain the leader of the revolution. Lenin presented three questions:

(1) Shall we immediately accept the German Terms?	(2) Shall we prepare for a Revolutionary War?	(3) Shall we consult the voters of Petrograd and Moscow?
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The votes were
cast as follows:

Lenin	Yes			
Stasova	Yes			
Zinoviev	Yes			
Sverdlov	Yes			
Stalin	Yes			
Sokolnikov	Yes			
Smilga	Yes	Yes	Yes	11
Bubnov	No	Unanimously	No	0
Uritzky	No		Not voting	4
Bukharin	No			
Lomov	No			
Trotsky	Not voting			
Dzerzhinsky	Not voting			
Joffe	Not voting			
Krestinsky	Not voting			

By a plurality, accordingly, the Bolsheviks had decided to bow to the will of the Germans. Thereupon Bukharin, Lomov, Bubnov, V. Jakovlev, Piatakov and V. M. Smirnov resigned from the Central Committee and from their government offices and issued a statement 'reserving for themselves the freedom of agitation (against the peace) within the party as well as outside its ranks.' Efforts by Lenin, Trotsky, and others to dissuade them were of no avail. A split in the Communist party seriously threatened, but Lenin was convinced of the wisdom of his course and followed it unflinchingly. He sent plenipotentiaries to meet the Germans.

En route to Brest, the Russian delegation, on February 25-26,

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passed through Pskov, 257 versts from Petrograd, and found it in the occupation of German troops. The German offensive had not even been stopped by the Bolshevik acceptance of Berlin's ultimative peace demands.

¶ PEACE AT THE TIP OF A SWORD

On February 28 the Soviet delegation arrived in Brest. Its personnel, however, was changed. Trotzky had refused to attend. Joffe, who opposed the Lenin policy, declined to accept any political responsibility for the delegation's acts, and went only as an adviser. The members were Sokolnikov, G. I. Petrovsky (later President of the Ukraine), George Chicherin, and Karakhan as secretary. The Germans sent von Rosenberg, and the Austro-Hungarians Dr. Gratz, both officials of second rank. The discussions did not promise to be of any great interest.

They opened on March 1. Von Rosenberg warned that they had only three days and would have to work 'intensively.' Sokolnikov replied that 'he was ready to dispense with all commissions and technicalities and to accept the terms which Germany, arms in hand, was dictating to the Russian Government.

Most of the talking was now done by the Germano-Austrians. Sokolnikov contented himself with two or three remarks lasting no more than one or two minutes, and with two formal declarations. The Russians painfully sought to avoid every impression that the treaty was the result of an agreement, of a give and take, of discussion. It was a peace handed them on the point of a sword, they said. Sokolnikov therefore tried to have the session over as quickly as possible. The Germano-Austrians, in addition to the terms contained in the ultimatum delivered in Petrograd on the 23rd, now added the demand that Russia renounce Batum, Kars, and Ardagan and prepare the way for their absorption by Turkey. There was no use objecting. The Germans were still advancing into Russia and the Ukraine. The Russian army was being demobilized. Allied spokesmen were talking about aid but not giving it. Was it not advisable then to sign the peace without delay in order thus to end the offensive? This was Sokolnikov's policy.

On March 3 the peace treaty was signed by the plenipoten-

BATTLE BETWEEN FACTIONS

tiaries of Russia and her four enemies.¹ The German representative thereupon announced that the offensive would be immediately discontinued. It was – but only in Russia. German and Austrian armies proceeded on their march into Soviet Ukraine.

Kaiser Wilhelm himself admitted that the document produced at Brest Litovsk was a 'Peace of Violence.' For he said, in a congratulatory telegram to Chancellor von Hertling: 'The German sword wielded by great army leaders has brought peace with Russia.' Then Wilhelm II expressed his 'deep gratitude to God, Who has been with us.' The sword and God.

Now the German armies were ready to start on their career as butter and egg and flour and cheese collectors. But the battle in Petrograd was by no means at an end.

§ THE BATTLE BETWEEN BOLSHEVIK FACTIONS

How serious the German threat to Petrograd had been may be judged from the fact that on February 23 the Government offices began preparing for evacuation. On February 26 the United States Embassy moved inland to Vologda, where it was soon joined by most of the Allied Missions. A few days later, March 5, the Bolsheviks decided to transfer their capital to Moscow, and on March 11 the chief organs of the Soviet Government established themselves in the ancient Kremlin.

The Communist delegates at Brest Litovsk had signed the treaty, but there was no certainty that the party and the soviets could agree to ratify a 'peace of violence.' Trotzky was now in almost complete accord with the Lenin policy. Always conscious, perhaps over-conscious of the possibility of dramatic effects, he had advanced the 'No war, no peace' slogan for its value as a demon-

¹ A queer incident is connected with this event. Immediately the treaty was signed, Karakhan, as secretary to the delegation, sent two telegrams to Lenin: one announcing the fact, the other asking for a train and guard to bring the Bolsheviks home. It so happened, however, that the second dispatch was delivered first and Lenin accordingly concluded that the negotiations had been broken off. In other words: WAR. Preparations were momentarily made for a hasty defence of the revolution. The whole Government was mobilized. But before many hours had elapsed, Karakhan's first message was in Lenin's hands.

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stration. In a 'post-mortem' on Brest written August 1, 1919, on the anti-Denikin front, Trotzky explained that his plan had been to disrupt the negotiations and thus provoke a German offensive in order to prove to the world, by capitulating in the face of superior strength, that the Bolsheviks had no secret agreement with the Central Powers. He wished to convince the Allies that the Bolsheviks were not German agents. This, he claims, was achieved, and the advantage lay in the circumstance that 'for a long time this made it difficult for the Entente bandits to attack us.' Bolshevik tactics at Brest, especially during the propaganda period beginning January 9 and ending with Trotzky's famous 'no war, no peace' declaration, undoubtedly did postpone all active expression of Allied hostility to the soviets. Not for very long; in fact, for only three or four months. Yet this breathing space was of tremendous importance.

On the other hand, the Trotzky programme was a dangerous game¹ for there was no guarantee that the Germans could be stopped betimes. Fortunately for Russia and Trotzky, the Brest Litovsk terms had no permanent influence on European geography. The boundaries it outlined were soon erased. But the peace would have been extremely expensive and Trotzky's demonstration at the conference very costly had matters developed differently. Before February 10 the Germans were offering conditions and frontiers that were bad enough; after the offensive, the Bolsheviks were completely at the mercy of the invaders. This was Trotzky's doing. Lenin would have signed. However, as it happened, the practical results of Brest were of short duration while the moral effect proved considerable. This was Trotzky's service.

At the Seventh Party Congress (March 6-8) Trotzky explained that he withheld his vote because, in his opinion, a revolutionary war would have meant a split in the party. 'It is impossible to conduct a war against the Germans and against our *bourgeoisie* . . . when you have opposed to you half or more than half of the party led by Lenin.' Trotzky favoured the revolutionary war in

¹ Trotzky subsequently admitted the error of his attitude after Brest. At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee on October 3, 1918, he said 'we were not right.' But he admitted that Lenin was.

EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE TREATY

principle but did not vote 'No' on the question of accepting the peace in view of the conflict in the party; he did not vote 'Yes' since he would have preferred to wait for revolutionary developments in Central European countries. He realized, to be sure, that the longer they delayed the worse might be the conditions the enemy imposed. But that was the prospect they faced from the very beginning of the Brest conference, and yet everybody had voted for dragging out the pourparlers – everybody except Zinoviev, who insisted that the longer the delay the worse would be the peace. Lenin, however, knew when to stop postponing; he realized that the Germans were in no humour for further delay; he did not wish to gamble with the interests of the revolution. Above all, his estimate of the revolutionary potentialities of Germany was more sober than that of Trotzky or of the Bukharin group, and more correct.

§ ALLIED EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE THE BREST TREATY

The Allies, like the Left Communists (but for different reasons), also did not wish to see the treaty ratified. And they tried to prevent it, albeit very half-heartedly. The Allies had made several efforts to win the Bolsheviks for the war. On one occasion the Americans offered Commander-in-Chief Krylenko 100 roubles for every Russian soldier he would place at the front against the Germans. Krylenko rejected this deal in cannon fodder. Subsequent endeavours are on the records of Robins, Sadoul, and Lockhart. But the most determined Allied effort came immediately after the signature of the Brest Litovsk peace treaty.

On March 5, two days after the signing, Robins saw Trotzky at Smolni. A conversation ensued in which the Russian inquired about the attitude of the American Government. He encouraged Robins to believe that if the Bolsheviks could receive economic and military aid from the Allies they would not ratify the peace. Robins wanted a statement in writing. He got it at four o'clock that afternoon.¹ In case, it said, the Soviets refuse to ratify the peace, or if the Germans advance despite the peace, or if the Soviets renounce the treaty before or after its ratification, 'it is

¹ Reproduced in the U.S. Congressional Record for January 29, 1919.

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very important for the military and political plans of the Soviet power for replies to be given to the following questions:

“Can the Soviet Government rely on the support of the United States of North America, Great Britain and France in the struggle against Germany?” What would be the nature of this assistance; what, in particular, would America do “should Japan – in consequence of an open or tacit understanding with Germany or without such an understanding” – occupy Siberia? Would England send aid to Murmansk and Archangel? The only condition named by Trotzky was complete independence in foreign and internal affairs to be directed in “accord with the principles of international socialism.”’

Robins took this paper and, together with his secretary Gumborg, went to Lenin’s office, where he was ‘assured of the genuineness of the position’ as outlined in the Trotzky document. Thereupon he went to see Bruce Lockhart, the British High Commissioner. Lockhart, too, had interviewed Trotzky that morning. Later that day he sent a secret and confidential telegram to the Foreign Office in London. He proposed aid to Russia from the Allies and warned that if ‘the Allies are to allow Japan to enter Siberia, the whole proposition is hopeless . . . this action (Japanese occupation) is quite unnecessary at the present moment as far as safeguarding supplies from Siberia is concerned.’ Furthermore,

‘If ever the Allies have had a chance in Russia since the revolution, the Germans have given it to them by the exorbitant peace terms they have imposed on them. And now when Germany’s aims have been unmasked to the whole world, the Allies are to nullify the benefits of this by allowing the Japanese to enter Siberia. If His Majesty’s Government does not wish to see Germany paramount in Russia, then I would most earnestly implore you not to neglect this opportunity. . . . Please show this telegram to the Prime Minister [Lloyd George] and Lord Milner.’¹

The Trotzky statement to Robins was submitted by wire to the State Department in Washington, and later, on March 9, Ambassador Francis sent two telegrams to the Secretary of State of the

¹ *R.A.R.*, page 82.

THE BOLSHEVIKS QUARREL

United States drawing attention to the serious consequences that would result from a Japanese invasion of Asiatic Russia. 'The Soviet Government,' he added, 'is the only power which is able to offer resistance to the German advance. . . .'

Was Trotzky consciously misleading the Allied and American representatives into believing that the Bolsheviks would fight if assisted? The commissar wished to gain time. He wished to gain good will in quarters which would determine how soon Allied intervention in Russia would commence. He wished, perhaps, to exploit the Allies' desire to prevent the ratification of the peace in order to win their disapproval of the impending Japanese adventure in the East. Moreover, the party congress was then in session. It might reject the German terms. That would have meant war, and Trotzky wanted to assure himself of foreign aid. But beyond all those considerations, it must have been uppermost in his mind that the Germans could not be trusted to keep hands off Bolshevik Russia. It was conceivable that they would attack whether or not the Soviets ratified the peace. And indeed there is reason to believe that if the mammoth German offensive on the West front had not been initiated just at this juncture, the Russian revolution would have been doomed without outside assistance. Trotzky was not misleading Robins, Lockhart, and Sadoul. He did not promise them that Russia would join the ranks against the Central Powers. He merely wished to know what might be expected from the Allies if the Bolsheviks were forced to go to war in order to save the revolution.

THE BOLSHEVIKS QUARREL

That such a revolutionary war was possible is clear from the unanimous vote of the Central Committee on February 23 in favour of preparing for it. Lenin would have been reconciled to it as a necessity. Bukharin made a virtue of it. He and his followers saw no other alternative. They had left the Central Committee and organized their own paper, *The Communist*,¹ which daily

¹ *The Communist* appeared daily in Petrograd between the 5th and 19th of March under the editorship of Bukharin, Radek and Uritzky; and in Moscow from April to June, as a weekly, under the editorship of Bukharin, Ossinsky, Radek, and V. M. Smirnov.

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printed violent attacks on Lenin's policy. At the party congress, March 6-8, the battle was long and bitter. Trotsky played a relatively minor rôle. The real struggle was between Lenin and Bukharin who led the 'young,' Left, Communists. Trotsky spoke for ratification.

The 'Left' faction was very vociferous. Outside the congress its views and acts were seconded by the Left Social Revolutionaries, who were even registering men for the revolutionary front. At the sessions the storm raged. Obolensky-Ossinsky argued that if they ever let the Germans get on Russia's back they would ride her not for a breathing-space but for years. Lenin's promises to the contrary were 'empty phrases.' Madame Kollontai believed that both the Germans as well as the Bolsheviks would regard even the ratified treaty as a scrap of paper. Therefore 'Long Live the Revolutionary War.' (Applause)¹.

Bukharin made his final speech under a continuous heckling fire from Lenin. Bukharin argued that there were two possibilities: to organize completely and then fight, or to organize while fighting. His programme excluded the first and called for the second. Lenin wished both. Events were on the side of Lenin. The army had almost disappeared. The Germans were upon them. Transport, food supply, and finances were disorganized. The Communist Party was divided. The international proletariat failed to revolt. The Russian *bourgeoisie* lay in wait for an opportunity to spring at the Red regime and bear it to the ground. These were the leader's arguments. They were unanswerable except with wild appeals to revolutionary enthusiasm which, Lenin said, was out of place in judging a hard, practical situation.

Accordingly, when the vote was taken, 28 votes were cast for the Lenin resolution demanding immediate ratification; 9 votes of the Bukharinites were entered against the resolution; and one delegate refrained from voting. Lenin was the victor by a big majority. This decision was followed by the election of a new Central Committee. Bukharin was chosen a member and Uritzky and Lomov candidates (substitute members). These three adherents of the 'Left,' revolutionary war wing, however, immediately announced

¹ *Stenographic Record of the Proceedings of the Seventh Communist Party Congress, March 6-8, 1918. Moscow, 1928.*

THE BOLSHEVIKS QUARREL

their refusal to accept the offices. They preferred to continue in opposition to Lenin rather than share responsibility for a policy with which they could not agree. Pleas by Lenin and Zinoviev to remain did not move them.

The battles for ratification were now almost won, but there was still the Congress of Soviets. This body, the highest government authority in Soviet Russia, met from March 14 to 16 in Moscow. Its word was final. Here the Left Communist opposition to Lenin was reinforced by the Left social revolutionaries and other anti-Bolshevik parties.

While the congress was in session, it received a message from Woodrow Wilson dated Washington, March 11. Sverdlov, first President of the Soviet Republic, read the document to the delegates.

'May I not take advantage,' was the characteristic beginning, 'of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia? Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in its attempt to free themselves for ever from autocratic government and become masters of their own life.'¹

Years later, in the summer of 1927, Stalin, the Russian Communist leader, confronted a group of Americans, the writer among them, with this statement and inquired how, in the face of such a sentiment, Russia was not recognized by the United States. Wilson, after all, recognized the Soviet regime *de facto* when he communicated with it directly (the message was wired to Francis

¹ *Current History*. New York. Vol. VIII, Part 1, page 49.

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in Vologda, who wired it to Robins in Moscow, who handed it to Lenin), and when he spoke to the Russian people 'through the Congress' of workers', soldiers' and peasants' soviets.

The Soviet Government, on February 8, five weeks before the Congress convened, had decreed the repudiation of all of Russia's foreign debts 'without exception and unconditionally.' Seven days later the official press published the firm protest of the diplomatic corps against the measure. Nevertheless, relations were not discontinued by the foreign powers on account of this issue of which so much was subsequently made, and President Wilson acknowledged as the highest ruling authority in the country the government which had annulled Russia's debts. He likewise expressed sympathy with the position and aims of the Soviet State. So, also, incidentally, did Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labour, who addressed a more guarded and less spirited message to the same Congress. Something more concrete than words, however, was required.

On the evening of the second day of the Congress, Robins was sitting on a step leading to the platform. He looked around and Lenin motioned to him. 'What have you heard from your Government' (in reply to the Trotzky questions)? inquired the Russian. 'Nothing.' 'What has Lockhart heard?' 'Nothing.' Lenin wished to know what the Allies would do, not say, to help the Bolsheviks. But he realized that there was no sense in expecting help from that quarter. 'Neither the American Government nor any of the Allied Governments will co-operate, even against the Germans, with the workmen's and peasants' revolutionary government of Russia.' So he said to Robins, and so saying he rose to the rostrum to make his final speech on ratification. The Congress was with him. Mensheviks, social revolutionaries, and the 'Left' Communists opposed the peace. Nevertheless, the Lenin resolution was adopted by 784 votes to 261. A national congress had approved the leader's strategy in signing the treaty of March 3 at Brest.

§ A 'TILSIT PEACE'

Napoleon, in 1807, humiliated Alexander I, Czar of Russia, and Friedrich Wilhelm, King of Prussia, by forcing upon them shameful, self-destructive terms of peace. The treaty was

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signed in Tilsit. A few years later the Russians and Prussians annulled the agreement and avenged themselves against the great conqueror. In all his speeches, Lenin referred to the Brest Litovsk Treaty as a 'Tilsit Peace.' It would not last long, he predicted.

It did not. On November 9, 1918, less than nine months after the ratification of the Brest Peace, the Kaiser was overthrown and a Social Democratic Government established in Berlin. By Point XV of the Armistice which ended the World War, the Germans were forced to renounce the Brest Litovsk Treaty and all its benefits. The Bolsheviks annulled the treaty two days later, on November 13. The Versailles Peace confirmed the cancellation.

§ THE KAISER AND THE BOLSHEVIKS

Under the Brest Treaty, normal diplomatic relations were established between the signatory countries. Count Mirbach was appointed German ambassador to Moscow, and Adolf A. Joffe Russian ambassador to Berlin. But Joffe's functions were not merely diplomatic. He was a revolutionist. He wanted to precipitate an insurrection against the government to which he was accredited and to which, presumably, he was *persona grata*. Acting in perfect bad faith – he admitted it in January, 1919 – he worked assiduously against the Imperial Government. More than ten Left Social Democratic newspapers were directed and supported by the Soviet Embassy in the German capital. The embassy bought information from officials in various German ministries and passed it on to radical leaders for use in Reichstag speeches, in workers' meetings and in the Press. Anti-war and anti-government literature was sent to all parts of the country and to the front. Tons of literature were printed and clandestinely distributed by Joffe's office. 'It is necessary to emphasize most categorically,' Joffe wrote in an almost unknown memorandum,¹ 'that in the preparation of the German revolution, the Russian Embassy worked all the time in close contact with the German Socialists.' Leaders of the German Independents discussed most matters of revolutionary tactics with Joffe, who was an experienced conspirator. In a

¹ *Vestnik Zhizni*, No. 5. Moscow, 1919.

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radio message, dated December 15, 1918, broadcast by Joffe to the revolutionary soviets of Germany, he admitted having paid 100,000 marks for the purchase of arms for the revolutionists and announced that he had established in Germany a 10,000,000 rouble fund for the support of the revolution, which was entrusted to Oskar Kohn, a Socialist deputy.¹

But Bolshevism harmed the Kaiser's cause in more ways than this. Churchill testifies that 'the German prisoners liberated from Russia by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk returned home infected by the Lenin virus. In large numbers they refused to go again to the front.'²

In October, 1918, Ludendorff realized that Germany would soon be on her knees begging for peace. He was ready for desperate measures. Could the twenty-seven divisions in the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Rumania be shifted quickly to France to close the cruel breaches made in the Western front? The question formed the subject of a highly important conference on October 17. But both Ludendorff and General Hoffmann agreed that the morale of these troops had been so undermined by Bolshevik influence that they would be of no real service in an attack.³ Twenty-seven divisions of rested forces might have prolonged the World War for months by giving Germany the reserves she could no longer mobilize at home. But sinister Communist propaganda spared the world this additional slaughter. Chancellor Prince Max of Baden declares that the Germans would have evacuated the Ukraine at this period but for the fear that it would cause the Bolshevization of Germany, perhaps of other European countries too.

Then came the collapse of Ludendorff's nerves and of the German West Front, the plea to Woodrow Wilson for an armistice, the abdication of the Kaiser and the Crown Prince – the end of Imperial Germany. The Bolsheviks felt that though the fall of Prussian militarism was largely caused by the failure of its machine

¹ A general confirmation of Soviet Russia's rôle in the German revolution will be found in Trotzky's *Terrorismus und Kommunismus. Anti-Kautsky*. Hamburg, 1920. Page 104.

² *The World Crisis*, 1916–18. Vol. 2. Page 491.

³ *Erinnerungen und Dokumente*, by Prinz Max von Baden. Berlin, 1927. Pages 419 *et seq.*

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to cope with the Allied enemy, the 'Lenin virus' played no small rôle in the large act of the drama.¹

Joffe's activities brought down upon him the wrath of the German Government. Prince Max of Baden avers that Berlin wished to strengthen the majority Social Democrats led by Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske, against the more radical Independent Socialists. Ebert had a secret pact with the prince about future policy. The Social Democrats even contemplated the preservation of the monarchy – much as Miluikov and the Cadets did in Russia in 1917. But the defeated army was turning red. The sailors at Kiel had hoisted the crimson flag. The Independent Socialists would become serious rivals of the Ebert-Scheidemann party if quick action were not taken. These considerations, however, could not be employed to bring about Joffe's ejection. Nor did the German Government base that action on the Soviet envoy's anti-Kaiser efforts. Scheidemann suggested instead that a box in Joffe's diplomatic post from Moscow be caused to burst in Berlin. Revolutionary circulars were discovered in it. But these circulars, the Austrian Social Democratic *Klassenkampf* revealed on December 1, 1927, 'were neither written, nor printed, nor packed, nor dispatched from Russia. They were, in fact, inserted into the diplomatic box by the Imperial (German) police; they were written in Germany by Comrade Levi.' Many other statements tend to confirm the suspicion that although Joffe was heavily laden with revolutionary guilt these particular circulars in his diplomatic mail originated with the Prussian Police. On November 5, accordingly, Joffe and his staff received orders to evacuate the Berlin Embassy and return to Russia. . . . The Socialists who succeeded the Kaiser continued his policy, and German relations with Moscow were only resumed in 1922.

Here ends the story of the Brest Litovsk peace.

The Brest Litovsk Conference was an attempt to arrive openly

¹ German Radicals always deny any responsibility for the defeat of Germany in the World War. They reject the hypothesis of the 'Stab in the Back' and argue that it was not the disaffection of the rear but the weakness of the front which brought about the debacle. In this connection, neutrals have remarked that instead of washing their hands of the 'Stab in the Back' like 100 per cent. patriots, real Radicals and Socialists would regret that there were not better, bigger, and more stabs.

THE BOLSHEVIKS MAKE PEACE

at an open covenant. There was no such meeting before it nor since. It is unique in world history.

In March, 1918, when the 'Peace of Violence' was signed, the Germans laughed. In November, 1918, when the 'Peace of Tilsit' was annulled, the Bolsheviks laughed – last. The Russians compromised with the enemy without compromising themselves. Brest Litovsk was a great practical defeat but a greater moral victory. Viewed in the light of one, the conference is the darkest page in Soviet history; viewed from the other it is the brightest spot in all the years of the republic's foreign relations.

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Foreign states spent millions of dollars equipping expeditionary forces against the Soviet regime. Thousands of foreign and foreign-supported troops fought for months and years against the Bolsheviks. Whole districts were laid waste by the invaders, and ruin caused which it required years to repair. Yet legally and officially Russia and these invaders were friends and allies.

'My Government still considers America an ally of the Russian people,' said Ambassador Francis after the Brest Peace had been signed.¹ And although Wilson's cordial message to the Soviet Congress was said to be a manœuvre to strengthen the opponents of Lenin and of the treaty, the President's words nevertheless put the United States on record as entertaining the friendliest intentions towards the new workers' and peasants' government. Also Mr. Balfour, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a speech to the House of Commons on March 14, referred to England, France, etc., as 'Russia's Allies.' This fiction persisted during years of foreign military intervention.

§ THE RAPE OF BESSARABIA

The foreign interventionists in Russia were the Germans and the anti-Germans. But as a prelude to the chief events of the period, a little side-show was enacted far to the south-east. When the Bolshevik revolution broke out, Bessarabia, a border province fated to play an important rôle in subsequent Soviet foreign affairs, boiled with partisan fighting. Petrograd's arm was too short and its voice too weak to command attention. Jassy, the temporary Roumanian capital, was near. Its statesmen had signed a peace with Germany which relieved them of the war burden. Soon after the New Year of 1918, accordingly, Rou-

¹ Interview published March 22, 1918, in the American bulletins issued by the Committee on Public Information of the United States in Moscow. Reproduced by *Russian-American Relations (R.A.R.)*. March, 1917 - March, 1920. *Documents and Papers*. New York, 1920. Page 95.

manian troops began occupying Bessarabia. Moldavian patriots offered resistance, but on January 26 the seizure of all Bessarabia by Roumania was an accomplished fact.

This action produced a Soviet 'Irredenta,' an 'Alsace on the Dnicper' as the official Moscow press wrote on January 26, 1928, a decade after the event. Soviet Russia is not yet reconciled to the loss of the province and contends that the occupation was unwarranted and remains unjustifiable. In 1918, indeed, neither the Allies nor Roumania considered the occupation permanent. Fasciotti, Italian Minister to Roumania, as doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Jassy, wired the Allied consuls in Odessa on February 21 that

'As far as Bessarabia is concerned, you are to remember that the intervention of Roumanian troops is a military measure not partaking of any political character whatsoever, an enterprise in complete agreement with the Allies and with the Bessarabian authorities for the obvious humanitarian purpose of feeding the Russian and Roumanian troops as well as the civil population.'¹

By invading Bessarabia, which was Russian territory, the Roumanian Government had committed an act of war. The Bolsheviks retaliated by ordering, on January 13, 1918, a rupture of relations with Roumania, and the arrest of Diamandi, Roumanian Minister in Petrograd.

A German advance had menaced Bukharest in December, 1916. Thereupon the National Bank of Roumania deposited in the Moscow Kremlin for safe keeping over 300,000,000 francs in gold, and two chests of jewels belonging to Queen Marie of an estimated value of 7,000,000 francs.² This wealth the Bolsheviks now confiscated and in doing so publicly declared that 'the Soviet Government takes upon itself the responsibility for the care of this fund, and undertakes to return it to the Roumanian people' — not to the 'Roumanian oligarchy.'³

¹ *L'Ukraine Soviétiste. Quatre Années de Guerre et de Blocus.* Official Collection of Documents published by Soviet Ukraine. Berlin, 1922. Page 51.

² *Russian Gold.* Pamphlet issued by the Amtorg Trading Corporation. New York, 1928.

³ *L'Ukraine Soviétiste. Quatre Années de Guerre et de Blocus.* Official Collection of Documents published by Soviet Ukraine. Berlin, 1922. Page 51.

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The gold and the jewels, however, have not been returned to their owners any more than Bessarabia was returned to Russia. But the liberation of Diamandi took place several days after his incarceration in the Fortress of Peter and Paul. He regained his freedom in such quick order thanks to the intercession of the Allied Diplomatic Corps which called on Lenin in a body.¹

Nevertheless, a state of hostility existed between Russia and Roumania which the Allies desired to end. Upon the mediation of the Allied consuls in Odessa, accordingly, discussions were actually opened, and Colonel Boyle, an adventurous Canadian who had dug gold in the Klondike and later tried to mine oil in Baku, flew several times from Odessa to Jassy with messages from Christian G. Rakovsky, the chief Soviet plenipotentiary, to the Roumanian authorities.

In the end, a protocol was signed on March 5, 1918, in which General Averescu, Roumanian Prime Minister, agreed to evacuate Bessarabia within two months.² The conflict between the two countries was thereupon officially declared closed. But Bessarabia remained under Roumanian occupation.

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The seizure of Bessarabia created a thorny international problem which still defies solution. In 1918, however, its significance paled beside the advance of the Germans into Russia. The giant military machine rolled over thousands of square miles of territory, and nobody, not even the usually self-assured Bolsheviks, were certain that it would stop before it got to the Urals. And while Lenin and his followers waited anxiously for Germany's reply to their acceptance of her terms, while, later, the empty formalities of the treaty of peace signature were being enacted at Brest Litovsk, the great monster moved forward ominously. Already, in the north, Reval and Pskov had been taken; further south, in White Russia, the cities of Minsk and Orsha.

General Hoffmann admits in his memoirs that he, at that time

¹ *Russia from the American Embassy*. By David Francis. New York, 1921. Page 217. *Ten Years of Soviet Diplomacy*. Moscow. 1927. Page 6.

² *L'Ukraine Soviétiste*. Page 52. For a general treatment of the question see also *Roumania and Bessarabia*, by Christian G. Rakovsky. Moscow, 1925.

(spring, 1918), advocated the capture of Moscow and the overthrow of Bolshevism by German arms. But troops were needed in Flanders for the famous March, 1918, drive which crumpled the Allied line, and Ludendorff vetoed his subordinate's plan. The offensive into Russia, accordingly, ceased when the Petrograd plenipotentiaries attached their names to the 'Peace of Violence' on March 3.

In the Ukraine, on the other hand, the agreement with the Rada offered a cynical legal basis for further penetration. 'If the Central Powers, who had made peace with the Ukraine for the sake of bread wanted to get bread, they had to go and fetch it,' said Hoffmann.

There was little effective opposition. In the middle of March, Kiev fell; and early in April, Kharkov. Soon all the Ukraine and the Crimea were prostrate, and the German-Austrian power even extended as far east as Taganrog and Rostov-on-the-Don, where they established friendly contact with the White Guard General, Krasnov.¹

Even the compliant Rada now seemed too independent to the military representatives of Berlin and Vienna. Accordingly they shelved it and raised up Hetman Skoropadski, a figure-head with monarchist sympathies, as ruler of the country.

Before long, however, it developed that bayonets might occupy a country but could scarcely collect wheat, butter and eggs. The nation became restive. Whole provinces seethed with militant discontent, and the Germans began to experience difficulties in obtaining bread.

Was the mujhik anti-German or pro-Bolshevik? He may have been both or neither, but he was not prepared to feed an invading army variously estimated at between 300,000 and 600,000 men, and, in addition, to sell for export at prices dictated by the foreign buyer. Politics apart, the peasant's strongest emotion is love of his own produce. He can embarrass any authority which attempts to take it from him by force or upon terms not agreeable to him.

¹ In the summer of 1918, General Krasnov addressed a letter to Emperor Wilhelm II in which he promised his aid to Germany should the Allies succeed in re-establishing the Eastern front. In the same communication he asked the Kaiser to recognize the independence of the Don district.

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Moreover, the German military in the Ukraine returned confiscated land to former owners and favoured the rich peasants above the poor. Nothing irritated the rural masses more. Bands of Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries, operating underground, nourished these feelings and fanned the fire of mujhik resentment. Insurrections broke out in many localities. Passive resistance was the least of the forces with which the Central armies had to cope. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire. Numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked. Partisans combed the country for isolated units of enemy soldiers and even attacked railway stations. Disaffection was wholesale. Strikes multiplied.

The Germano-Austrians met the situation with a terror which made people more sullen but no less determined. If opposition was driven deeper underground it was at least equally effective.

As a bread-collecting venture, consequently, the Central Powers' occupation of the Ukraine was more or less disappointing. Count Czernin tells us¹ that in nine months this 'granary of Europe' yielded them only 113,421 tons of flour, of which 57,392 tons were shipped to Austro-Hungary. In addition, the invaders obtained 172,349,556 kilograms of other articles such as butter, fats, cheese, fish, eggs, horses, sugar, etc., etc. All in all, 24,000 freight cars filled with goods were dispatched to Central Power territories, and it is estimated that half as much more was smuggled across the frontier. These quantities were not without significance. They staved off the actual starvation of thousands of citizens in the Dual Monarchy but did not prevent its collapse or rescue the situation for its associates. They enabled the Germans to eat more meat in 1918 and supplied the army with 140,000 badly needed horses, but could not so strengthen the Central Powers as to prevent the disaffection of the civil population nor the collapse of the front.

¶ THE GERMANS SEEK OIL

While the Germans and Austrians occupied the Ukraine, German and Turkish troops were making themselves at home in the rich and strategic Caucasus. This region had attracted the atten-

¹ *Im Weltkriege*. Czernin. Page 345.

tion of Constantinople long before Brest Litovsk. As a matter of fact, the Turkish campaigns against the armies of Grand Duke Nicholas in the territory between the Black and Caspian Seas cost the Porte more lives than any other Ottoman activity during the war. But when Russian resistance was broken and the Brest Peace signed, the armed forces of the Sultan were free to wander where they pleased in the much-coveted Caucasus. Early in April Kars was occupied ; and on April 15, Batum, the gateway of the Caucasus, fell into Turkish hands.

Turkey was Germany's ally, but not always a reliable one. Moreover, the Caucasus was too valuable economically to surrender even to a faithful associate. From a purely military point of view, no German reinforcements were required in this theatre. The Turks were pouring whole divisions into an area where a few regiments could have maintained control, and yet the Germans felt constrained to put in a personal appearance because, as Ludendorff explains,

'this was demanded by our supply of raw material. The behaviour of the Turks in Batum had again proved that we could not depend on them in this matter. They had taken all available stores for themselves. We could therefore expect oil from Baku only if we fetched it ourselves.'

The streets of German cities, Ludendorff informs us, were dark; the activities of German military aeroplanes circumscribed for want of petroleum. And submarine warfare depended on oil. To cover Germany's petrol deficits, it was accordingly decided that 'the Batum-Tiflis-Baku railway be put in operation by Colonel von Kress with the consent of the Turks. Naturally the decisive question was how we could get to Baku.'¹

Baku may have presented some difficulty to Ludendorff's mind, but the entrance into Georgia was facilitated by the Menshevik Party. Soon after the opening of the Turkish offensive, the nations of the Caucasus seceded from Russia, declared themselves autonomous, and set up a 'Trans-Caucasian Federation' consisting of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan.

The Mensheviks of Georgia were the spiritual fathers of this

¹ *Meine Kriegserinnerungen*, Ludendorff.

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new state. These Mensheviks called themselves Georgian Nationalists. Nevertheless, they had never demanded Georgia's secession from the Czar's empire. Menshevik leaders such as Tscheidze and Tseretelli played important rôles in the Kerensky Government. They never raised their voices in favour of the separation of Georgia and the Caucasus from the body of Russia. But when the Bolsheviks seized the government the Menshevik leaders proclaimed the independence of Georgia and her neighbours.

It was, however, a startling brand of independence. For before the Georgian Republic was much more than a month old, its authorities had invited the Germans to give them the comfort of their presence. Ludendorff, as we have seen, had already planned the seizure of Baku, and Georgia is the high road to that greatest of oil cities. On May 25, accordingly, three thousand German troops under von Kress, now General, landed in the Georgian port of Poti and on the very same day the Trans-Caucasian Federation was officially declared non-existent, and Noi Jordania, the Menshevik leader, read the Declaration of Independence of the Georgian Republic.¹ Three days later, Chenkeli, its representative, gave form to this 'independence' by signing an agreement with the Germans by the terms of which the railways and naval equipment of the country were surrendered to the Germans for the duration of the World War. Subsequently, a pact was signed between Turkey and Georgia giving the former the right to carry petroleum free of charge over the Batum-Baku pipe-line. Thereafter, until the Germans left, Georgia was a willing tool in the hands of the invaders.

Germans and Turks now established themselves for a prolonged stay. Supplementary units came from Germany and additional Turkish troops were brought in from other fronts. 'The Turks are sacrificing all Arabia, Palestine, and Syria to these boundless undertakings of theirs in the Caucasus,' Limon von Sanders, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish armies in Syria, complained to Count von Bernstorff, German ambassador in

¹ The intrigues which accompanied this episode are described by Joseph Pomiankowski, Austro-Hungarian Field-Marshal in Turkey during the World War, in his *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*. Vienna, 1928. Pages 361-2.

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Constantinople. Turkey planned to annex the Caucasus, and the Sultan's Government, completely under the domination of Enver Pasha, sent Pan-Turanian propagandists deep into Dagestan and even into the Crimea.

§ BAGDAD TO BAKU

Meanwhile, a great Turkish force concentrated on Baku. A German detachment advanced into Northern Persia to occupy Tabriz, and a Turkish army made its first steps into Azerbaijhan. Local Bolsheviks had set up a government in Baku soon after the November, 1917, coup. But the regime was opposed by the moderate Tartar Nationalists or Mussafatists who had actually dispatched a delegate to Major-General Dunsterville in Enzeli, Persia, to pray for his assistance.

Dunsterville had started out from Bagdad in February of that year with a company of British officers. Russia had not yet signed the Brest Litovsk Peace. Her position as an ally still carried some weight in London. There could be no announcement, therefore, of any intention to invade her territory. It was merely given out that the 'Dunsterforce'¹ would prevent a 'German march on India.' Later, however, Sir Percy Sykes, Inspector-General in Persia, aired the correct version.² He explained that no large force could be moved 800 miles across desert from Bagdad to Baku. 'The authorities therefore decided to dispatch a military mission to reorganize the sound elements of the country into a force that would prevent the Turks and their German masters from reaching Baku. . . .'

This was an unusual move, bold in conception and difficult of execution but much to the taste of the adventurous Dunsterville.

Before the middle of the summer, the Dunsterforce had traversed the desert in forty motor-cars and pitched its tents in Enzeli, where it waited an opportunity for a leap across the Caspian. This came in August. On the 13th of the month, the Bolsheviks, faced by a united bourgeois and Menshevik opposition, left the Government, and three days later, Dunsterville, with

¹ *The Adventures of the Dunsterforce*, 1920. By Major-General Dunsterville London, 1921.

² *Persia*, by Sir Percy Sykes. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1922. Vol. 32.

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about a thousand men and much artillery, appeared on the scene as the guest of the Mussafatists.

Several weeks later, however, great masses of Turkish infantry closed in on the city and a bombardment commenced. Thereupon Dunsterville took to his ships and returned to Persia without firing a shot. (September 13, 1918.) The Turks immediately occupied Baku, and immediately denationalized the oilfields which a Communist decree of May had declared State property.

§ A BRITISH SALT LAKE

The Caspian Sea, nevertheless, remained under British control, thanks to General Denikin, an officer of the Czar's General Staff who had served Kerensky but fled south to the Kuban on the advent of the Bolsheviks. There, in December 1917, with headquarters at Jekatrinodar (now Krasnodar), he organized a Cossack army and later pushed down as far as Derbent on the Caspian. The Caspian fleet thus fell into his hands. He placed it at Britain's disposal. 'Commodore Norris had taken charge of the Imperial Caspian Navy and on behalf of General Denikin's anti-Bolshevik government held command of the Caspian Sea.'¹

The Caspian was practically a British lake. The Bolsheviks, to be sure, were in Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga, and occasionally sallied forth with their inferior flotilla to challenge the British seamen, but the British ruled supreme along the Persian coast of the Caspian and in Transcaspia.

A small Anglo-Indian force under General Malleeson had advanced into Transcaspia from Meshed in Persia, and set up a Menshevik-Social Revolutionary Government at Askhabad, hard on the Persian frontier, with whose sanction they fought Bolshevism in Turkestan and tried to occupy Tashkent. They took Merv and its famous oasis and even looked into the waters of the historic Oxus, but never became masters of Bokhara or Khiva.

When Dunsterville evacuated Baku and returned in Commodore Norris's ships to Enzeli, some of his men were carried straight across the Caspian to Krasnovodsk to join General Malleeson's

¹ *East Persia, A Backwater of the Great War*, by Brig.-General W. E. R. Dickson. London, 1924. Page 62.

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force.¹ The stay of the Turks in Baku and the Caucasus was too short-lived to permit them to threaten this British army. On the other hand, the British in Transcaspia were too weak to dispute Turkish domination of Baku or Turkish-German rule in the Caucasus.

All the time the Turks concentrated on Baku, Adolf Joffe protested to Talaat Pasha, who was then in Berlin, against such violation of the Brest agreement. The Moscow Government likewise sent Leonid Krassin to the German Staff Headquarters to remonstrate with Ludendorff.² The Grand Vizier and the generalissimo, however, gave Soviet diplomats no satisfaction, and, on September 20, soon after the capture of the oil city, Moscow announced that it ceased to be bound by the Brest Litovsk Treaty as far as Turkey was concerned. None the less, the Sultan's troops continued the conquest of Azerbaijan, thus adding to the Russian territory held by the Central Powers.

GERMANY'S CONQUESTS IN RUSSIA

The Quadruple Alliance was now master of an enormous fraction of the former Russian Empire. Apart from the territories handed over to Germany by the Brest Treaty (Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia) and to Turkey (Kars, Batum, Ardagan), armies of the Central Powers had occupied all of the Ukraine, including the Don Basin, rich in iron and coal, and all of the Caucasus with its petroleum resources. A continuous belt of country, from the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic to the Black, Azov and Caspian Seas, comprising approximately 400,000 square miles and inhabited by about 60,000,000 people, had fallen into foreign hands. It had accounted for much of Russia's export grain, most of her oil, and at least 80 per cent. of her coal and iron, as well as most of her sugar and tobacco. Moreover, it contained large centres of steel, chemical and textile manufacture. These conquests left Bolshevik Russia with only one port, except those on the distant Arctic, but even that port, Petrograd, was not free

¹ General Malleson is notorious in the Soviet mind for the summary execution of twenty-six Baku commissars delivered to him at Krasnovodsk by his comrade-in-arms Dunsterville during the latter's brief sojourn in the oil city.

² *The Brest Peace*, by G. Sokolnikov. Moscow, 1928. Page 11.

RED AND WHITE IN FINLAND

from the menace of German occupation. Danger threatened from the direction of Finland.

§ RED AND WHITE IN FINLAND

The Kerensky Government, whose eminent supporters were later so solicitous about the autonomy of Georgia, had refused a Finnish request for independence. Petrograd's actual control over Finland, however, was slight, and both the Reds and Whites in the province used the Kerensky interval for the mobilization of their forces, and when the Bolsheviks seized power in November, 1917, the Finnish civil war was already a fact.

On December 4 the Helsingfors Senate declared Finland an independent republic and applied to Russia for recognition. Swinhuvud, the head of the new government, went personally to see Lenin in Petrograd. He laid his case before the leader and, on the same day – December 31 – the Council of People's Commissars approved. January 4, Finnish recognition by the Soviet Republic was officially proclaimed. Germany, Sweden, and France soon followed suit.

This bourgeois Finnish government was pro-German. In October and November, 1917, a German cruiser and a U-boat landed munitions in Finland, and no sooner had the Swinhuvud Cabinet been formed than negotiations commenced for undisguised German intervention. At the same time, Helsingfors demanded the recall of the Russian troops still quartered in Finland.

Events moved quickly. A workers' general strike was called throughout the country, and on January 27 the White Cabinet fell. A Red Government succeeded it. Now civil war commenced in earnest. The anti-proletarian elements concentrated in the north where, under Mannerheim, a general in the Czar's army, they gathered a considerable fighting force. The proletarian government had at least 60,000 guards of its own, but it could also lean for support on the Russian troops. With these on the scene the Whites' cause remained hopeless.

At Brest Litovsk, von Kuehlmann and von Hoffmann tried to persuade the Bolsheviks to withdraw their army. But the Bolsheviks were anxious to bolster up the Soviet regime in Finland, which in the absence of a strong Communist Party, required the

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extra prop. Then came the German offensive and the German ultimatum demanding the immediate evacuation of the Russian army.

On March 3, the very day when the Bolsheviks agreed to retire their armed units from the Åland Islands and Finland and their fleet from Finnish waters (as soon as the ice permitted), the Germans landed on the islands and, a month later, 'at the request of the Finnish (White) Government,' according to General Mannerheim, 'units of the powerful and victorious German army disembarked on Finnish soil to expel the Bolshevik monsters.'

The Reds struggled stubbornly but unsuccessfully against the combined strength of the Germans and White Finns, and on April 29, after three days of sanguinary street fighting, Helsingfors succumbed. On May 12, after more killing, Viborg, to which the Soviet Government had fled, was captured and partially gutted. Viborg is but a short ride from Petrograd.

Thus ended the Soviet regime in Finland.¹ What followed reflected little credit upon German rule. The country began to starve. Russia had been its source of bread. In the second place, a White Terror was inaugurated which holds its place among the bloodiest in post-war Europe. General von der Goltz, who commanded the German occupational forces, made no attempt to curb Mannerheim. To be sure, he was a guest and could not interfere in internal Finnish affairs. Yet he was able to 'persuade' the freedom-loving Finns that they wished to establish a monarchy and that they wished to offer the crown of that monarchy to none other than a German prince, Friedrich Karl of Hesse. Proud Finland thus became a vassal state.

The presence of several divisions of German soldiers in Finland constituted a perpetual threat to Petrograd. But Petrograd was a hungry city which foreign conquerors would be required to feed. In a general German offensive for the capture of Moscow

¹ The Soviet Government of Finland left behind it a document unique in the annals of international diplomacy; an agreement between two unfederated socialist republics. On March 1, the Red Governments of Helsingfors and Moscow signed a treaty of mutual friendship. It provided that disputes arising between the contracting parties be settled by an arbitration court whose chairman would be appointed by the Central Committee of the Swedish Left Social Democratic Party.

GERMANY'S POLICY

and Central Russia, nothing could be simpler than to march across the narrow strip of territory from Viborg to Petrograd. In the absence of such a drive, a constant Damoclean sword over the city was more effective than actual possession. The Germano-Finn combination accordingly turned its attention farther north and deployed in the direction of Kem and Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean.

§ GERMANY'S INTERVENTIONIST POLICY

The aims of the Central Powers in Russia were varied. They wanted bread and raw materials from the Ukraine and the Caucasus. There was also the desire of serious business men in Germany to obtain permanent economic concessions in Russia which could be exploited after the war. Count Wilhelm Mirbach, the first ambassador from Berlin to Soviet Moscow, arrived in the capital on April 23 and commenced negotiations not only for the supplementary conventions adumbrated in the Brest Treaty, but also for industrial and commercial advantages for his countrymen. The success of such endeavours depended, obviously, on the goodwill of the Bolsheviki.

The Quadruple Alliance, furthermore, wished to prevent the formation of an Eastern front. A million or more German troops had been transferred to France and Flanders before the Brest armistice. They had made possible the great offensive of March 17, 1918, which nearly brought the Kaiser's armies within reach of the Channel ports. A counter-move by the Allies was inevitable. No forces could be diverted from the West; it would be a decisive summer. Accordingly, Russia must be maintained in a state of military paralysis.

German policy shifted with movements of armies and changed in a day or a week. At this juncture (April-May, 1918) it appeared as if the Germans were intent on occupying Moscow and overthrowing the Bolsheviki.

Moscow in German hands might have meant one of two things: the absolute precluding of an Eastern front and the economic enslavement of the country, or a second Ukrainian situation. As a matter of fact, the Left Social Revolutionaries never ceased advocating the annulment of the Brest Litovsk

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Treaty as a means of provoking a German occupation of Moscow. They then proposed to raise the standard of revolt against the foreigners, precipitate insurrections as in the Ukraine, sabotage, harass the invader, and by all these means not only strengthen the revolutionary spirit in Russia but even hasten the revolution in Germany. Whether this calculation was correct or not is of no moment; that civil, partisan war, however, would have followed German seizure of Moscow was undoubted. Faced with this prospect, the Germans proceeded warily.

In April, units commenced creeping slowly northward from the Ukraine in the direction of Moscow. Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, and near-by districts were entered. When Moscow protested in Berlin, Wilhelmstrasse replied that it knew nothing of such movements. Perhaps it did not. The military were acting on their own, and using irregular German bands instead of ordinary army regiments. Nevertheless, Moscow's heightened diplomatic resistance rather sobered Ludendorff, who, above all else, wished to avoid active Bolshevik opposition.

The German authorities in the Ukraine had obstructed the conclusion of an armistice between Soviet Russia and Skoropadski Ukraine. They had preferred to leave the situation in the flux so that a slight push might any day deliver Moscow into their hands. But Berlin now realized that the consequent state of uncertainty magnified Germany's difficulties with the peasantry. Moreover, the Americans were arriving in France and the Allies were preparing a grand attack. Germany could no longer waste attention or energy in Russia and the Ukraine. She needed certainty and clarity. On June 12, accordingly, the Ukraine and Soviet Russia signed an armistice which inaugurated a period of greater moderation in Germany's dealings with the Bolsheviks.

§ ALLIED INTERVENTION

If the chief desire of the Germans was to prevent the creation of an Eastern front, the chief desire of the Allies was to create one. In a Note on the war addressed to the Imperial War Cabinet, Churchill outlined his plans for the further prosecution of the World struggle. "There are two perfectly simple things to do. . . . (1) Above all things reconstitute the fighting front in the East;

AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY

(2) make a plan for an offensive battle in France in 1919.' The Secretary of State for War apparently attached as much importance to the former as to the latter proposal, for 'If we cannot reconstitute the fighting front against Germany in the East, no end can be discerned of the war. Vain will be all the sacrifices of the peoples and the armies. . . .'¹

How did Churchill propose to re-establish the anti-German line in the former Czarist Empire? Obviously, he and his friends could avail themselves either of Allied forces or of anti-Bolshevik forces within Russia. But a combination of the two was the wiser course. The country would be invaded and the invaders would rouse elements opposed to Bolshevik policy.

Furthermore, there were the Czecho-Slovak prisoners in Russia proper. They had served, unwillingly, in the Austro-Hungarian army which fought against General Brusilov and been taken captives. They were available for anti-Bolshevik activities. In addition, counter-revolutionary generals like Denikin could be mobilized for the attempt to renew fighting in Russia.

This was the interventionists' plan. But the plan involved the destruction of the Soviet regime. In the first place, co-operation with counter-revolutionaries like Denikin would help them in the achievement of their main purpose, the replacement of the Communists by themselves. Also, there was the probability that after identifying themselves with this goal, the Allies would adopt it as their own when the primary incentive of their efforts disappeared.

§ AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY

An alternative suggested itself to some Allied representatives. Perhaps it would be more advisable to gain the favour of the Bolsheviks. Perhaps, if the Allies supported the Russians in the organization of their army and economy, the resistance of Moscow to the Germans would be stiffened, and in a crisis the Soviets might conceivably resist a German armed force. But even if this did not occur, Allied assistance to Soviet Russia would make her a source of danger to Germany and compel Germany to maintain larger forces in the east as a guarantee against unwelcome

¹ *The World Crisis*, 1916-18, By Winston Churchill. London, 1927. Vol. 2.

developments. These Allied representatives (Lockhart, Robins, etc.) believed that their side would gain more by keeping Russia a friend than by making her an enemy. It was a policy based on the assumption that the Red State was stable and that the Bolsheviks were honest men even if deluded extremists.

Colonel Robins is testifying before the United States Senate Committee on his activities in Russia subsequent to the November revolution. 'We went to the representatives of the Allied military missions and urged that we enter into negotiations at that time with Trotzky . . .' with a view to preventing unguarded military supplies from falling into German hands. But the

'gentlemen of the allied missions threw up their hands and said, "What! Work with this German agent, thief and murderer Government? Nothing doing! And, anyhow, Robins, we might think of it if they had any real power, but they have not. They will not last but three months longer."' ¹

Robins received aid and moral support from General William B. Judson, the chief of the United States Military Mission, 'and because he went to see Trotzky,' Robins testifies, 'in order to arrange to prevent raw materials from going into the Central Empires, he was summarily recalled. . . .' The Soviets also wished the Allies to take hold of their transportation system. There was an American railway mission in the Far East. Trotzky said to Robins, 'You send in your mission. We will give you control of the Trans-Siberian at all points. We will make any man you designate assistant commissioner of ways and communication. . . .' It was a simple proposition. 'The American ambassador thought well of it'; he (Francis) wired the State Department on March 9, that

'Trotzky asserted that neither his Government nor the Russian people would object to the supervision by America of all shipments from Vladivostok into Russia and a virtual control of the operations of the Siberian railway.'

¹ *Bolshevik Propaganda*. Hearings before a sub-committee of the Committee of the Judiciary. United States Senate, February 11, 1919 – March 10, 1919. Washington, 1919. Page 787.

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This transpired subsequent to the signing of the Brest Litovsk Treaty. Even after the treaty's ratification, similar conversations proceeded with Allied and American representatives. During the second fortnight in March, for instance, Ambassador Francis who sat in Vologda and conducted diplomatic business by means of Colonel Robins and a long-distance telephone, tried to purchase 648 pounds of platinum – at \$100 an ounce – from the Soviet Government. Upon the urgent request of Francis, likewise, 245,000 pair of shoes were to be shipped to Russia from the United States in April. Lenin, as an earnest of Bolshevik goodwill, made special exceptions in favour of the International Harvester Company of America and at about the same period (April 19) Francis notified Robins in Moscow that he was 'endeavouring to foster commercial relations between Russians and Americans through Archangel and Vladivostok'¹ – all this, it should be remembered, *after* the repudiation by the Soviet Government of Russia's foreign obligations, and *after* her betrayal of the Allied military cause. England too. Lockhart, the British special commissioner who had superseded Sir George Buchanan as London's chief envoy, was in constant touch with the Communists, and on April 20 he wired Francis: 'I am carrying on negotiations here with central authorities to reach agreements on lines laid down by His Majesty's Government. Favourable progress here. . . .'²

Lenin sent Colonel Robins a long memorandum on May 14 adumbrating a 'Plan for Russian-American Commercial Relations' which suggested United States co-operation in the construction of electric power stations at Volkhov and Skvir, the digging of the Volga-Don Canal, the exploitation of coal-mines, and in the development of seal hunting, of lumbering, of Siberian railways, etc., etc. In the same document Lenin 'guarantees that the military stores which are on hand in Russia will not be sold to Germany.'³

Such instances could be multiplied to prove, (1) the desire of the Soviet Government for co-operation with the Allies, (2) the desire of some Allied representatives to further such co-operation. Bolshevik policy was based on the wish to attract foreign

¹ R.A.R. Pages 152-3.

² *Ibid.*

³ R.A.R. Page 211.

financial assistance for the difficult task of rehabilitating and developing the country. But of greater importance was the political motive; the more support the Soviets received from the Allies the better they could resist German demands. Also, the Communists may have imagined that they could gain by arraying one or more of the Allied powers against the others.

§ ALLIED POLICIES

There was no unity among the Allies. The outstanding war aim of the Allies in Russia was the formation of an eastern front to prevent German concentration in the west. But agreement was lacking on whether this could best be achieved by co-operating with the Bolsheviki or by antagonizing them. Generally speaking, the representatives of the Allies in Moscow were at least realistic; the statesmen at home, already under the influence of counter-revolutionary emigres, and affected by the 'Bolsheviki are German agents' propaganda which they themselves had inspired, had a distorted view of the Russian scene. In Vologda and Moscow as well as in the Allied and Associated capitals sharp differences of opinion prevailed. The Japanese Embassy had already left Russia, and thus proclaimed its impending active hostility to the Soviet regime. The other nations vacillated. In the case of the United States, Colonel Robins, acting for Mr. Francis in Moscow, was friendly; Mr. Francis in Vologda was less friendly, Secretary Lansing in Washington was cold. He approved very few of Robins's or Francis's co-operation suggestions. Or, in the case of France, Captain Sadoul and the other military attachés were helpful, M. Noulens, sitting in Vologda, nursed a rising bitterness towards Bolshevism, and Clemenceau was frankly hostile. He refused to allow Kamenev entrance into France as Soviet envoy despite the fact that Noulens, the French ambassador in Russia, had visa-ed his passport. Yet at the same time Litvinov was in London as recognized plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government and the recipient of verbal notes from the Foreign Office and letters from Austen Chamberlain and other state officials.¹

¹ The writer was privileged to examine Mr. Litvinov's private archive of this period.

ALLIES HELP THE RED ARMY

Nor was England's policy free of internal contradictions. Bruce Lockhart had committed himself to co-operation. He trusted the sincerity of the Communist leaders and in an official letter to Colonel Robins dated Moscow, May 5, 1918,¹ he actually enumerated the important instances in which Trotzky, acting for the Government, 'has shown his willingness to work with the Allies.' Lockhart, however, could not convince London to adopt his course or accept his advice. Or, to put it more correctly, he could not convince everyone in London. For sometimes the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing, and on occasions the left hand was permitted to caress while the right hand stabbed. While Churchill, for instance, was arranging Allied intervention in Russia, Lloyd George sent Sir William Clark to discuss trade problems with Chicherin. These were two varying methods of coping with 'German domination of Russia.' Sir William, in fact, was engaged in conversations with the commissar when British troops landed on Soviet territory. Then, of course, he hastily returned home, disavowed by events. But there is a more astounding circumstance on record: Allied military attachés actually helped to organize the Red Army which later shot down Allied troops.

§ ALLIES HELP THE RED ARMY

Even prior to the German offensive in March, the Bolsheviks had realized the need of a dependable army. The Czarist army represented too rotten a foundation, yet some of its healthy elements could be saved. Moreover, workers' guards had been formed; revolutionary units had sprung up spontaneously throughout the country to defend the Red regime. There were also wild Cossack regiments that volunteered to serve under the Soviet banner, and Communist Letts, and the sailors who had turned the fleet over to the Bolsheviks. These were the nuclei.

In January, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars decreed the formation of a workers' and peasants' army; in February, officers' training corps were established and the real work commenced of welding all the scattered forces into a centralized fighting apparatus; in March, on the 16th of the

¹ *R.A.R.* Page 203.

month, Leon Trotzky, who had left the Foreign Office, was appointed People's Commissar of War.

Lenin had always been favourable to the 'receipt of support and arms from the Anglo-French imperialist brigands.' The Central Committee of the Communist Party concurred. Trotzky conducted the negotiations. They were twofold: economic and military. The Bolsheviks needed an army. Plenty of men volunteered, and former Czarist officers too (some because they wanted jobs, others because they were sympathetic – but all were carefully watched by trustworthy Communist 'Political Commissars'). Expert advice, however, was lacking as well as technical knowledge and, above all, supplies. Accordingly, contact was established with the Allied military attachés. During March, April, and May, 1918, most interesting conversations proceeded. As early as March 11 Colonel James A. Ruggles, Chief of the American Military Mission, had a 'satisfactory interview with Trotzky,' as Francis reported, 'but no definite programme (was) adopted.' Within ten days Captain Riggs, Moscow representative of Ruggles who had proceeded to Vologda, wired his superior officer: 'Sadoul and I had interview Trotzky to-day and yesterday. Soviet Government asks French Military Mission for inspector instructors for new army.' The next day, Robins informed Francis that the 'French mission here has accepted Trotzky offer and is making assignment of officers for inspection work for Soviet army.' Forty-eight hours later, not only French, but 'American, French, English and Italian officers . . . are now co-operating with Trotzky.'¹ This was not the sort of neutrality the Central Powers expected after the ratification of the Brest Litovsk Treaty, but Russia was looking after her selfish interests.

The military attachés, very naturally, did not act without the knowledge and approval of their Governments. Ambassador Francis, for instance, 'authorized Ruggles to instruct Riggs to render active assistance in organizing Soviet army.'² Lockhart likewise wrote approvingly of the Soviets' invitation 'to us to send a commission of British naval officers to save the Black Sea Fleet' and 'to co-operate in the reorganization of the new army.'³

¹ *R.A.R.* Pages 97, 107, 108, 110.

² *R.A.R.* Page 117.

³ *R.A.R.* Page 203.

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Sadoul also acted on instructions from higher authorities and his Italian colleague too, no doubt.

But the Allies were no fools. They entertained no love for Bolsheviks and had no special desire to further the revolution. They believed the Red Army would help fight Germany. This explains their support.

The Allies did not persuade themselves, however, that the Red Army could do the job unaided. London, Paris, Rome and Washington were contemplating intervention in Soviet Russia with their own armies. At first, they thought they could obtain the Kremlin's approval. With this in view, the British War Cabinet, meeting on April 22 under Lloyd George's chairmanship, 'decided that Smuts should go to Kola [Murmansk - L. F.] to see Trotzky.'¹ Smuts, for some unrecorded reason, did not undertake this strange mission, but on May 2 Ambassador Francis, while encouraging friendly relations with his left hand, 'recommended the intervention in a cable' to the State Department with his right,² and on the next day asked Colonel Robins, 'Do you think the Soviet Government would oppose Allied intervention if they knew it was inevitable?'³ Francis inquired. But Lockhart was sure. He was convinced that 'a policy of Allied intervention, with the co-operation and consent of the Bolsheviks Government, is feasible and possible.'⁴ Lockhart may not have been very far from the mark - at the moment. A small British landing had been made at Murmansk in March to cope with the northern advance of the Germano-Finns. Moscow, it was clear, would resist intervention aimed at the revolution or undertaken with a view to the permanent occupation of Soviet territory. But if the Allies limited their military efforts on Russian soil to fighting against a real German offensive, the Communists were prepared to sit by passively until their own interests came under fire.⁵ Lenin and Chicherin understood the risk thus incurred. There was the danger of making Russia an

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson : His Life and Diaries*, by Callwell. London, 1927. Page 93.

² *Russia from the American Embassy*, Francis. Page 266.

³ *R.A.R.* Page 162.

⁴ *R.A.R.* Page 203.

⁵ See Chicherin's statement to the writer on page 126.

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international battleground. The undying enmity of Germany would be provoked – and the Bolsheviks, at this juncture, were inclined to believe that Germany might win the World War. Nevertheless, since Moscow believed that the Allies would carry out their interventionist plans irrespective of its own attitude, it wished to direct the invasion's spearhead away from itself and against the Germans.

For a moment, therefore, the British War Cabinet, Mr. Francis and Mr. Lockhart toyed with the idea of obtaining Russian acquiescence to their interventionist designs. Acquiescence would have simplified matters. Obviously, however, such a notion could be entertained only so long as the purpose of intervention was anti-German. Nobody expected the Bolsheviks to agree to intervention against the Bolsheviks.

The Allies had already recommended, encouraged and aided the Japanese invasion of Asiatic Russia in April without asking Bolshevik acquiescence. May and June, nevertheless, constituted the critical period in which the 'Little Interventionists' who envisaged intervention in Russia as a strictly anti-German move, and the 'Big Interventionists' to whom an invasion would serve the purpose of destroying Bolshevism and Russia and the Germans as well, fought for control. Towards the end of June 1918, the latter had won and the problem of Bolshevik consent to intervention disappeared from the calendar. This decision, indeed, had been foreshadowed by the Japanese-British landing in the Russian Far East.

§ JAPANESE INTERVENTION

Japan's invasions of Soviet Russia in April and subsequently were frankly annexationist. Almost immediately after the original peace summons of the Bolsheviks, and before even a truce with Germany had been negotiated, the Allied military attachés warned that Japan might undertake punitive measures against Russia. Brest Litovsk was a respite; the Allies refrained from overt hostile acts while it continued. Yet all the time Tokio intrigued.

As an ally of Great Britain, Japan automatically adhered to the Western Entente. But Japan was pro-Japan, and neither

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pro-Entente nor anti-German. She considered the war an opportunity to gain power and territory.

The moment Russia collapsed, Japan girded her loins for new acquisitions in the Czar's Asiatic domains. The Island Empire had ambitions in Siberia. England wished to weaken Russia by reducing her size and driving her away from the seas. Japan and Britain, therefore, were well met in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911. And when the revolution broke out, the two countries immediately commenced to plan the seizure of Russian land on the Pacific. France concurred. Foch, in an interview with Mr. Grasty,¹ urged Japan and the United States to meet Germany in Siberia.

America barred the way. It is part of America's foreign policy to weaken Japan's position on the Asiatic mainland. Japanese intervention in Siberia would, therefore, offend the United States, and the United States could not be offended for she was just then beginning to ship large quantities of supplies and men to the European battlefields. Accordingly, a campaign to win Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated. London and Paris undertook to break down the resistance of his 'single-track mind' and obtain his 'O.K.W.W.' for the Siberian venture of the Tokio Elder Statesmen.

The matter was not simple. The President's single-track mind saw only the French front. Even if there was no fundamental consideration of policy against Japan's control of Siberian territory, he could not grow enthusiastic about a 'side show' far from the field of war. His propaganda speeches and his army were calculated to defeat Germany. And he was being assured that intervention in Asiatic Russia would only strengthen Germany. 'Japanese invasion would . . . eventually make Russia a German province,' Francis wired Washington on March 9. The Bolsheviks preferred Germany to Japan. Trotzky said, 'I, of course, object to both armies, but if there is no other alternative, I say, better the German army than the Japanese. . . . If Japan sends an army force she will not withdraw it. . . .'² The President decided against Japanese intervention.

¹ *New York Times*, February 26, 1918.

² *Leon Trotzky. Collected Works*. Vol. XVII, Part 1, 'The Soviet Republic and the Capitalist World.' Moscow, 1926.

Tokio requested Allied approval of its plans as early as February, 1918. On the evening of March 3, a little dinner took place in Washington. The British, French, and Italian ambassadors were present, and someone, perhaps Wilson himself or perhaps Lansing, read a note which the United States Government proposed to send to Tokio. 'The wisdom of intervention seems to it most questionable.' Of course, assurances could be given that Japan was acting as 'an ally of Russia and in Russia's interest and with the sole view of holding it safe against Germany and at the absolute disposition of the final peace conference.' Japan, in other words, was posing as a willing agent of the Allies – God forbid selfish motives! – nevertheless 'such assurances,' the note continued,

' . . . could be discredited by those whose interests it was to discredit them, and . . . a hot resentment would be generated in Russia, and particularly of the enemies of the *Russian Revolution for which the Government of the United States entertains the greatest sympathy.*' ¹ (Italics mine – L. F.)

The note aroused such a storm that it never went over the wires, but Tokio was checked for a while. 'No further information on Eastern question,' Francis informed Robins on March 15. 'Apparently Japan was preparing move and if stopped was by our intervention.' Nevertheless the campaign continued. On the very day (March 14) when President Wilson's special message of sympathy was read to the Soviet Congress in Moscow, Balfour, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, advocated Japanese occupation in a statement before the House of Commons. How did he justify the plea? By asserting that Japan would save Siberia from Germany. *No other reason or excuse was given.*

Pressure on Wilson continued despite his determined opposition.

'One of the last acts of the Supreme War Council on March 17 had been to send a cable to President Wilson, urging

¹ *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, by Charles Seymour. London, 1928. Vol. III, page 431. (House gives the date of the note as March 5.) Pages 398 to 434 of the same volume contain interesting material of a detailed character showing how the Allies tried to win the approval of President Wilson for intervention in Siberia.

GERMAN PRISONERS IN SIBERIA

him to agree to Japan undertaking operations in Siberia, a matter to which both the British War Cabinet and the British military authorities attached very great importance.’¹

Why? Because the Germans might occupy Siberia.

Does this bear examination? Not in its extreme form, but few presented the extreme form. Few people asserted that a German army would march straight across Russia, traverse the Urals and invest Siberia from there to Vladivostok. It is an eleven-day trip, in normal times by express train, from Moscow to the Pacific. The armed forces of the Central Powers were in Reval, Pskov, and Vilna at the time. Ludendorff was more interested in Channel ports than in Pacific ports. Every sensible statesman knew that the German General Staff would not waste its divisions in the Farthest East.

GERMAN PRISONERS IN SIBERIA

Accordingly, the press of Allied countries began to teem with tales of armed German prisoners in Siberia. Not a regular German army, but the tens of thousands of Germans captured by Russia in the war and transferred to Siberia for safe keeping – these would seize Siberia and hold it for the Kaiser. Against these Japan asked permission to advance.

When such stories commenced circulating, Ambassador Francis and Mr. Lockhart, both of whom opposed Japanese intervention, were taken by a natural desire to investigate the rumours. They accordingly sent Captain W. L. Hicks of the British Mission in Moscow, and Captain William B. Webster, military attaché to the American Red Cross Mission in Russia, to Siberia. The two officers left Moscow on March 19, remained away more than a month, and on April 26 submitted a ‘Report of English and American officers in regard to arming of Prisoners of War in Siberia.’² They said:

‘We used every means possible in making investigations. We consulted with various Allied consuls, with the Swedish and Danish Red Cross representatives, with the Russian Secret Service, with the Y.M.C.A. men working in the prison camps,

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson . . .*, Callwell. Page 71.

² *R.A.R.* Pages 177 *et seq.*

with the Soviets in charge of prisoners, and, finally, with prisoners of war, both civil and military, many of whom were personally known to Captain Webster in his work as American Embassy Delegate in Central Siberia during 1916-17.

'Our investigations carried us to Irkutsk, Chita, Dauria, Krasnoyarsk, and Omsk. . . .

'We did not deem it necessary to go further east than Chita on the Amur line, inasmuch as Major Walter Drysdale, the American Military Attaché in Peking, whom we met in Irkutsk had just made this trip, stopping at all places where prisoners of war were interned, and reported that none of them had been armed and that they were all well guarded. . . .

'We found at Omsk that three sets of prisoners consisting of Hungarians, Czechs and Slavs had been incorporated into the Revolutionary Red Army. . . . The first party, consisting of 434 men, was sent to the Manchurian Front and here we were able to see and talk with them. A second unit, consisting of about 300 men, was later sent to this same front, and while we were in Omsk we interviewed the third set, consisting of 197 men. *This made a total of 931 prisoners who have been officially armed for military purposes.* In no other part of Siberia was this being done . . .'
(Italics mine. — L. F.)

Moreover,

'The Central All-Siberian Soviet, at Irkutsk, stated that naturally such a number was limited and that they would guarantee that not more than fifteen hundred prisoners of war would be armed in all Siberia. . . . They submitted this guarantee in writing. . . . The Omsk Soviet confirmed this guarantee. . . .

'*We can but add that after seeing the armed prisoners and the type of men they are, that we feel there is no danger to the Allied cause through them.*'¹ (Italics mine. — L. F.)

¹ In a memorandum which Dr. Masaryk, later President of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, placed before Mr. Roland S. Morris, United States Ambassador in Tokio, after a trip across Siberia, he wrote (on April 10, 1918), 'Nowhere in Siberia, between March 15th and April 2nd, did I see armed German and Austrian prisoners. The anarchy in Siberia is no greater than in Russia.' See *Die Welt Revolution. Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen*. 1914-18, by T. G. Masaryk. Berlin, 1925. Page 214.

GERMAN PRISONERS IN SIBERIA

Nine hundred and thirty-one prisoners had been armed in Siberia several thousand miles from Japan and as many miles from Moscow. Tokio, therefore, deemed it necessary to send a whole army.

It is significant that immediately Captain Hicks submitted his report, the British War Office recalled him, and only on the insistence of Lockhart did Hicks remain.

On April 4, Francis wired to Robins as follows:

‘After two sessions of two hours each with military attachés and Garstin (a British captain), the Allied ambassadors agreed to cable their respective governments, advising against Japanese intervention or interference for present. I had done so a day or two before.’

Yet on the very next day, Japanese and British troops landed in Vladivostok. Vologda did not know what London and Paris were doing – or was Vologda trying to mislead the Bolsheviks?

Immediately Russia was swept by a wave of resentment and the central government issued orders to resist the Japanese. To lull the Communists into a false sense of security, and to assuage the United States it was officially stated in Allied capitals that Admiral Kato bore individual responsibility for the landing which served ‘purely for protection of Japanese life and property.’ Some unknown persons had attacked and killed a Japanese merchant in the town, but they had not robbed him. The episode occurred a day before the landing. The Vladivostok soviet therefore felt justified in suggesting that the murder was political and served the Japanese as an opportune excuse. Had not intervention been planned in February, two months prior to the murder? That tradesman from Nippon who was sacrificed to international intrigue afforded the technical justification of an occupation which was not lifted from April, 1918, till late in 1922. ‘The cause of justice stands,’ President Wilson proclaimed in Baltimore twenty-four hours after the Japanese-British landing. ‘Does it?’ the Bolsheviks asked.

George Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, tells what followed.

'April 16 a so-called Far Eastern Government was formed in Peking with Horvath¹ as Prime Minister and Admiral Kolchak² as Minister of War. On the next day, Japanese spies were arrested in Irkutsk and it was discovered that the Japanese consul was implicated in the espionage. On the following day a counter-revolutionary plot was unearthed in Vladivostok and documents were found throwing light on the rôle of the Entente in the formation of the counter-revolutionary Siberian Government. April 25 the Soviet Government demanded that England, France, and the United States recall their consuls from Vladivostok and investigate their activities and explain the relation of those Powers to the counter-revolutionary moves of their agents in Russia. The chief inspiration of a consistent policy of intervention, the French ambassador Noulens, impertinently defended the Japanese descent in his famous interview of April 22. On April 28 the Soviet Government demanded his recall, and when this demand was not acceded to, it commenced to treat Noulens as a private citizen and ignored him completely as a political figure.'³

¶ CONTRADICTIONS

The trend of Allied diplomacy now begins to emerge. Washington opposes, London and Paris openly support, Japanese intervention. At the same time, Allied officers drilled the Red Army

¹ Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

² Admiral Kolchak had served with the Black Sea Fleet under the Czar. On trial before the Cheka in January, 1920, he testified that he was sent to England by Kerensky, in August, 1917. There he met Jellicoe. From London he proceeded by British cruiser to Ottawa and thence in a special car to New York and Washington. 'I was guest of the nation,' he declared. In the capital, he interviewed the President and naval officers. His mission was to persuade the chiefs of the United States to attack the Dardanelles and enter the Black Sea. From America he returned to Japan, where he received an invitation from the British to join their army on the Mesopotamian front. The admiral accepted but *en route* a telegram intercepted him at Singapore 'ordering' him to retrace his steps and come to Peking. There he was told by the British that he would serve better by putting himself at the disposal of the anti-Bolshevik leaders in the Chinese Capital. This he did.

³ *Two Years of Soviet Foreign Affairs*, by George Chicherin. Small pamphlet, published in Moscow, 1920. Page 11.

CONTRADICTIONS

which would soon be shooting down Japanese and other Allied soldiers.

Francis, Noulens, and the other Allied envoys in Vologda cable on April 4 against intervention. Yet the Governments of Noulens and Lockhart are for intervention. Then the diplomats in Russia experience a sudden change of heart. Noulens advocates intervention on April 22, Francis on May 2. However, having committed themselves and having been committed by their Governments to a policy of intervention without consulting the Bolsheviks, they proceed to consult the Bolsheviks, though they know that their countries will intervene whether the Bolsheviks agree or not, and in the case of England, that the Government has already intervened.

The Japanese try to exploit anti-German hysteria to obtain United States sanction of their aggression. When this fails they blame it on the death of a poor tradesman. And further to prepare for hostile reaction to their move, they attempt to shift the burden of responsibility on to a single admiral who, if need be, can be officially reprimanded and withdrawn. It is all so transparent.

Balfour assures the world that Japanese intervention is in Russia's interests. . . . His assurances were doubted.

'If Japan should decide to take Vladivostok, Harbin, and Russia's territory in the Extreme East,' wrote the *Manchester Guardian* on February 28, 'it will not be to please the French or to help the Allies. It will be because Japan has long desired to possess these places and thinks Russia's plight is her opportunity.'

The Allies made excuses, but were not quite comfortable. A small Japanese force, and fifty British marines, had landed in Vladivostok. That city alone, however, did not justify all the effort and commotion. Japan harboured designs on all Siberia and not only on one port. But the killing of a single citizen in Vladivostok did not warrant penetration a thousand miles inland. For that a better justification was required. Presently it appeared in the form of the Czecho-Slovaks. These would now offer the excuse for large-scale Allied intervention in Siberia.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS

The Czecho-Slovak revolt was one of the strangest episodes in the history of the Russian revolution. It supplies a most important clue to the policy of the foreign Powers towards Bolshevism. . . . From the very beginning of the World War, the Czechs and Slovaks, who fought against Russia in the Austro-Hungarian armies, deserted *en masse* to the enemy. They had a strongly developed national feeling; they hated the Dual Monarchy and hoped the war would end with its destruction and their constitution as an independent State; moreover, as Slavs they felt a kinship to the Russians.¹

These Czech and Slovak prisoners were pro-Ally. They and their cousins who had lived in Russia as civilians accordingly proposed to form a corps and fight side by side with the forces of the Czar. Delegations approached the 'Little Father,' who spoke pleasant words in reply but took no action – the Czecho-Slovaks were republican and Roman Catholic. Moreover, as Chicherin once suggested to the writer, Petrograd did not wish to close the door to a separate peace with Austro-Hungary by supporting one of the Dual Monarchy's disaffected minorities.

Finally Czarist autocracy was overthrown and succeeded by the Provisional Government. The Czecho-Slovak politicians in Petrograd and with them the French Military Mission, particularly General Janin, now increased their pressure on the Russians to permit the formation of the proposed force, and on April 22, Dukhonin ordered the mustering of the Czecho-Slovak prisoners.²

Dr. Masaryk, later President of the Czecho-Slovak republic, who was then in Russia, desired to have an independent army, and he desired it to fight in France. 'Accordingly I came to an agreement with the French Military Mission,' writes Masaryk –

¹ The Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Army acted in much the same manner and the Russian Government soon allowed the organization of a Serbian Legion on Russian soil.

² *Die Welt Revolution* . . . , Masaryk. Page 427. My account of the early history of the Czecho-Slovak army follows Dr. Masaryk's. Close reference was also made to *Der Aufstand der Nationen*, by Edward Beneš. Berlin, 1928. Beneš was a trusted co-worker of Masaryk during the World War and later became Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.

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it was in May, 1918, 'to send 30,000 prisoners to France. . . . We were promised . . . that the transports would be sent via Archangel as soon as possible.' French discipline was introduced, and French liaison officers were attached to the entire corps.

A significant detail: When Masaryk visited General Headquarters on October 9, it was 'explicitly agreed with Dukhonin that our army would be used only against the *foreign enemy*.'¹ (*Italics mine.*—L.F.). This was Masaryk's 'chief principle of non-intervention' in Russian internal affairs. He intended the Czecho-Slovak army only for the struggle with the Central Powers.

As soon as it became clear that Russia was intent on making peace with the Central Powers and that the Czecho-Slovaks could no longer fight Germany and Austria on Russian territory, Masaryk and his supporters decided to move out of the Ukraine, where the army was concentrated, into Russia. The idea was to proceed 'from Kiev to France by way of Siberia—a fantastic plan,' Dr. Masaryk asserts. And, now that the Czecho-Slovaks were no longer a part of the Russian army and no longer received roubles from Petrograd, Masaryk went to Moscow to see to it that his 50,000 men were absorbed into the French army. 'The point was,' he adds, 'to secure our army financially.' The Czecho-Slovaks, who had no funds of their own, now went on the payroll of Paris. 'We were financially dependent on France and the Allies,' writes Masaryk.²

Almost immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, Masaryk intimates, pressure was put on the Czecho-Slovaks to place themselves at the disposal of the Allies in *Russia*. 'England would have preferred to see us in Russia or, actually, in Siberia.' Nevertheless, Masaryk succeeded in commencing the Odyssey to Flanders.

Now, however, comes an extremely sensational revelation.

'I had thought of the war against the Bolsheviks and against Russia. I would have attached myself and our corps to an army which would have been strong enough for a struggle against the Bolsheviks and the Germans, and which would have defended democracy.'

¹ *Die Welt Revolution* . . ., Masaryk.

² *Ibid*, page 198.

In the very next sentence the future President simplifies the idea by eliminating non-essentials. 'There was only one possibility for the fight against the Bolsheviki – the mobilization of the Japanese.' It follows plainly that the leader of the Czecho-Slovaks was ready to take up arms against the Bolsheviki if the Japanese did so.

Towards the end of April, when the Germano-Austrian occupation made it impossible for them to remain in the Ukraine, the Czecho-Slovaks began their famous 'Anabasis' to Vladivostok. On the eve of this movement, their leaders received 80,000 pounds sterling from the British (Masaryk admits this), and 11,000,000 roubles from the French consul in Moscow,¹ thus completing their dependence on the Allies.

No sooner had the Czecho-Slovaks entered upon their adventure than the Bolsheviki commenced disarming them. This was done in accordance with a previous agreement, and when Masaryk heard in Tokio that the Russians had relieved his corps of its arms, he wrote in a secret memorandum to Roland S. Morris, American envoy in Tokio, 'This report is very favourable: the army is *en route* to France and needs no weapons because it will be re-equipped there.'² Nevertheless, the Czecho-Slovaks refused to give up all their weapons.

This may have been cleverly planned, for one observer, M. René Marchand, then correspondent in Russia of the *Paris Figaro*, 'regarded the Czecho-Slovak affair just as I regarded the Jaroslav rising, as a manœuvre to bring about intervention at all hazards.' The same writer believed that the Czecho-Slovaks were 'artificially incited to mutiny.' At all events, their opposition to Bolshevik attempts to disarm them was a violation of an agreement between their own leaders and the Soviets.

The agreement was concluded on March 26 and provided, according to Edward Beneš, Czecho-Slovakian Foreign Minister, for the departure of the Czecho-Slovaks to France 'as a group of free citizens who, for protection against counter-revolutionary attacks, were to take a limited number of arms with them.' In

¹ *My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution*, by M. P. Price. London, 1921. Page 292.

² *Die Welt Revolution* . . ., Masaryk. Page 216.

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his book Beneš further reports that the Soviets showed their good-will by allowing the ex-prisoners to obtain military supplies from the stores at Archangel when they reached that port on their way to France. 'Lavergne won Trotzky's approval through the aid of Sadoul,' writes Beneš. That was on May 7. Yet three weeks previous, on April 13, 1918, 'at the military conference, the view of a part of the commanders of the first [Czech] division was adopted against surrendering the arms at the next station to the Bolsheviks – in accordance with the agreement with the Soviets.' The Foreign Minister then relates how the troops hid their weapons. 'The branch of the [Czecho-Slovak] National Council knew of this,' he says accusingly, 'but tolerated it in silence.' Later, Dr. Maxa and Chermak, Czech representatives in Moscow, wired to the corps to fulfil the terms of the treaty which they had signed with the Commissariat of War. But no heed was paid to their remonstrances.

Frequently, attempts are made to explain the hostility between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Bolsheviks by the incident at Cheliabinsk when a Hungarian prisoner, who apparently provoked the Czechs, was murdered by them on the railway track. But that occurred on May 14, while the decision to resist Bolshevik efforts to disarm them 'in accordance with the agreement' had been adopted on April 13. Beneš does not deny that Russian White officers had found pivotal positions in the corps from which they could influence the mood of their Slav brethren. Allied attachés likewise had a hand in the matter. But according to Masaryk and Beneš, the Bolsheviks were not at all at fault.

Frequently, misinformed persons suppose that the Bolsheviks disarmed the Czechs in reply to German pressure. There certainly is no documentary proof, and the Bolsheviks deny it. Even Paposhke, Beneš' secretary, admits that the first known German representations to Moscow were made on May 28 – whereas the disarmament agreement between the Communists and the Czecho-Slovaks dates back to March 26, when the Germans, according to Paposhke,¹ had forgotten about the existence of the ex-prisoners corps. Germany, of course, might have complained against the

¹ The Causes of the Czecho-Slovak Offensive in 1918. Published in the Prague Monthly, *Volia Rossii*, VIII-IX, 1928.

operation of armed Allied forces in Russia – and did on May 28 and June 8 – on the basis of the Brest Litovsk Treaty which enjoined neutrality upon the Bolsheviks.

Concede that the Czecho-Slovaks

‘were nothing more than unconscious tools of French militarism in the East, which was exploiting to its own advantages the strong anti-Austrian and patriotic sentiments of these Czecho-Slovak exiles.’¹

Admit that they were duped by their French liaison officers or by the British. It is not important whose is the blame. The fact remains that the Czecho-Slovaks who were themselves not reactionary had put their lot in the hands of reactionaries and served reactionary purposes. Many of the Czecho-Slovak leaders expressed extreme displeasure with subsequent developments. Masaryk himself disapproved of the alliance between his army and the monarchist Kolchak. But such disapproval nowise changed the circumstances.

In the end, of course, the Czecho-Slovaks never reached France. After various experiences, which will be referred to below, the Czecho-Slovaks occupied Vladivostok on June 28. They had fought their way across Siberia and seized the railway in doing so. Why did they not ship to France? The road was clear; the port was theirs. Their goal was France. Why did they turn back to join Kolchak? Why did they begin to move westward? The answer is, assuming that the ex-prisoners themselves were innocent and sincere, that their masters, the Entente, did not intend to allow their departure for France. The Czecho-Slovaks were too valuable an asset in the anti-Bolshevik struggle to be transported to the Western front.

Of necessity, the Czecho-Slovak battalions were stretched out along a far-flung line, so that, when the trouble started, they were in a position to occupy in quick succession Novo-Nikolaevsk, Omsk and Cheliabinsk in Siberia on May 25, Pensa in European Russia on May 30 and Samara on the Volga on June 8.

‘The events taking place on the Volga and along the Siberian Railway,’ M. Philips Price, Moscow correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, wired his paper on June 11, ‘are a clear proof

¹ *My Reminiscences* . . . , Price. Page 290.

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that the Czecho-Slovak forces are not engaged in innocent self-protection from Bolshevik terrorism. It is significant that in every town to which they come in East Russia and Siberia they arrest the local soviets and set up an authority, relying upon the Cadets, Right Social Revolutionaries and Cossack officers.'

This interference in internal Russian affairs seems to have met with the hearty approval of Ambassador Francis, who wrote from Vologda to his son Tom on June 4, saying:

'I am now planning to prevent if possible the disarming of 40,000 or more Czecho-Slovak soldiers, whom the Soviet Government has ordered to give up their arms under penalty of death. . . . I have no instructions or authority from Washington to encourage these men to *disobey* [*Italics mine.*—L.F.] the orders of the Soviet Government. . . . I have taken chances before, however.'¹

Thus encouraged, the Czecho-Slovaks became an undisguised counter-revolutionary force. What was the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards them?

In a lecture delivered in Moscow on June 16, Trotzky, Soviet Commissar of War, explained that since the Czecho-Slovaks were commanded by counter-revolutionary officers and since they possessed Russian weapons, 'I made the condition that all arms be returned to the Soviets. I decided to permit each echelon to keep a few rifles for the maintenance of order; they agreed. . . . Later we learned that this condition was not fulfilled,' and that non-fulfilment caused most of the friction between the soldier-prisoners and the local Soviet authorities.

Then the Japanese, in April, took temporary charge of Vladivostok. The Bolsheviks feared co-operation between the Japanese and Czecho-Slovaks with a view to the conquest of Siberia. Accordingly, Trotzky continued:

'I informed their representatives and the representatives of the French Mission that we could not send them to Vladivostok but were prepared to carry them to Archangel and Murmansk. We demanded that France and England tell us how many ships

¹ *Russia from the American Embassy*, by David R. Francis. New York, 1921. Page 303.

they could make available at Archangel. . . . I waited for a reply but received none and thereupon declared that France and England bear nine-tenths of the responsibility for what is now happening. I got no reply to my direct question to the chief of the French Mission as to whether the French would remove the Czecho-Slovaks. In answer to my inquiry whether England agreed to transport the Czecho-Slovaks on her vessels, I was told, "The situation is difficult. We have no free ships." . . . I waited and the Czecho-Slovaks waited many weeks for the reply of the French Government. . . . The bourgeois press maintains silence about these facts.'

Radek discussed the same subject with Philips Price on June 6.

'The Soviet Government,' he said, 'is also ready to consult the Allies on the question of the future of the Czecho-Slovaks. One thing, however, we will not endure, and that is that Soviet Russia should become a prey to any military adventurer who gets enough foreign money and machine-guns. Precisely because we know that Allied Military Missions have been trying to use the Czecho-Slovaks for subversive purposes, we have decided to insist on disarming them. If the Allies are really so anxious to get the Czecho-Slovaks out of Russia, why do they hold up transport in Vladivostok and refuse to allow some 10,000 Czecho-Slovaks, who have already arrived there, to depart for the West?'¹ [for France, that is.]

The only reply to the question posed by Radek was: '*The Allies did not want the Czechs to leave Russia.*'

Data adduced by Dr. Beneš, the Czecho-Slovakian Foreign Minister, in his recently published *Der Aufstand der Nationen*, makes the whole matter 100 per cent. clear. It had been understood that the Czecho-Slovak corps was to fight in France. But *as early as April 1, 1918*, the British Ministry of War forwarded a memorandum to Beneš in which doubt was expressed whether 'these troops . . . could come as far as Europe. They should therefore be employed in Russia or Siberia.' Beneš did not like the idea. France too opposed: Paris was perturbed about the Western front and wanted reinforcements; England, however, thought of weakening Russia.

¹ *My Reminiscences* . . ., Price. Page 296.

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On May 10 Beneš saw Arthur J. Balfour in London. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs intimated that the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia might remain there. Five days later Lord Robert Cecil expressed the same wish.

London, meanwhile, brought pressure on Clemenceau to accept its plan of using the Czecho-Slovaks as the basis of an interventionary force against the Bolsheviks. The activities of the French Military Mission in Russia tended in the same direction. During the first week in June, writes Beneš, 'the French military representatives, Vergé and Guinet,¹ who had received urgent telegrams from Paris, refused to guarantee the transport of the troops to France.' Definite instructions were sent to General Lavergne from Paris on June 20 to keep the Czechs in Russia, and a week later he was ordered to mobilize around the Czecho-Slovak nucleus all counter-revolutionary elements, to seize the Trans-Siberian Railway and to prepare for Allied intervention – which eventuated in July and August. This complete identification of the French policy with the British found expression in a note from Clemenceau to Pichon on July 12.² This decision of June 20, moreover, marks the complete victory of the 'Big Interventionists.'

On June 28, it will be recalled, the Czecho-Slovaks, 'Without warning or provocation of any kind, seized the city [Vladivostok], disarmed the Red Guard and drove out the Soviet Government.' These are the words of H. K. Norton.³ And on July 12 the Czecho-Slovaks commenced moving westward, that is, back into Siberia.

'The real motives for this change of front on the part of Czechs have been the subject of some debate,' writes Norton.⁴ 'The stated reason was hardly sufficient to cover all the circumstances. It did not explain the capture of Yakutsk, far from the

¹ Guinet was chief of the French Mission attached to the Czechs. His rôle and that of the French generally in the Czecho-Slovak affair is discussed in *Notes sur la Revolution Bolchevique. Quarante Lettres de Jacques Sadoul*. Paris, 1922. Pages 94 *et seq.*

² *Der Aufstand . . .*, Beneš. Page 514.

³ *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*, by Henry Kitredge Norton. London, 1923. Page 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*

line of the railroad, where there were, and had been, no Czechs. It did not explain the advance of the Czechs against the Russian forces in the Ussuri Valley, with whom they had been on the best of terms, immediately after the seizure of Vladivostok. It did not explain the attacks along the Amur railway from the West. It did not explain the determination to hold the Volga line, and even to advance into Russia itself. . . .

‘The efforts of the Bolsheviks to detain them [that is, to prevent them from joining the Japanese at Vladivostok. – L. F.] were hardly sufficient to warrant the change of front, for those efforts had been wholly futile. . . .

‘The other explanation offered, and this is universally believed by the Siberians, is that the Czechs were prevailed upon by the Allies and under the urgency of France, to attack the Russians from the rear in return for recognition and assistance. [Philips Price is of the same opinion. – L. F.] This hypothesis covers all the circumstances already mentioned, and receives additional support from the later action of the Allies. France recognized the Czecho-Slovak Republic on June 30. Great Britain followed on August 13. The United States granted recognition on September 2, and Japan on September 9.’

We must now view these important Czecho-Slovak armed battalions as having ‘renounced their ambition to fight the Germans in France’ for the task of fighting the Russians in Russia. Coming up from the south, one branch of the line, so to speak, moved into Siberia while another penetrated deep into Russia. During July they captured Ufa, Verkhni-Uralsk, Simbirsk, Yekatrinnburg, and, early in August, Kazan.

Having taken Samara on June 8, a strong Czecho-Slovak force entrenched itself in the Volga district and slowly crept up the great river in the direction of Moscow, the heart of the revolution. More and more proof begins to accumulate of a conscious Allied plan to overthrow Bolshevism.

§ THE PLAN TO OVERTHROW BOLSHEVISM

Lenin had said, during the Brest Litovsk debate, that if they lost Petrograd they could retreat to Moscow, if they lost Moscow

PLAN TO OVERTHROW BOLSHEVISM

they could retreat to the Urals, and if they lost the Urals they could retreat to Vladivostok. But only two or three months later, the Czecho-Slovaks held Vladivostok and the Urals, Krasnov was trying to capture the lower reaches of the Volga, the Germans were in the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Ukraine and Finland, Denikin was in the Kuban, Dutov was on the march. This period was the Bolshevik zero hour in the Civil War. They controlled less territory than ever before or ever after. Moscow was surrounded by a small blotch of red. The rest of the country was white, black, black-white-red, etc. Now if only Moscow could be crushed the Soviet regime would be at an end.

History was in a feverish haste. Events follow one another kaleidoscopically. The plan to forge an iron ring around the red capital quickly matures. There are battles, insurrections, assassinations, invasions – two most exciting months.

A map and the chronology of events reveal the outline:

July 1. British-French landing in Murmansk.

July 6. Assassination of Count Mirbach, German ambassador in Moscow.

July 6. Left Social Revolutionist insurrection in Moscow.

July 6. Anti-Bolshevik uprising in Jaroslav.

July 9. Anti-Bolshevik risings in Murom, Ribinsk and Arzamas.

July 25. Allied diplomats leave Vologda for Archangel.

July 29. Assassination of Eichhorn, Commander-in-Chief of German forces in Ukraine.

August 1. Allied landing in Archangel.

August 6. Czecho-Slovaks take Kazan.

August 24. White plot against Soviets revealed in Moscow.

August 30. Uritzky, prominent Bolshevik, assassinated in Petrograd.

August 30. Attempt on life of Lenin in Moscow.

★

It is almost a straight north-south line from Archangel to Moscow. The only important towns on the route are Vologda and Jaroslav. Ribinsk is near Jaroslav. It is almost a straight east-west line from Kazan to Moscow. The only important towns on the route are Arzamas and Murom. If all these points fell into the

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hands of the Allies or their Russian supporters, Moscow and with it the Bolshevik regime were doomed. So the schemers reckoned.

The roads were to be cleared by the Russian Whites. They would open the Archangel-Moscow line for the Anglo-Americans; they would open the Kazan-Moscow line for the Czecho-Slovaks. Then the Anglo-Americans would come down from Archangel and, simultaneously, the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan would advance on Moscow.

§ SAVINKOV

The preparatory work was to be carried out by the Right Social Revolutionaries and Savinkov. Savinkov was an interesting character. Under Czarism he played a striking rôle as terrorist and political novelist. He acted as Assistant Minister of War under Kerensky, supported the monarchist general Kornilov in August, 1917, and, upon the fall of the provisional government, fled southward to join Kaledin, Kornilov, and Alexeev. This distant post, however, pleased his adventurous soul little, and in February, 1918, he appeared in the Red capital with far-reaching plans.

During his Moscow stay – from February to June – Savinkov mobilized White officers, monarchists, social revolutionaries, and a sprinkling of Mensheviks. He received funds from the French mission and the Czecho-Slovaks.

Six and a half years later the author sat opposite Boris Savinkov in a court-room in Moscow. Savinkov had entered Russia in the latter half of August, 1924, on a false passport. A few days later he was arrested by the GPU, and on August 27 his trial commenced before the Supreme Military Tribunal of the Soviet Union.

Savinkov, accused of crimes punishable by death, is being questioned by the justices. His organization, he admitted, contemplated attempts on the life of Lenin and of Trotzky. Then the examiner turned to the question of armed insurrection.

Chief Justice Ulrich. ‘With whom did you speak personally?’

Savinkov. ‘I have already named Consul Grenard, the military attaché Lavergue [both French. – L. F.] and the French ambassador Noulens. They told me that your [the Bolshevik. – L.F.] Government will be deposed and then there would be a possi-

bility of continuing the war on the Russian front, albeit with weak forces, provided the contemplated Archangel landing was supported by armed attacks. With this in view it was necessary, they said, to carry out armed attacks according to this plan: occupy the Upper Volga, the Anglo-French landing will support the rebels, and the upper Volga will serve as a base for the advance on Moscow. . . .'

Ulrich. 'And Vologda?'

Savinkov. 'Vologda? I also spoke of Vologda, but our forces were weak there. They also spoke of Kostroma. Included in the plan were Ribinsk, Jaroslav, Kostroma and Murom.'

Ulrich. 'And Vologda?'

Savinkov. 'We did not have sufficient forces to attack in Vologda. And the French said to us that they would take care of Vologda themselves. . . . I say again that this entire plan was based and could only be based on the projected Anglo-French landing in Archangel. Otherwise this scheme was inconceivable.'

Ulrich. 'Apart from the promised landing, did the French promise or give you anything?'

Savinkov. 'They promised nothing, but they gave money.'

Ulrich. 'When, how much, whom?'

Savinkov. 'They gave the money to me. . . . I received 200,000 Kerenskyroubles through a Czech by the name of Klecanda. All in all, I received up to 2,000,000 Kerensky roubles from the French.'

Ulrich. 'That was in May, 1918?'

Savinkov. 'Yes, in May - June, 1918. Later, when we determined on the risings, the French gave us 2,000,000 in one payment specially earmarked for the risings.'¹

Savinkov, at this juncture, entertained certain doubts regarding some details of the scheme. He thought it wiser, perhaps, to join the Czecho-Slovaks at Kazan; in fact, he evacuated some of his men to that city. However, the French objected. And Savinkov received a telegram from Noulens in Vologda

'in which he positively assured me that the landing would take place between the 5th and 10th of July, or, excuse me, perhaps it

¹ The quotations are from the official stenographic record of the trial. Page 56.

was between the 3rd and the 8th of July, and he urged me strongly to begin the uprising along the upper Volga in those days and not later because it might happen that "the landing takes place and you will not have risen." It was this telegram which forced me to attack on the 5th in Jaroslav or Ribinsk, and on the 6th in Jaroslav.'

With respect to Czech contributions, Savinkov testified on the same day that Klecanda came to him on his own initiative and gave him 200,000 Kerensky roubles. 'It was these 200,000 roubles, as a matter of fact, that then saved the organization.' Masaryk had one interview with Savinkov who was in Moscow illegally, but, in his *Welt Revolution*, disclaims any personal understandings or dealings with him. On the other hand, Klecanda, who actually brought the money to Savinkov, was secretary of the Czechoslovak committee in Russia, and 'a great help to me,' according to Masaryk.

Additional evidence is furnished by René Marchand, Russian correspondent at that time of the Paris *Figaro* and *Petit Journal*, and official of the Moscow French Consulate. 'The Jaroslav uprising,' he wrote in 1919, 'was made upon a formal demand by M. Noulens, and on the strength of positive assurances that Allied troops were about to land.'¹

From the mouths and pens of these anti-Bolsheviks we know that the plan to capture Moscow and overthrow the Soviets was devised and financed by the Allies. But circumstances intervened which upset all calculations. The Archangel descent came too late, and the Jaroslav rising failed; so did the Ribinsk mutiny. And the Czechs were delayed *en route* to Kazan.

Jaroslav was the key to the situation. The ancient city lies on the Archangel-Moscow route and also on the Volga. Savinkov

¹ René Marchand, as bourgeois correspondent and patriotic Frenchman, was in closest intimacy with the French officials in Russia at the time when these events took place. He himself was heartily in favour of intervention against the Bolsheviks whom he considered German agents. He expressed his sentiments in writings of that period. Later, however, he realized the folly of his ways, repented publicly, and published a pamphlet entitled *Why I Support Bolshevism* (London, 1919), which throws much light on the psychology of the interventionists.

ASSASSINATION OF MIRBACH

led the attack personally. It commenced at 2 a.m. on the morning of July 6. Tanks, heavy artillery, and aeroplanes were employed in a struggle which lasted twelve days and resulted in the well-nigh complete gutting of the town. Finally, the Social Revolutionaries surrendered. Many, including Savinkov, had previously fled, but Jaroslav was Savinkov's greatest fiasco. With the walls of its historic buildings crumbled the high hopes of the Allies to destroy Bolshevism before it had become sufficiently entrenched. Now there was nothing left for the Entente diplomats to do in Vologda or anywhere on Soviet territory. They accordingly proceeded to Archangel despite insistent urgings by Chicherin to come to Moscow, urgings reinforced by a personal visit to the ambassadors of Karl Radek and Arthur Ransome, then correspondent of the London *Daily News*.¹

It was Trotzky who objected to the presence of Allied diplomats at Vologda, and Chicherin accordingly warned the ambassadors that Vologda might at any time be subjected to White bombardment.

¶ THE ASSASSINATION OF MIRBACH

The opening of the sanguine Jaroslav revolt synchronized with an event of great moment – the assassination of Count Wilhelm Mirbach, the German ambassador in Moscow.

On the afternoon of July 6, Mirbach sat in his office on the ground floor of the embassy when two Russians asked to see him. They came from the Cheka, the Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle with Counter-Revolution, and urged pressing business. On being ushered into the presence of the Count, Blumkin and Andreiev produced their documents, signed by Dzerzhinsky, the Chief of the Cheka, and counter-signed by an assistant. Before these could be examined, however, Blumkin drew a revolver and shot at Mirbach and his two attachés. The ambassador immediately rushed to an adjoining room, but was overtaken by a bullet which struck him in the back of the head. To make matters certain, Blumkin then hurled a hand-grenade at the diplomat and, without stopping to retrieve caps or portfolios, both assassins

¹ *Correspondance diplomatique. Se rapportant aux Relations entre la République Russe et les Puissances de l'Entente.* 1918. Moscow, 1919.

jumped through the window – Blumkin broke a leg in the fall – and escaped in a waiting auto to the headquarters of the Left Social Revolutionary Party.

Immediately the news of the count's death reached Dzerzhinsky, he and Karakhan proceeded to the embassy. It was clear that his signature had been forged by Blumkin who, though he indeed worked in the Cheka, was known as a Left Social Revolutionary. Accordingly, Dzerzhinsky dashed across town to the brigade headquarters of the Social Revolutionary Popoff where he and Latziz, his assistant, demanded the surrender of the assassins. The Bolsheviks personally searched the house and smashed some doors in the process, but when the assassins were not found Dzerzhinsky threatened to arrest the Social Revolutionaries present unless they delivered Blumkin and Andreiev. In lieu of a reply the Social Revolutionaries disarmed the commissar and his companions and 'temporarily detained' them in the cellar of the building.

'I organized the Mirbach affair from the beginning to the end,' Marie Spiridonova, Social Revolutionary leader, boasted in her cross-examination by the Cheka on the 10th. 'We,' she explained, referring to the Central Committee of her party, 'adopted a resolution on the necessity of assassinating Count Mirbach as part of a plan we had accepted of annulling the Brest Treaty of peace.'¹

Another part of the plan was an insurrection on the following day. The Left Social Revolutionaries, operating from their staff headquarters in the Morosov Palace on Triekhsviatitelsky Street, seized the central post office, patrolled the streets of a section of the city, and arrested all Bolsheviks they could lay hands on. They proposed to take Lenin and Trotzky prisoners and then seize the government. The revolt, however, was poorly organized and indifferently directed. On the night of the 7th, a battalion of faithful Letts, commanded by Peterson, captured the Social Revolutionary headquarters, arresting most of the heads of the party.

In their proclamation which accompanied this episode, in

¹ *Red Book*. Published by the Cheka in Moscow in 1919, but immediately withdrawn from circulation. Page 200.

ASSASSINATION OF MIRBACH

their statement to the Cheka and at the Soviet Congress which opened just two days prior to the assassination, the Left Social Revolutionaries admitted that their purpose was to provoke war against Germany. There is no doubt that they intended the murder of Mirbach (which Blumkin subsequently confessed having executed on orders from the Left Social Revolutionary Central Committee) as a provocation to the Central Powers. It was hoped that the Germans would retaliate by occupying Moscow, and this step, in turn, would justify an Allied attack on the capital.

Some Bolsheviks believe that the Left Social Revolutionaries acted under Allied instructions. I cannot agree. In my opinion, the Left Social Revolutionaries were as resolutely opposed to Entente imperialism as they were to German. They thought that the Brest Peace doomed the revolution to destruction. To save it, they proposed precipitating a partisan war in Russia much like that which worried the Germans in the Ukraine. Mirbach would be shot. Prestige would demand revenge. The Germans would march into Moscow; the Allies would march too; both imperialisms would lose and the European revolution would be hastened. It was a puerile, impossible, unpolitical plan, but it was not an Allied plan. The most one can concede is that the ambassadors in Vologda may have been aware of the Left Social Revolutionaries' intentions (spies were ubiquitous), and timed the revolts in Jaroslav, etc., and the landings in Murmansk and Archangel to synchronize with the Mirbach affair. This is Savinkov's hypothesis too.

During the same period, according to Cheka charges levelled early in September, Bruce Lockhart, the British High Commissioner, was engaged in planning the assassinations of Lenin, Trotsky, and other Communist leaders, and in an effort to bribe the Lettish Guards to strike a blow against the revolution. Lockhart was arrested, despite the protest of Chicherin, and expelled from the country.

That Lockhart had previously been strongly opposed to Allied intervention in Russia is proved by documentary evidence. But intervention with Bolshevik sanction appealed to him as feasible, and when this sanction was not forthcoming, his Government

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nevertheless proceeded with plans calculated to destroy the Communist leaders, capture Moscow, and overthrow the Soviet regime.

Lockhart was in no position to change his government's policy, and under the circumstances, and remembering it was war-time, he did modify his own tactics although he of course undertook far less than the military and intelligence agents. Nevertheless, Lockhart at this time began to send funds to Denikin and to give money to the National Centre of counter-revolutionaries in the Bolshevik capital. He also received Berzin, the chief of a regiment of Communist Letts stationed in Moscow. Berzin said his men did not wish to fight on the side of the Bolsheviks. It was understood that the Letts would be led out of Moscow northward, and that General Poole, the commander of the British force that had landed at Archangel, would assume a friendly attitude towards them when he met them in his progress south to the Soviet centre. Berzin was then put in touch with Riley and other British representatives. Obviously things were done which could not be reconciled with normal diplomatic usage. But in conversation with the writer, Lockhart categorically denied that he had plotted the assassination of Lenin and other Russian leaders, or in any way furthered, or given encouragement to, such plans.

INTERVENTION IN NORTH RUSSIA

The Allied scheme for the capture of Moscow failed not only because the Jaroslav revolt was suppressed but also because the Anglo-French-American landing in Archangel came too late. Foreign troops commenced disembarking in Murmansk during the latter half of June, and on the 1st of July the occupation was complete. Had events proceeded according to programme, Archangel would have fallen into Allied hands no more than ten days later. Instead, a whole month elapsed.

Obviously, no Allied diplomat could announce that the purpose of the Murmansk-Archangel descent was the overthrow of the Soviet Government. Russia, officially, was an ally. Besides, the Entente's only *avowed* interest in Russia was anti-German. Accordingly, two justifications were given for the occupation.

'There was a danger,' said Churchill in the House of Commons

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on July 29, 1918, 'of Archangel becoming a submarine base for the Germans, and the danger of the loss of all that great mountain of stores we had accumulated there in order to keep that means of contact with Russia, and for all these reasons, combined with the fact that it was hoped the Czechs would make their way out by that route, the Allies in 1918, as an essential military operation and as part of the war, decided to occupy Archangel and Murmansk and put an inter-Allied force on shore there.'

Now German U-boats were, it is true, operating in north Russian waters. So were Allied men-of-war. But the submarines had never attempted to establish a permanent base. A U-boat can sink ships and shell a town intermittently but it cannot deposit enough soldiers on shore to capture that town. Moreover, why in order to prevent the establishment of a German base, did the Allies require over 12,000 armed individuals? Why did they need to penetrate a few hundred miles inland and occupy all intervening territory?

The second 'reason' is equally lame. There were, it is true, some stores at Murmansk and 'great mountains of stores' at Archangel. Far back in February the Bolsheviks had suggested to Robins that they be removed inland, and when no agreement was reached on the matter, they undertook the task themselves. The Russians were as anxious as the Allies to prevent the supplies from becoming a German prize. Yet when the Soviets commenced transporting these military goods to safer centres, the Allies protested. On March 4, 1918, Douglas Young, British consul in Archangel, wrote:

'The British Government regards all the stores on hand in Archangel as the exclusive property of the Allies and not of Russia. . . . The stores cannot become the property of the Russian Government even in part.'¹

In much the same tone, Ambassador Francis telephoned to Colonel Robins on March 30 saying:

'Authoritatively informed that large shipments being made to

¹ Translated from the original Russian translation which I saw in the possession of M. Kedrov, the Soviet commissar in charge of the removal of the stores.

interior from Archangel where immense accumulations of munitions and other supplies furnished by Allies on credits represented loans since repudiated, but Russian Government claims ownership nevertheless. Such position untenable. . . .¹

Neither of these statements testifies to any burning desire on the part of the Allies to have the stores removed from the reach of the Germans. Probably the interventionists felt that it was just as bad whether the Germans or the Bolsheviks obtained the supplies. At any rate, the Russians, clearly, were busily at work carrying the valuable goods into their own warehouses, and no protest stopped them. Ambassador Francis testified before the U.S. Senate Overman Committee on March 8, 1919, that 'the Bolsheviks were shipping a hundred cars a day out of Archangel and sent them to Kotlas, sent them down to Vologda, and to Petrograd and Moscow. . . .'² This activity was prosecuted with vigour in the spring of 1918 under the eyes of Allied consuls, who must have known that the material remaining at Archangel or Murmansk in July–August was too small in quantity to justify the landing of an army.

The Bolsheviks, harried as they were, could scarcely prevent an Entente landing in the North. Chicherin therefore made it clear to the ambassadors that while the Bolsheviks objected to intervention, they would resist foreign landings only in case they were directed against the Communist Government. In June – it was before the Mirbach assassination – Chicherin tells the writer, he sent one of his subordinates, a Left Social Revolutionary named Vosniskensky, to Vologda to interview the Allied missions there. Vosniskensky saw Noulens, who spoke frankly of his proposed 'Little' intervention for anti-German purposes and of 'Big' intervention for anti-Bolshevik purposes. He likewise saw Sir F. O. Lindley, the British envoy. He informed both Noulens and Lindley, under instructions from Moscow, that the Soviets would not resist landings of foreign troops on the Arctic provided they moved inland in the direction of Finland against the German forces there. But if they proceeded towards Petrograd or Moscow, the Bolsheviks would be forced to fight.

¹ *R.A.R.* Page 122.

² *Bolshevik Propaganda. Hearings* . . . Page 976.

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Chicherin sent numerous notes to London and Washington on the subject of the Murmansk and Archangel occupations. Between the lines, the same policy can be read. The Communists, because they had no other choice, were prepared to countenance Allied descents not aimed directly against them.

In view of these facts, neither the thesis that intervention was a World War measure aimed at the Germans, nor Churchill's U-boat excuse, nor his stores story, will bear examination. To the confirmed interventionist for intervention's sake, the anti-German motive had become subordinate to the anti-Bolshevik.

The Germans' war power was beginning to decline rapidly. Bulgaria was crumbling; Allenby rained heavy blows at the Turks; the Allies had stayed Hindenburg's offensive in the West, and Foch even directed one or two successful counter-offensives. On June 24, von Kuehlmann declared in the Reichstag that the war could not be ended by military means, and though the statement cost him his position it attested to Berlin's waning self-assurance. This lack of confidence was mirrored in the reaction to the Mirbach incident. The Bolsheviks expected severe reprisals; even the taking of Moscow. Wilhelmstrasse, as a matter of fact, demanded Bolshevik permission to dispatch a battalion to guard Dienezhni Pereulok 5 where Mirbach had been killed, and in high Bolshevik quarters this was interpreted as the introduction to more sinister measures. The Kremlin, nevertheless, protested violently against the German demand and Germany, whose hands were full elsewhere, everywhere, retreated. An exchange of notes took place in the second fortnight of July, and finally both parties agreed on the increase of the embassy's personnel to 300. The added staff was to arrive in groups of thirty without arms or uniforms.

This was a diplomatic victory for Chicherin. It pointed to Germany's weakness. Indeed, Karl Helfferich, who quietly appeared in Moscow on the 28th of July as Mirbach's successor, had strict instructions to follow a conciliatory policy of economic rapprochement. Helfferich's own attitude was extremely aggressive. No sooner had he arrived in Moscow than he established contacts with White elements and decided that Germany would act most wisely if she pooled her strength with the counter-revolutionaries in order to give the Bolsheviks that 'light blow' which, in

his opinion, would have sufficed to overthrow them early in August. He would not have signed the supplementary agreements envisaged by the Brest Treaty and he would have catered to the 'undivided Russia' sentiments of the Whites by returning the Baltic provinces. His plan of an anti-Communist *putsch* engineered by German brains and gold also included military operations by Czarist generals in South Russia and the bribing of the Lettish regiments in the capital. To all this the ambassador confesses in his three-volume opus on the 'Weltkrieg.'

§ A BOLSHEVIK OFFER TO GERMANY

Early in August, Chicherin, on behalf of the Soviet Government, made a most significant proposition to Helfferich. The commissar suggested that the Germans march an army into Russia. The Bolsheviks, according to this plan, would open a corridor for the Germans, who could enter the country from Finland and, while avoiding such cities as Petrograd and Petrozavodsk, advance to stem Allied penetration southward from Murmansk and Archangel. At the same time, German forces from the Ukraine were to resist General Alexeev's efforts to extend his influence north of the Don.¹

General Alexeev, Chicherin explained to the writer on one occasion, received comfort from the German forces in the Ukraine despite the fact that he was pro-Entente. The Bolsheviks wished to destroy this united front of the Powers against the revolution. Moreover, the Brest Litovsk Supplementary treaties, then in preparation, envisaged the return to the Soviets of the railways leading to Rostov-on-Don. These, highly important to the Russians as a link with the Caucasus, were, however, in the hands of General Alexeev, and the Germans were thus offering Moscow something they did not have. But the supplementary agreements represented a *quid pro quo*, and since the Bolsheviks gave real values they asked in return more than empty promises. They wanted the Germans to take the railways from Alexeev, the White counter-revolutionary. This was the one of the salient features of Chicherin's proposal to Helfferich.

¹ These facts, told me by Chicherin, are referred to casually by Helfferich in his *Weltkrieg*.

BOLSHEVIK OFFER TO GERMANY

This strange offer would never have been made had Moscow known, as it might have known, how quickly Imperial Germany was nearing her doom.

The reason for the Bolsheviks' proposal is clear; they were attacked on all sides; the Allies had definitely determined on intervention and might again repeat the Jaroslav-Vologda-Archangel and Kazan-Murom-Armazas scheme for the capture of Moscow. The Communists wished to win foreign support and only Germany could give it.

Helfferrich, however, in his extreme Moscowphobia, never even submitted Chicherin's offer to his Government. Soviet diplomats subsequently discovered that the Berlin Foreign Office was completely ignorant of the suggestion.

The German Government, however, would never have entered upon such an adventure. It was negotiating in friendly manner with Joffe. It disapproved of Helfferrich's machinations with the Russian Whites, and the ambassador was, in fact, recalled to Berlin during the first week of August. The German General Staff as well as the civilian authorities had no desire to complicate the eastern situation by destroying the Soviet regime and establishing a pro-German monarchist substitute which would inevitably be subjected to Allied attack. At a meeting with the Kaiser in Spa on July 2, 1918, Ludendorff stated definitely that they 'must make no attempt to overthrow the Bolsheviks at the present moment,' and the Chancellor agreed.¹ In like manner, Germany could not have wished to intercede on behalf of the Bolsheviks and thus provoke a bitter struggle with the Allies in Russia when she needed every soldier to prevent defeat in France.

Meanwhile, the fear struck into the Germans' hearts by the murder of Mirbach had not disappeared. Convinced that the Allies would succeed in occupying Moscow, some members of the German embassy's staff evacuated their families to the home country. Helfferrich left Moscow on the 6th of August. The next day a number of the embassy's departments moved to Petrograd, where they were closer to the border. A week later they went still

¹ Secret protocol of the meeting published in the Berlin *Rote Fahne*, November 6, 1928.

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farther and took up their abode on territory occupied by the Germano-Finns, leaving a few representatives in Moscow. These movements were scarcely proofs of strength or indications of offensive intentions. Moreover, Germany's position in the Ukraine, especially after the assassination of General Eichhorn and as a result of the subversive activities of Piatakov's underground Bolshevik agents, grew increasingly alarming.

This decline of the Reich's strength was reflected in three supplementary agreements which Berlin and Moscow signed on August 27 in accordance with the stipulations of the original Brest Treaty.¹

In these

Germany promised to

Soviet Russia promised to

Pay six billion marks in goods, bonds, and gold.²

Evacuate White Russia.

Occupy no more Russian territory.

Evacuate Rostov and part of the Don.

Give Russia access to the sea via Reval, Riga and Windau, and

Surrender Baku to the Russians.

Renounce sovereignty over Estonia and Latvia.

Sell Germany 25 per cent. of Baku's oil yield, and
Take cognizance of Germany's recognition of an independent Georgia.

This was much better than Brest. Yet the rapid sinking of the

¹ From the official German and Russian texts deposited in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

² The Soviet Government actually paid 120,000,000 roubles gold to Germany in two shipments during August and September. Viewed retrospectively, this was the height of folly. Germany was on her last legs and could never have forced Russia to pay. But Joffe misinformed Moscow on the strength of the Central Powers. He did not expect that their collapse was so imminent.

BOLSHEVIK OFFER TO GERMANY

Central Powers warranted a bigger victory for Moscow. Co-operation between the Entente and the Russians at this juncture would have permitted the Kremlin to defy Berlin at every point; it would have weakened Germany and given the advantage to the Western Powers. The Allies, however, had made war on the Soviet State, and the attacks of the Czecho-Slovaks, the landings in Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok undermined Bolshevism's diplomatic defences against the Germans.

Despite Soviet warnings that foreign invasion would be met with armed resistance, troops continued to land and by July 1, 4,000 British, French, American, and Serb soldiers had invested Murmansk. Within a fortnight the entire district had been occupied, including Kandalaksha, about 150 miles south of Murmansk, and Kem, near by Kandalaksha. On August 2 a landing was made at Archangel, where, on the same day, and under the protection of Allied cruisers and Allied soldiers, the Soviet was overthrown and a bourgeois coalition government set up under the presidency of N. V. Chaikovsky, a former revolutionist who opposed the revolution when it came.

This was the first case of large-scale intervention in Soviet Russia by oversea armed forces of the Allied Powers. At Vladivostok a few hundred Japanese and fifty British came on shore, but did not overthrow the Bolshevik Government nor attempt to penetrate inland. Here, however, there were more than 10,000 men (further reinforcements came later), and their activity consisted in the establishment of authorities opposed to the Bolsheviks as well as the conquest of territories far from the coast.

It is no surprise to find Englishmen, Frenchmen, Serbs and Italians among these forces. But Americans? Had not President Wilson strenuously opposed Japanese intervention in Siberia? Had he not expressed sympathy and friendship for the Soviet Government?

American diplomacy was very transparent:

May 2. Mr. Francis advocated intervention in a secret cable.
May 31. Mr. Francis made a public statement to the effect that
‘The policy of my Government is not to intervene in
the internal affairs of Russia.’

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May 31. Mr. Lansing cabled Mr. Francis: 'The friendly intentions of the United States towards Russia . . . will not be changed under the influence of accusations. . . nor through any denials of diplomatic privileges . . .'

June. American troops landed in Murmansk.

§ WOODROW WILSON AND INTERVENTION

Nothing the Bolsheviks had done could have caused the change. Perhaps there was no change. Wilson proclaimed friendship for Russia when he thought such action could bring her back into the Allied fold. Now all hopes of such a development were obviously unreal. He had opposed Japanese intervention in the Far East because America's traditional Far Eastern policy demanded it. The President's position was not determined by any interest in the revolution or the Moscow regime. If it had been, he could not have allowed intervention in the North.

Having approved of intervention in Murmansk, it would have been inconsistent to disapprove of it in Siberia. Yet Wilson did continue to object to Japanese occupation in Siberia. Clearly, his motives were anti-Japanese rather than pro-Bolshevik.

Strong British pressure was being brought on Wilson to join the contemplated Siberian adventure. At a War Cabinet meeting in London on June 19, Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 'again said that I would have to ask for the withdrawal of Poole [the British general in charge of the Arctic expedition. — L. F.] and of all his command if the Japanese did not come in, as we shall lose all our men at Pechenga, Murmansk, and Archangel.'¹ This statement is noteworthy because it draws attention to the connection in the minds of the military between these two very distant fronts and because mention is made on June 19 of men at Archangel when they actually disembarked in that city only on August 2. (This delay contributed materially to the failure of the Allies to capture Moscow in July.) Yet, despite the Commander-in-Chief's arguments for assistance to the Japanese, Lloyd George 'hangs back for some unaccountable reason.'² The unaccountable reason was the President of the United States. The Cabinet, accordingly, decided to cable to Woodrow Wilson,

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson . . .*, Callwell. Page 109.

² *Ibid.*

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‘urging upon (him) the need of Japanese intervention in Siberia.’¹

But the President remained firm. A month later, on July 16, the same British War Cabinet deliberated upon the same question.

‘. . . A. J. B. [Arthur J. Balfour],’ Sir Henry Wilson notes in his diary, ‘brought up [Lord] Reading’s objection to Knox² going to Siberia, saying President Wilson was opposed to it. I was very angry, and Lloyd George and Bob Cecil backed me; so Knox goes to-night by New York and Vancouver.’

George and Cecil backed Sir Henry because they knew Wilson was weakening. The next day, in fact, the United States State Department sent notes to the Powers in which it expressed preliminary agreement with intervention.³

The Allies, tired of Woodrow Wilson’s obstructions, had determined to defy him. Orders for intervention in Siberia had been given without Washington’s consent. Faced with this *fait accompli*, Wilson immediately joined the expedition.

Such a sudden reversal of policy required public justification. The oracle spoke on August 3. ‘Military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks,’ ‘the westward-moving’ Czecho-Slovaks. But why Czecho-Slovaks, who had captured the entire length of the Siberian railway and were moving west back into Siberia to attack the Bolsheviks needed protection was not explained. This official communique stated that the Czecho-Slovaks would be protected against ‘the armed Austrian and German prisoners who were attacking them.’ British and American military experts had discovered 931 armed prisoners. There were 50,000 Czecho-Slovaks.

Paris, London and Tokio had forced Wilson’s hand. They had decided to march into Asiatic Russia over Washington’s veto. And rather than lose all control of and touch with the Siberian

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* . . ., Callwell.

² General Knox, then already designated to command the British forces about to be landed in Siberia.

³ *American Policy toward Russia Since 1917*, by F. L. Schuman. New York, 1928, page 103.

situation, the President had agreed to participate. As a characteristic compensation, however, the official announcement of August 3 said that the 'Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok.' On the same day, the Japanese Government accepted the 'proposal'; on the same day a detachment of British landed in Vladivostok; a week later came four French companies. On the 12th of August, the Japanese arrived, and on the 15th the Americans.

Strangely enough, the official United States statement of August 3¹ opened with anti-interventionist arguments.

'In the judgment of the Government of the United States,' it began, '— a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation — military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion than cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distress.'

Then why intervene? To re-establish an Eastern front? But the statement doubts it.

'Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed,' it continues, 'even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would . . . be more likely to turn out to be a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. [This is probably an uncomplimentary reference to Japan's designs. — L. F.] Her people, if they profited by it all, could not profit in time to deliver them from their present difficulties. . . . We are bending all our energies now to the purpose . . . of winning on the Western front and it would . . . be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.'

These are unanswerable contentions against intervention. But since the Japanese and British were not to be arrested, the American Government made a wry smile and joined the party. It imagined that it could keep Tokio in check and therefore proposed that the number of men be limited to a 'few thousand.' By some

¹ It was signed by Frank L. Polk, but written, according to F. L. Schuman, *American Policy toward . . .*, by Woodrow Wilson.

AMERICAN-JAPANESE FRICTION

mistake, however, the United States broke the agreement and sent in 8,500 troops instead of 7,000.¹ Thereupon, on the ground that they were no longer bound, the Nippon militarists increased their forces in Siberia to 73,400. Subsequent protests by Secretary of State Colby were of no avail.

The United States forces were to be employed 'to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence.' (Against whom?) This opened the way to the support of anti-Bolshevik elements which wished to establish themselves in Siberia.

AMERICAN-JAPANESE FRICTION

Sharp conflicts soon developed between the American and Japanese chiefs in Siberia. The United States may have joined the forces of reaction in Russia, but its purpose in intervening was certainly not territorial aggrandisement. Japan, on the other hand, was plainly laying the groundwork for future annexations to round out her war-time gains in China. Accordingly, the more aggressive Japan's moves became, the more cautious grew the attention of the American authorities in Siberia. This was also due, in part, to the statesmanlike conduct of Major-General William B. Graves, head of the American Expeditionary forces. And there was a natural desire to distinguish between the methods of the two countries.

From the very beginning, the intentions of the Japanese were clear. By the end of August they had, in addition to the men landed at Vladivostok, 30,000 soldiers in North Manchuria and 6,000 at Manchuli, on the Manchurian-Siberian frontier. Early in September they had proceeded as far west as Irkutsk. The whole Baikal region lay at their feet.

More and more Japanese troops kept coming into the country. But it was impossible to check their numbers. For if the American or British or French Government placed a captain in charge of its men at a certain point, Japan was certain to send a colonel. If the others sent a colonel, Tokio never failed to dispatch a general. The Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied forces in Siberia was, accordingly, General Otami, a member of the Supreme Military

¹ *The Russian Soviet Republic*, by E. A. Ross. New York, 1923. Page 154.

Council of Japan. All troop movements were reported to him, but the Allies were unable to obtain information with regard to movements of Japanese troops. Allied military operations required the approval of the Commander-in-Chief. Japanese operations were not even brought to the attention of the Allies.

Within a few months Japan had several times as many soldiers in Siberia as all the other nations combined, and additional reinforcements could be ordered to march on short notice from Korea and Manchuria. They held the railway line from Vladivostok to Chita and their faithful ally, Ataman Semenov, had gained control of the district between Manchuli and Chita. At the same time, the Czecho-Slovaks were in command of the country west of Chita as far as the Urals, and beyond too.

Under these circumstances anti-Bolshevik groups could work with facility. A number of governments were set up at various places but only one pretended to national significance. That was the 'Provisional All-Russian Government' appointed at Ufa on September 22, 1918, by the so-called 'State Assembly,' and consisting of Astrov, N. D. Avksentiev, Boldirev, Vologodski and N. V. Chaikovsky, the chief of the Archangel Cabinet who, it is important to note, was included in the Ufa list because of the kinship between the two districts under Allied control and of the intention ultimately to unite both regions and all Russia in one counter-revolutionary state. The 'directors,' as they were called, now moved to Omsk and began to organize their administration. Vladivostok recognized its authority as did Irkutsk, and most of that part of Siberia which the Czecho-Slovaks had occupied. Semenov, the Japanese puppet, however, remained hostile, while General Horvath, who supervised the Chinese Eastern Railway by the grace of the Japanese, offered only paper allegiance. Omsk, nevertheless, became a power to reckon with.

ADMIRAL KOLCHAK

Admiral Kolchak had arrived in Omsk in September. Kolchak was appointed Minister of War, it will be remembered, of a government formed in Peking during the month of April. In the interval he served as director of the Chinese Eastern Railway and as such, on one occasion, it fell to his lot to offer money and assistance to

Semenov. 'Semenov,' Kolchak testified before the Cheka,¹ 'received support for the most part from the Japanese mission.' He, therefore, not merely refused to accept Kolchak's proffered assistance; he even refused to see Kolchak, who had gone to the edge of Manchuria to meet him. That was in May. Later Kolchak travelled to Tokio, where he interviewed General Knox and discussed with that Englishman details for the reorganization of the Government and army of Siberia. On his return to Siberia, he met Gaida, a Czecho-Slovak leader destined later to play an enigmatic rôle in the history of his own country. Gaida, according to Kolchak's testimony, wished to establish a dictatorship. He fired Kolchak's ambition.

Kolchak was Minister of War of the Omsk Government. Nevertheless, he caused the directors of that government to be arrested on the night of November 18 and declared himself 'Supreme Ruler of Russia.' A group of officers had engineered the coup.

The British, French, and Americans took kindly to Kolchak from the very start. 'Harris, the American representative,' says Kolchak, 'showed me the greatest feelings of friendship and extraordinary sympathy.'² A day after the coup, Mr. Harris promised the new dictator United States aid. The British naturally came to his side whole-heartedly. The French too were cordial. But the Japanese adopted an attitude of extreme though sometimes veiled hostility, and their creatures, the Atamans Semenov and Kalmikov, forthwith commenced warlike operations against Kolchak's government.

The people were not consulted, and since the Powers and the Czecho-Slovaks approved of the 'Supreme Ruler,' the territory which had owed allegiance to the Omsk directorate accepted the rule of the Omsk dictator while the districts under the sway of Semenov's and Kalmikov's Cossacks did not. Kolchak now commenced to mobilize an army to suppress his Ataman opponents and, what was of more consequence, to overthrow the Bolsheviks in Russia. He had Britain's liberal support. Speaking of Kolchak's forces, Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons, on May 29, 1919, 'In the main these armies are equipped by British munitions and British rifles, and a certain portion of the troops are actually wearing British uniforms.'

¹ *The Cross-Examination of Kolchak*. Leningrad, 1925, page 186. ² *Ibid*, page 106.

ALLY AND ENEMY

With the rise of Kolchak, even the slightest pretence of democratic opposition to the Bolsheviks disappeared. All the generals in the Ukraine, the Don, the Kuban and the Caucasus, whether pro-German or pro-Entente, were frankly reactionary and autocratic, and, for the most part, enthusiastically monarchist. Krasnov, Alexeev, Dutov, Denikin, Kornilov, Kaledin and the others never even claimed to have popular support. The Chaikovsky Government in Archangel district, likewise, was the creature and tool of the Allied arms.

In November, 1918, therefore, the civil war in Russia became a clear-cut struggle between Red revolution and black reaction, between Communists and monarchists, between Bolshevik enemies of bourgeois democracy and Czarist enemies of all democracy. The Allies sided with the latter.

§ WHY INTERVENTION?

The Entente Powers had definitely committed themselves to intervention. First they hesitated; then for a moment they entertained the notion of intervening with Bolshevik consent; now they had thrown in their lot with the internal enemies of Moscow.

This little understood change from formal relations to open hostility can be explained by a number of circumstances:

1. Because Japan insisted on intervention (not for anti-German reasons but for her own benefit) and could not be thwarted without creating the danger of her deserting the Entente. Having consented in principle to Japanese interference in Siberia, it was easier for England, France, and Italy to intervene themselves.

2. Because the Czecho-Slovaks offered men like Noulens and Churchill, the enthusiastic advocates of intervention, an argument with which to convince men like Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George, the doubters, that intervention was necessary to save these Allied troops from destruction. First they created a situation in which friction between the Czechs and the Soviets became inevitable and then they made the appeal for the rescue of the Czechs. This was in May-June, 1918.

3. Because in May the interventionists used the disaster on the Western front to convince their governments that only an



A SOVIET CARTOON SHOWING UNCLE SAM, FRANCE, JOHN BULL, SENDING THE DOGS OF WAR, 'DENIKIN,' 'KOLCHAK' AND 'YUDENICH,' AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKS

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WHY INTERVENTION?

Eastern front could save the Entente cause, and that only foreign troop landings in Russia could create an Eastern front.

There were three categories of interventionists:

1. The Churchill, 'Big Intervention' brand who saw Bolshevism as a menace and wished to overthrow it. The desire to create an Eastern front against the Germans was a sincere motive in their case, but behind it was their hatred of the Bolsheviks, which exceeded their hatred of the Germans.

2. The Japanese, who were not interested in the overthrow of Bolshevism but rather wished to see a state of Russian disorder and weakness from which they could extract advantages.

3. The doubters who favoured only the 'Little Intervention,' that is, intervention against the Germans.

Intervention on a large scale became possible when the 'Big Interventionists' won the approval of the 'Little Interventionists.' And in June-July came the intervention which the Lloyd Georges thought 'Little' but which the Churchills knew would be 'Big.' For in June and July the Germans were withdrawing many thousands of troops from the Eastern front to the Western. The Entente no longer feared the 'Germanization' of Russia. But the menace of Bolshevism remained.

Intervention found the Soviets standing alone on a small piece of territory faced by a combination of Russia's *bourgeoisie* and a group of foreign countries. They had little money, an imperfect organization, a weak army, limited experience, and insufficient military equipment. The enemy disposed of huge financial resources, expert military leadership, boundless supplies of arms, munitions and stores, great stretches of territory (Siberia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the North, etc.), and the richest agricultural, raw-material producing and industrial sections of the country.

Yet in the end, victory came to the Soviets. Single-handedly they fought England, America, Japan, Serbia, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, the Baltic States, Kolchak, Denikin, Petlura, the Mensheviks, Yudenich, Wrangel, Semenov, Kalmikov, and a host of lesser forces, and won.

To understand how they did it is to understand the secret of Soviet Russia's persistence to the present day. The elements which made for her victory then contribute to her stability now.

'BIG' ALLIED INTERVENTION

November, 1918, marks a milestone in the history of the Soviet Civil War. The rise of Kolchak, the fall of the Kaiser, and the close of the World War represent the dawn of a new phase.

The Kolchak coup introduced clarity into the internal Russian conflict. It became a struggle between the establishment of the new and the restoration of the old. In like manner, the Armistice revealed the true character of foreign intervention. After the defeat of the Central Powers, the 'German menace' could no longer be offered as an excuse for Allied interference. If Allied troops had entered Russia to reconstruct the Eastern front or to prevent military supplies from falling into German hands or to defeat the sinister designs of armed enemy prisoners, then the Armistice should have signalled the beginning of evacuation. Instead, Allied support to counter-revolutionaries increased considerably after the Armistice.

By this time, the White Russian *émigrés* had consolidated their influence in foreign political circles. Not unlike their prototypes in the French revolution, these counter-revolutionary nobles, landlords, industrialists, and bankers fled abroad immediately after the Bolshevik upheaval and created, in London, Paris, Washington, etc., salons, bureaux, and unofficial centres of anti-Soviet activity. With their wealth and social position, they quickly won the ear of important personalities in government positions, and became the accepted sources of information on Russian questions.

The *émigrés* affected the course of Soviet international relations from the very beginning. Even during Brest Litovsk their influence was not negligible. And as the Powers slowly moved towards a more and more anti-Bolshevik stand, the Whites' status gained force. They were consulted. They lobbied. They volunteered advice. And 'they' includes the whole gamut from the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Cyril to Miliukov and Kerensky.

Everywhere, except in Germany, governments continued to deal with and regard as representative the diplomatic envoys of

the Czarist and Provisional Governments. Official exchequers even advanced money to ambassadors and financial agents of pre-1917 regimes in Russia who spoke in the name of non-existent governments.

White *émigrés* became the advisers of foreign offices and Cabinet Ministers. The counter-revolutionaries had one aim in life: to unseat the Bolsheviks. When this aim was adopted by the Western Powers towards the end of the World War, a perfect *entente* arose in which the rôle of the Russians must not be underestimated.

It was natural that the Allies should concentrate more attention on Russia when they had finished with Germany. The Great Powers felt that Moscow represented an idea the spread of which constituted a danger to their hegemony. During the War their energies were divided. Now fleets, armies, munition factories, war offices, newspapers, and Cabinets could be more readily mobilized for the battle against Bolshevism.

Once this motive was frankly admitted in a British General Staff memorandum dated February 4, 1919, which declared that Bolshevik success in the Archangel campaign 'would give the Bolsheviks' cause an impetus which would be felt not only in Siberia and South Russia but throughout the civilized world.'¹ The English army chiefs, in other words, were conscious of their rôles as protectors of certain international interests.

THIN ICE

Yet the more usual intervention explanation avoided reference to such matters and appealed to the patriotism or sporting instincts or ethical sensibilities of all classes of the population of a given country. Thus, Sir Henry Wilson, writing officially to Winston Churchill, said:

'Having been initiated as an anti-German measure, the signature of the German Armistice robbed the campaign of its original purpose. It may then be asked why did we not immediately withdraw our troops from North Russia in November, 1918. There were two main obstacles in the way of doing this. In the first

¹ *Army, The Evacuation of North Russia*. 1919. British Blue Book. Cmd. 818. London. Page 23.

‘BIG’ ALLIED INTERVENTION

place, owing to climatic conditions, we could not be sure of being able to remove the whole force from Archangel before the port was closed by ice.’¹

But Murmansk, where part of the Allied forces was stationed, is open all the year round. The Gulf Stream keeps it free of ice. Why were not the soldiers sent home through Murmansk? Or, why were not the soldiers at Murmansk sent home? The Murmansk units gave the Archangel detachment no protection or cover. Besides, why did not evacuation take place in the spring season when ships could enter and leave? Why was the British occupational army retained in North Russia until October, 1919, and then removed not because the military wished but because pressure at home and in the exiled battalions compelled evacuation?

Sir Henry proceeds with his second reason.

‘In the second place,’ writes the Field-Marshal,² ‘the prosecution of our anti-German policy had involved us in obligations to those loyal Russians who had remained true to the Allied cause and had thereby compromised themselves with the Soviet Government.’

This holds as little water as the ice argument. The only persons who ‘remained true to the Allied cause’ were so few in number that they could have been carried off on troop ships, as in fact they finally were. That the ‘loyal Russians’ constituting the Northern Government lacked all mass support is testified by Ambassador Francis himself, who on one occasion ‘had to tell the President [Chaikovsky] . . . that if the Allied forces were withdrawn from Archangel, the officials of the new government would be driven into the Arctic Ocean.’

Soon lack of sympathy with the Allies turned to enmity and soldiers conscripted into anti-Bolshevik battalions commenced to mutiny and to shoot their British officers. The only ‘loyal Russians’ left were a group of politicians kept in power by foreign bayonets and machine guns, and so supine that Francis could boast: ‘I think now he [Chaikovsky] will not appoint a minister

¹ *Army, The Evacuation of North Russia*. 1919. British Blue Book. Cmd. 818. London.

² *Ibid.*

FROZEN DEMOCRACY

to whom we [the ambassadors] object.' Under the circumstances, and unless the British-American-French interventionists were prepared to maintain them in office permanently, the compromised counter-revolutionaries would, sooner or later, have to seek safe refuge abroad. The White regime on the Arctic might just as easily have been scrapped at the end of the World War as it was a year later.

¶ FROZEN DEMOCRACY

The Archangel regime was wholly undemocratic. Ambassador Francis tries to place the blame at the door of the British and French. The British Commander-in-Chief, 'General Poole,' for instance, 'was approving orders issued by his subordinates which sent all Russian soldiers of *democratic inclinations* out of Archangel to the front.' Yet Francis himself describes how American privates replaced striking Russian motormen and conductors on the Archangel tram-cars.

The British even intrigued to erect a monarchist dictatorship. Late in the evening of September 6, 1918, a group of officers led by a Captain Chaplin kidnapped the Chaikovsky Government and carried off its members to Solovietzky Island, an ice-bound dot in the Arctic Ocean. S. Dobrovolsky, a well-known White leader, reports that the British thereupon posted armed sentinels throughout the city to protect the usurpers.¹ Ambassador Francis, on the other hand, conferred with the supporters of the deported ministers. Finally, at a stormy meeting between General Poole and the Allied diplomatic corps, a compromise was accepted by the terms of which Chaikovsky would be returned to power and instructed to constitute a less liberal government.

Mr. Francis cordially disapproved of the British rôle in this theatrical coup. The day after it occurred, the Allied leaders were reviewing three newly arrived American battalions. The ceremony finished, this conversation ensued:

General Poole. 'There was a revolution here last night.'

Francis. 'The hell you say! Who pulled it off?'

Poole. 'Chaplin.'

¹ *The Civil War in Siberia and the Northern Province. Memoirs of White Leaders.* Moscow, 1927. Page 233.

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Chaplin, Russian naval adviser on Poole's staff, was standing near by. Francis motioned to him.

Francis. 'Chaplin, who pulled off this revolution here last night?'

Chaplin. 'I did. I drove the Bolsheviks out of here. I established this government [the Chaikovsky Government. – L. F.]. The ministers were in General Poole's way, and were hampering Colonel Donlop [French Provost-Marshal]. I see no use for any government here anyway.'¹

Since real authority was vested in Poole and in Donlop, the Governor of Archangel, Chaplin questioned the necessity of local Russian government. Therefore, apparently, he had no scruples against making away with the 'loyal Russians' for the sake of whose safety, presumably, intervention was being prolonged.

The London statesmen, realizing the inadequacy of their explanations, continually advanced new supporting arguments. They had demanded the Siberian expedition to protect the Murmansk landing and now, when all *raison d'être* for the Murmansk landing had disappeared, they commenced to defend it as a protection for the Siberian expedition.

Notwithstanding the weak grounds for foreign intervention, it had to be reckoned with as a potent military force. In August, 1918, British, French, and Americans, were pushing down from the North; the Czecho-Slovaks continued their victorious march in the Volga district; Krasnov, the German-subsidized White, pressed up towards Moscow, and in Moscow itself anti-Bolshevik machinations by Allied representatives and assassinations by hired agents continued to multiply.

THE BOLSHEVIKS' FIRST VICTORY

Bolshevik prospects did not seem bright. The bullets that temporarily felled Lenin struck horror into the hearts of the Kremlin leaders. For a moment it appeared as if the end had come. But they girded their loins for a great effort. On September 2 the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government placed the entire country under martial law, and three days later the

¹ *Russia from the American Embassy*, Francis. Page 270.

THE BOLSHEVIKS' FIRST VICTORY

Council of People's Commissars announced the initiation of the Red Terror as a weapon against the Savinkov organization and other opponents of the revolution. 'Death to all traitors,' 'Merciless war on the foreign invaders' were the new slogans. The Bolsheviks had been driven to the wall; they fought with all the fierceness of a beast at bay.

While the Cheka mowed down the scheming officers and conspiring Whites operating on the Bolshevik territory, the Red Army and Navy moved against the Czecho-Slovaks. Petrograd workers and units of the Baltic fleet were brought from the Neva River, through the tedious, intricate canal system which makes it possible to go by water from Petrograd to Persia, and concentrated on the Volga near Kazan. At the same time, land forces led personally and inspired by the fiery eloquence of Trotzky, bore down on the same Tartar city. Meanwhile, the Kazan proletariat sabotaged within the walls. On the 10th of September the town fell. A cry of rejoicing went up in the Communists' camp; it was their first victory.

The Commissar of War now ordered Tukhachevsky to take Simbirsk by September 12. On that date, a telegram to Trotzky read: 'Command executed. Simbirsk captured. Tukhachevsky.' By October the entire Volga district had been cleared, and the Czecho-Slovaks were in retreat towards the Urals.

Three weeks remained before the Volga would be closed by ice. Fuel was needed from the south to give light and heat to Central Russia. Grain was needed to keep it from starvation. 'Mother Volga' would bring life to the revolution. The flotilla from Petrograd worked feverishly, loading, unloading, transshipping. Contagious enthusiasm reigned. Victory had encouraged them to unusual efforts.

That autumn saved the Bolsheviks from becoming a mere episode in the annals of the Russian revolution. But this was, as yet, no time to take stock, for the enemy had massed troops on several fronts, and triumphs on one did not guarantee safety.

Drilling became ubiquitous and Red armies multiplied. One pursued the Czecho-Slovaks, another dealt with Krasnov, another kept watch in the Ukraine, still a fourth struggled with the Allied forces at Murmansk and Archangel. Simultaneously, Red bands and peasant partisans harassed Semenov and Kalmikov in Eastern

'BIG' ALLIED INTERVENTION

Siberia. They had no contact with Moscow, but were not less opposed to the counter-revolution. Bolshevik defence began to present an obstacle to the foreign interventionists and their Russian allies. The balance remained decidedly in the Communists' disfavour. Nevertheless, their slow uphill climb had already commenced.

All the time, without relaxing its vigilance on internal affairs, the Kremlin kept a sharp look-out for signs of international revolution. In this respect, nothing had changed since Brest Litovsk, for all the Bolsheviks from Lenin down continued to believe that the new regime in Russia could only be saved by similar upheavals abroad. The collapse of the Central Powers therefore brought encouragement to Moscow.

§ MOSCOW AND THE KAISER

Late in September the Bulgarian front was smashed by Allied attacks. The Germans in France and Flanders were retreating in the face of Foch's hammering blows.

'This news,' writes M. P. Price, an eye-witness,¹ 'evoked wildest excitement in Soviet Russia. The *Izvestia* came out with great spreadlines announcing the "Collapse of World Imperialism" and the coming of the social revolution. At a special meeting of the Moscow Trade Union Council on the following day I heard Lenin make a long speech on the international situation. He offered the support of a million Red soldiers and all the material resources of the Soviet republic . . . to the German workers if they should overthrow the Kaiser's Government and get into difficulties with the Entente.'

When Prince Max von Baden became German Chancellor and accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Bolsheviks cried, 'He will not stay long. Liebknecht will see to that.' The eyes of Red Russia were fixed on Karl Liebknecht, on Rosa Luxemburg and on other Communist leaders abroad. But the Bolsheviks were convinced that once the revolution was loosed, it would not remain within the confines of the Central Powers. They consequently spared the Allies in their propaganda no more than they did the

¹ *My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution*, by M. P. Price. London, 1921. Page 343.

LENIN v. WOODROW WILSON

German Imperialists. Woodrow Wilson, it will be recalled, was the hero of the hour. His idealism inspired myriads. He spoke words that thrilled whole nations. Justice, right, and humanity called in his name. Only the Bolsheviks remained sceptical. They suspected that he was a man of words – and words only. A note accordingly was dispatched to Washington which sought to dispel the ‘Wilson illusion’ which might, the Communists thought, check that spirit from which revolutions spring. The world was divided between Lenin and Wilson, and this was a Leninist broadside against the opponents’ fortress.

LENIN v. WOODROW WILSON

The document is altogether unique in diplomatic correspondence.¹ With pungency, sharpness and irony, it reviewed the Fourteen Points and Wilson’s several statements of sympathy for the Soviet republic. The President’s words had been high-minded protestations of friendship. Yet the United States Government, it said, assisted the Czecho-Slovak adventure. The result was famine in Central Russia.

‘This was the first thing that the working men and peasants of Russia experienced in practice from your Government and that of your allies after the promises made by you in the beginning of the year. And after that they experienced another thing – the invasion of the North of Russia by the troops of your Allies in which American troops participated, the occupation of Russian territory without any cause and without any declaration of war . . .’

‘You have promised, Mr. President,’ the communication continued, ‘to help Russia secure full and unhindered opportunity for the adoption of her independent decision with regard to her own political development and her national policy. But in reality this

¹ When the Political Bureau decided on the note, Lenin instructed Radek to draft it and outlined its contents. Then Radek’s effort was submitted to Chicherin who introduced the lofty sarcasm which distinguishes it. Thereupon, it was re-submitted to Radek, who added polish and finishing touches. The note was forwarded to Wilson through the Norwegian Embassy. Printed in *R.A.R.*, pages 258 *et seq.*, and in *Bolshevik Propaganda*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary. United States Senate. February 11, 1919, to March 10, 1919. Washington, 1919.

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assistance expressed itself in the fact that the Czecho-Slovak troops and soon afterwards your own troops and those of your Allies attempted at Archangel, at Murmansk, in the Far East, to force upon the Russian people the government of the oppressors . . .’

‘The acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia has not given exactly the kind of results that one would have expected after your message to Congress, Mr. President.’ Nevertheless, ‘Our experience has helped us create a firmly-welded, disciplined Red Army which is growing every day in strength and is learning to defend the revolution.’

Mr. Wilson, at the time this note was sent, had made the armistice with Germany conditional on her withdrawal from occupied territories.

‘We are ready, Mr. President,’ wrote Radek, ‘to conclude an armistice on these conditions, and we request you to inform us as to the time when you, Mr. President, and your Allies intend to remove your troops from Murmansk, from Archangel and from Siberia.’

The note then passed to a most arrogant disquisition on wider, international problems.

‘You demand the independence of Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and freedom for the people of Austro-Hungary. . . . But strangely we do not notice in your demands any mention of freedom for Ireland, Egypt, India, or even the Philippine Islands.’

The League of Nations had been heralded by Wilson; it would end all wars. But, argued this Communist manifesto, wars were made by capitalists seeking profits, markets, dividends. Why not establish a real League by first overthrowing capitalism?

‘Thus, Mr. President, though we know from experience what your promises mean,’ the note read, ‘still we have placed ourselves upon the ground of your proposition with regard to international peace and the League of Nations, only we have endeavoured to deepen your propositions that they could not bring results contradictory to your promises, as has happened with your promise of help for Russia. We have tried to formulate your proposition for the League of Nations so specifically as to prevent the

League of Nations from turning out to be a league of capitalists against the nations. . . .’

Then the note undertakes a frontal attack.

‘We have had to do,’ it says, ‘with the President of the assault upon Archangel and of the invasion of Siberia. We have also had to do with the President of the Peace Programme of the League of Nations. Is not the first of the two the real President who actually directs the policy of the American capitalist Government?’

Turning now to less academic matters, the Soviet message puts some questions and demands ‘exact and entirely business-like answers.’

‘Do the Governments of America, Great Britain, and France intend to cease calling for the blood of Russian people and the lives of Russian citizens, if the Russian people will agree to pay them for it and to buy themselves off by ransom. . . . And if so what kind of tribute from the Russian people is it that the Governments of America, Great Britain, and France demand?’

There follow important hints on the debt question. The note says:

‘We would especially like to learn what are the demands of your French Allies with regard to those milliards of roubles which the Paris bankers advanced as loans . . . to the criminal Government of the Czar. . . . The Russian people, who are exhausted by war and who have not yet had time to enjoy the benefits of the popular Soviet Government and to improve their economic affairs, will not be able to pay in full to the bankers of France the tribute for the milliards spent by the Czar’s Government against the interests of the people. . . .

‘Do your French Allies present the demand for the payment to them of a part of this tribute in instalments, and if so what part? . . .

‘But if . . . you should give us no answer to our fully definite and specific questions, we will draw from it the entirely undeniable conclusion that . . . your Government and those of your Allies intend to get out of the Russian people tribute both in cash and in the natural wealth of Russia and in territorial aggrandisement.’

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This unusual note was a combination of pure revolutionary propaganda and shrewd diplomacy. The Bolsheviks hoped that their offer to pay old debts would pave the way to negotiations and to a cessation of armed foreign intervention. Neither the Allies nor Wilson, however, vouchsafed a reply.

The chief executive in Washington, his single-track mind preoccupied with serious German business, did not react publicly to the Bolsheviks’ bitter mockery. It may have struck home; it may have cost him sleepless nights. But he remained silent.

Meanwhile, high hopes dashed by the sudden realization of defeat created an explosive atmosphere in Central Europe. Insurrections began to multiply. On November 2 a revolution broke out in Hungary. On the 8th the sailors of the German fleet at Kiel mutinied and on the 9th the German revolution was a fact. Two days later the Armistice ended the bloodiest war in world history.

Conquered and conquerors heaved a sigh of relief. Now the trenches would be forsaken for peaceful pursuits. No more interminable death lists in the daily papers. No more long lines of hospital trains. Peace. Rest. Productive work. Only Russia had to prepare for battle. Victory had left the Allies free to cope with the Bolshevik problem.

Lenin had entertained a premonition of evil. ‘Early in November,’ writes Price, ‘he seemed to discern Allied fleets passing through the open Dardanelles and landing well-trained armies, equipped with tanks and latest inventions of scientific warfare, on the coast of South Russia.’ Also, he feared an agreement between Germany and the Allies whereby the former would be employed to suppress Bolshevism in the East and be spared too many humiliations in the West as compensation. It is known now that the Ludendorff party would gladly have undertaken that task. The Turks, also, according to one report, offered their services to the Allies. The Armistice, in other words, brought increased concern to the Bolshevik leaders. Lenin said to Chicherin, ‘Now *das Weltkapital* will start an offensive against us.’¹

The Armistice required the Germans to evacuate territories

¹ Related to the writer by Chicherin. Lenin used the German word. He said, ‘Na nas idyot das Weltkapital.’

occupied by virtue of the Brest Treaty and in subsequent conquests. An immediate execution of this obligation would give the Bolsheviks an opportunity of filling the vacuum created by German retirement. Chicherin accordingly engaged in several long-distance conversations with Haase and other heads of the new Berlin Government. The German Social Democrats who controlled the Government had, however, received intimations from the Entente to prolong the occupation of the Ukraine until the French arrived to relieve the Germans, and since Chicherin knew from Oskar Kohn that Kautsky in Wilhelmstrasse favoured a pro-Entente policy ('We must flirt with the Allies,' Kautsky had said), the Bolsheviks desisted from their efforts. Lenin waved his hand and remarked to Chicherin, 'Don't bother with them any more.'

On the other hand, the Communists in the Ukraine continued their activity among the German and Austrian troops and succeeded in convincing thousands to return home. The news of revolts in Austro-Hungary and Germany produced a spirit of mutiny in the armies of occupation, and many battalions imprisoned their officers, set up Soviets, and decided to demobilize themselves. These developments, however, could not produce the results of a general evacuation which only the Ebert-Noske regime in Berlin could have ordered.

When partial German evacuation commenced in December, 1918, Skoropadsky, the German puppet in Kiev, was overthrown by Petlura, the Minister of War of the Central Rada, who had been imprisoned by Skoropadsky but released a few weeks before the Armistice. The gradual withdrawal of the Germans now increased the area over which the Reds and the Petlurists fought for the domination of the Ukraine. Meanwhile, the French arrived on the scene.

Obviously, intervention could no longer be explained on anti-German grounds. Premier Clemenceau, moreover, did not usually mince words. Addressing himself to General Franchet D'Esperey, Clemenceau wrote: 'I hereby enclose a letter which presents a general plan for the economic isolation of Bolshevism in Russia with a view to provoking its fall.' Subsequently, on December 13, M. Clemenceau said in a telegram:

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‘The inter-Allied plan of action is not of an offensive character, but it simply interdicts to the Bolsheviki access to the Ukraine regions, the Caucasus, and Western Siberia, which are economically necessary to them for their endurance, and where elements of Russian order are being organized.’

And again, on December 21, he wired:

‘The plan of action of the Allies is to realize simultaneously the economic encirclement of the Bolsheviki and the organization of order by the Russian elements.’¹

Intervention and armies were to achieve the ‘economic isolation of Bolshevism.’ Why ‘economic’ (and why defensive) is not quite clear; ‘military’ would seem more appropriate since Clemenceau proceeded to instruct his general to draw up a programme of attack in consultation with General Berthelot, formerly chief of the Allies’ armies in Roumania, Transylvania, and South Russia. Clemenceau’s message to Franchet D’Esperey was dated October 27, 1918,² when he felt thoroughly confident of the ‘imminent capitulation’ of Germany. The Allies, plainly, intended losing no time in dealing with the Bolshevik problem.

The plan was elaborated in October; activities commenced in November. The foreign Powers took the initiative. They had their designs and issued their orders independently of Russian advisers or Russian Whites. Yet to ignore native anti-Bolshevik forces would have been folly, and the Allies accordingly hastily summoned the representatives of all counter-revolutionary elements for a special conference in Jassy, Roumania. The invitations, which came from the French, reached several score of Cadets, Monarchists, Social Revolutionists, etc., in Kiev and Odessa, whither they had fled from Bolshevik rule, and urged them to attend the meeting to discuss the question of ‘aid for Russia in the struggle with Bolshevism.’³

¹ Read by M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber of Deputies, December 29, 1918.

² Published in the Paris *Matin* for June 17, 1919.

³ The details of this meeting are taken from a description of the Jassy Conference by M. S. Margulies, one of its participants, printed in his book *A Year of Intervention*, Berlin, 1923. They conform with the facts from other sources.

THE FAMOUS JASSY CONFERENCE

THE FAMOUS JASSY CONFERENCE

The conference in Jassy, the temporary Roumanian capital, lasted seven days and ended on November 24. It convened in the salons of the French and British ministers, listened to greetings and statements from Henno, the French consul in Kiev, and maintained uninterrupted contact with the entire Allied diplomatic corps including Charles J. Vopika, a Czech who boasted of being 'the first Czech to represent America in the capacity of ambassador.' Finally, it was decided to request the Entente Powers to dispatch an expeditionary force of 150,000 men into Russia for the overthrow of the Soviets. The assembled Whites, moreover, agreed on the necessity of a personal dictatorship in Russia. Sharp differences of opinion arose on the choice of the dictator, the alternatives being ex-Grand Duke Nicholas and Denikin. After prolonged discussion, the mantle of authority was placed on the shoulders of the latter.

Allied diplomats invited Russian Whites to a foreign capital. The resulting meeting appointed a Czarist Staff General as dictator of Russia. This happened in the month when the final blows were delivered in the war to make the world safe for democracy. But the Allies had not even waited for the Jassy Conference's deliberations. They had previously decided to give aid to Denikin, who, with his 'Volunteer Army,' was at Yekatrinodar, a short distance from Novorossisk on the Black Sea. The Dardanelles being open in consequence of Turkey's defeat, the approach to Novorossisk and to Denikin was absolutely free.

Denikin had been waiting impatiently for Allied assistance. He was poorly armed and exposed to Bolshevik attacks which gave him no rest. His goal was the rich Ukraine and then the heart of Russia, Moscow. But without munitions and money such moves would be irresponsible adventures. Finally, on November 22, Yekatrinodar received information by radio that an Allied squadron had entered the Black Sea; the next day it anchored at Novorossisk; three days later, French and British agents presented themselves to Denikin. At the official reception, the representative of Paris announced Denikin's appointment as head of the armed Russian forces in South Russia and promised all possible aid to 'the fraternal and allied Volunteer Army.'

‘BIG’ ALLIED INTERVENTION

Soon afterwards, Denikin received from General Scherbachev a report, dated November 16, of the latter's conference with General Berthelot in Bucharest at which the French commander promised to land twelve French and Greek divisions in Odessa within a few days. This Allied force would quickly occupy Kiev, Kharkov, the Donetz Basin, Krivoi Rog, and the Kuban in order to give the Volunteer and Don armies 'the possibility of organizing themselves more firmly and of being free for wider active operations.' The *tempo* of Allied troop shipments, however, left Denikin ill at ease, and on December 7 he urged Franchet D'Esperey to rush at least two divisions to the regions of Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav. A week later, the promised French and Greek divisions had not yet landed and Denikin therefore requested the Allies to prevent the Germans from evacuating Kharkov for the time being. He feared the capture of that city by the Bolsheviks or the Petlurists.

Finally, on December 17, the first French landing took place in Odessa. Gradually the entire Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea and a belt of territory reaching back about 100 miles from it were occupied by some 12,000 troops including Algerians, Senegaliens, Poles, and Greeks. The force was extremely well equipped with tanks, aeroplanes and artillery, and could rely for support on an Anglo-French fleet consisting of three dreadnoughts, eight cruisers, twelve torpedo-boats and a number of transports. In the Crimea, in addition, some French soldiers, a battalion of Greeks and several thousand coloured troops had taken command of the situation.

§ BRITISH AND FRENCH ZONES IN RUSSIA

French influence was confined to the Ukraine and the Crimea in accordance with a Franco-British agreement entered into on December 23, 1917, by the terms of which North Russia, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, the Kuban, and the eastern part of the Don region fell to the lot of England.¹

On November 16, accordingly, the British who had been driven out of Baku in September by the oncoming Turks, returned from Persia in the vessels of the Denikin fleet. The flagship flew the national banners of Great Britain, the United States, France – and of the long-deceased Czarist Empire. A week later, a British division landed at Batum on the opposite side of the Caucasian isthmus.

¹ For text see *Appendix*.

THE BOLSHEVIKS SURROUNDED

Baku now replaced Meshed as the base for the British expeditionary force under General Malleson in the Transcaspia, and more troops were transported across the sea to that far-off Central Asiatic province. At the same time, and in view of the policy confirmed in the agreement of December 23, 1917, the British stretched out a finger to the Baltic. An English squadron sailed up the Baltic, touched at Libau and Riga, and, on December 12, anchored at Reval, where it unloaded thousands of rifles and a quantity of cannon for the Esthonian army. Thus supported, the bourgeois Government of Esthonia felt secure. In Finland, too, a reactionary Cabinet resisted the Bolsheviks and even contemplated an advance on Petrograd.

Remained Latvia and Lithuania. Here local Communist factions endeavoured to set up a Soviet regime and hoped that the Russian Red Army would march to their assistance. As a matter of fact, Bolshevik troops entered both these little States in January, 1919. France and England, fearing the westward flow of Communism, immediately pressed the late enemy into service, and ordered Germany to keep her tired forces in Latvia and West Lithuania.

THE BOLSHEVIKS SURROUNDED

With the exception of Latvia and Lithuania, where, however, the Germans under von der Goltz soon ejected the Russians, the encirclement of Soviet Russia which Clemenceau had planned was now complete. On the west, Russia was cut off from the outside world by the Baltic buffers, the Germans, the British fleet and by Poland; on the north, by British, French, American, Italian and Serbian troops; on the south, by the French in the Ukraine, Denikin in the Kuban, and the British in Caucasia and Transcaspia; on the east, finally, by the Japanese and their faithful atamans in Eastern Siberia, and by the Czechs and Kolchak in Western Siberia.

Thus surrounded, the Lenin Government could no longer dream of assistance from bourgeois quarters. The Bolsheviks, of course, felt that sooner or later revolutions in other countries would reinforce their position. Yet the example of the German revolution had proved that a so-called 'revolutionary' regime could be as anti-Communist as Wilhelm II. For the moment, therefore, they were thrown back on their own strength.

‘BIG’ ALLIED INTERVENTION

How did the Bolsheviks view their own prospects early in 1919? They must have gained confidence in their hold on Moscow and Central Russia. They were certain that the Whites had nothing to offer and would in fact ultimately antagonize the masses. Time, they believed, was on their side. The longer the breathing-space, the better the Bolsheviks could organize their internal forces and the more thoroughly the non-Bolshevik groups would discredit themselves. Time might also bring a real revolution in Germany to supplant the ‘Kerensky intermezzo,’ as the Bolsheviks regarded the Ebert-Scheidemann-Noske regime.

Accordingly, prolonging the breathing-spell became the most pressing business of Soviet diplomacy. And while the Red Army fought, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs opened its peace offensive. The goal was a truce based on *status quo*.

On the first birthday of the Soviet republic, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the highest governmental authority in the country, made a solemn offer to the Entente Powers to enter into peace negotiations with Moscow, and instructed Chicherin to undertake all necessary steps. Immediately Maxim Litvinov, who had returned to Russia from England, was ordered to Sweden to prepare the ground for peace pourparlers. At the same time (December 2, 1918) Chicherin broadcast a plea for peace to Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States.

Litvinov’s instructions included a statement of the financial and economic concessions which the Soviet republic was prepared to make to the victorious Powers. On December 3, 1918, he told Arthur Ransome, then correspondent of the London *Daily News*, that

‘an immediate payment of debts is impossible, but a moratorium might be arranged on compromise lines involving the grant of commercial concessions, the payment of . . . gold, mining concessions, etc. Also we have flax and other raw materials which could immediately be delivered, and forest timber.’

Litvinov tried to win various public men in Scandinavian countries for the cause of peace with Russia, but for obvious reasons his eyes were riveted on Paris.

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

'The effect of the Russian problem on the Paris [Peace] Conference . . . was profound: Paris cannot be understood without Moscow. Without ever being represented at Paris at all, the Bolsheviki and Bolshevism were powerful elements at every turn. Russia played a more vital part at Paris than Prussia.' – *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: Written from his Unpublished and Personal Material*, by Ray Stannard Baker. London, 1923. Vol. II, page 64.

The eyes of the world were now fixed on Paris where the map-makers and nation-carvers would endeavour to create a new Europe and new empires. Woodrow Wilson, breaking the presidential precedent of remaining in the country whose chief executive he was, had decided to attend in person. He and his staffs sailed on the *George Washington* from New York and arrived in Paris on December 13. During the latter part of the same month, London enjoyed the privilege of fêting him.

Two days after Christmas, the King tendered a banquet to the President in Buckingham Palace. It so happened that David R. Francis, who had quit Archangel, likewise received an invitation. And in one of the happiest moments of his life he brushed sleeves with George V. 'Mr. Ambassador,' said the monarch politely, 'what do you think we ought to do about Russia?' Francis replied that the Allies must overthrow the Bolshevik Government. 'The King rejoined by telling me he thought so too, but President Wilson differed from us.'

Wilson kept Francis at arm's length and refused to grant him an audience. As an advocate of the 'little intervention,' he saw no reason for the presence of Allied troops in Russia after the Armistice. The President was thinking of negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Litvinov had established contact with Wilson's single-track mind.

On the 24th of December, on the eve of the Christian world's Peace-on-Earth-Good-Will-to-Men festival, Litvinov made a 'Peace Appeal' to the President. Wilson later read it to the Peace Conference.

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§ LITVINOV'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

'The Russian workers and peasants,' the note states, 'fail to understand how foreign countries which never dreamed of interfering with Russian affairs when Czarist barbarism and militarism ruled supreme, and even supported that regime, can feel justified in interfering in Russia now. . . .'

Two alternatives were open to the Allied and associated Powers, Litvinov submitted. 'One is continued open or disguised intervention on the present or on a larger scale.' The other was 'to come to an understanding with the Soviet Government, to withdraw the foreign troops from Russian territory, and to raise the economic blockade.' Furthermore, to help Russia 'regain her own source of supply, and to give her technical advice on how to exploit her natural resources. . . .'

There follows Litvinov's peroration.

'The dictatorship of toilers and producers,' he impressed on the President, 'is not an aim in itself, but the means of building up a new social system under which useful work and equal rights would be provided to all citizens. . . . One may believe in this or not, but it surely gives no justification for sending foreign troops to fight against it, or for arming and supporting classes interested in the restoration of the old system of exploitation of man by man.'

'I venture to appeal to your sense of justice and impartiality.' Litvinov here must have struck a weak point in the President's psychic make-up. It were strange if at this time Wilson was not intoxicated by his own idealistic pronouncements. Also, he was perhaps thinking of getting the Japanese out of Siberia – and Shantung too. Besides, the Bolsheviks seemed to be offering advantages to rich foreigners.

Litvinov's final sentence probably affected the President much. The Russian made the demand of '*audiatur et altera pars*.' Listen to the other side of the question, he urged. 'Give us a day in court.'

That Christmas Day in 1918 when he read Litvinov's appeal, Wilson made his decision. He would give the Bolsheviks a hearing. As a preliminary step, accordingly, he sent W. H. Buckler, attaché

LITVINOV'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

to the United States Embassy in London, to speak with Litvinov in Stockholm. Buckler told the Russian that his telegram had made a favourable impression on Wilson and on Lloyd George, to whom the President had shown it.

The commissar outlined to Buckler a number of definite proposals which he wired to the President. The result came with almost lightning speed for, though Wilson's emissary left London as late as January 1 or thereabouts, action with a view to invite the Russians to Paris was taken by January 5.

On that day the British Embassy in Paris sent an identical *aide memoire* to the French, Italian, Japanese, and American Foreign Offices which suggested that a message be forwarded to the Bolsheviks in Moscow, and to all other governments in Russia requesting them to call a truce for the duration of the Paris Peace Conference and to delegate representatives to the Conference.

Immediately S. Pichon, French Foreign Minister, rejected the suggestion. 'It fails,' he said, 'to take into account the principles which have not failed to dominate its [the French Republic's] policy and that of the Powers in Russia.' The regime of the Bolsheviks was 'criminal,' and it did not 'represent in any degree that of a democratic government.' Furthermore, Moscow could not claim to be recognized as a regular government when it had negated 'all the principles of public and private right.' M. Pichon entered into no parallel criticisms of the regimes of Chaikovsky and Kolchak and Denikin. He did not even mention them. On the contrary, he recalled the Allied policy of

'furnishing at all accessible points of Russia all the aid and succour which it is possible to give to the healthy, faithful, honest elements in Russia, in order to help them escape from the bloody and disorderly tyranny of the Bolsheviks. . . .'

Pichon raised no objection to the presentation in Paris of the claims of the various Russian counter-revolutionary governments. He excepted the Bolsheviks. Semenov might come and Kalmikov, Petlura, and Kolchak. Only Lenin and Trotzky would be kept out. For 'the French Government . . . will make no contract with crime.'

But there were Wilson and Lloyd George. And there were

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the Communists who uninterruptedly broadcast armistice and peace appeals. Men so sensitive to popular opinion as Wilson and Lloyd George could not well ignore such appeals.

§ RUSSIA AT VERSAILLES

When the Paris Peace Conference opened its historic session, the Russian question therefore stood in the forefront. Everybody realized that Europe could have no peace until Russia was pacified.

Russia occupied the Conference the very day it convened. On January 12 the peacemakers assembled. Among them were Foch, General Weygand, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, and General Bliss for America. Foch immediately urged a quick peace with Germany in order to free the Allies' hands for an anti-Bolshevik crusade. He wished to crush Bolshevism by force. He would send a large American Army commanded by an American into Poland; he would use the Russian prisoners in Germany.

Woodrow Wilson objected. Communism was indeed 'a social and political danger,' but 'there was great doubt in his mind whether Bolshevism could be checked by arms.'¹ He planned to kill it with kindness. He proposed to negotiate with the Muscovites.

No one wanted Russia represented at the Peace Conference. Lloyd George simply desired to summon the Russians to Paris 'somewhat in the way that the Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary States to render an account of their actions.'² The Entente would listen to testimony and pleas and claims, then send the Russians home, and adopt its decisions.

The French Government opposed the presence of Bolsheviks in Paris. 'They would convert France and England to Bolshevism,'³ said Mr. George in re-stating the French objection. The Welshman laughed, but Clemenceau and Pichon insisted, and the statesmen being the guests of France, could not be rude.

However, Mr. Sazonov, the Czar's Foreign Minister, had the

¹ *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: Written from his Unpublished and Personal Material*, by Ray Stannard Baker. London, 1923. Vol. I, page 166.

² *Ibid.*

³ Minute of the Conversation in Pichon's office in the Quai d'Orsay on January 16, 1919, reproduced in the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate, Senate Document 106, page 1235.

RUSSIA AT VERSAILLES

ear of some delegates. He was Kolchak's Foreign Minister. Savinkov had also appeared on the scene with credentials from Kolchak. Besides, there were Prince Lvov of the provisional government in Petrograd; Maklakov, the Czar's ambassador; Chaikovsky, who had fled from a too trying post in Archangel, and a host of other prominent Russians of various shades from monarchist white and Cadet grey to Kerensky pale pink. They were consulted, they wrote memoranda, they sat with the mighty of the earth and made politics. But Red remained anathema.

The French refused to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. This grew out of their attitude on intervention. They were unalterably committed to the collapse of the Communist regime. What, then, could be gained by parleys? The same position was maintained by the British advocates of intervention-to-the-bitter-end.

The British camp, however, was not united. Lloyd George, representing the civilians or 'Frocks' as Sir Henry Wilson sneeringly styled them, feared the consequences of a war against Russia on the heels of the exhausting conflict with Germany. He entertained no excessive love for Bolshevism. He certainly preferred Kerensky to Lenin and might even have recognized Denikin or Kolchak where he found it embarrassing to deal with the Soviets on an equal footing. But he was a politician first, last and all the time, and more war was unpopular.

The Prime Minister of England is speaking. Woodrow Wilson, Baron Sonnino of Italy, Mr. Balfour, M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon are gathered in the latter's office around the large flat desk near the fireplace (January 16). They debate the British proposal for a discussion with the several Russian factions. He does not wish to recognize the Bolsheviks, says Mr. George. Nor does he wish them to attend the conference of the Powers. He wants information which Sazonov cannot supply. All the Russians in Paris are anti-Bolshevik partisans. He would like to hear the other side too; hence his suggestion.

Yet all this involves the problem of intervention. Why is the British Premier opposed to it? 'There is one report that the Bolshevik, are stronger than ever, that their internal position is strong and their hold on the people stronger. . . . It is also reported that the peasants are becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the busi-

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ness of the Great Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either side.' Moreover, 'the hope that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had not been realized.'

Lloyd George believed that 'the Bolshevik movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism.' His opponents both at home and in the French Government immediately inquired, 'And did we not destroy German militarism? Surely Lenin is not stronger than Wilhelm. If we could smash Germany we can unquestionably overthrow the handful of men who reign from the Kremlin.'

If they proposed to kill Bolshevism by the sword, answered Lloyd George, 'the armies would mutiny. . . . The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia?'

'Kolchak and Denikin,' was the ready reply of his opponents. Churchill, Noulens, Foch, and the French and British military, still put their trust in the anti-Bolshevik elements of Russia. But Lloyd George, with an instinct that explains much of his political success, already sensed the inferior quality of the Russian White leaders.

'Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the Bolsheviks?' says the official summary of the meeting in Pichon's office.¹ 'He had been told that there were three men, Denikin, Kolchak, and Knox. In considering the chances of these people to overthrow the Bolsheviks, he pointed out that he had received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to fight; that the Russian army was not to be trusted. . . . If the Allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building on quicksand. He had heard a lot of talk about Denikin, but when he looked on the map he found that Denikin was occupying a little backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that Denikin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the map, there was a great solid block of territory between Denikin and Kolchak. More-

¹ Minute of the Conversation in Pichon's office in the Quai d'Orsay on January 16, 1919, reproduced in the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate, Senate Document 106, page 1235.

DISAFFECTION IN ALLIED ARMIES

over, from information received it would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist.'

Intervention, therefore, was no solution. And 'it would be manifestly absurd,' said Mr. George frankly, 'to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of themselves.'

¶ DISAFFECTION IN THE ALLIED ARMIES

The Premier's wisdom was dictated by fear. 'If a military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki,' he declared, 'that would make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London.' At the same meeting:

'President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order.'

The soldiers were thinking, and they were tired.

'We are sitting on the top of a mine which may go up at any minute,' wrote Sir Henry Wilson in his diary for January 17. 'Ireland to-night has telegraphed for some more tanks and machine guns and is evidently anxious about the state of the country.'

On the 22nd, noting proceedings at a London Cabinet Meeting, he said:

'I emphasized the urgency of the situation, pointing out that unless we carried out our proposals we should lose not only our army of the Rhine, but our garrisons at home, in Ireland, Gibraltar, Malta, India, etc., and that even now we dare not give an unpopular order to the troops, and discipline was a thing of the past. Douglas Haig said that by February 15 we would have no army in France.'

Doubts were beginning to creep into the heads of the inter-

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ventionists. The task of suppressing the Irish rebellion, occupying the Rhine province, and pacifying the Near and Middle East, would have staggered any statesman, without the additional responsibility of a difficult adventure in Russia. This was especially true in view of the mood of the British workers: a railway strike threatened. Other trade unions were in revolt. The Labour movement actively opposed intervention in Russia.

Leaders commenced to waver. Sir Henry Wilson spoke with Lloyd George in Paris on the 1st of February and then made this entry: 'Prime Minister wants to clear out of Constantinople, Batum, Baku, Transcaspia, and out of Syria.' No mention of Siberia and Archangel. On the same day, the Field-Marshal wrote, 'Had a long talk with A. J. B. [Balfour]. I find him in favour of clearing out of the Caucasus and of Constantinople and of Syria, but not of Mosul.'

The next day news came to Paris of riots in Glasgow and strikes in London and Liverpool. French labour too was restive. In January, the General Federation of Labour as well as the permanent administrative committee of the French Socialist Party adopted resolutions which indicated their opposition to Russian intervention. Moreover, the *poilus* had had enough of the trenches. On February 3 Foch admitted to Sir Henry Wilson that 'his men won't stand it much longer, and will demobilize themselves as the Belgians are doing.'

These developments introduced a new note into the conversations of the statesmen at Paris. They had come to that city on the heels of triumph and expected nothing more than the simple job of nation-slicing and map-carving. Instead, disillusioned and suddenly awakened nations stirred with an unprecedented spirit of revolt and protest.

'The Bolshevist danger was very great at the present moment,' said Clemenceau, according to the official summary of the Council of Ten's deliberations at Paris on January 21, 1919.

'Bolshevism was spreading. It had invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very morning they received very bad news regarding its spread to Budapest and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger was probably greater there than in France.

DISAFFECTION IN ALLIED ARMIES

If Bolshevism, after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a great danger. Therefore, something must be done against Bolshevism.'

The 'Tiger' saw clearly that as a representative of one system of society he must advocate war upon a rival system with militant intentions against his own. President Wilson, too, was of this point of view and at the same meeting he said, 'As Baron Sonnino has implied, they were all repelled by Bolshevism and for that reason they had placed armed men in opposition to them,'¹ thus giving the lie to the anti-German excuse. All the statesmen, in fact, were conscious of the need of fighting the threat of Communism. The threat was close at home.

The Allies had just waged a successful war against a great and strong enemy. A puny group of extremist-propagandists was defying them in Moscow. How simple it would be to crush them. There were thousands of aeroplanes, tanks, cannon. Millions of soldiers in arms. The sea was open and transport unlimited. A force of 150,000, it was estimated, could put a White Government in power in Russia and thus ensure the domination of capitalism.

But armies refused to fight.

'The Canadian soldiers,' Lloyd George declared at the Conference on January 21, 'would not agree to stay and fight against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred among the other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the British tried to send any more troops, there would be mutiny.'

Then the British Premier, turning to Woodrow Wilson and Clemenceau, asked what contributions America and France would make towards the raising of a volunteer army of 150,000 to combat Bolshevism. 'President Wilson and M. Clemenceau each said none.' (Foch planned to fight Bolshevism with Americans, Russians, Poles, Roumanians – but not Frenchmen.) Lloyd George now put the same question to M. Orlando, and 'M. Orlando agreed that Italy could make no further contributions.'

¹ Printed in full as it was read to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, by Wm. C. Bullitt. New York, 1919. Page 24.

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These were unanswerable arguments against intervention. Telegrams from home kept worrying the nervous diplomats in Paris with labour unrest and army disaffection. The trouble was, as Clemenceau said, that 'the Allies were in need of a speedy solution . . . their populations could stand no more.'

§ THE PRINKIPO PLAN

Accordingly, the meeting of January 21 instructed Woodrow Wilson to draft a plan for a conference of all Russian parties somewhere in Salonika or the Island of Lemnos. The condition of attendance would be a cessation of hostilities on all internal Russian fronts.

Deep in their hearts, many of the participants in the Paris Peace parley hoped that these Russian pourparlers would never eventuate. M. Pichon and the French Foreign Office were particularly antagonistic. Clemenceau would have favoured the immediate formation of the *cordon sanitaire* by supplying money and munitions to Poland, the Baltics, Roumania and Czechoslovakia. But the Quai d'Orsay, as well as the French militarists, pressed for intervention. Balfour too looked upon the Salonika or Lemnos idea as a manœuvre. He thought the Bolsheviks would refuse, 'and by their refusal they would put themselves in a very bad position.' Sonnino, on the contrary, thought the Bolsheviks would be first to come. Therefore, perhaps, he fought the proposal. President Wilson believed that Allied liberalism in deigning to speak with Bolsheviks would 'bring about a marked reaction against Bolshevism.' Clemenceau thought the reverse might be the case.

On the 22nd, Wilson submitted the plan for a conference of all Russian factions on Prinkipo or Prince's Island, near Constantinople. The opening was set for February 15.

The British agreed to send Sir Robert Borden to Prinkipo. Wilson decided to delegate William Allen White, and Italy, M. Teretti. But the British General Staff opposed the measure, and the French Foreign Office hastily began to sabotage the meeting. Sir Henry Wilson and M. Pichon were as certain as Lloyd George that the mobilization of a large Allied army for war in Russia was impossible. But they had faith in Kolchak and Denikin and they

BOLSHEVIK COMPROMISES

thought that funds and munitions plus military advice would help the Whites defeat the Reds. Moreover, these men could perhaps gauge facts and hard conditions correctly, but they had no scale in which to weigh the influence of the ideas which the Bolsheviks were popularizing in Russia. Sir Henry and Pichon and their colleagues conceived of the Bolsheviks as a handful of men, poor, inexperienced, friendless. In a few months, the Red menace would be swept out of Russia and Central and Western Europe.

It had been decided to invite the Bolsheviks to Prinkipo. There is a suggestion that the first piece of sabotage by the enemies of this move was the failure to transmit the invitation. Moscow was never summoned to the conference. But on the 23rd of January, the powerful radio station in the Soviet capital picked up an unaddressed news item announcing the decision of the Peace Conference to convene a Russian truce parley. Five days later, Chicherin broadcast a message to Wilson complaining that his Government had not been invited. No reply was received and the Bolsheviks thereupon, on February 4, acting on the assumption that they were invited, wired their acceptance.¹

¶ BOLSHEVIK COMPROMISES

This radio contains important statements.

With respect to foreign loans: 'The Soviet Government first of all declares its readiness to make concessions in this matter to the demands of the Entente Powers. It does not refuse to recognize its financial obligations to its creditors in Entente countries. . . .'

With respect to interest: 'In view of the difficulties of the Russian Soviet Republic's financial position and its insufficient foreign credits, the Russian Soviet Republic proposes to guarantee the payment of interest on its loans with a definite quantity of raw materials. . . .'

With respect to concessions: 'The Soviet Government is prepared to grant citizens of Entente countries mining, lumbering and other concessions. . . .'

With respect to territorial settlement: 'The Russian Soviet Govern-

¹ Printed in the full original Russian text in Vol. II of *International Politics*, by Professor J. V. Kliuchnikov and Andrei Sabanin, an official collection of documents published by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Moscow, 1926, Pages 221-3.

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ment does not, under any conditions, intend excluding from these discussions the examination of the question of annexations by the Entente Powers of Russian territory.'

With respect to propaganda: 'The Russian Soviet Government . . . declares its readiness, if necessary, to include in the general agreement with the Entente Powers a pledge of non-interference in their internal affairs.'

The tone of this radiogram was extremely business-like and serious. It testified alike to Bolshevik weakness and to Bolshevik strength. The Soviet Republic had repudiated its foreign debts. Now it was ready to recognize them and to pay them and to guarantee interest as well. It would permit foreign capitalists to enter Russia and exploit her natural resources. It would renounce sovereignty over most of Siberia, Northern Russia, parts of the Ukraine, part of the Don and all of the Caucasus, the Transcaspia and the Crimea. It would refrain from hostile propaganda.

The policy which allowed of these compromises represented a repetition of Lenin's tactics during the Brest Litovsk period. Then the Bolsheviks felt instinctively that revolutions abroad would fortify their position. Meanwhile they wished to persist and enjoy a respite from fighting. Now they saw the world revolution coming. If they could only hold out themselves! Besides, the Bolsheviks felt that if the Whites were given sufficient time, their internal policy would alienate peasant support. For the time being, concessions and an armistice would grant Bolshevism a much-needed breathing spell. Bolshevism was fighting on a dozen fronts and though success crowned some of its military endeavours no one could foresee a final favourable issue of the struggle. Hunger was menacing wide expanses of the country. The Allies seemed inclined to send food. Industrial production except for war purposes was at a practical standstill. Agriculture languished. Russia needed peace and the Bolsheviks had decided to buy it at a great price in the confidence that the sacrifice was temporary.

We know now that the Bolsheviks miscalculated. The saving revolution in Europe did not materialize. Had the Allies, therefore, accepted the Moscow offer contained in the February 4 radio, much of Russian and world history might have been totally different. Certainly the Moscow reply to the Prinkipo proposition

BOLSHEVIK COMPROMISES

offered advantages to the capitalist world which exceed by far anything that has been wrenched from the Bolsheviks from that day to this.

How did Wilson and Lloyd George look upon the Soviet reply? 'The Bolsheviks,' the President thought, 'had accepted, but had accepted in a way that was studiously insulting.' He read into the Moscow rejoinder this Bolshevik view: 'We are dealing with perjured governments whose only interest is in striking a bargain, and if that is the price of European recognition and co-operation, we are ready to pay it.' The American Chief Executive was presumably offended by such a Communist attempt to purchase goodwill and peace by means of economic concessions.

What about Lloyd George?

'I never saw a man more angered than Mr. Lloyd George, who said, "We cannot let that insult go by. We are not after their money or their concessions or their territory. That is not the point. We are their friends who want to help them and must tell them so." We did not tell them so,' continues Wilson, 'because to some of the people we had to deal with the payment of foreign debts was a more interesting and more important matter. . . .'¹

So the Peace Conference did not tell the Bolsheviks that it did not want their money, or concessions, or territory. Nor did it make a confession of friendship. Mr. Lloyd George overcame his anger long enough to refrain from making Moscow a proffer of help. Indeed, though allegedly insulted and infuriated, both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George liked the Soviet reply so much that they went on supporting the Prinkipo project, and when it failed, the idea of Bolshevik payments and concessions continued to have such an appeal that they supported the Prinkipo plan in modified form, not once but twice.

¹ President Wilson made these statements to a private meeting of the Democratic National Committee held in the White House on February 28, 1919, during his short visit to the United States. They were first published years later by Joseph P. Tumulty, the President's private secretary in his *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him*. London, 1922. Page 374. The President's address, in the course of which he said, incidentally, that the Bolsheviks were 'the most consummate sneaks in the world,' was an appeal to the committeemen to support the League of Nations as a counterpoise against Communism.

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Pichon and the French Foreign Office, however, were bent on sabotaging the Prinkipo meeting. Mr. William C. Bullitt, attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, who was in daily touch with Secretary of State Lansing, Colonel House, and other prominent United States diplomats in Paris, testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate that 'The French – and particularly the French Foreign Office, even more than M. Clemenceau . . . were opposed to the idea [of Prinkipo – L. F.], and we found that the French Foreign Office had communicated to the Ukrainian Government and various other anti-Soviet Governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they would support them and continue to support them, and not allow the Allies, if they could prevent it, or the Allied Governments, to make peace with the Russian Soviet Government.'

British military leaders probably brought similar pressure on Kolchak and the Archangel Cabinet. At any rate, the anti-Bolshevik Governments rejected the Prinkipo suggestion, or failed to accept it by February 15, thus automatically cancelling the invitation.¹

During February the interventionists continued to work with zeal. Early in the month, Wilson discovered from a memorandum which 'he had from unimpeachable sources' that the French Government press was instructed 'to emphasize chaotic conditions in Russia.'² But the real opportunity came to the enemies of Bolshevism when Wilson sailed for America on February 15 and Lloyd George proceeded to London shortly afterwards to deal with serious labour difficulties. Colonel House substituted for the President, and Winston Spencer Churchill sat in the seat of the mighty Premier.

'The first thing that Winston Churchill did [on February 18] was to demand instant action against Russia, and he practically supported Foch's Napoleonic scheme, which was now resurrected with new determination, for applying military force against Soviet Russia.'³

¹ The Governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia accepted. So did the Soviet Government of the Ukraine. Georgia refused to attend, as did Kolehak, Denikin, and Archangel. The last three sent a joint reply on February 19, 1919.

² *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* . . ., Baker. Vol. I, page 297. ³ *Ibid.*

MR. BULLITT'S SECRET MISSION

Churchill wired Lloyd George for support of his proposal. Instead he received a reprimand. For Lloyd George and the Americans had not yet admitted defeat and planned to resurrect the Prinkipo suggestion for a Russian conference. In fact, it had occurred to Wilson in the days when he saw the Prinkipo idea dying to send a representative to Lenin. The choice fell on William C. Bullitt.

MR. BULLITT'S SECRET MISSION

The Bullitt Mission was secret. Only the British knew of it in advance. Before proceeding to Russia on official instructions from Lansing and House, Bullitt consulted these gentlemen as well as English diplomats regarding the terms that appeared acceptable to the Allies. The representatives of both Powers agreed on several fundamental principles: cessation of hostilities, economic relations with Russia, feeding Russia, withdrawal of Allied armies, debt settlement.

Bullitt left Paris on February 22, accompanied by Captain Walter Pettit, of the American Military Intelligence Service, and Lincoln Steffens, an eminent American journalist. He arrived in Russia on March 8, spent a week in the country, and held several conferences with Lenin, Chicherin, Litvinov, and with Menshevik and Social Revolutionary leaders who told him they were opposed to intervention.

The Bolsheviks took Bullitt's mission extremely seriously. On March 13, 1919, for instance, Chicherin wrote to Rakovsky, who was then in the Ukraine: 'The decision is very important. If we do not reach an understanding, the policy of blockade will be pressed with vigour. They [the Allies.—L. F.] will send tanks, etc., to Denikin, Kolchak, Petlura, Paderevski, etc.' Four days later Chicherin wrote again to Rakovsky: 'He [Bullitt] doesn't believe big concessions can be put over in Paris.'¹

Bullitt brought back an impression of a regime which was rapidly consolidating itself around Lenin and the Communist Party. He also brought back the Soviet Government's peace proposals drafted by Litvinov, approved by Lenin, and handed to Bullitt by the latter on March 14. The Bolsheviks suggested a con-

¹ These letters are from Rakovsky's private files.

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ference and an armistice pending its convocation. All *de facto* governments in Russia would remain in control of the territory they now held until and if the inhabitants voted a change; the economic blockade was to be lifted; the Soviet and other Russian Governments would 'recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire.' It is an interesting index to Russian distrust of the French that Chicherin told Bullitt that 'The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semi-official guarantee from the American and British Governments that they will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to the conditions of the armistice.' Bullitt refused to accept this special request.

Before Bullitt left, it occurred to Litvinov to make an interesting suggestion about debts. Litvinov, who always had placed considerable hope in the possibility of cordial American-Russian relations, proposed that the United States take over all Russia's obligations to the European Powers and cancel a corresponding volume of the Allied debts to the United States. Such a procedure, Litvinov reasoned, would simplify Russia's relations with the Allies and give the Bolsheviks only one creditor from whom they might expect to receive better terms of payment. With Lenin's consent, this proposition was made orally to Bullitt as a possible alternative to individual settlements with the several countries.¹

Mr. Bullitt wired detailed reports of his mission as soon as he reached Helsingfors. They were examined by Secretary Lansing and Colonel House. Lloyd George and Balfour saw copies. On his return to Paris, late in March, he submitted a written report at the request of the President.

Bullitt believed that the Bolshevik proposal presented 'an opportunity to make peace with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis – perhaps a unique opportunity.' He recommended immediate action.

According to Bullitt's testimony before the Senate Committee, House, Lansing, General Bliss and Henry White of the American Peace Delegation all thought it highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on the basis of the Moscow proposition. They told him so after a long discussion on the day following his return to

¹ Related to the writer by Litvinov.

MR. BULLITT'S SECRET MISSION

Paris. The next morning he breakfasted with Lloyd George, General Smuts, and Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the Council of Ten. The Premier thought the matter of extreme importance but 'did not know what he could do with British public opinion.' The *Daily Mail* was objecting to a Liberal policy towards Russia. The interventionists were also busy in the House of Commons. Mr. Lloyd George simply feared to act in the face of such opposition. He preferred to procrastinate. Thinking aloud at the breakfast-table, he suggested that he would send Lord Lansdowne to Moscow, who might bring home tidings that would impress the electorate and thus enable Lloyd George to adopt some definite policy. Then he thought Robert Cecil might go; before the next course had been served he thought of Smuts, then again of the Marquis of Salisbury as special ambassador to the Bolsheviks.

Subsequently, Bullitt learned that Balfour favoured his plan. Colonel House told him that Orlando had been won for it. But the French still knew nothing – not officially. Thus the Peace Conference worked. Nobody dared to accept a definite programme and push it through. Statesmen avoided responsibility and killed time.

Bullitt never spoke to President Wilson about the Bolshevik plan. The night after his return to the French capital, House telephoned to Wilson suggesting that he receive his own envoy. The President promised to do so the next evening. The next evening Wilson 'had a headache.' A day later Colonel House explained that Wilson had said he had a one-track mind and was too occupied with Germany at present to be able to discuss Russia. So he left the whole matter to Colonel House.

Wilson was not inclined to take a committing step. Lloyd George stood in terror of his voters. On the one hand, Labour opposed intervention. On the other hand, the bourgeois parties opposed a pact with the Communists. April 2, just a day or two after Bullitt had submitted his written report, the London *Times*, warned that the Council of Ten contemplated a deal with Bolshevism, and, acting on this and similar information, a group of Members of Parliament telegraphed Lloyd George their protest against any agreement with the Lenin regime.

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¶ WOODROW WILSON SUGGESTS FEEDING COMMUNISTS

The British Premier felt called upon, in the circumstances, to adopt the tactics of inactivity and indecision. The Americans, however, resolved to make one more attempt; they would feed the Bolsheviks.

Much of Wilson's peace programme at Paris may have been conceived as a check to Bolshevism. He revealed his purposes on the *George Washington's* first trip to France. In an ornate cabin on the top deck and in the presence of his co-workers, the President frequently spoke from the depths of his mind. 'The poison of Bolshevism,' he said on one such occasion, 'was accepted because it is a protest against the way in which the world has worked. It was to be our business at the Peace Conference to fight for a new order . . .' 'What did he mean by a new order?' asks Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson's keeper of documents. 'There were two great central ideas in his programme . . . (1) the right of self-determination of peoples . . . (2) . . . a league of nations.' As Herbert Hoover wrote in a letter to Oswald G. Villard, editor of the *New York Nation*, on August 17, 1921, 'the whole of American policies during the liquidation of the armistice was to contribute everything it could to prevent Europe from going Bolshevik or being overrun by their armies.'

Wilson's liberalism was the Allies' sharpest weapon against Communism. They wielded it poorly and blunted its edge. But the Prinkipo scheme and the Bullitt Mission were consistent moves of the President to weaken Bolshevism by fair treatment. This same motive inspired the sponsors of the plan to feed Russia.

¶ HOOVER AND THE BOLSHEVIKS

Professor Fridtjof Nansen, the well-known Norwegian Arctic explorer and statesman, was in Paris mobilizing support for famine relief in Russia. His greatest recruit was Herbert Hoover, head of the American Relief Association then operating in Belgium. (President Wilson had considered Hoover for the post of chief of a Russian Relief Commission as early as March, 1918. The President contemplated such aid as an alternative to Japanese inter-

vention, but subsequently he yielded to Allied urgings and O.K.'ed the invasion of Asiatic Russia.) On March 28, 1919, Hoover sent a long memorandum to Wilson outlining his views on the Bolshevik menace and urging that some 'neutral of international reputation for probity and ability' (Nansen) be allowed to 'create a second Belgian Relief Commission for Russia' *on condition that the Bolsheviks cease their military operations*. This proposal would be made only to the Communists. That it was conceived as an anti-Bolshevik measure appears from Hoover's own words:

'If such an arrangement can be accomplished it might at least give a period of rest along the frontiers of Europe and would give some hope of stabilization. Time can thus be taken to determine whether or not this whole system [Bolshevism. — L. F.] is a world danger, and whether the Russian people will not themselves swing back to moderation and themselves bankrupt these ideas.'¹

Should it develop that Bolshevism was the world menace some people suspected, Hoover was prepared to fight it. Feeding would afford an opportunity of discovering the facts, and full stomachs might destroy the Reds.²

A few days later Hoover and Nansen drew up a letter to Woodrow Wilson asking for a definition of the political terms on which the Peace Conference would approve relief measures. On April 9, Orlando, Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau (the 'Big Four') addressed a reply to Professor Nansen stating that their only condition was the cessation of hostilities and the complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military supplies. (Clemenceau signed 'with some reluctance.')

Immediately the news became public, a storm of opposition arose. The 'Russian Political Conference,' a White organization, entered a protest to the Council of Four signed Prince Lvov, Sazonov, Maklakov, and N. Chaikovsky. 'The proposition to feed our enemies,' they complained, 'comes when the moment of victory is near for us.' The reactionary press of the world likewise

¹ *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-23*, by H. H. Fisher. New York, 1927. Page 14. This is the official story of the A.R.A. in Russia.

² It is believed in some quarters that Hoover pursued similar anti-Communist aims in his feeding operations in Hungary at this time.

protested. So did the French Foreign Office, Clemenceau's formal signature notwithstanding. The result of this relief enterprise, Pichon submitted on April 16, 'would be a moral and material reinforcement of the iniquitous Bolshevik Government.' He therefore insisted that only the non-Soviet sections of Russia be fed. Hoover rushed into the controversy with an appeal to the counter-revolutionaries to remember that 'the newly born democracies [*sic*] of Siberia, Kuban, Finland, Esthonia, Lettland, Livonia, Poland, Ruthenia, Rumania, Armenia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Austria, and other nationalities which surround Bolshevik Russia must have a breathing spell to build up some stability.' Food and necessities and the relief-armistice would relieve them of 'the constant threat of Bolshevik invasion' and give them time to set up 'orderly governments.' But Hoover's voice was not heard.

Meanwhile, Nansen sent a wireless to Lenin in which he quoted the 'Big Four's' reply. This was not a simple matter. The Allied radio stations, according to Nansen,¹ refused to transmit the message. He appealed to the Norwegian Government but its radio was not yet communicating with Russia. Then he decided to go himself to Moscow. *En route*, the 'Hun' authorities in Berlin consented to send the communication, and when he reached Norway Chicherin's reply awaited him. It was dated May 7. It accepted the proffered aid, offered to pay for it, and expressed thanks to Nansen, but suspecting 'foul play,' suggested the convocation of a conference to discuss all political and military problems involved. Nansen considered the Bolshevik reply a basis for negotiations and wired Chicherin to that effect. William Allen White likewise considered the Bolshevik demand for a conference a just one, and wrote, 'so when the proposition came to the Bolsheviki to stop where they were winning and keep on losing where they were losing, they refused. The food did not go in.'² 'In my opinion,' writes Nansen in *Russia and Peace*, 'this was regrettable. . . . I am convinced that if these negotiations had attained their object the state of affairs in Europe would have been entirely different from what we see to-day.' But the Allied statesmen did not look far into the future. At that moment Kolchak was moving on Moscow,

¹ *Russia and Peace*, by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen. New York, 1924.

² *Syracuse Herald*, June 15, 1919.

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according to the newspapers, and negotiations with the Bolsheviks were therefore considered unnecessary.

The purposes of the Bullitt Mission and of Nansen's feeding plan – both variations of the Prinkipo proposal – were defeated by Kolchak's successes. These victories of the Admiral enabled the Entente, for the first time since the end of the World War, to adopt a definable position towards the Russian question.

The new policy – which maintained from April, 1919, to the end of the Russian Civil War – was twofold: few foreign troops, but much foreign money, ammunition, and advice.

¶ EUROPE ON THE VERGE OF REVOLT

February and March of 1919 now appear as the most ominous period in Europe's troubled post-war existence. The whole continent seemed on the brink of a social upheaval that threatened to sweep all governments into the ashbin of history. The nations were hungry and disillusioned; the armies were tired and unwilling to drill or fight or do guard duty; the statesmen were weak and confused.

These circumstances saved the Bolshevik revolution from a crushing blow by the victorious Entente. The state of affairs permitted of no concentration of forces against Russia. 'The war to end wars' had barely closed, yet in the spring of 1919 the world was torn by more than a dozen armed conflicts. The late enemy required feeding, and in March the Allies assembled at Paris decided to send bread into Germany. For Bolshevism marched over the land and if Germany succumbed, capitalism in Europe would lose one of its firmest supports. On March 21, a Hungarian Proletarian Government was proclaimed in Budapest under the leadership of Bela Kun. Bavaria, which boiled all through February and March, established a Soviet Government on April 5. And the Third or Communist International (Comintern) which first met in Moscow in the first week of March, 1919, sought to encourage the Red tide.

These developments, more particularly the Hungarian Communist revolution, gave the interventionists an excuse for a new campaign against Bolshevism. Foch presented a plan for the military encirclement of the Hungarians with the aid of Roumania

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and Czecho-Slovakia, and French generals in Constantinople established an effective food blockade of the revolutionary country. The British and French interventionists in Paris renewed their pressure on the assembled diplomats for a holy crusade against Russia and pointed to the outbreaks in Central Europe as indications that the menace could only be crushed by force – otherwise it would be upon them in very few months.

The anti-interventionists, who were second to none in their abhorrence and opposition to Bolshevism, did not, however, regard armies as an effective weapon against the spread of the new order. The Peace Conference in early April had not yet settled the critical Fiume question with the Italians nor the equally troublesome Shantung question with the Japanese. The German treaty was not ready; the French were violently anti-Wilson; Lloyd George vacillated so quickly it was difficult to follow his gyrations; there was no unity. At this time the subject of a renewal of the World War caused the 'Big Four' serious worry. 'Would the Germans sign?' was the problem of the hour. Clemenceau favoured maximum pressure upon Germany. Lloyd George and Wilson felt that such tactics would drive Germany into the arms of Russia. A Russian-German-Japanese Entente was frequently rumoured.

A secret memorandum circulated by Lloyd George on March 25 for the 'Considerations of the Peace Conference' stressed the danger of a *bloc* between Moscow and Berlin and although, as Clemenceau showed in an immediate secret reply, this was but a plea for the placation of Germany at the expense of France instead of at the expense of Britain, the Georgian memorandum served as an answer to the interventionists; Europe was too unsettled to permit of an armed expedition against Bolshevism. While the Allies were occupied in Russia, Germany might turn on her conquerors along the Rhine.

These were important considerations. 'Bolshevism' was on everybody's lips at Paris. But 'Bolshevism' referred not merely to the Bolshevism of Russia: it referred to the unrest at home and particularly in the Allied armies. The West had no men to fight Moscow.

Conscious of the sacrifices its citizens had made during the War, the French Government early disapproved of sending its nationals

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to fight in Russia. Its policy was to let others do and die; Paris would pay – and supply the powder. This was the *cordon sanitaire* idea.

The British interventionists, both of the anti-Bolshevik, class-conscious school of Churchill, as well as of the anti-Russian, Indian Office school of Lord Curzon and Milner, originally planned to destroy the Soviet Government by directing a British army against it. But the disturbing events which followed the Armistice, the opposition of Labour and the obstruction of Lloyd George deterred them. They too, thereupon, decided to have recourse to only financial and material assistance; men would not go except in most urgent cases.

The revolutionary developments in Europe, Ireland, in Egypt and in the Middle East, determined the British to evacuate from Russia even those troops they already had there. As early as January 26, Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote to Lloyd George to the effect that he

‘was in favour of clearing out of Omsk now, if France would agree, and getting ready to clear out of Murmansk and Archangel next summer, but on the other hand I would want to strengthen our position on the line Batum-Baku-Krasnovodsk-Merv.’

Sir Henry’s special solicitude for the Caucasus and Caspia reflected British interests in imperial expansion and in petroleum.

On February 12, the British War Cabinet discussed the Russian question and showed ‘no disposition to approve of warlike operations being undertaken against the Bolsheviks.’¹ Later in the same month Sir Henry Wilson presented a memorandum to the British Government advising ‘evacuation of Archangel, instructional staffs only with Denikin and Kolchak, and handing over Transcaucasia to Italy.’ A few days later, Sir Henry was back in Paris and had a ninety-minute interview with Foch. The Frenchmen, who a month previous had entertained ‘Napoleonic’ schemes for the conquest of Russia, now agreed with Wilson on evacuation. Moreover, ‘he has no belief in either Denikin or Kolchak – and I am afraid I agree,’ Sir Henry noted.

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. His Life and Diaries*, by Callwell. London, 1927. Vol. II, page 169.

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Towards the end of March, Henry Wilson actually made plans for British departure from South Russia and he and the Italian General Diaz 'came to an understanding with regard to the Italian preparations to take over the positions at present held by Milne's force in and about Transcaucasia.'

Hunger, mutinies in Allied armies and navies, labour discontent, British imperial unrest, and the rising tide of nationalism in Central Asia forced the 'Big Four' to decide unanimously that 'military action was not the answer to Bolshevism.' Not even in Hungary. Sir Henry Wilson's policy, as he wrote in April to Admiral Cowan commanding in the Baltic, was that of 'getting our troops out of Europe and Russia, and concentrating all our strength in *our* coming storm centres, viz. England, Ireland, Egypt, India.'

At this time, the British force in North Russia boiled with discontent. Russian conscripts had turned on their British officers and shot them. British soldiers disobeyed orders and declined to fight. Americans demanded ships for home. Meanwhile, the Red Army crept slowly forward, reducing the distance between the Allied armies and the sea. Labour M.P.'s in London called loudly for precipitate evacuation.

THE FRENCH IN SOUTH RUSSIA

In the French garrison in the Ukraine the situation was equally disquieting. The French military had probably conceived of the occupation of the Ukraine as a mere process of relieving the Germans at a quiet guard-post. But Germany's task had never been so simple. Moreover, the Austro-Germans had commenced to evacuate before the French arrived, and when they finally did come on the scene, they found the Bolsheviks and Petlurists poised to give them battle. This precipitated trouble. The French were not prepared to shed their blood.

During March, 1919, the Red Army advanced on Kherson. In the struggle which ensued the French lost 400 men and 14 officers. The result was the hasty evacuation of Kherson and Nikolaiev and the concentration of the entire French force in Odessa.

The French had occupied the hinterland of Odessa as far as

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Kherson in order to ensure their food supply. With Kherson and Nikolaiev in enemy hands, the situation in the great seaport became precarious, the more so as the Communists in Odessa were planning an insurrection in conjunction with radical elements in the Tricolour fleet.

Red troops were closing in on Odessa. General d'Anselme, commander of the French troops, wired Paris about the 'excellent condition' of the enemy forces and of the critical food situation in the city. A starving civil population and casualties in fighting back the Bolsheviks stared Pichon and Clemenceau in the face. The parliamentary opposition was demanding evacuation. Accordingly, on the 2nd of April, d'Anselme received instructions to leave South Russia within forty-eight hours. The next morning a panicky evacuation commenced. April 6 a Soviet Government had already been established while the French occupational army was steaming in the direction of Constantinople. Later in April, the foreigners likewise departed from the Crimean Peninsula.

The disaffection in the French fleet and garrison offer only partial explanation for this sudden evacuation. Marti, the French Communist, has exaggerated the importance of the mutiny in the French Black Sea fleet as well as his own rôle in the incident. Neither was the military situation very critical. Only one division was located at Odessa. One or two additional divisions covered by the guns of the navy would have made Odessa impregnable. But the French were disillusioned with both Denikin and Petlura. They were disagreeably surprised by the knowledge that the situation required fighting. Above all, however, evacuation was the result of pressure at home and the realization that the French army would not spill its blood on foreign soil for a cause which had not won its heart. Subversive Bolshevik propaganda sowed disaffection among the French troops on land.

The first week of April, 1919, therefore, marked the end of grandiose French plans for intervention in Soviet Russia. From that date, help from Paris to the counter-revolutionaries expressed itself in money, military missions and materials, also in the instigation of the Poles and Roumanians to fight the Bolsheviks. Active participation of large French units in the Russian civil war, however, practically ceased.

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Similarly, British plans for the evacuation of South Russia and the Caucasus began to mature at this time. The British garrison actually left the Caucasus, as we shall see, in the summer of 1919, but

‘after the arrival in Yekatrinnodar – Spring, 1919 – of General Milne, the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Near East, it became clear,’ writes General Lukomsky, Denikin’s Chief-of-Staff,¹ ‘that aid from the Allies would be limited to the sending of supplies for the army and to moral support.’

Here again the British were reacting to Labour and Liberal pressure at home which Moscow always encouraged by means of notes and printed public declarations, as well as to the restive spirit of their army. Moreover, the statesmen and military in London were concentrating attention on their own ‘coming storm centres,’ the only point being that they were not ‘coming’: they had arrived. Ireland, Egypt, and India were seething. An Afghan war for independence was at hand.

The evacuation of the French, and the British preparations for evacuation as well as the decision of both these great Powers to restrict their future activities in Russia, should in the ordinary course of events have given support to the faction at the Paris Peace Conference which favoured negotiations with the Bolsheviks. The Lloyd George-Wilson policy which had found expression in the Prinkipo proposal, in the Bullitt Mission and in the Hoover-Nansen relief plan should, normally, have gained strength from the Anglo-French decision to withdraw their Russian armies, and from the numerous difficulties facing the Allies.

§ KOLCHAK ADVANCES

This would indeed have been the effect but for important Kolchak victories. On March 6 the army of Kolchak, anticipating offensive intentions on the part of the Red Army, attacked in full force from the Ufa-Perm line against a weak Bolshevik centre and broke through the enemy defences. Kolchak had 112,000 men massed on his Ural front; the Soviets faced him with 96,000 soldiers. The Fifth Army of the Bolsheviks soon commenced to

¹ *Memoirs*, by General A. S. Lukomsky. Berlin, 1922. Vol. II.

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retreat towards the Volga, and Kolchak's forces rushed headlong after it.

These Kolchak advances were widely heralded and exaggerated by the friendly press of Europe and America. Newspapers and experts counted the days that separated Kolchak from Moscow.¹ As a matter of fact, Moscow was never threatened. The Bolshevik setback, to be sure, was serious. Several large units were crippled; about 14,000 men were lost. Further Kolchak advances might have produced a critical situation. But in the third week of April, the 'Supreme Ruler's' forward movement had been checked, and early in May, Red forces were registering small successful counter-offensives. A reorganized Red Army, hastily reinforced with Communists and volunteer trade unionists, now held the line and allowed no further progress into Central Russia.

The changed situation, however, found no echo in the Western Press, and throughout April and May – indeed even on through the summer – Europe slept securely in the confidence that it would awake some day to read the announcement of Kolchak's capture of Moscow and the overthrow of Bolshevism.

How did Kolchak's brief success affect Allied policy? On April 16, when his troops were still moving towards the Volga, Lloyd George defended himself against verbal attacks in the House of Commons. He was still opposed to intervention. Of course, they could conquer Russia if they wished. But the expense would be excessive. 'I would rather see Russia Bolshevik until she sees her way out,' declared the Premier, 'than see Britain bankrupt. And that is the surest way to Bolshevism in Britain.'

'To attempt military intervention in Russia,' he reiterated, 'would be the greatest act of stupidity that any Government could possibly commit. But then I am asked why do you support Kolchak, Denikin, and Kharkov?' (Lloyd George mistook the capital of the Ukraine for a counter-revolutionary leader. Later in the same speech he referred to 'General Kharkov.') His answer was that these people had opposed Germany and were helped by the Allies for that reason.

¹ For an account of the misstatements regarding White army victories see the special supplement of the *New Republic* (New York), entitled 'A Test of the News,' by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz. August 4, 1920.

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At the Peace Conference on January 16, Lloyd George had spoken his distrust of the Russian 'White' hopes. Kolchak was a monarchist, he had argued; besides, he had no contact with Denikin. The British statesman asked consideration for these facts in a speech advocating the Prinkipo plan. Subsequently, for similar reasons, he had given unofficial approval to the Bullitt Mission. But in March, news of Kolchak's victories was broadcast through Europe. Mr. George cooled towards Mr. Bullitt. So did President Wilson. And in April, the Welshman rudely disavowed Bullitt. Kolchak was approaching Moscow, the papers screamed. Accordingly, Lloyd George backed the winning horse. On January 16 he could not see why anyone should support Kolchak. On April 16 he was trying to convince Parliament that Kolchak, Denikin and 'Kharkov' ought to be supported.

The military, naturally, were quick to take advantage of the civilian change of heart, and on the very day Lloyd George addressed the House of Commons we find Sir Henry Wilson writing to Churchill, Secretary of State for War, advising recognition of Kolchak. He likewise urged co-operation in the management of the Trans-Siberian railway, 'the continued presence of small numbers of Allied personnel to hearten the Siberian forces,' and more supplies.¹

The movement to recognize Kolchak now gathered momentum and the Peace Conference yielded to the pressure. The statesmen had completed the German peace and handed a neatly bound copy to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on May 7 in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors. Much to the relief of all Allied leaders, the Germans had not rejected the terms. Hearts and minds, accordingly, were now freer for the Russian problem, and on May 26 the Supreme Council, consisting of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Woodrow Wilson, and Saionji, addressed a joint note to Admiral Kolchak² laying down the law to the 'Supreme Ruler of All the Russias.' They opened with several statements hardly worthy of great men. 'It has always been the cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers,' they said, 'to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia.' Then, in immediate contradiction, they

¹ British Blue Book. *Army. The Evacuation of North Russia*, 1919. Cmd. 818. Page 31.

² *Ibid.*

refer to intervention during the War, they admit maintaining forces in Russia since the Armistice and announce that 'they are prepared . . . to continue their assistance.'

This flouting of the truth is only equalled by the distortion of fact that follows. The note speaks of the Peace Conference's effort to establish peace 'by inviting representatives of all the warring governments within Russia' to a conference. The reference, of course, is to Prinkipo. Wilson knew that the Bolsheviks had accepted this proposal.¹ Kolchak had flatly rejected it. Yet in the communication to Kolchak, Woodrow Wilson and the other statesmen of Versailles stated that 'this proposal . . . broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government.' The Omsk Admiral must have laughed! It probably gave him his cue in answering the Paris note.

The note then outlined the conditions under which the Allies were prepared to help and recognize Kolchak. Will Kolchak and his friends call the Constituent Assembly 'as soon as they reach Moscow,' institute free elections, guarantee that the Czarist regime will not be re-established, recognize the independence of Finland and Poland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Caspian and Caucasian Republics, agree to permit the Peace Conference to settle the Bessarabian question, join the League of Nations, and finally, abide by his declaration of November 27, 1918, to pay Russia's foreign obligations? If he did all these things he would receive aid and recognition.

None of this, be it noted, is interference in Russia's affairs. However, Kolchak made reply on June 4. Of course he accepted the conditions. But Kolchak, being a sincere partisan of an 'undivided Russia' could scarcely reconcile himself to the thought of losing all the Baltic and Caucasian provinces and perhaps Bessarabia to boot. He therefore resorted to a clever ruse. Was he not a staunch democrat? Was he not affirming in this reply that the Constituent Assembly would be the highest sovereign institution of the land? How then could he himself determine questions of international relations, boundaries, autonomy, etc.? That must be left to the Assembly. He thus avoided a rejection of the Allied terms and evaded a definite enunciation of policy. Kolchak's

¹ See page 167.

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only concession was the recognition of Polish independence. He condescended to this concession at the urgent request of Colonel John Ward, the British Army representative at Omsk. Colonel Ward tells the writer that in framing the reply to the Big Four, Kolchak faced the united opposition of his uncompromising royalist supporters, who, but for Colonel Ward's aid in drafting the document, would have made it an unequivocal reflection of their reactionary views.

General Knox, the chief British agent in Omsk, leaned towards these Right extremists, while Colonel Ward won the ear of the 'Supreme Ruler' with a relatively more liberal policy.

But by the time Kolchak's answer reached Paris, the Red Army had thrown him back towards the Urals. His chances of reaching Moscow were nil. The thought of recognition was therefore dropped, and on June 12 the Supreme Council sent him a bored letter acknowledging his rejoinder and promising support.

The Allies' definite alignment with Kolchak and their pledge of aid precluded further conversations with the Bolsheviks and should have closed the period of direct intervention. But the militarists objected to such logic and tried to discover excuses for the continued stay of foreign troops in Russia. Thus, on May 4, General Ironside, commander of the British forces at Archangel, received orders from London, sent with Lloyd George's approval, to effect a junction with the Czech General Gaida who presumably, in connection with Kolchak's short-lived success, planned to push up from the Perm region to Kotlas. Here, in other words, was a fresh reason for prolonging the British occupation in North Russia.

President Wilson, too, rushed to support the presence of American forces in Siberia. They were needed there to protect the railway mission of John F. Stevens, which railway mission kept the lines running that brought Kolchak munitions and food.¹

Thus, the end of the Peace Conference saw America and the Allies committed to a definite anti-Bolshevik policy. It saw them committed to Kolchak. They had, it is true, decided not to intervene with their own troops. But in no case did the Great Powers

¹ Reply of Wilson to Senate Resolution concerning American troops in Siberia, June 26, 1919. *R.A.R.*, page 343.

KOLCHAK THROWN BACK

withdraw all their forces from Russia immediately after the adoption of a non-intervention policy. England, in fact, sent reinforcements.

One more thing is clear: the only justification the Allied and Associated Powers now had for their anti-Bolshevik policy was the desire to overthrow Bolshevism and to weaken Russia. This was frankly confessed. On every turn during the Paris Peace Conference, Bolshevism was the bogey. If Poland asked for a loan it was to defend the world against Bolshevism. If Germany required feeding it was to make her safe against Bolshevism. In 1919 the world lived in fear of Bolshevism and statesmen frequently acted under the same impulse. 'Bolshevism,' however, occasionally served as a cloak for enmity towards Russia. This, as we shall see, was often the case with the British imperialists, with Japan, with Roumania, Poland, etc.

For practical purposes, the British had now accepted the French *cordon sanitaire* idea. This indeed became the policy of the entire Western world: help the Russian border states and help the Russian Whites fight their battles without foreign troops.

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

Every one of the counter-revolutionary governments in Russia received assistance from an Allied Power or a group of Powers. The Bolsheviks fought unaided.

The reliance of the Whites on outside help was a matter of necessity. It testifies to that intrinsic weakness which ultimately spelled their defeat and disappearance.

§ WHITE DIFFICULTIES

The anti-Soviet regimes were destroyed by the Red Army. But in the final analysis, they came to grief by reason of their own shortcomings.

The Whites put their trust in the city *bourgeoisie* and in the rural landowners, who constituted their natural support. It followed that the working-men and peasants were ignored and antagonized. With practically no exception, the proletariat in Russia was favourably disposed to the Bolsheviks. The peasantry, originally, may have been indifferent. It had peace. It had land. It wished to be left alone. But the anti-peasant policy of the Whites roused it to active opposition.

Kolchak's reign was really ended by village uprisings in his rear. Denikin perhaps would have reached Moscow but for obstructions by the Ukrainian peasantry. Kolchak promised that the land problem would be solved in the future by the Constituent Assembly. The Siberian peasants refused to wait for the fulfilment of this vague prophecy. Denikin even commenced the restitution of confiscated land to former owners. General Lukomsky, Denikin's closest co-worker, refers in his memoirs to the robberies perpetrated by Denikin's forces in the villages, and to 'the irresistible awakened appetites of the landowners approved by the local authorities' which played into the hands of Bolshevik agents who organized successful revolts against Denikin at the most critical period of his advance on Moscow.

The Whites realized the importance of Russia's hundred million

RED DIFFICULTIES

peasants. But their slogan was political and economic restoration. They were bound by bonds of past experience, sympathies, and ideology to the richer classes. They could not satisfy the economic demands of the mujiks.

Another problem which the White Governments failed to solve was the question of nationalities. Practically all the armed attempts to overthrow Bolshevism originated on the periphery of Russia where large numbers of the population were not Great Russian. Yet the leaders of these armed attempts were almost invariably Great Russian and wrote 'Great Undivided Russia' on their banners. The national minorities protested.

Denikin and Krasnov experienced difficulties with the inhabitants of the Don, Kuban, and Terek regions who yearned for independence.

In the Ukraine, the autonomy movement was strongest. Petlura posed as its standard-bearer. But when Denikin moved into the Ukraine in 1919, Petlura left off fighting the Bolsheviks and, for a while, concentrated all his hostility on the Great Russian restoration. This division of the anti-Soviet forces naturally strengthened the Communists.

RED DIFFICULTIES

Though aided by such objective conditions, the task facing the Soviets was supremely difficult. The country they controlled was completely blockaded. In 1919, the foreign trade turnover amounted to only 500,000 poods as compared with more than two billion in 1913. All diplomatic, semi-diplomatic and consular representatives had departed from Moscow, and Soviet Russia had lost every contact with the outside world. Not even the Red Cross of neutral nations remained.

Transport was seriously crippled. Epidemics raged. Cut off from Western Europe and from domestic sources of oil, coal, iron, bread and other necessities, Central Russia's industries suffered woefully. Famine threatened.

Yet under these conditions, the Bolsheviks fought on a front which completely encircled them. The Red Army had first claim on all supplies. In 1920, according to official figures, the armed forces consumed 25 per cent. of the flour, 60 per cent. of the fish,

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

60 per cent. of the meat, 40 per cent. of the fats, 100 per cent. of the tobacco, 90 per cent. of the men's shoes, and 40 per cent. of the cotton goods of the entire country. The strength of the army increased from 435,000 in December, 1917, to 1,500,000 in the middle of 1919, to 5,300,000 in 1920.

The exigencies of civil war necessitated the rationing of the civil population. This system plus the concentrating of attention on the requirements of the army characterize the economic arrangement known as the Military Communism. 'Militant' Communism as applied to this period is a misnomer. The Russian term is 'voyenni' or 'relating to war' and cannot possibly be translated 'militant.' Nor was the system militant in conception or intention. It was more a product of war-time necessity than of any desire to put Bolshevik theory quickly into practice.

Only the high centralization of the Soviet Government which reflected the unity of the Communist Party culminating in the unquestioned leadership of Lenin permitted the singleness of purpose that paved the way to Bolshevik victory in the Civil War. Moscow had one policy and it was always strictly adhered to. The Whites were divided among themselves.

The programme of the Soviets won the sympathy of the national minorities. The device used was the introduction of the federative principle which granted large measures of political and economic autonomy and complete cultural freedom to any ethnic unit that craved it. The Russification psychology of Czarism was alien to Bolshevism and the peoples of the periphery knew it and appreciated it.

The programme of the Soviets likewise won the sympathy of the peasants. To be sure, the villages strenuously objected to the requisition of their bread for army uses, and reacted unfavourably whenever the Bolsheviks resorted to it. But the mujhik knew that the landowner did not follow in the wake of the Reds as he did in the train of the Whites. He knew that the Bolsheviks would let him keep his holding. He therefore supported the Communists longer and more frequently than he did their enemies. This was the most important single factor in Russia's internecine struggle during the year 1919.

WAR IN THE BALTICS

§ 'WEDGING IN'

The second phase of the Civil War began late in 1918 with the end of the World War, the rise of Kolchak, the retirement from Russia of the armies of the Central Powers, and the opening of the Dardanelles and the Baltic to Allied vessels. It changed the face of the war against Moscow. World capital, Lenin had said, would now muster its strength to destroy the menace; the danger to Bolshevism was therefore the greater. On the other hand, German evacuation – in accordance with the terms of the World War armistice – offered the Bolsheviks an opportunity to extend their territory.

The northern Archangel front had, by this time, sunk to secondary importance as a result of climatic conditions and because Moscow was too impregnable. And in view of the expansion opportunities offered in the West and South, the Bolsheviks neglected Kolchak for the Baltic and Ukraine-Don fronts.

§ WAR IN THE BALTICS

The situation in the Baltics became fluid immediately after the Armistice. It will be recalled that von Kuehlmann had insisted at Brest Litovsk that Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were already 'self-determined.' The Bolsheviks, however, declined to accept 'self-determination' that had found its highest expression in an application, on April 12, 1918, for incorporation into the German Reich. Two days later the Kaiser granted their 'request' and accepted them into the 'Imperial family.' And when the representatives of the new little vassals approached Joffe in Berlin during May, for recognition of their 'independence,' he, naturally, denied both the fact and the petition.

These Baltic governments remained in power as long as German troops continued in occupation. But the moment the regular divisions began to withdraw, Soviet forces followed in their footsteps. At the same time, the civil population organized for self-government.

On December 23, 1918, the Soviet Government at Moscow recognized the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Esthonian Soviet Republics and offered them 'all necessary aid and support.' Except in Latvia, however, soviets did not yet exist in these provinces and

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

the penetration of Russian troops only reflected the desire of the Bolsheviks to anticipate the British.

Latvia did have her own revolutionary army. Vatzetis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, a Lett whose Western orientation was not untainted with Latvian nationalism, had, early in 1918, withdrawn Lettish Communists from the Ukrainian, Don, and Ural fronts to organize them into Latvian Rifles who now became a Latvian Red Army. On January 5, 1919, the workers of Riga, Latvia's capital, seized the city and proclaimed a soviet state. The new Latvian Red unit rushed to its support. Other Red forces advanced into Esthonia, Lithuania, and White Russia.

In Esthonia, White forces stemmed the tide, drove out the Bolsheviks, and created a convenient spring-board for General Yudenich's attempt to take Petrograd later in the year. In White Russia the Red Army met resistance from the Poles; in Latvia and Lithuania, from the Germans.

§ 'HUNS' 'HELP' ALLIES

The presence of the Germans in Latvia and Lithuania is of considerable interest. The Armistice had permitted the Germans to maintain their forces in the Baltic provinces. The Treaty of Versailles confirmed this arrangement. That document, in Article 433, abrogated the Brest Litovsk 'Peace of Violence' and ordered the withdrawal of German troops 'as soon as the governments of the principal allied and associated Powers shall think suitable, having regard to the internal situation of those territories.' The Allies, who did not wish or were not able to employ their own soldiers in the Russian border states, had decided on making use of the Germans to prevent the spread of Bolshevism westward. There was the danger that Soviet influence in Lithuania might reach contiguous Prussia and from there join hands with Spartacism in other sections of Germany. The Ebert Cabinet in Berlin gladly served the Allies in this matter and, though it withdrew part of the tired regular forces, it financed the irregular, volunteer battalions of von der Goltz.

The Germans, of course, were pursuing their own interests. If anti-Bolshevism offered a partial explanation of their action, its chief motivation was the desire to maintain their political and

economic influence in that corner of Europe against the impending infiltration of the British. No sooner had this become clear, than the Allies, under pressure from London, began to call a halt to German operations in the Baltic states.

During the month of March, 1919, especially, the Germans and Latvian Whites registered several important successes against the Bolshevik forces and thereupon commenced an encircling movement in the direction of Riga. An Allied note dated April 23 demanded that these German activities cease. But the warning was not heeded. On May 4, accordingly, the Allies insisted with Berlin that von der Goltz be recalled. Instead, the General captured Riga eighteen days later.

Foch, in a communication dispatched June 18, ultimately ordered the Germans to stop their advance into Esthonia and to evacuate the Latvian ports of Libau and Windau, and all Russian territory. But von der Goltz was sure of his ground. He knew he could not easily be suppressed by Allied arms. Perhaps he even thought that Paris and London would not sincerely intercede on behalf of the Bolsheviks by forcing his withdrawal. The fact is that the German forces remained near Riga and as late as September 27 the Supreme Council threatened to exert economic pressure on all of Germany unless she compelled von der Goltz to retire. He finally did so in December.

Finland, at this juncture, possessed a fairly well-established bourgeois government which had won Allied recognition. In Esthonia, a bourgeois government held its own with the help of a British squadron and of White Russian troops. The Latvian soviet republic was destroyed through the instrumentality of von der Goltz's cohorts, while in Lithuania, the Germans and the Poles prevented the establishment of a Red regime.

The Bolshevik effort to thrust westward thus ended in complete failure. Thereafter, few developments of moment took place on the Baltic front until Yudenich's advance in the summer of 1919 and the Polish offensive in 1920.

§ WHITE *v.* RED IN THE UKRAINE

Events in the South assumed infinitely greater importance and magnitude. Here too the strategy of the Bolsheviks consisted of

'wedging in' between the departing Germans and the oncoming Entente forces. The Allies, on the other hand, wished to avoid a vacuum into which the Bolsheviks might rush, and attempted to delay German evacuation.

But the Germans failed to stay on – thanks to the mutinous attitude of their soldiers, and Allied aid materialized slowly and insufficiently. General Franchet d'Esperey had promised twelve divisions, but only one arrived in Odessa, for a limited stay. The Bolsheviks therefore had only Petlura to reckon with. But Petlura was responsible for the German occupation from which the peasants had suffered. Moreover, the Ukrainian proletariat supported Bolshevism, and the mujhik, until grain requisition commenced, sided with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks, accordingly, experienced comparatively little difficulty in establishing their power throughout the greater part of the Ukraine during the winter and spring of 1919. January 3, Kkarkov was taken; January 12, Chernigov; February 5, Kiev; in March, the French lost Nikolaiev and Kherson; and on April 5, a Soviet was set up in Odessa after its evacuation by the French and capture by Ataman Gregoriev, a rough peasant partisan whose alignment with Bolshevism reflected the friendship of the peasant masses for the Bolsheviks.

§ SOVIET RUSSIA WISHES TO AID SOVIET HUNGARY

The Red Army now made ready to enter the Crimea and, in April, successfully pursued the remnants of Petlura's force to the East Galician frontier, capturing Zhitomir, Kamenetz-Podolsk, and Tiraspol. From a military point of view, the Bolsheviks were now in a position to do one of two things:

- (1) March an army into Roumania and recapture Bessarabia, or
- (2) March to the assistance of Soviet Hungary.

These possibilities tempted Moscow greatly. In fact, on March 26, Vatzetis, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, wired Antonov-Avscenka, in charge of the Kiev operations, to limit his activities on the Roumanian front, to destroy Petlura, and move towards East Galicia and Bukovina in order to establish 'direct, intimate contact with the Soviet armies of Hungary.'¹

¹ Quoted from the archives of the Soviet War Commissariat.

MOSCOW WISHES TO AID HUNGARY

Europe was sitting on a volcano. Revolutions had broken out in Hungary and Bavaria. Checked on the Baltic front, the Bolsheviks, it appears, were bent on penetrating into the Balkans and so come to the aid of Hungary. For, on Allied inspiration, Roumania was making war on Bela Kun's soviet state. This war threatened the life of Bolshevism in Hungary. The Russians, moreover, realized that Communism in Budapest and in all of South-Eastern and Central Europe would be tremendously stimulated if they gave direct military assistance to Bela Kun or distracted the Roumanians with an offensive into Bessarabia. The Bolsheviks planned both moves. Red Budapest was in constant radio communication with Moscow, using Kharkov as a relaying centre. Aeroplanes flew regularly from Hungary to the Ukraine, bringing leaders or reports and taking back suggestions, Soviet legal codes as models, and post. A Bolshevik offensive would establish direct geographical contact with Bela Kun, bring Bessarabia back to Russia, perhaps inspire a revolution in Roumania and affect the affairs of the entire Balkan peninsula at least.

Europe's post-war history may have been totally different had these projects been effected or even initiated. There is rich ground here for speculation, for the continent was in a receptive mood for revolutionary ideas. However, a number of circumstances intervened to prevent the fruition of these plans to carry the red banner through Europe.

Early in March Kolehak broke through the Ural front and commenced advancing into the Volga region. During April, the Admiral's progress grew menacing, and the Bolsheviks were compelled to reinforce their eastern front with troops from the south. This weakened their ability to extend into Hungary – an undertaking which would probably have involved them in wars with East Galicia and perhaps with Czecho-Slovakia.

Furthermore, just when he had been ordered to march towards Bessarabia, Ataman Gregoriev suddenly deserted the Bolsheviks, and set out on his short-lived career as an independent partisan marauder and perpetrator of anti-Jewish pogroms which ended with his murder by Makhno.

Finally, the Red Army's winter and spring campaigns of 1919

against Krasnov and Denikin in the Don-Kuban district had not been decisively successful, and in April and May there were indications that these forces intended ambitious offensives eastward and northward. Under the circumstances, the thought of a major offensive towards Soviet Hungary was perforce abandoned. By May, to be sure, Kolchak had been checked, but before Moscow could recover from the extra efforts required for this task, it was called upon to cope with Denikin. In May, too, Yudenich commenced moving from his line near the Esthonian-Russian border, and crept forward towards Gatchina and so close to Petrograd, the hearth of the revolution, that he actually printed currency for distribution upon its capture.¹

During May, units actually began to march towards Roumania, but these events quickly put an end to the plan. Nevertheless, it persisted, and in June Rudnianski, Bela Kun's representative in Moscow, proposed to use radical Hungarian ex-prisoners and other international groups to be collected in Russia for the purpose of cutting a corridor through Bukovina to Hungary. But the general military situation had become so serious in May that only insufficient attention could be granted to such side-shows.

May, 1919, was the critical month in the history of the Soviet civil war. Kolchak regarded his reverses as temporary and expected to push ahead and join forces with General Miller, who, after Chaikovsky's retirement in favour of the more congenial pursuit of playing diplomat in Paris, had become head of the Archangel Government. Denikin was driving up in the direction of Kharkov and Moscow, while Yudenich menaced Petrograd.

§ FOREIGN AID FOR KOLCHAK

Yudenich, Denikin, Kolchak, and all the more important White leaders owed whatever successes they achieved to Allied help. To try to prove this is, as the Russian saying goes, like trying to break through an open door. No effort was made to conceal it. No effort could have been made to conceal the fact, for instance, that foreign troops were stationed in Siberia. *Avanti*, an Italian daily, estimated their number at 116,800 as compared with 90,000

¹ A fresh unused 1,000-rouble note of this currency is in the possession of the writer.



KOLCHAK AND HIS BRITISH STAFF WATCHING MANOEUVRES

FOREIGN AID FOR KOLCHAK

Russian soldiers in Kolchak's battalions. Of the non-Russians 5,600 were British, 7,500 American (official figure), 760 French (official figure), 2,000 Italian, 4,000 Serb, 55,000 Czecho-Slovak, 10,000 Polish, 4,000 Roumanian, and 28,000 Japanese. But not only did the foreign fighters for Kolchak outnumber his own men; his own men owed everything they had to the Allies. Churchill, in the critical May month, declared before the House of Commons that 'in the main these (Kolchak's) armies are equipped by British ammunitions and British rifles, and a certain portion of the troops are actually wearing British uniforms.' The commander-in-chief of all the interventionists' strength with Kolchak was at one time the British General Knox and later the French General Janin. And Sir Henry Wilson noted in his diary for April 29, 1919, that he had spent time in the morning 'considering a message I am sending to Kolchak advising him as to the strategy of his summer campaign.'

America, though she lagged behind England, France and Japan, likewise lent a helping hand. On April 26, 1919, Serge Ughet, financial agent of the former Russian Government in Washington, wired to Omsk suggesting that the 'Supreme Ruler' make a declaration of liberal policies in order to win United States public opinion.¹ On July 24 of the same year, Ughet informed his superiors in Siberia that while the U.S. Secretary of War was not anxious to sell uniforms and other war materials, he would give him quantities of rifles at cost price and on twelve months' credit.² And Mr. Ughet admitted to the writer that a hundred locomotives paid for by the United States Treasury were shipped by him to Vladivostok and Novorossisk.³

In July, 1919, when the Paris Peace Conference had under consideration the question of Kolchak recognition, President Wilson ordered Roland S. Morris, the American ambassador in Tokio, to proceed to Siberia and report on conditions there. The envoy arrived in Omsk on July 21, remained in the country three weeks

¹ These telegrams are from the secret archives of Kolchak's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were seized by the Red Army when it captured Omsk and Irkutsk. The writer has been able to avail himself fully of all the documents contained therein by courtesy of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs where the Kolchak documents are now deposited.

² *Ibid.*

³ See article entitled 'Kerensky,' *New York Nation* of April 27, 1927.

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

(on July 31 he interviewed the authorities of the University of Perm, who told him that Kolchak's was an undemocratic, military regime), and advocated recognition. The *Springfield Republican* of August 24 supplied further details. Morris's statement on Kolchak's government, it said, was rather pessimistic, nevertheless he favoured recognition if the admiral could hold out another month. 'By the time this report could be acted upon, however, Kolchak had met with serious reverses in Western Siberia. Morris cabled urging haste to save the situation . . .'¹ – but it was too late, and Wilson waited watchfully.

§ BRITAIN AND DENIKIN

The United States, as far as can be ascertained, gave little assistance to Denikin, although Admiral McCully represented Washington at Yekatrino-dar. Great Britain, on the other hand, was extremely generous to the leader of the Volunteer Army. Since the soldiers' frame of mind did not encourage the dispatch of masses of rank and file to Russia, Churchill, as Secretary of State for War, reconciled himself to military missions. One such body, consisting of 2,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers, functioned with Denikin. Its duties, Churchill explained in the House of Commons, 'are confined to advice and supervision in the distribution and use of British materials.' The next day, December 17, 1919, Churchill added: 'Every effort has been made by the Mission to re-organize the railways, and with the same object technical materials to the value of 500,000 pounds sterling and commodities and clothing to a similar value are being sent out by the War Office.'

Though support of this nature was important, British aid assumed far greater proportions. ' . . . very valuable assistance is being given by the Allies to General Denikin's army in South Russia,' says the *Manchester Guardian* of May 21, 1919, quoting Reuter. 'Great Britain is supplying complete equipment with arms and guns for 250,000 men.' London was making the counter-revolutionaries a gift of a whole army's outfit. To add glory to worldly goods, King George pinned the Order of the Bath on Denikin through his chief officer at Yekatrino-dar, General H. C. Holman.

¹ *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*, by H. K. Norton. London, 1923. Page 88.

THE HIGH COST OF INTERVENTION

§ FOREIGN AID TO YUDENICH

There is equally strong evidence of foreign help to Yudenich. Wiring from Riga, Walter Duranty, *New York Times* correspondent, stated that 'Yudenich's advance was made possible by four British tanks and British crews.'¹

On August 26, 1919, Nabokov, Kolchak minister in London, wired Omsk that 'the army of Yudenich received from England complete war equipment for one division.' September 16, Sablin, a well-known monarchist, informed Kolchak that 'a ship has arrived in Reval with clothing and full equipment for 30,000' (men).² This was the time of Yudenich's hottest preparations for his second drive on Petrograd. Churchill gave without stint. A telegram in the archives of the Omsk Foreign Office from its London agent reports his audience with the Secretary of State for War who, in the Russian's presence, ordered sent to Yudenich 'arms, clothes, shoes and medical supplies' for 20,000 soldiers in addition to materials already forwarded. Also, 10 light and 16 heavy cannons, and 15 aeroplanes. (October 18.)

Moreover, the British Navy participated in the actual fighting. During one of Yudenich's sallies against Petrograd, for instance, seven English torpedo-boats moved on the Soviet fortress of Kronstadt. In the encounter that ensued on the night of August 18, three were sunk by the Russian mine-carrier *Gabriel*.

§ THE HIGH COST OF INTERVENTION

All these forms of allied support were, needless to say, extremely expensive. A British White Paper gives England's total outlays for naval and military purposes in Russia from the Armistice to October 3, 1919, as amounting to no less than 94,830,000 pounds sterling – excellent ammunition for the Socialist Opposition in the House of Commons. And Baron Consuke Hayashi, Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, told a Labour delegation on June 15, 1921, that Japanese intervention in Siberia, which he styled 'an unfortunate movement,' had cost his government 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 pounds sterling during the last three

¹ Quoted by *Soviet Russia*, a New York weekly, on December 13, 1919.

² From the secret archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Omsk,

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

years.¹ What shares the United States and France contributed to the billion and more dollars spent on foreign interference in Russian affairs is not known, but French assistance was probably not even second to that of the British, for while Paris sent few missions and fewer poilus to the Whites within Russia, she spent fortunes in preparing Poland, Roumania, and Czecho-Slovakia for anti-Bolshevik adventures.

But Allied intervention was not confined to men, missions, and materials. Wherever it was necessary, the Allies likewise interceded diplomatically. Thus Churchill, according to a telegram from Nabokov to Kolchak, dated June 13, 1919, undertook to persuade Finland to join Yudenich's offensive.² Similarly, Maklakov telegraphed from Paris on April 1, 1919, concerning French negotiations with Esthonia with a view to a joint Yudenich-Esthonian drive on Petrograd.³ And, September 18, 1919, Sablin informed Omsk that 'British Government (had) instructed its agent in Reval to seriously warn Esthonian Government against concluding peace with (the) Bolsheviks.'⁴ Professor Dennis, among others, confirms the fact that the Western Powers tried to induce Finland to join Yudenich in attacking Petrograd,⁵ and the Council of Five of the Paris Peace Conference is on record as having put pressure on the same country to the same end.

These diplomatic efforts, driven home with promises of practical help, sought to mobilize against the Bolsheviks all available non-Bolshevik forces. In like manner, the Allies endeavoured to co-ordinate the military operations of the various White Governments, and, by confronting the Soviet regime with powerful offensives on all fronts, to bring about its downfall.

¶ THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE FOUR WHITE FRONTS

Too often the activities of the numerous counter-revolutionary groups in the Russian Civil War are regarded as disjointed, inde-

¹ 'Attacks on Russia during 1921.' Pamphlet published by the British 'Hands off Russia' Committee. London, 1921.

² From Kolchak's Secret Archives.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*, by Alfred L. P. Dennis. New York, 1924.

pendent affairs. The truth is that common plans frequently existed and that at least the major anti-Bolsheviks had constituted themselves into a closely knit union recognizing one leader and one general purpose. That leader was Admiral Kolchak, and the general purpose was the re-establishment of a 'great undivided Russia' presumably with a constitutional monarchy as the form of government. When and why the choice fell upon Kolchak is not known. Perhaps his pro-British leanings and his enlistment to fight for the British in Mesopotamia influenced the selection. Be that as it may, the fact is that the other counter-revolutionaries looked to him as 'Supreme Ruler' and that the entire Czarist diplomatic service abroad acknowledged Omsk as its capital. To it all reports were transmitted. With it the Allies dealt. The Allies, undoubtedly, were the cement of the union.

¶ DENIKIN AND KOLCHAK

Denikin announced his allegiance to Omsk just as foreign help began making itself felt in his camp. His Army Order #45 issued May 30, 1919, said: 'I subordinate myself to Admiral Kolchak as Supreme Ruler of the Russian State and as Supreme Commander of the Russian armies.' This statement which, in view of imperfect telegraphic connections, could not be transmitted directly from Yekatrino¹dar, was relayed through Constantinople on June 15 and stamped 'Received' in Omsk on June 20.¹ Exactly a week later, the 'Supreme Ruler' wired his thanks to Denikin in unusually lyric language.²

The critical month of May, 1919, marked by increased and more or less successful military activity against the Bolsheviks, likewise seems to have been devoted to the consolidation of the White political situation and the raising of Kolchak's prestige. All the threads meet in Sazonov's hand. Sazonov had been the Czar's foreign minister. He was also Kolchak's Foreign Minister. But he spent all his time abroad – most of it in Paris. During May he paid a ten-day visit to London. The Peace Conference was still sitting. The Big Four deliberated the question of Kolchak recognition, and Sazonov wished to strengthen his British ties. Apparently the sojourn pleased him greatly and he so informed his

¹ From Kolchak's Secret Archives.

² *Ibid.*

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

master in a telegram dated June 1 and decoded and typewritten on Omsk Ministry of Foreign Affairs stationery on June 5. He had seen the king in private audience, he had twice held conferences with M.P.'s 'of various parties.' The British Government, he said, was ready to help, but Labour must not be antagonized by reactionary moves in Siberia. The same message¹ shows Sazonov's concern not only for the Siberian situation but also for the Archangel and Yudenich fronts.

These diplomatic victories, however, were not matched by similar triumphs on the field of battle. Kolchak, it will be remembered, lost heavily in May after initial gains in March and April. By the end of July, the Supreme Ruler's prospects seemed so dark that he wished to resign, and at a conference in Omsk asked the Allied representatives to transfer his authority, title and responsibilities to Denikin. Only after earnest pleas from the foreigners and their promises to grant more aid did he consent to remain.

Unaware of the sad turn of events in Siberia, Denikin struggled with the problem of reconciling his allegiance to Kolchak and an 'undivided Russia' with his own desire for power and with the Cossacks' yearning for autonomy. Soon after he had officially recognized Omsk, therefore, he consulted the admiral telegraphically. Neratov, Denikin's Foreign Secretary, wired to Kolchak's envoy in Athens, who in turn transmitted the message to Siberia. Under date of July 6, we read:

'Neratov wires #870: The Commander-in-Chief [Denikin. - L. F.] requests you forward to Admiral Kolchak: "In view of my subordination to you as Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander it is now necessary, until the fronts will actually be united to decide the following questions: (1) the limits of my authority in civil and military administration, in legislation, and in judicial affairs; (2) the organization and activity of departments in the field of foreign relations . . ."'

In view of the difficulty of communicating with Omsk, a delegation was being sent to Paris under General Dragomirov to describe conditions in South Russia to Kolchak over a direct wire and obtain his instructions.

¹ From Kolchak's Secret Archives.

ARCHANGEL AND KOLCHAK

Dragomirov supplied Sazonov with all the information available on the separationist tendencies of the populations in Denikin's territory and on the concessions that were required by his Commander-in-Chief's *amour propre*. A lengthy correspondence ensued and there was no final decision until December, 1919, when Kolchak, expelled from Omsk and about to be deserted by his followers and executed, wired from Irkutsk to Sazonov a hasty 'In reply to yours of November 8 I agree to conditions.' But Kolchak's agreement was of no importance. For in December, 1919, Denikin, as well as he, were about to fade into the historical past.

One thing the Dragomirov mission did accomplish. It won a rise in salary for Denikin. On August 22, a telegram from Sazonov to Kolchak pointed out that Denikin was receiving only 2,250 roubles a month and wanted more. Across the document on to which this message is decoded, the 'Supreme Ruler' wrote in green ink his resolution in favour of giving Denikin as much as the assistant Commander-in-Chief in Omsk received, and signed 'Admiral Kolchak, August 26, 1919.'¹ Such subordination by Denikin, amounting almost to humiliation, could scarcely have been voluntary. It apparently reflected Allied insistence on interdependence and co-ordination.

How closely Kolchak identified himself with Denikin may be seen from a proclamation he made during the latter's successes. 'We,' he announced, 'have taken Kiev, Odessa, Tambov, Kozlov, Yeletz, and will take Chernigov and Kursk. . . .' The 'we' is significant.

§ ARCHANGEL AND KOLCHAK

The relation between the Northern Archangel Government of Chaikovsky-Miller and the Omsk 'Supreme Ruler' was likewise close, thanks to the wish of the British that it be so, and 'General Miller . . . drafted at the end of March, 1919, a letter which recognized Admiral Kolchak as dictator.'²

On account of the small number of foreign troops, of the unreliability of the Russian troops, of the hostility of the local population and of unfriendly climatic and terrain conditions, the

¹ From Kolchak's Secret Archives.

² *The Russian Revolution*, by James Mavor, London, 1928.

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

northern front, throughout 1919, played only a secondary rôle – as a sort of arm or branch of the Kolchak Eastern front. Therefore, and as a result of Labour opposition, the British decided in March, 1919, to liquidate it.¹ But this was displeasing to the military, who sought to postpone evacuation. The difficulty of withdrawal served as the best excuse. The generals explained that in order to bring away the troops already there, you had to have more troops. So, where the British had a rifle strength of 3,905 in North Russia and a ration strength of 6,832 on January 2, 1919,² the force numbered 18,400 in the autumn when evacuation finally took place. Thus reinforced in order ostensibly to end the expedition, the commanders proceeded not to evacuate but to carry out the expedition's 'original intention of joining hands with the Czechs on the Perm-Vologda railway.'³ In June General Ironside therefore opened an offensive in the direction of Kotlas in order to establish contact with Kolchak. This occurred months after the decision to withdraw.

The British military justified the offensive as a protection for their contemplated evacuation. They feared a Red Army attack that would hinder it. But the Bolsheviks had repeatedly offered to sign an armistice in order to facilitate evacuation. Moreover, the guns of the British cruisers lying in the White Sea could easily have afforded sufficient cover for the embarkation of several thousand soldiers and of several thousand Russian civilians. With respect to the salvaging of supplies, the force that had been sent with the avowed purpose of preventing munitions from falling into the hands of the Germans left sufficient materials behind to supply Red Army brigades during the entire length of the Russo-Polish War.

The British military told the public that England's biggest man-power stake in the Russian Civil War had to be 'rescued' by means of offensives, and of reinforcements which tripled the size of the original force. The British military further insisted that in their solicitude for the Archangel expedition they would 'hesitate to withdraw the Ninth Bn. Hampshire Regiment from Admiral Kolchak's command at Omsk.' They moreover wished

¹ British Blue Book, Cmd. 818. *Army. The Evacuation of North Russia. 1919.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

66

Секретная телеграмма Министра Иностранных Дѣлъ
на имя Верховнаго Правительства..

Парижъ, 22 Августа 1919 г.

№ 1009-133.

Генераль Драгомировъ проитъ передать: Члены
миссии по собственному почину позволяютъ себѣ пред-
ставить Вашему Високопревосходительству частный воп-
росъ о желательности назначенія оклада содержанія
Генералу Деникину, какъ помощнику Верховнаго Главно-
командующаго, ибо въ настоящее время Генераль Дени-
кинъ ограничилъ себя окладомъ со всеми добавленіями
2250 рублей въ мѣсяць.

/ Подп./ Сазоновъ.

SECRET TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SUPREME
RULER

PARIS, August 22, 1919, No. 1009-133.

'General Dragomirov asks to transmit: The members of the mission on their own initiative permit themselves to present to your Excellency a private question of the desirability to fix a salary for General Denikin as Assistant of the Commander-in-Chief, because at present General Denikin has limited himself to a salary including all other emoluments of 2,250 roubles per month.

(Signed) SAZONOV

Across this telegram Kolchak wrote in green ink 'Necessary grant same salary as Chief of Staff of Commander-in-Chief.

(Signed) ADMIRAL KOLCHAK

26 VIII, 1919

Facing page 205

YUDENICH AND KOLCHAK

‘to encourage the Japanese in any effort they may be prepared to make towards sending troops to the Ural front, or assisting in the equipment, training and organization of the Siberian army.’¹ But more even than this was required before the little complement in Archangel could be withdrawn: the deputy Chief of the British Imperial General Staff urged a Finnish offensive on Petrograd.

¶ YUDENICH AND KOLCHAK

It is said that Yudenich was originally appointed by Kolchak but no record of the fact is available. That the two White leaders, however, were intimately related, follows from the circumstance, as we have seen, that the British dealt with Yudenich through Kolchak’s diplomatic representatives and that Yudenich received all his foreign assistance through the hands of Kolchak agents.

Yudenich too recognized the ‘Supreme Ruler’ and was subject to instructions from Omsk. On August 17, 1919, for instance, Sazonov wired from Paris to Kolchak:

‘I am wiring to Stockholm as follows: Please inform General Yudenich that within the limits of the authority given him by the Supreme Ruler he can entrust men of his own choosing with various phases of local government, but the formation of a cabinet of ministers is not in accord with the endeavour to unite state authority in the hands of the Russian Government in Omsk and may create a false impression of a unique position occupied by the North-Western District. Only individuals authorized by me [Sazonov. – L. F.] to do so have the right to conduct negotiations with foreigners regarding foreign affairs. With respect to the agreement with the Esthonians, it may include only matters of a military character.’

As a reply to this stern message it was announced in Reval on August 19, that ‘the new Government of Yudenich recognizes its temporary and district character and declares its agreement with Admiral Kolchak and with the programme adopted by him and by General Denikin.’

¹ British Blue Book. Cmd. 818. *Army. The Evacuation of North Russia.* 1919.

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

§ YUDENICH AND DENIKIN

To complete the united front of the four big White leaders there is the link between Yudenich and Denikin to which Lloyd George alluded in the House of Commons on December 18, 1919, when he said 'General Yudenich, who is acting more or less in concert with General Denikin . . .'

There was, then, a tie between Kolchak and the three other fronts, between Archangel and Yudenich and Kolchak, between Yudenich and Archangel and Denikin, and between Denikin and Yudenich and Kolchak.

The interdependence of the counter-revolutionary groups, product of a common political ideology and aim, in turn resulted in a co-ordination of military activities which, in view of poor communications and the distances between fronts, could only have been planned for in some foreign capital after consultation with Kolchak's agents. The first attempt at such military co-ordination was made in the spring of 1919 when Allied assistance began to assume great importance, and its first-fruits were the notable successes gained during the critical May month of 1919 around Petrograd and in the Ukraine.

§ YUDENICH AT PETROGRAD'S GATES

Yudenich commenced his offensive at daybreak on May 13, found the Soviet forces unprepared, and registered appreciable forward pushes. On the 25th, Bulak-Balakhovich, later of pogrom fame in White Russia, took Pskov with the aid of Esthonians. The White army was supported by a well-planned conspiracy hatched in Petrograd by two reactionary organizations called the 'National Centre' and the 'Resurrection Union' which enjoyed foreign financial support and the assistance of foreign agents in the city. Thanks to their efforts, one regiment in the Red Army mutinied, the fort of Red Gorka raised the flag of revolt and fired on Kronstadt and on the Soviet fleet. Grey Horse Fort followed suit. In Petrograd a railway strike was contemplated. The counter-revolutionaries even placed agents in Red Army staff headquarters.

This plot was discovered by the Cheka in June and wholesale arrests followed. The revelations produced a deep effect on the

‘THERE IS NO ESTHONIA’

Petrograd proletariat and thousands offered their services against Yudenich. In fact, the number of factory workers who applied for mobilization exceeded the demand and many were rejected. These enthusiastic recruits soon checked Yudenich's advance. By June and the early part of July the White offensive, so auspiciously begun, had been halted – both favourable and unfavourable developments on this front were rapid because the distances were small.

A Soviet counter-offensive which commenced in August met with almost instantaneous success owing to the retirement of the Esthonians – not for military but for political reasons. They simply turned about and left the front open for the Bolsheviks to march ahead. The result was the recapture of Pskov and the complete paralysis of Yudenich's forces.

¶ ‘THERE IS NO ESTHONIA’

The political feature of Yudenich's summer campaign against Petrograd was the defection of the Esthonians. Esthonia had aligned itself with the general in answer to Allied pressure, but it harboured no good wishes for his success. It scarcely could in view of his attitude.

N. N. Ivanov, a member of Yudenich's Cabinet, has preserved a most interesting conversation on this question between himself and his chief which took place early in 1919. The discussion turned to relations with Esthonia. ‘There is no Esthonia,’ Yudenich explained. ‘It is a piece of Russian soil – a Russian province. The Esthonian Government is a gang of criminals who have seized power, and I will enter into no conversations with it.’¹ Such an attitude is scarcely surprising; it arose naturally from his Great Russian policy, from his belief in an ‘undivided’ Russia.

Esthonia was of course aware of Kolchak's and Yudenich's hostility towards the national aspirations of the border states of the former Czarist Empire. When England tried to make the Great Russians and the national minorities fight under the one banner of Anti-Bolshevism, it was therefore essaying a difficult task. For though the Esthonians and Finns and Latvians were as antagonistic to the Soviets as Kolchak or Yudenich or Denikin,

¹ *Events outside Petrograd in 1919*, by N. N. Ivanov. Archives of the Civil War. Berlin, 1921.

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

they realized that the victory of Bolshevism would not threaten their independence while the victory of the Whites would.

§ CABINET FORMATION IN FORTY MINUTES

The defection of the Esthonians and the support of Petrograd factory hands had defeated Yudenich's first effort, yet neither he nor the Allies despaired of final victory. The condition of achievement, however, was reorganization, and with this in view General March, of the British Army, arrived dramatically in Reval on August 10. The same evening he invited eleven leading White Russians to his apartment. Then, in the presence of the American and French military attachés, he ordered the assembled leaders to form a new Government in forty minutes. He drew his watch. It was 6.20 p.m. as he spoke: the cabinet must be ready at 7. Moreover, this new Government would be required to sign an agreement with Esthonia immediately and on the spot.

Faced with such an ultimatum, the Yudenich group meekly complied. Yudenich could not but obey General March, and the British saw plainly that the General would never take Petrograd until some settlement was patched up between him and Esthonia. But the incident provoked Kolchak's jealousy. Forthwith, Sazonov protested against Yudenich's independence in foreign affairs, and against an agreement with Esthonia which was more than military in character.¹

If Yudenich's situation was difficult, England's was complicated and anomalous. On the one hand she supported Kolchak and Yudenich, to whom independent border nations were anathema; on the other hand, she supported those border nations out of her desire to weaken her age-long enemy, Russia, and drive the Muscovite Power away from the seas. Yet military expediency required that the two elements, the restorationists and the natural enemies of the restorationists – the Esthonians – be made amicable bed-fellows. It was impossible.

§ DENIKIN'S DISTANT OFFENSIVE

'General Yudenich,' Lloyd George had said, '... is acting more or less in concert with General Denikin.' That was a fact:

¹ See page 205.

their offensives had been timed to synchronize. Both commenced in May.

Fortune smiled on Denikin more warmly than on his friend in Reval. In May, he moved forward rather rapidly in three directions: towards Tsaritsin to unite with Kolchak on the Volga, towards Voronezh and Kharkov to take Moscow, and towards Odessa and Crimea to occupy the Ukraine.

Denikin was favoured by mutinies in the Red Army. Ataman Gregoriev's revolt exposed the southern Ukraine to anti-Bolshevik attack. In the same month of May, Makhno, who commanded a corps in the army, started an insurrection against Bolshevism and attacked the very units to which he had formerly adhered, thus opening a breach for Denikin's advance on Kharkov. Such disaffection in the Red Army's ranks was not accidental; it reflected opposition to Moscow's peasant policy on the part of the richer mujhiks of the Ukraine who were naturally displeased when the Bolsheviks requisitioned grain for the fighting forces.

Denikin enjoyed another advantage – he had cavalry, whose moves were quick and deadly. The Bolsheviks possessed little until later in the campaign. During September Trotzky gave out his famous summons, 'Proletarians, to horse,' and Budenny's mounted Cossacks began to play a decisive rôle in Soviet strategy. Until then the dashing divisions of Mamontov's and Shkuro's cavalry sowed devastation throughout Soviet Ukrainian territory.

The Bolsheviks were faced not only by 150,000 fairly well organized troops of Denikin but also by the Poles and by Petlura. Moreover, the Red Army was forced to spend considerable energy in battling with Makhno and numerous bandit, pogromist chiefs.

Denikin made swift progress. The campaign was long and bitterly fought with many trying contests and advances and retreats on both sides, but until October success remained with the Volunteer Army. From May till October he moved forward in the direction of Moscow and the Bolsheviks could not stop him. On September 20 he captured Kursk (330 miles from Moscow), October 5 Chernigov, and October 14 Orel (245 miles from Moscow).

Moscow was alarmed. In the second fortnight of October a 'Committee for the Defence of Moscow' came into being, and the fourth week of the month was proclaimed 'Defence Week.' Workers

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in the factories organized in flying squads to hold the capital, and thousands of others volunteered for service in the Red Army. The Communist Party which, in the Ukraine, sent 80 per cent and in places 90 per cent of its membership into the hottest sectors of the front, now mobilized in its entirety for the decisive struggle.

As in the case of the Yudenich summer offensive against Petrograd, the Whites proposed to avail themselves of the services of their sympathizers within the camp of the enemy. According to the plan, a counter-revolutionary conspiracy in Moscow would undermine the Bolsheviks' authority there and prepare for its capture by Denikin.

A man carrying a million roubles was apprehended by the Cheka in Viatka on July 27. Questioned, he confessed to be a courier from Kolchak to the 'National Centre' in Moscow bearing the wherewithal for a grandiose plot. This led to the arrest of the conspirator-in-chief, an engineer named Schepkin, and several dozen accomplices. Secret information regarding the strength and position of Red Army units was found in their possession; they had regularly supplied Denikin with data on the Soviets' military status. . . . Before the summer ended, most of the plotters were executed by the Cheka.

§ DENIKIN'S END

Towards the commencement of winter, the tide at the front turned in favour of the Bolsheviks. Denikin had lengthened his line and proceeded far from his base. To refresh his spent army, he was forced to conscript among the local population which was neither loyal nor ready to fight. He even pressed Red Army prisoners into the ranks. Moreover, the peasants began to understand his pro-landlord policy and harassed his rear. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, now threw enthusiastic workers into the front line and brought up reserves from other theatres. Finally Denikin's greatest political difficulty, apart from village uprisings, was the disaffection of the inhabitants of Terek, Dagestan and Kuban, who resented his policy towards national minorities.

A further blow to Denikin's cause was the deflection of Allied ammunition from him to D'Annunzio. Entente arms were frequently shipped to Russia in Italian vessels, the seamen on which

KOLCHAK'S END

had organized in trade unions led by a certain Jiulietti. During the Genoa Conference in 1922, Chicherin met Jiulietti together with D'Annunzio. In 1919 D'Annunzio had founded a republic at Fiume on near-Soviet lines. He thought of making Italy the leader of national revolutionary movements; he planned an alliance between Italy, Germany and Soviet Russia. At the time, and even later, he maintained contacts with Italian Communists, notably Bombacci. Jiulietti, who knew D'Annunzio and Bombacci well, persuaded his Italian sailors to divert many shiploads of war materials from Denikin's Black Sea ports to the pink free state of Fiume.

Apart from these difficulties, a split had developed in Denikin's own camp. Two factions struggled for control – the pro-Entente Cadets, and the Russian monarchists whose sympathies went out to the Hohenzollern dynasty.

Thus weakened, Denikin's sun began to decline. In November a general retreat developed. Soon the Volunteer Army was fighting for its existence – not in the Ukraine but in the Don region. The Red Army swept ahead irresistibly in all directions; Budenny's cavalry advanced rapidly, and by March, 1920, Denikin was back in the Northern Caucasus, where his adventure saw its inception in 1918. During the same month, the Soviets entered Yekatri-nodar, Denikin's capital, Tuapse on the Black Sea, and Novorossisk, the port at which Allied supplies had arrived. Tens of thousands of prisoners were taken; invaluable equipment such as tanks, aeroplanes, locomotives and guns fell easily into Bolshevik hands.

This was the end of Denikin. A remnant of his army under General Baron Wrangel saved itself by rushing into the Crimean bottle and inserting the cork at Perekop. Thousands of stragglers trekked across the Caucasian Mountains into Georgia – but the Volunteer Army as such had passed into history. In May, 1920, Denikin himself appeared in London and began to write his valuable many-volumed memoirs.

§ KOLCHAK'S END

While these kaleidoscopic events were unfolding on the Southern front, another Red force pounded at Kolchak. The 'Supreme Ruler' had become a sorry spectacle; even the Allies

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

despaired of his success and informed him that they would henceforth concentrate their support on Denikin. The Siberian peasants refused to enter his ranks. Partisan bands operated everywhere to the detriment of the White divisions.

Under the circumstances, the Red Army's advance was determined by its own rapidity of movement. It quickly traversed the Ural plateau during the early autumn, and by October had conquered much of Western Siberia. Omsk fell without a struggle. The admiral himself fled with his gold and some archives in the direction of Irkutsk to the Baikal region.¹ His followers gladly deserted, and no less than 100,000 prisoners were counted by the Bolshevik forces in these operations.

Kolchak perhaps believed that with the help of the Allies and Czecho-Slovaks he could make a stand in the Trans-Baikal. But the Czechs were demoralized, anxious to get home, and completely disillusioned about the character of the Admiral's 'cause.' On December 25, therefore, Kolchak resigned his military command in favour of Ataman Semenov who had fought him all the time.

The 'Supreme Ruler,' his dreams of supremacy and ruling miserably dashed, surrendered himself to General Janin, the French officer in charge of the Allied forces in Siberia. Janin, in turn, handed him over to the Bolsheviks because they threatened to annihilate his corps if he did not.² The Bolsheviks thereupon tried him before a Revolutionary Tribunal, found him guilty of more crimes than one in their calendar, and shot him at five in the morning of February 7, 1920. That was the end of Kolchak's regime.

Western Siberia had gone 'Red.' The Japanese held the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok. Between the two a sort of buffer state was established on April 6, 1920, with a capital at Chita. Alexander Krasnoschekov, recently arrived from Chicago, was chosen president of this 'Far Eastern Republic.'

During the Red Army's operations against Kolchak in the Ural

¹ Part of the archives of the Kolchak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was abandoned in Omsk and seized by the Bolsheviks. The remainder travelled to Irkutsk and became Soviet property upon the capture of that city. These documents are now in the vaults of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow.

² *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*, by H. K. Norton. London, 1923. Page 93.

У К А З Ъ

В Е Р Х О В Н А Г О П Р А В И Т Е Л Я

4 января 1920 года
г. И-Удинскъ.

Въ виду предрѣшенія мною вопроса о передачѣ ВЕРХОВНОЙ ВСЕРОССИЙСКОЙ власти Главнокомандующему вооруженными силами вѣа Россіи Генераль Лейтенанту ДЕНИКИНУ, впредь до полученія его указаній, въ цѣляхъ сохраненія на нашей РОССІЙСКОЙ Восточной Окраинѣ оплота Государственности на началахъ неразрывнаго единства со всей РОССІЕЙ:

1/ Предоставляю Главнокомандующему вооруженными силами Дальняго Востока и Иркутскаго военнаго округа Генераль Лейтенанту Атаману СЕМЕНОВУ всю полноту военной и гражданской власти на всей территоріи РОССІЙСКОЙ Восточной Окраины объединенной РОССІЙСКОЙ ВЕРХОВНОЙ властью.

2/ Поручаю Генераль Лейтенанту Атаману СЕМЕНОВУ образовать органы Государственнаго Управленія въ предѣлахъ распространенія его полноты власти.

ВЕРХОВНЫЙ ПРАВИТЕЛЬ

А. И. Колчакъ

ПРЕДСѢДАТЕЛЬ СОВѢТА МИНИСТРОВЪ

ДИРЕКТОРЪ КАНЦЕЛЯРІИ

ВЕРХОВНАГО ПРАВИТЕЛЯ

ГЕНЕРАЛЬ МАЮРЪ

KOLCHAK'S UKASE DATED JANUARY 4, 1920, ANNOUNCING HIS RESIGNATION AS 'SUPREME RULER' AND TRANSFERRING HIS OFFICE TO ATAMAN SEMENOV UNTIL DENIKIN CAN TAKE CONTROL

YUDENICH TRIES AGAIN

region, one of its sections bent sharply to the south, and, instead of pursuing the Admiral's main force, undertook a bold move in the direction of Turkestan. Within three months, these troops had penetrated into the distant Trans-Caspian region, captured Krasnovodsk on the Caspian (February 6, 1920), and paved the way for the immediate setting up of a Soviet Government. Thus, another tremendous slice of Russian territory was relieved of White influence and of foreign intervention.

¶ YUDENICH TRIES AGAIN

By this time Yudenich too had disappeared. General March, it will be recalled, reorganized the North-West Government in forty minutes. There followed a flood of supplies from Britain and of military experts. Churchill staked much on the capture of Petrograd.

The Bolsheviks were making a determined stand against Denikin around Orel. They were busy liquidating Kolchak's army. Moscow seemed threatened. At this juncture, Yudenich began to menace Petrograd which, for the revolution, was almost as vital as Moscow. By October 16, his soldiers had taken Gatchina and approached the suburbs of Peter's 'Paris of the North.'

Almost panicky, the Bolsheviks rushed young cadets and the most reliable Communist units to Petrograd. Trotzky himself appeared on the scene and faced the possibility of stubborn street fighting within the limits of the town. Every house would become a fortress, he proclaimed.

Factories organized for defence; barricades were thrown up in the southern suburbs. The fleet hurried into the Neva – into the heart of Petrograd. At the same time, the front, not far from the limits of the town, received reinforcements.

The Whites used tanks which the Red Russians had never seen. But progress became impossible in the face of the Bolsheviks' will to win, and Yudenich soon yielded. The first fortnight in November saw the crisis: first standstill, then retreat, then retirement to Esthonia and to inactivity. The bitter winter had arrived now and resumption of operations was inconceivable. . . . A heavy burden fell from Moscow's shoulders. Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich were no more.

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

§ MENSHEVISM AND OIL

There remained at this juncture – early in 1920 – the Poles on the Russo-Polish frontier, Baron Wrangel in the Crimea, and the British in Georgia. The former two are major chapters; Georgia was an important episode.

Georgia is one of the most illuminating phases of the Russian civil war; it involves British policy in the Near East, oil, empire, and Menshevism.

With the World War Armistice, the Turks and the Germans evacuated the Caucasus. By the secret Anglo-French agreement of December 23, this region acquired the status of a special British zone of influence, and the British therefore made haste to occupy it.

Why did they go in?

‘After the Armistice,’ writes Arthur Moore, a well-known British authority on Asiatic problems, in the London *Times* of July 10, 1922, ‘we poured troops into the Caucasus which is largely Musulman. Far across the Caspian we had troops even in the famous Merv. At first these had a stabilizing influence, and we announced that we had come to keep the Bolsheviks away. But as soon as the Bolshevik menace began to materialize, it was we who faded away. Why, then, did we go there at all? Islam knows the answer. We went to try to get hold of the Baku oil-fields, but we were not prepared to fight for them.’

There is even a better State’s witness: Herbert Allen, Chairman of the Bibi Ebat Oil Company. Addressing a stockholders’ meeting in London, according to the official statement published in the English Press on December 24, 1918, he applauded British penetration into the Caucasus and Trans-Caspia as an unparalleled opportunity ‘for the creation of a second India or a second Egypt.’ And then he came to the crux of the situation in these words: ‘The oil industry of Russia liberally financed and properly organized under British auspices would, in itself, be a valuable asset to the empire. . . . A golden opportunity offers itself to the British Government to exercise a powerful influence upon the immense production of the Grosni, Baku, and Trans-Caspian fields.’

NITTI OBJECTS

Petroleum, then, was one of the motive forces of British policy in the Caucasus.

Early in 1919, as we have noted, much disaffection had developed in the British Empire and much unrest in the British Army. This period was one of the most menacing in the recent history of Imperial England. Trouble in India, Ireland, Egypt, strikes at home, confusion in Paris, etc., etc. Accordingly, the military decided to shorten their line, retrench themselves, and retire to their own 'storm centres.' Sir Henry Wilson wished to withdraw from Siberia and from Northern Russia, *but* 'I would strengthen our position on the line Batoum-Baku-Krasnovodsk-Merv.' In the face of a crisis throughout the entire Near and Middle East (Afghanistan stood on the verge of a successful war of independence) the Chief of Staff was prepared to shoulder added responsibilities in the Caucasus and Caspia.

§ THE ITALIANS AND THE CAUCASUS

Nevertheless, the task seemed too difficult, and London decided to resign in favour of the Italians. 'Lloyd George still wants the Italians to go to the Caucasus,' wrote Sir Henry Wilson on May 5, 1919, 'although he told [President] Wilson their presence there would create "hell"—which pained my cousin.' And at a meeting of the Peace Conference on May 5th, Sir Henry Wilson declared that 'the Italian military and naval mission must now be at Constantinople on its way to Batoum-Baku to make arrangements for taking over.'¹

But a bit later in the month the Italians entertained some doubts about the wisdom of accepting this 'theatre of disturbance,' as Sir Henry, who was making the gift, called the Caucasus. Opposition to the Caucasian adventure, indeed, may have been one of the causes of the fall of the Orlando Cabinet and the rise of Nitti.

§ NITTI OBJECTS

'When I assumed the direction of the Government in June, 1919,' writes Nitti, 'an Italian military expedition was under orders for Georgia. The English troops, who were in small

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson . . .*, Callwell. Vol. II, page 188,

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number, were withdrawing. Italy had, with the consent of the Allies and partly by her own desire, prepared a big military expedition. . . . Georgia is a country of extraordinary natural resources, and it was thought that she would be able to furnish Italy with a great number of raw materials which she lacked. What surprised me was that not only men of the Government, but intelligent financiers and men of very advanced ideas [the reference is to Socialists. – L. F.] were convinced supporters of this expedition.’¹

Nitti fought the project. He regarded Georgia a natural part of Russia. ‘Georgia before the war formed part of the Russian Empire,’ he says, ‘and no country of the Entente had considered that unjust.’² Why, therefore, this sudden interest in the independence of Georgia?

The whole story of Italy’s rôle or contemplated rôle in the Caucasus is veiled in mystery. The plan must have been the result of a *quid pro quo*, the details of which are not available. Nor do we know the real reasons why Nitti stood out against it. Apparently, however, his obstructions succeeded and autumn saw the British still in the Caucasus. The question of withdrawal, nevertheless, remained pressing, and on September 2, the Cabinet discussed it. ‘Curzon favoured our leaving a brigade there. So did Milner; but Bonar Law, Montagu, Austen, and I opposed this.’³

§ THE BRITISH AND THE CAUCASUS

So the matter remained suspended for several months. The British Government was divided and did nothing. The smashing of Denikin, however, made some action imperative and the problem now commenced to cause ‘sharp disagreement in Cabinet circles.’⁴

Curzon had gone to Paris with Lloyd George. Under Curzon’s

¹ *Peaceless Europe*, by Francesco S. Nitti. London, 1922. Page 147. Nitti is mistaken about the riches of Georgia. It is a rough, mountainous province whose only raw material of importance to foreign countries is manganese. But Georgia controls Europe’s access to Baku, the world’s greatest oil field. Nitti was probably under the impression that Baku belonged to Georgia.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson . . .*, Callwell. Vol. II, page 219. ⁴ *Ibid.*

THE BRITISH AND THE CAUCASUS

pressure, the Allies, on January 11, recognized the *de facto* government of Georgia and Azerbaijan. This was their answer to the Denikin debacle. In December, at a session of the League of Nations, England had refused to take such a step. Recognition of these separationist states would have riled Denikin, the patriot of an 'undivided Russia.' When he had fallen, recognition offered the possibility of continued resistance to Bolshevism. And this is indeed what Curzon wished. 'Curzon now wants to hold Batoum-Baku, and Montagu backs him.'¹ Curzon had won Montagu to his point of view; the ex-Viceroy of India was working hand in hand with the Secretary of State for India. To them, obviously, Georgia and Azerbaijan were important not so much for their significance in the petroleum struggle as out of imperial considerations. The Caucasus would round out the empire. It would give Britain a bridge from Europe to Persia. With the Caucasus and the Trans-Caspia in England's grip, Afghanistan could not be defiant. India would be safe. This, Empire, is the other motive force of England's policy in the Caucasus. Oil and Empire.

Having recognized Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Supreme Council called in their representatives who 'told the Frocks the same ridiculous cock-and-bull stories they had told me and Beatty, and for Lloyd George's benefit and Winston's anger, they added that they feared and hated Denikin, who was a Czarist.' On the basis of these 'cock-and-bull stories,' nevertheless, the meeting 'decided to arm, equip, and feed the Georgians, Azerbaijanese and Armenians.'²

The idea of intervention was not yet dead at this late day. Intervention plus *cordon sanitaire*. Again it is Sir Henry Wilson who lets the cat out of the bag, and with winning military frankness makes this cynical statement:

'It is amazing to see the Frock mind. In St. James's Palace is sitting the League of Nations, their principal business being the limitation of armaments. In Downing Street is sitting the Allied Conference of Lloyd George, Millerand, Nitti, and a Japanese, who are feverishly arming Finland, Baltic States, Poland, Rumania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Persia, etc.'

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson . . .*, Callwell. Vol. II, page 223.

² *Ibid.*

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

With respect to Batum and Georgia the situation remained tense, for half the Cabinet and the military insisted on evacuation because the soldiers were required elsewhere. The British force in the Caucasus had gradually dwindled – the Generals withdrew detachments quietly as the need arose. Nevertheless, Curzon persisted. He coaxed one postponement after the other from the Cabinet, hoping, probably, that some accident would retrieve his position. Finally, it was no longer tenable and Curzon applied to Paris and Rome for support. These agreed to dispatch tiny units, whereupon all but two British battalions were removed from the Caucasus. They held Batum. A month later, April, 1920, the Red Army took Baku, and Azerbaijan became an autonomous soviet republic.

In April the historic San Remo Conference convened. According to Nitti, 'the possibility was discussed of an expedition by Great Britain, France, and Italy to defend at least the oil production' of the Caucasus. But the verdict was 'No.' In fact, despite opposition from Curzon and Berthelot of the Quai d'Orsay, the meeting decided on April 23, 1920, to evacuate Batum.

Undaunted, Curzon, when he got back to London, continued his stubborn battle for the maintenance of even the two little battalions at Batum. And it was not a foolish point of view. For in British circles, the idea gained ground that if they left Batum, Persia would be next. Lloyd George actually favoured the evacuation of both. Others proposed concentration in Iraq, which seemed about to blow up. Curzon stubbornly stood by his guns and at a cabinet meeting as late as June 18 showed inclinations to resign, together with Milner, in case Persia should be surrendered.

Curzon and his friend were finally overruled; the English garrison left Batum on July 7, 1920, after the city had been transferred to the sovereignty of the Georgian Menshevik Republic.

ANTI-MENSHEVISM

The Georgian Menshevik Republic, it may be recalled, came into being immediately after the Bolshevik revolution. A few months later its leaders invited the Kaiser's troops. After the armistice, they welcomed King George's troops. Presumably, they would have greeted King Victor Emmanuel's troops. But they

ANTI-MENSHEVISM

objected very strenuously to Bolshevik troops. For, as the Mensheviks admitted, they preferred the 'imperialists of the West to the fanatics of the East.' Logically, therefore, they threw in their lot with the imperialists and fought the Bolshevik 'fanatics.'

Trotsky has written a never-refuted pamphlet on Menshevik rule in Georgia called *Between Imperialism and Revolution*.¹ He shows, on the basis of Menshevik documents and statements, that the Mensheviks co-operated with Denikin, and that they permitted thousands of White officers to embark from their ports in Allied ships to join Wrangel in his last stand against the Bolsheviks. Strict neutrality would have demanded internment.

The Russian Mensheviks themselves, as distinguished from the Georgian who were a *petit bourgeois* party, strongly condemned the policy of their Georgian friends. Socialists like Ramsay MacDonald, Kautsky, Mrs. Snowden, Huysmans, on the contrary, found nothing but praise for the Georgians.

Trotsky proves, again on the basis of Menshevik diaries, declarations, newspapers, etc., that the Georgian Mensheviks persecuted their national minorities (the Ossetians and Abkhazi). Confronted with peasant dissatisfaction, they burnt villages in large number. Punitive expeditions harassed the country population.

Before Denikin had been finally dispatched, the Bolsheviks offered the Mensheviks an alliance against him. Tiflis rejected the proposal. When Wrangel commenced his career in the Crimea they assisted his efforts. Trotsky says, 'One can say without exaggeration: Menshevik Georgia created the Wrangel army.' He puts the number of officers, etc., who came to Wrangel from Georgia at 30,000.

These acts, according to Trotsky, would have justified Soviet Russia in declaring war against Georgia in 1920. But the Red regime had Poland on its hands, and Wrangel. Moreover, a move against Georgia, asserts the War Commissar, would have facilitated the work of Churchill and Millerand, who sought to mobilize the border states for renewed crusades against Moscow. Therefore, the Bolsheviks 'with great patience, agreed to make unheard-of concessions.'

¹ *Zwischen Imperialismus und Revolution*, by L. Trotsky. Hamburg, 1922.

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There had been trouble with the Communists in Georgia. Menshevik repressions in the villages and in the districts of the national minorities made their opposition popular. A certain percentage of the workers in the cities were sympathetic to Communism. And when the victorious Red Army, having destroyed Denikin, neared the borders of Georgia – and Azerbaijan – these elements naturally developed an enthusiasm for sovietism. In Azerbaijan the anti-Bolsheviks simply fled, and thus paved the way for the establishment of a Red regime.

The victory of the Bolsheviks over Wrangel and their expulsion of the Poles from the Ukraine, in 1920, added to their prestige in Georgia. Furthermore, the end of these activities enabled the Russians to concentrate appreciable troops on the northern border of Georgia for the event of foreign intervention against the Communist revolution which was being planned by the Georgian Reds. Alone the proximity of this army encouraged the Georgian comrades, and Moscow's military successes on other frontiers was a guarantee against arbitrary Allied interference. Under these favourable circumstances, the Georgian Bolsheviks, certainly after consultation with Ordjonikidze, the native Georgian who commanded the Red Army at the northern boundary of the Menshevik state, decided to strike. Insurrections broke out in various parts of the province. A Soviet regime was called into being which immediately invited the Red Army. Together they swept the weak Menshevik regime out of the country.

The question is: Would the Menshevik regime have persisted but for the Red Army? I think the answer is in the negative. There had never been an *independent* Georgian Menshevik republic. It was first a German dependency and then a British colony. When the British evacuated, they knew and said they were handing it back to Russia, for no other alternative exists. Georgia, with her geographic position and economic dependence, must adhere to Russia, or be held by England, or fall to the lot of Turkey. She cannot stand alone. Her location is too strategic. She is too weak, and too poor economically – Russia feeds her. The Mensheviks themselves realized this first, and better than anyone else. It determined every move in their foreign relations.

To the Bolsheviks, the crucial point was: Shall we leave an



‘DENIKIN,’ ‘YUDENICH,’ ‘WRANGEL,’ AND ‘POLAND’ TAKING NOURISHMENT FROM ‘ANGLO-FRENCH-AMERICAN CAPITAL’

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opening for the British to dominate Georgia and use her territory as a base for operations against us? In view of Menshevik Georgia's bad record as an independent and a neutral, they said 'No.'

Menshevik Georgia became Soviet Georgia in February, 1921

★

Before retracing our steps to deal with the Russian-Polish War and with Wrangel, it will be well to examine into the divergent policies of the several Powers towards intervention in Soviet Russia. The countries that concern us are Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and France.

These four nations divide into two groups: England and Japan on one hand; America and France on the other.

¶ GREAT BRITAIN

In Georgia and the Caucasus generally, British policy aimed at acquiring invaluable petroleum deposits and at enlarging the size and rounding out the periphery of the empire. As in the case of Mosul, the two purposes are so closely interlaced and so intimately interdependent that an attempt to distinguish their comparative importance loses all sense of reality. Baku, as Chicherin put it, is 'a finger pointing to Asia.' (His eye was on the physical shape of the Aspheron Peninsula.) Baku is also the world's largest oilfield.

The Caucasus was the last stand of the British interventionists. The possibility of annexation, as in the case of Iraq and Palestine, kept them there longest.

Not imperial expansion, however, originally induced the British to go the way of intervention. This would certainly have been welcomed as a by-product. They probably calculated that expansion would be an inevitable by-product of the weakening of Russia. The weakening of Russia was the motive which united all types of interventionists in England.

Russia and Britain were ancient rivals. The 'bear that walks like a man' never loved the lion, nor did the lion wish to lie down with the bear. The hate was written in history; it took its origin deep in the centre of Asia where the two empires met.

But there is nothing static or unchangeable in world politics, and on August 31, 1907, when Russia was exhausted from the 1905

revolution and the war with Japan, and England looked about for allies against the looming menace of Germany, the confirmed enemies called a truce and signed a treaty (delivering Afghanistan to the 'protection' of England, declaring Tibet forbidden ground for both Powers, and outlining British and Russian 'zones of influence' in Persia) which paved the way to the British-Russian alliance that found its highest expression in World War co-operation.

The Bolshevik revolution broke the truce. The old rivalry reappeared. The old hatred was enhanced. New hates appeared. For to the British, Soviet Russia seemed to combine the former menace of Russia with the novel threat of Communism.

Here again it is difficult to determine where the anti-Russia motive ends and the anti-Bolshevik motive begins. Anti-Bolshevism was a convenient lever to rally against Moscow countries and forces that had no interest in an anti-Russia policy. British statesmen may have been aiming at the old antagonist, the bear, when they seemed to be pointing a shot at the red revolutionist.

Arch-interventionists like Churchill repeatedly urged the League of Nations to undertake an anti-Russian crusade.¹ In such cases, he obviously would paint Russia not as a rival of Britain in Central Asia but as a menace to civilization and a power for evil in Europe.

The anti-Bolshevik factor was strongest with such men as Churchill, the active executor of Britain's interventionist policy. In 1919, Europe did stand on the threshold of revolution, and a person of the keen mental calibre of Churchill realized how quickly the movement could be stemmed by destroying the first Soviet regime from which inspiration went out to all its potential imitators.

Since the anti-Bolshevik and the anti-Russian motives were mixed, the strategy of intervention frequently became confused and contradictory. Had the British desired merely the overthrow of Bolshevism they would have supported only Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich, whose goal was the destruction of the Reds, and whose dream was a strong, undivided Russia.

¹ See, for instance, his speech before the British Russian Club quoted in the London *Times* of July 19, 1919.

J A P A N

But England also encouraged the Esthonians, Finns, Letts, Caucasians and Transcaspians to break up the Empire and create independent states. England's purpose here was obviously to weaken Russia, to drive her back from the Baltic Sea, and to deprive her of Turkestan and the Caucasus.

Long after it had become manifestly clear that Bolshevism would persist in at least a part of Russia, London statesmen continued the struggle for the separation from Russia of her Asiatic provinces. In this phase, the imperial, anti-Russian motive was unquestionably predominant.

Speaking at the Guildhall on November 10, 1919, Lloyd George referred to Bolshevik victories against the Whites and said: 'You must not imagine that I am reading from the present situation any sort of prediction that the Bolsheviks are going to conquer the whole of Russia. I do not believe it. (Cheers.) The free peasantry of the South have in their hearts a detestation of Bolshevism, and I do not believe that the Bolsheviks will conquer that aversion.'

Even Lloyd George, who was an interventionist of moderate enthusiasm compared with Churchill or Milner or Curzon, wished to see Russia divided irrespective of whether or not Britain would later rule the parts.

Apart from the mutually complementary anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russia motives and the imperial interests which dovetailed with them, we have the quest of raw materials that found expression in the designs on Russia's oil resources in the Caucasus and her lumber resources in North Russia. These, combined, constituted the fountain of British interventionist policy.

¶ J A P A N

Japan is coupled with England because both were highly aggressive and because both aimed to undermine Russia's strength. Nippon statesmen occasionally did refer to Bolshevism and the 'danger to civilization,' but more often they were agreeably silent or cynically indifferent to the world's opinion of their ventures in Siberia.

Of the important White leaders, Japan built up an active relationship only to Kolchak. This relationship was not one of

friendship. Tokio openly supported Ataman Semenov, who bitterly fought Kolchak, and who, far from favouring an undivided Russia, wished to establish his own Trans-Baikalian independent state. Japan likewise financed Ataman Kalmikov, her second subservient puppet in Eastern Siberia, whose enmity for Kolchak was no milder than Semenov's.

At the same time, however, Japan co-operated, at least half-heartedly, with Kolchak. There is no madness in such method. Japan consciously gave assistance to two opposing factions in order to weaken both. This is not uncommon policy. It has been tried in both China and Arabia. Moreover, Japan's relations with the Allies, especially England, made it incumbent upon her to join their joint measures for the support of Omsk.

Japan did not want Russian unity. 'That the Japanese have systematically tried to prevent the unification of the Russian Far East and the establishment there of peace and order,' says H. K. Norton, 'is undoubted by any non-Japanese observer of events in that corner of the world.'

The four great Far Eastern Powers are Britain, America, Japan and Russia. Geographically, the position of the last is the strongest, for she sits firmly on the Asiatic mainland and is contiguous with the problem country of Asia, China. A Russia restored to pre-War dimensions could check Japan's annexationist plans in China, in Manchuria and Mongolia, in much the same manner as she might cause embarrassment to the British Empire in Central Asia.

During 1918, especially, but in 1919 as well, Japan dreamt Pan-Asiatic dreams. Chicherin tells the writer that the Bolsheviks found Japanese agents as far west as Uzbekistan and Bokhara, and he considers Baron Ungern-Sternberg, who sought the Bolsheviks first in Siberia and then in Mongolia, an ideologist and supporter of this Pan-Asiatic movement. Even partial success, however, was inconceivable if Russia got back on her feet. Hence Tokio's efforts to hinder Russian unification.

But Japan's political considerations were heavily loaded with economic ballast. Japan requires new fields for economic conquest. She teems with population; she is industrious and ambitious. Her inhabitants need food, her people need new avenues of

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employment, and her industries need raw materials. Siberia (and China) can supply them all.

In Japan's career as an interventionist in Russia, the economic factor was more potent than in the case of any other Power. Her motives too were less disguised. She was the first to begin. She was the last to retire. The World War presented her with tremendous grabbing opportunities in China and Russia, and Tokio sought to exploit these opportunities for the political and economic aggrandizement of the country. How this could be achieved, whether by an alliance with the Allies, or by co-operation with Germany, as contemplated at one time, or by a war with the United States, as some parties urged, made little difference.

§ THE UNITED STATES

The United States was the least aggressive of the Powers in the Russian Civil War. She coveted no Russian territory. Her business and financial stakes in Russia were comparatively insignificant.

The United States opposed, in principle at least, all measures that might prejudice the integrity of Russia. She long refused to recognize the Baltic republics. She failed to recognize the Caucasian republics. She obstructed Japanese intervention in Siberia. A strong Russia could check an aggressive Japan. Therefore America preferred a strong Russia to a dismembered Russia.

America's chief interest in the Russian internal struggle was not Russia but Japan. Washington in 1918 objected to a Japanese invasion of the Russian Far East because it would strengthen Japan's position on the Asiatic mainland. For the same reason America looks with disfavour on Japanese encroachment in China. (Incidentally, there is much in common between the policies of the several Powers in China and their policies in Russia during the Civil War. The why of this circumstance would make an interesting subject for study.)

Despite President Wilson's friendly messages to and concerning the Bolsheviks, American troops began to land in North Russia in June, 1918. Yet Wilson continued to bar the way to the invasion of Siberia. His policy then was not anti-interventionist, but anti-Japanese, and the anti-Japanese motive tended to restrain any existent American tendencies towards militant anti-Bolshevism.

Washington was persuaded to associate itself with the British-

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French *descent* in North Russia on the ground that the move would reconstruct an Eastern front. Later, Woodrow Wilson was simply stampeded by the Allies into consenting to intervention in Siberia.

Wilson detested Bolshevism. But armed force never appealed to him as a means of suppressing it. He would have tried – and actually attempted to employ – kindness, negotiations, feeding. He conceived of the League of Nations as the ideal weapon against Soviet Russia, a weapon better far than armies.

However, the United States, during Wilson's administration, frequently acted as it did not desire to act. The President yielded to pressure. Nor was he able to resist the urgings of friendly Powers. Accordingly, in August, 1918, the State Department not only identified itself with intervention in Siberia but even tried to create the impression of having initiated the adventure.

The history of American intervention in Siberia is replete with conflicts with the Japanese. Friction never ceased. The immediate stimulus may have been trivial or important. Fundamentally, the trouble lay deep in the antagonism between the two countries in Manchuria and Asia generally.

The struggle for domination in Manchuria is a story of railroads. This was the 'most serious bone of contention' between Japan and America. These are the facts:

When the Czar fell, the Kerensky Government asked Washington to operate the Chinese Eastern Railway for it. The United States gladly sent over a commission headed by Colonel John F. Stevens to undertake the task. After the advent of the Bolsheviks, the Allies considered themselves the *ad hoc* heirs of the line, took it over, and asked America to run it for the time being.

Japan refused to consent. And Semenov, the Japanese puppet who held Chita and the surrounding territory, immediately began to plunder the property and obstruct traffic. The ataman was a specialist in such activities and did his duty well. Negotiations opened. There were protests, notes, diplomatic *demarches*. Finally, on February 10, 1919, Frank L. Polk, acting Secretary of State, informed Ishii, the Mikado's envoy in Washington, that America accepted the terms of the Japanese memorandum of January 9th.¹ By these terms, Colonel Stevens remained president

¹ *R.A.R.*, pages 276 *et seq.*



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of the technical management of both the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian railways, as far as the latter was not in Bolshevik hands, while an inter-allied force would guard them. It was further agreed that American soldiers would guard the eastern spur of the Trans-Siberian and Japanese soldiers the Chinese Eastern. The Japanese command, however, failed to co-operate with Stevens and endless friction ensued from which business and American-Japanese relations suffered grievously.

The Japanese naturally resented the presence of an American expeditionary force in Siberia which interfered with their aggressive intentions. On one occasion, for instance, a considerable number of Kalmikov's Cossacks mutinied against the Japanese puppet and surrendered themselves to the Americans. The Japanese objected to such protection. General Graves turned a deaf ear. On another occasion, Semenov kidnapped Boris Skvirsky, who later directed the Soviet Information Bureau in Washington, and began rushing him towards the Chinese border. Graves sent an armoured auto in pursuit and rescued the Russian from the certain death that awaited him.

Like the Japanese, Kolchak too disliked the conduct of the Americans. He frequently complained against their 'radicalism.' One such protest was made in February, 1919. Another, dated December 12, 1919, is a report to Kolchak from an agent in Vladivostok who explains (1) that the United States soldiers are infected with Bolshevism, (2) that most of them are Jews from the East Side of New York City who constantly agitate for mutinies, (3) that it is not inconceivable that the Bolsheviks may receive support from the American Army, and (4) that the propaganda of the Y.M.C.A. is a preparation for Bolshevism. . . . Perhaps Kolchak's informant received his inspiration or facts from Japanese sources. It is true, however, that in their hatred for the atamans and the Japanese, the Americans did give comfort to pro-Bolshevik partisan bands and even to the pro-Bolsheviks who set up the Far Eastern buffer republic at Chita.

The United States expeditionary force, and the American railway experts were finally withdrawn in accordance with a State Department declaration dated January 17, 1920. But Washington's declaration of August 3, 1918, had stated that America

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invited the Japanese and the other Allied states to invade Siberia. Accordingly, in April 1921, the Constituent Assembly of the Far Eastern republic sent a note to the State Department suggesting that since it was responsible for the invitation it might also ask the Japanese to evacuate. But Washington did not reply.

American intervention in Siberia was a fruitless, dismal tragedy-comedy. Similarly in North Russia.

FRANCE

French interventionist policy in Russia has been subjected to considerable misinterpretation by the Bolsheviks. They have therefore frequently misunderstood French policy in the peaceful years that followed.

France was *not* a very active participant in the civil war.

France was *not* interested only or primarily in debt payment.

France was *not* interested in the maintenance of a united Russia.

Generally, French policy is summarized thus: France had lent great sums of money to Czarist Russia. Only a strong Russia could settle these debts. Therefore she played a prominent rôle in the struggle within Russia, but not, as in the case of England and Japan, with a view to the dismemberment of the country. . . . All this is incorrect.

France had 750 officers and men in Siberia, about 2,300 soldiers in Archangel, and, for three months, some 12,000 in the Ukraine, of whom 4,000 were Poles, 1,500 Russians, and 2,000 Greeks. But the majority of the remaining 4,500 'Frenchmen' hailed from the African and Asiatic colonies of the Third Republic.¹ This was the entire extent of French intervention.

What about supplies? The big White chiefs, Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich, were protégés of England. Churchill gave them almost everything they ever possessed. Wrangel is the exception. He was a French tool. Yet the Baron, as we shall see, acted as a sideshow to the Russian-Polish War, and though he represents the last effort of the Whites, he properly belongs – from the point of view of foreign support – not to the history of the intra-national, but rather to the international, struggle against Soviet Russia. To

¹ A month before evacuation, the force was increased to a rifle strength of approximately 35,000.

be sure, the French furnished sinews of war to the counter-revolutionaries. Yet though the extent is not known, it cannot have been large. Britain supplied the lion's share.

And money? Here too, France must have been a minor contributor – except in the case of the Czecho-Slovaks. The leadership of the Czech army lay in French hands. Its advisers were French. Masaryk admits its financial dependence on French francs. This, however, represents an early commitment of Clemenceau's before the World War had been won and when the army was truly destined for the French front. Noulens had other intentions, and when the Czecho-Slovaks remained to fight against the Bolsheviks in Russia, France could not possibly have dropped the burden. (The bills, nevertheless, became a nuisance.) Most of what may appear on the books as French subsidies to Kolchak was actually paid for the maintenance of the Czechs.

France's outstanding part in the civil war was her expedition to Odessa in the early part of 1919. With a Franco-Hellenic-Polish-Roumanian force, France made ready to occupy her zone in Russia. The Ukraine and the Crimea constituted the French zone by the terms of 'L'accord Franco-Anglais du 23 décembre 1917, définissant les zones d'action française et anglaise.'

This document is frequently referred to by Denikin in his memoirs, by General Lukomsky in his memoirs, by numerous White authors as well as by Soviet writers. Its terms were actually put into practice.¹ It is significant first for its date. *December 23, 1917*. Less than two months after the Bolshevik revolution, eleven months before the end of the World War, Great Britain and France met to dismember Russia. Allied representatives still sat in Petrograd urging resistance to German demands at Brest Litovsk, offering assistance to the Red Army, and speaking of Russia as an ally. At the same time, allied representatives sat in Paris dividing the carcass of the bear.

The Caucasus, part of the Don, the North Russian timber belt, and the Baltics fell to England's lot; Poland, the Ukraine and the Crimea were the share of France. Alone the fact that Paris signed such a treaty proves that the policy of an undivided Russia was no longer hers.

¹ See Appendix for text.

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Republican France and Czarist Russia were closest friends. France needed a strong Russia as a balance against Germany. But now a strong Bolshevik Russia could of course not be trusted to serve French purposes. Had there not been suggestions of a Russian-German military alliance? Paris, therefore, sponsored Poland. A well-financed, well-advised Poland would be more tractable than any kind of Russia and would herself be interested in serving French anti-German purposes.

But Poland had a sad history and therefore unlimited ambitions. She dreamt of the frontiers of 1772. Pilsudski, her national hero, visualized a country stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and including Lithuania and the Ukraine.

By sponsoring Poland, France *ipso facto* identified herself with Polish plans. This consideration induced Paris, in 1919, to send an expedition to the Ukraine and Crimea rather than to some other parts of Russia. A contributory reason was the accessibility and proximity of these sections to Salonika and Constantinople where France had concentrated considerable masses of troops.

Even during the life of the Franco-Russian alliance, Chicherin tells the writer, Paris encouraged Ukrainian separatists. The commissar declares that France availed herself of the services of the Freemasons and, with the help of a certain Markotun, organized lodges in the Ukraine which soon extended their influence to the Don region. These, in the latter part of 1917, became the foundation of the so-called 'Francossack' movement which organized the Don Cossacks under French leadership for the struggle against Bolshevism and against centralized Russia.

France had tremendous financial stakes in the Ukraine and the Don. Before the war, 32·6 per cent of all foreign capital invested in Russia was French. Professor Ohl of the Soviet Commissariat of Finance, who examined the records of the Czarist Exchequer and takes his figures from that official source,¹ places the total French investment in antebellum Russia at 731,746,600 roubles, of which 43·3 per cent fell to the mining and 21·6 per cent to the metallurgical industry.

These industries are concentrated in the Ukraine and the neighbouring Don region, part of which likewise entered into the

¹ *Foreign Capital in Russia*, by P. V. Ohl. Petrograd, 1922. Page 10.

French zone; and as a matter of fact, 80·4 per cent of French capital in metallurgy was invested in South Russia, and 79·5 per cent. of French capital in mining was invested in the Donetz Basin.¹

Without regard to the future of the Russian State, French interventionists aimed to safeguard these interests and secure them for their French owners.

France intervened in the Ukraine out of these several considerations, and in her desire to defeat Bolshevism. The statesmen of no other nation were so frank, bitter, and uncontrolled in their denunciations of Soviet Russia. They even promised, on a number of occasions, never to recognize the Bolshevik Government. This attitude cannot have been due to Moscow's cancellation of Russia's foreign obligations, for Moscow had, in reply to the Prinkipo proposal and in the memorandum to Mr. Bullitt which of course did not remain a secret to the Quai d'Orsay, pledged herself to recognize, pay, and pay interest on all foreign obligations.

One reason for France's uncompromising policy towards the Bolsheviks was her fear of Bolshevism. It might seize Poland as it had Hungary. From Hungary it could conceivably spread to the little allies that Paris had mobilized in the Balkans. With Germany eliminated and Britain busy consolidating her war gains and buttressing her empire, Bolshevism was the only real threat at that time to French hegemony on the European continent.

However, France never developed any enthusiasm for intervention in Russia, because her statesmen, especially Clemenceau, preferred the policy of the *cordon sanitaire*. Let Poland do the job, and Roumania, and Czecho-Slovakia, the 'Tiger' argued. France did not put her heart into the expedition to Odessa.

Yet certain phenomena accompanying this expedition are extremely helpful in interpreting French policy. The Ukraine was the bridge over which Denikin had to pass in order to reach Moscow. Denikin stood for an undivided Russia. England showed him every kindness. Nevertheless, (or shall we say – therefore) the French were rather unkind to the general.

There was continual friction between the French command in Odessa and Denikin's Volunteer Army. When the French arrived in the city, they drove out the Petlurists who held the town in slip-

¹ *Ibid.*

shod fashion and set up their own civil government despite protests. 'We simply had the usual occupation,' Lukomsky of Denikin's staff complains.¹

The French checked Denikin's every step. In January, 1919, for instance, he wished to move his headquarters from Yekatrino-dar to Sevastopol in order to prepare for the Ukrainian offensive. But Franchet d'Esperey (whom the Russians soon christened 'Franchet Désespéré') wired: 'I find that General Denikin should be with the Volunteer Army and not in Sevastopol where French troops are stationed which are not under his command.'²

The French also offended Denikin by entering into negotiations with Petlura. Denikin's relationship to Petlura is characterized by a September 5, 1919, telegram from his foreign expert Neratov to Kolchak, in which he writes that he had informed the local representatives of the Allied missions that the Petlurists were a dangerous movement. 'To recognize Petlura,' the wire said, 'and work together with him would be to recognize the dismemberment of Russia.'³

The Denikinites never made any secret of this attitude. It was a corollary of their restorationist philosophy. Nevertheless, the French entered into relations with Petlura, the enemy of Russian unity, and as time went on, the relations between the French and Denikin became worse while relations with Petlura grew better.

Subsequently, when Poland was fighting as an ally and under the dictation of France against Soviet Russia and trying to wrest the Ukraine from Bolshevik rule, Petlura co-operated with the Poles. Petlura had previously been an enemy of the Poles. His change of heart may have had its inception during the months of contact with the French in Odessa.

France, to be sure, may not have been so deeply interested in dismemberment as England and Japan. She herself had no such territorial ambitions in Russia. Yet she was the sponsor of Poland which had.

A revision of the common conception of France's attitude towards a strong Russia, requires a change in our emphasis on the importance of debt payment. If Pilsudski had succeeded, with

¹ *Memoirs*, by General Lukomsky. Berlin, 1922. Vol. II.

² *Memoirs*, General Lukomsky. ³ From Kolchak's Secret Archives.

RUSSIA'S POLICY IN THE CIVIL WAR

French aid, in annexing the Ukraine, Lithuania and White Russia from Soviet Russia, Soviet Russia would not have been in a position to repay if she wished. The Ukraine is Russia's source of bread, iron, coal and steel. A Ukraine-less Russia is a Russia seriously handicapped economically. This France knew – yet was not deterred. Debts were not uppermost in her mind.

France also showed a definite disinclination to work closely together with any of the major White aspirants. She put her trust in the border States who were not only her pawns in the Russian game but also her bulwarks on the European continent. Of these States, Poland was best fitted and most willing to attack Soviet Russia.

§ SOVIET RUSSIA'S POLICY IN THE CIVIL WAR

Soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, they found themselves attacked on all sides. Their policy, in such circumstances, was very simple: to fight the enemy back.

It is one of the most interesting phases of the revolution that a nation which had left the trenches and deserted from the World War because it was war-weary, rebounded lightly into the battle only a few months later. The 'Peace' slogan on which the Communists rode into power in November, 1917, made way for enlistment and mobilization agitation in January and February, 1918. Workers had joyfully rushed from the anti-German lines to their factories, peasants to their ploughs. The revolution sent them home. Yet in the same year, when the revolution called them to the colours, they came in millions.

Nor is it comprehensible, at first sight, how this handful of Bolsheviks, this 'undemocratic regime which ruled by brute force,' managed to defeat the armies of all the foreign interventionist Powers and the White battalions of experienced Czarist Staff Generals, well-equipped with Allied war material. How did it happen that civil war, intervention, blockade, epidemics, and famine did not bring Lenin to his fall? In August, 1918, Bolshevism tottered. Communists sitting in the Kremlin could imagine the knife at their throats. Moscow was surrounded by an ever-narrowing iron ring formed by Allied, Czecho-Slovak and counter-revolutionary troops, while within the walls of the capital, assassins, plotters, and international adventurers sought to undermine

THE ALLIES AND THE WHITES

the foundations of the new republic. How did the Bolsheviks annihilate this powerful enemy?

Bolsheviks submit that their victory in the Civil War is the best proof of their strong backing among the masses; they argue that it is the finest indication of the democratic, representative character of their regime and of the unpopularity of the Whites.

During the Brest Litovsk Conference, the Soviet leaders saw the Civil War coming. And it was one of the great strokes of Lenin's genius that he insisted on a 'breathing-space,' no matter how brief. He wanted the peasants to go to their fields, the workers to their tools. If it was only for a month, or two or three, they would discover in the interval who was their enemy and who their friend. The 'breathing-space' would show them the gains and losses from the revolution. Life moved quickly in those days. Men saw clearly in a week what might otherwise require years of study and debate. Soldiers returned from the World War trenches realized that the revolution had been made by people of their own kind, and for their kind. The 'boss,' the exploiter, the landlord – all of them, rightly or wrongly, the personification of what the Russian under-dog detested – had been swept away. The romance of the revolution captured simple souls. In its first period its newly-found power and freedom intoxicated all who drank at its spring. And from this 'inebriated' state they were called upon to fight the Whites and foreigners who, it was said, came to relegate the workers and peasants to their former status of ruled instead of ruling. One has merely to think back to the times portrayed so vividly in John Reed's *Ten Days That Shook the World* to realize how fiercely the masses would throw themselves into the fray against an enemy of the new order of things. I have met hundreds of Russians throughout the Soviet Union who spoke of the Civil War as the most thrilling experience of their adult existence. They could not see why they should fight the Germans. They did know why they should fight the Whites. The peasant wished to keep his land; the worker wanted to control his factory, his Soviet and the Government.

To the great mass, Bolshevism was part promise and part fulfilment. From the revolution had come peace, land, and a new form of ownership. But it also painted a glorious future which attracted and provoked. The enemies of Communism had noth-



KRUPSKAYA (LENIN'S WIFE) AT THE FRONT

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ing thrilling or inspiring to offer. Lenin operated on credit. His capital was a promissory note on coming years. The Whites on the other hand could appeal only to the record of that past which they wished to enthrone again. Psychologically, the position of the Bolsheviks was therefore stronger.

Communist propaganda in the Red Army's ranks won the hearts of privates who had joined up with little enthusiasm for the cause. Moreover, nuclei of Communists and tried trade unionists served to strengthen the backbone of any unit whose politics wavered. Members of the Bolshevik Party and of related organizations could be relied on for loyal moral leadership in the army. They were frequently thrust into the hottest battle. Whenever a front weakened they rushed into the breach. The military strategy of Denikin and Wrangel was superior to the Red Army's. But this morale more than compensated for the difference.

The Soviets enjoyed the advantage of a united command. The Communist Party was supreme. The leadership of Lenin and Trotzky was unquestioned. Differences of opinion scarcely existed. When they arose they were frankly thrashed out and removed. In the fire of the revolution personal disputes, small ambitions and petty bickerings temporarily disappeared. But the camp of the Whites showed a diametrically opposed picture.

The Whites depended so much on foreign countries that they paid little attention to domestic support. Their policies alienated peasants, workers, and national minorities. The *bourgeoisie* in Russia was too young and weak to be of much service to the counter-revolutionary cause. The nobles and the aristocrats went abroad.

The difficulty of co-ordinating the efforts of Esthonia and Yudenich, of Petlura and Denikin, and, in general, of reconciling the important White leaders with the restive ethnic groups which sought autonomy, must be regarded as one of the chief contributing causes of the counter-revolution's failure.

Geography further handicapped the counter-revolutionaries. Despite attempts at co-ordination which had more political significance than tactical advantage, not one of the four White fronts – Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Archangel – ever established contact with any other. The Bolsheviks, however, fought from a compact centre well supplied with transportation facilities and

possessing the best railway junction in the country – Moscow. Shifting of troops from a quiet front to a troubled sector was comparatively simple. For the Whites, it was practically impossible.

Morale is even more important in civil war than in international war. For enthusiastic troops immediately infect the non-combatants among whom they fight, while discouraged and despairing units whose only urge is loot can scarcely strike a sympathetic cord in the civilian population. In the Ukraine, the Whites pillaged whole cities and pogromed large Jewish settlements. In the Caucasus they burnt villages. In Siberia they staged public whippings of recalcitrant mujiks. The memoirs of leading Whites tell how drunkenness, licence, and corruption further undermined the discipline and spirit of the anti-Bolshevik forces.

All these circumstances enabled the Red Army to defeat the Whites despite its inferior equipment and less-experienced officers.

Notwithstanding their weaknesses, the Russian Whites might still have won the battle against Bolshevism had the foreign Powers been in a position to give them unlimited support. But the Allied armies aroused no enthusiasm for the war against Moscow, and Allied statesmen lived in fear of mutinies and strikes. A force of 100,000 British or French or American volunteers could undoubtedly have overthrown the Communist regime early in the Civil War – though it could not have guaranteed against a resurgence of the Soviets or against its own inoculation with the ‘Lenin virus.’ Yet when England did intervene, her armed units were small and, later, unreliable. The French expedition to Odessa consisted of more Algerians, Roumanians, Poles and Greeks than real natives of the republic, who, like the Americans in Archangel and Siberia, murmured loudly against their forced exile. Only Japan gave of her strength without reserve or fear. At the height of intervention she had no less than 70,000 men in Asiatic Russia. But her interests were localized in Eastern Siberia. Her relations with the Allies would have compelled full co-operation with Kolchak had Tokio desired penetration further westward. And the Japanese astutely refrained from any measures that might have improved the chances of the ‘Supreme Ruler,’ or of anybody else, to re-establish a united Russia.

Had the foreign armies been fresh and faithful, and had the

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Allies pursued a common policy, or even if they had not interfered with one another, the Bolsheviks might have found it much more difficult to repulse intervention. Perhaps one of the Western World's greatest errors was its persistence in the conviction that the Bolsheviks represented a mere handful of agitators who could not long hold power.

In 1919 and 1920 Soviet diplomacy could scarcely have mitigated intervention. The Muscovite reply to the Prinkipo proposal, the offer to Bullitt, and similar statements of the Soviet position towards foreign countries, so many of which contained promises to recognize and pay pre-war obligations, were of course intended as bait to certain Allied circles, while the Bolsheviks proposed to tempt other business interests with economic concessions. But even if some individuals or groups were won for a more conciliatory attitude towards Soviet Russia by these tactics, there is no proof that governmental policy ever felt the effect of their deviations. More often, financial and industrial enterprises in the West identified themselves with the policies of their countries and hoped that force and time would substitute for Bolsheviks a regimen which would offer better economic opportunities. Only when the policy of intervention had clearly failed to achieve its object did the business world urge relations of peace and commerce with Soviet Russia.

Bolshevik diplomacy, however, succeeded in winning the support of some Labour and Liberal forces in Allied countries. Chicherin's long notes were sometimes addressed directly to these sections of the population. Often the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had them in mind when it wrote or radioed to foreign governments. Moscow appealed to Left Opposition elements to obstruct the interventionist policies of their governments, and at least in England the results were appreciable. Proletarian sympathy, frequently of a romantic nature, with the proletarian state in Russia would scarcely have affected the politics of Allied Cabinets had that policy enjoyed enthusiastic and wholesale support in other quarters. But when soldiers began to mutiny, business-men to think of trade, and ministers to doubt the likelihood of White success, Labour sentiment – especially in England – was able to mobilize a strong body of public opinion which hastened the day when the policy of intervention was scrapped.

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Poland let slip a unique opportunity in 1919. Throughout the autumn of that year, the 12th Russian Army faced a hostile Polish army in the neighbourhood of Minsk and Bobruisk. When Denikin came within dangerous proximity of Moscow, the Bolshevik High Command drew heavily on this unit for reserves, and thus seriously weakened its potential resistance. The Poles took no advantage of this development. 'A slight effort in the fall of 1919,' writes General Kakurin,¹ would have enabled Poland to regain her 1772 frontiers in the Ukraine. But Pilsudski did not make the slight effort.

This strange conduct Kakurin explained to me as follows: A Polish attack at the time of Denikin's greatest success might have given him Moscow. But the re-establishment of a reactionary Russia constituted a danger to Poland. For even if Denikin had submitted to the will of the Allies to maintain a separate Poland, he would never have parted with the Ukraine, or Lithuania, or White Russia – on all of which Pilsudski had designs.'

Count Alexander Skrzynski, Polish Foreign Minister in 1922–3 and from 1924 to 1926, confirms the Kakurin hypothesis.

'Undoubtedly,' he writes,² 'Denikin would have received with great gratitude the help of the Poles, but only on the understanding, scarcely concealed, that such help was forthcoming from the Poles as faithful subjects of Russia.'

'Denikin reasoning in this way, the Poles could have no interest in giving him help. That is why his episode was played out independently of the evolution of Polish Eastern Policy.'

Nothing could be plainer: two anti-Bolshevik interests hate one another so cordially that they refuse to co-operate against the common enemy.

The idea of a possible Russo-Polish agreement was first sug-

¹ *How the Revolution Fought*, by N. Kakurin. Moscow, 1926. Vol. II, page 321.

² *Poland and Peace*, by Count Alexander Skrzynski. London, 1923. Page 39.

РОССИЙСКАЯ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ
ФЕДЕРАТИВНАЯ
СОВЕТСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА.

Народный Комиссариат
Иностранных Дел.

Канцелярия Народного Комиссара.

4-го октября 1919 г.

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Москва, ул. Старо-бульварная и Патриаршая
пер. д. № 30/1

Телефон № 4-22-86.

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Российским Советским Правительством вести переговоры с
представителями Польского Правительства по всем вопро-
сам, возникшим или имеющим возникнуть между Польской
Республикой и Российской Социалистической Федеративной
Советской Республикой, обращаться к представителям
Польской Республики с запросами и выяснять отношение
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отвечать представителям Польской Республики на подоб-
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установить как в общем, так и в частностях, основа-
ния соглашения, могущего обеспечить мирные отношения
между Польской Республикой и Российской Социалисти-
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НАРОДНЫЙ КОМИССАР

ПО ИНОСТРАННЫМ ДЕЛАМ

Берин

Секретарь

В. А. Мухоморов

MARKHLEVSKY'S LETTER OF CREDENTIALS, SIGNED BY CHICHERIN, TO NEGOTIATE WITH POLAND ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
Facing page 239

SECRET POLISH-RUSSIAN ARMISTICE

gested to Chicherin by Wieckovski, who came to Moscow early in 1919. Wieckovski talked of a united front between Russia and Poland against the outside world. He stated definitely that Poland, at any rate, would not support Denikin.

§ A SECRET POLISH-RUSSIAN ARMISTICE

Julian Markhlevsky was a prominent Polish Communist. The end of 1918 found him in Germany. But Noske, the Social Democratic Minister, issued a death warrant for him; and Markhlevsky, rejecting the alternative of an aeroplane escape to Holland, fled in the disguise of an agricultural worker to his native country.

In Warsaw, Markhlevsky met an old acquaintance, Josef Bek, assistant Minister of Interior and member of the innermost political circle in Poland. Bek had access to the all-powerful Pilsudski. Markhlevsky pressed home the danger to Poland which a White Russia would constitute. He inspired articles to that effect in the Polish Press, notably an editorial in the Warsaw *Rabotnik* of June 11, 1919, entitled 'Kolchak.' The Admiral, the counter-revolutionary generals and the Czarists generally, would never countenance an independent Poland. Pilsudski saw the logic of this argument and permitted Markhlevsky to continue his work. After a while, the Polish authorities even delegated an officer to accompany Markhlevsky to the Russian border on his way to consult with Lenin.

The Bolsheviks fully approved of the activity which Markhlevsky had commenced on his own initiative. Before long, he was ordered to return to Poland. On July 5, 1919, the radio operator at Detskoe - (formerly Tsarskoe-) Selo sent a slip of paper to Chicherin in which he announced that he had repeated a message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw and received a receipt¹; the message stated that a certain Kujavsky would soon cross the Polish-Russian frontier. Kujavsky was Markhlevsky.

Kujavsky-Markhlevsky went to a forest near Bialovesh. There he met Count Kosakovsky. Everything was kept in deep secret. This happened in July.

Subsequently, in October, 1919, a Polish and Soviet delega-

¹ This document is now in the possession of Mrs. Markhlevsky, who kindly permitted the writer to copy it and other material left by her deceased husband.

tion met at Mikashevitch near Lutsk. Officially they were Red Cross missions occupied with the knotty problem of the exchange of prisoners. But Markhlevsky had a credential signed Chicherin and dated October 4, 1919, which authorized him to 'conduct negotiations with the representatives of the Polish Government on all questions that have arisen or may arise' between the two States, and especially to ascertain 'the basis of an agreement which would guarantee peaceful relations between the Polish Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.'¹ This constituted a broad diplomatic assignment of far greater importance than Red Cross business.

Markhlevsky and his assistants remained at Mikashevitch from October 9 to December 22. They lived in a train and held their sessions with the Poles on the sidings of the tiny railway station. And while Markhlevsky talked prisoners with the official Polish representatives, he now and then – four times during the period – received visits from a mysterious gentleman named Colonel Berner. The Colonel was a confidant of Pilsudski and spoke in the name of the statesman-general. They discussed the old question: would Poland refrain from attacking Soviet Russia while the Bolsheviki were engaged by Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and other Whites? The advantages were as clear to the Russians as to the Poles. Markhlevsky and Berner likewise exchanged views on a future Polish-Russian frontier. Indeed, so much progress was registered that the situation seemed to require a personal meeting between Pilsudski and Markhlevsky. This was actually agreed upon.

Both Pilsudski and Markhlevsky were passionate hunters. According to the scheme, they would meet 'by accident' while engaged in a chase in the thick woods of Eastern Poland.

Much of this mystery, secrecy and make-believe is explained by Pilsudski's position with respect to the Allies, more particularly France. Poland has her own federationist plans, but their success was predicated on the defeat of the Russian Whites. France, however, egged Warsaw on. The policy of *cordon sanitaire* required another attack on Soviet Russia; required it before the Bolsheviki could recuperate from the White attacks.

¹ Photographic copy obtained from the Lenin Institute in Moscow.

SOVIET PEACE OFFERS

Accordingly, Pilsudski, in order to keep the goodwill and financial backing of Paris, saw himself forced to create the impression of warlike intentions against the Bolsheviks, even when for a moment he preferred a peaceful course. The Poles therefore moved their troops about, and, during the whole period in which Markhlevsky negotiated with Colonel Berner, sought to act as if they were preparing for battle with the Russians.

The purpose of the Markhlevsky discussions was a Polish-Russian armistice lasting at least till Denikin collapsed. This conformed with Poland's best interests. Yet France, in her desire to overthrow the Soviet regime, and with no understanding for the welfare of Poland – the whole Polish-Russian War is a monument to that lack of understanding – wished to precipitate the struggle without delay. And therefore Pilsudski was compelled to deceive Paris while his agent parleyed with Markhlevsky.

The meeting between Markhlevsky and Pilsudski never took place. Pilsudski's internal enemies opposed it, and he feared the effect abroad. Yet Markhlevsky's mission did postpone the opening of the war, and, according to Chicherin, kept the Polish army on the Polish side of a line demarcated by Markhlevsky and Berner.

The Poles bided their time until Moscow had annihilated most of its enemies. During the whole of 1919 they pushed forward into Soviet territory. On April 19, 1919, Polish troops occupied Vilna, the capital of Soviet Lithuania, and on August 8 they entered Minsk, the centre of Soviet White Russia, deep in the heart of Russia. The Russian-Polish line now ran along the Berezin River, touching Bobruisk and Mozir. Here it remained from August to December while the Bolsheviks dispatched Denikin and while Markhlevsky negotiated with Pilsudski's lieutenants. The Poles loyally fulfilled their pact with Moscow.

§ SOVIET PEACE OFFERS

But by the beginning of 1920 the anti-Bolshevik military movement in Russia was in its death struggles. Poland now proposed to act.

These intentions did not remain secret, and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow consequently commenced to pour

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out peace notes, settlement proposals, armistice suggestions, etc., etc.

In December, 1919, it became clear that the Poles had no intention of renewing the Markhlevsky pourparlers, then about to adjourn for the Christmas holiday. An important peace offer was accordingly sent to Warsaw by Chicherin on December 22, 1919, in which he declared the 'firm wish of the Soviet Government to end all its conflicts with Poland.' Immediate negotiations were proposed. 'Peace between Poland and Russia is a life necessity for both countries,' the note appeals. The 'Soviet Government is convinced that all differences between them can be removed by a friendly agreement.'¹

This note was never answered.

Lenin, Chicherin and Trotzky, in the name of the Council of People's Commissars, issued a declaration to the Polish Government and the Polish nation on January 28, 1920, which warned that the Allies were driving Poland into 'an unwarranted, senseless and criminal war with Soviet Russia.' To avoid all possible misinterpretation, the Moscow Government reaffirmed: that it 'unconditionally recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic'; that it entertained no aggressive intentions; that the Red Army would not advance beyond the then existing line; and that the Soviet State had not concluded agreements with Germany or any other Power aimed directly or obliquely against Poland.²

This almost humiliating declaration brought no results. Patek, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, merely acknowledged it on February 4 and promised a reply.

On February 2 the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic again appealed to the Polish people. 'The Russian nation,' it said, 'thirsts for peaceful construction, thirsts for a system of peace under which there will be no place for war between countries.' Once more peace negotiations were urged.

At the risk of boring Warsaw by repetition, Chicherin radioed a further peace offer to Patek on March 6. The Commissar literally begged.

¹ *Red Book*. Collection of Documents on Russian-Polish Relations from 1918 to 1920. Published by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Moscow, 1920. Page 82.

² *Ibid*.

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Finally on March 27 Patek informed Chicherin that the Polish Republic was ready to enter into negotiations with Russian plenipotentiaries, and named the date and place: April 10 – Borisov. To let the Russian delegates pass through the firing zone, the Poles would interrupt hostilities in the Borisov sector for twenty-four hours.¹

This was unsatisfactory. Moscow replied on the very day Patek's message arrived, and expressed pleasure at Poland's acquiescence. But why a truce for only twenty-four hours and only in one small segment of the front? 'We, for our part,' wrote Chicherin, 'see no reason that would justify new human sacrifices and the continuation of bloodshed. . . .' What kind of a peace conference could take place amid the roar of cannon and the screams of the wounded?

§ POLAND'S POLICY

Were the Poles sincere? Count Skrzynski, Polish ex-Foreign Minister, says No.

'The [Soviet] proposals for peace,' he declares, 'were not given any serious consideration. . . . When, however, parliamentary and democratic policy did not permit them to be left without an answer, the question of the place where the negotiations might be held was raised in such an offensive spirit that the whole question stopped at that point.'²

Almost the identical words are employed by H. H. Fisher, a neutral commentator and the official historian of the American Relief Association.

'The Poles,' he affirms, 'did not give them [the Soviet peace proposals] serious consideration, and the reply which the Government ultimately and reluctantly made was so offensive in spirit and so extravagant in its demands that peace on the basis of the Soviet's terms, which were by no means unreasonable, was obviously not desired.'³

Patek knew the Borisov suggestion was unacceptable. Therefore he made it. After he became Polish Minister to Moscow,

¹ *Red Book*.

² *Poland and Peace*, Skrzynski. Page 40.

³ *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-23*, by H. H. Fisher. New York, 1927. Page 32.

Patek told the writer that at the time the Borisov proposal was made the Poles held a highly favourable military position – presumably for the coming offensive. A truce for a longer period than twenty-four hours and at a different place would have permitted the Bolsheviks to strengthen their defence.

In a desperate attempt to save the situation, Chicherin there-upon proposed that the discussions take place in Warsaw or Moscow or Petrograd or an Esthonian town. Patek, however, remained adamant.

The Poland which rejected peace because it prepared for war needed peace no less than Soviet Russia. The inclusion of many millions of non-Poles within her territories made the political situation chaotic. The economic position might have given every reason for pause. Hoover's A.R.A., at the instigation of the Paris Peace Conference, distributed over \$50,000,000 worth of food in Poland during February–August, 1919. It continued its relief measures in 1920 while Poland continued her war preparations. In June of that year, the A.R.A. was feeding 1,315,000 children.¹ At that time, Pilsudski's army had penetrated deep into the Ukraine. Foreign relief committees were giving clothing and shoes to hundreds of thousands. Poland, the chief sector of the *cordon sanitaire*, counted no less than 34,000 cases of typhus in January, 1920 – a catastrophe with which the Polish Government was powerless to cope. Yet the Warsaw authorities dreamt of foreign conquests. And the Paris diplomats who had refused to feed Soviet Russia unless she pledged to cease fighting back her enemies, vigorously pushed their relief programme in Poland without even attempting to check the wildly aggressive plans of her statesmen.

Mr. Herbert Asquith put the matter succinctly in the House of Commons on August 10, 1920. 'There she was six months ago,' he said of Poland, 'a population stricken with disease and famine, and it is no exaggeration to say, on the verge of national bankruptcy, and it was under these circumstances that she started this campaign.' 'Her avowed object,' he continued, 'was to get rid of the comparatively limited frontier, not an ungenerous frontier . . . and to go beyond it to the ancient boundaries of the Poland

¹ *America and the New Poland*, by H. H. Fisher. New York, 1928.

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of 1772. . . . As I say, it was a purely aggressive adventure. . . . It was a wanton enterprise.'

Poland's plans were crystallized into one word – 'Federalism.'

'Federalism (its most eminent exponent was Pilsudski) was an audacious, romantic scheme for the solution of the eastern borderlands question by the creation, at the expense of Russia, of a series of independent States – Lithuania, White Russia, Ukraine – federated with and under the hegemony of Poland.'¹

The same idea still colours Polish foreign policy.

The question of Poland's frontiers had not been settled. Neither the Foch line demarcating the boundary between Poland and Lithuania (July 27, 1919) nor the Curzon line secretly drawn by the Supreme Council on December 8, 1919, was accepted as final by Polish leaders. Poland had successfully defied the Peace Conference in the matter of Eastern Galicia, and her politicians did not intend to accept from the world's diplomats less than they thought obtainable by force of arms.

The British Press of March 8, 1920, published an interview Patek gave the Warsaw correspondent of the Paris *Journal* on the subject of peace with the Soviets. He was in favour of negotiations, said the Minister, but 'the basis of our conditions will be the frontier of 1772.'

'Polish opinion by this time,' says Professor Fisher, 'was intoxicated with the doctrine of "federalism" which could not be realized except by war.'² And strangely enough, the most enthusiastic advocates of the federative idea, which amounted to poorly disguised imperialism, were the Polish Socialists, led by Pilsudski and by Ignatius Dashinski, Vice-Premier of Poland. On January 4, 1920, for instance, Dashinski's organ, *Naprzod* (Forward), said: 'For the entire future of Poland it would be of tremendous importance if we could move back the boundary of Russia eastward to the Dnieper.'

Ostensibly, the Poles were interested in liberating their eastern neighbours from the 'yoke of Bolshevism,' but Professor Fisher, among others, affirms that 'this grandiose scheme unfortunately ignored the fact . . . that such neighbours as the Ukrainians and

¹ *America and the New Poland*, Fisher.

² *Ibid.*

the Lithuanians would welcome almost any fate in preference to Polish rule, however disguised.¹ Mr. A. L. Kennedy, an extremely pro-Polish and anti-Bolshevik Englishman, does not conceal the fact that beneath the so-called federative idea lurked annexationist plans. Referring to Pilsudski's programme of creating two large buffer States, White Russia and the Ukraine, between Poland and Russia, Kennedy admits that 'though nominally independent, they were obviously immature, and would be dependent upon Poland for their security.'² Indeed, a treaty subsequently signed by Petlura in the name of a Ukraine he did not rule provided for the appointment of two Polish ministers in the Ukrainian Cabinet Pilsudski proposed to set up.

No less a Polish patriot than Count Skrzynski exposes the hypocrisy of the federationist idea.

'The nations,' he writes, 'which according to this theory Poland wanted to liberate from Russian servitude did not have any definite wishes about the matter, and even if they did not particularly care for Russia, they had less affection for Poland.'

Regarding the economic motive, we have a hint from Mr. Kennedy, who was in Poland at the time and enjoyed the unbounded confidence of Polish statesmen. In his opinion, 'The struggle between Russia and Poland was really for the control of its rich resources, which included further east the great Donetz basin,'³ where France, the friend of Poland, held tremendous financial stakes.

§ PETLURA, THE POLES, AND THE POPE

So, while Moscow rained negotiations proposals, Warsaw searched the map for allies. Petlura was an easy conquest. In 1919 the Bolsheviks had pushed him out of the Ukraine into East Galicia. Haller's Polish legions pushed him back again into the Ukraine. Even before the Soviets had finally destroyed Denikin, they easily found the little energy necessary to strip Petlura of any vestige of power, following, and authority. In December, 1919, therefore, the 'Hetman' appeared in Warsaw. The Poles welcomed him,

¹ *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, Fisher. Page 33.

² *Old Diplomacy and New*, by A. L. Kennedy. London, 1922. Page 318.

³ *Ibid.*

ENGLAND'S CHANGED ATTITUDE

fêted him, and came to an understanding with him that later assumed definite form in the treaty of April 23, 1920, in which Petlura renounced all claims to East Galicia and accepted, in return for Polish aid, the doubtful gift of leadership in a future non-Soviet Ukraine. Many of Petlura's faithful supporters considered his surrender of East Galicia treason to the Ukrainian nationalist cause, and M. Levitzky, for instance, the Hetman's minister in Copenhagen, resigned his post to take up cudgels against his former chief.¹

In this connection, mention must be made of Petlura's relations with the Pope. It appears that a certain Boom, a Jesuit priest of Belgian descent, moved in Petlura's entourage during 1919. At Boom's suggestion, Petlura appointed Count Tyshkevitch his representative to the Vatican. Soon after this appointment, Count Tyshkevitch transmitted to Petlura a letter from the Pope which contained the Holy See's recognition of Ukrainian independence. Whether this move reflected Benedict the XV's anti-Bolshevik orientation or his desire to create in Eastern Europe an extensive empire dominated by Roman Catholic Poland remains unestablished in view of the poverty of data now available on the subject.

ENGLAND'S CHANGED ATTITUDE

Petlura's alignment with Poland afforded Pilsudski little encouragement for his Napoleonic adventure. He required more potent allies. Accordingly, in January, 1920, we find Patek, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, lobbying for help in the British capital. His reception was cold. England's policy had undergone a radical change. Downing Street seemed in a mood to break with the interventionist tradition of the past.

The victories of the Bolsheviks over Denikin, Kolchak and Yudenich in the last quarter of 1919, coupled with the rising tide of labour unrest and imperial disaffection, affected London deeply. Churchill, who had never enjoyed the full support of Lloyd George nor the complete backing of the Curzon school,

¹ Levitzky, later the leader of the Ukrainian Movement in Poland, gave the writer an explanation of his position in an interview which took place in Lemberg in November, 1926. This important subject will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.

was now branded an expensive failure. Lloyd George decided to try another tack. He would withdraw the blockade around Soviet Russia.

The blockade had become completely effective in January, 1919, when the Scandinavian countries, yielding to Allied pressure, withdrew their diplomatic missions from Moscow and expelled Litvinov and Vorovsky. Thereafter, for almost a year, Russia could neither buy nor sell abroad. She needed food, clothing, anæsthetics and medicines to cope with typhus and other epidemics; she was ready to pay for them with gold and goods, but the Allies insisted on the blockade. As late as October, 1919, the Paris Peace Conference requested the German Government to join the blockade and at the same time addressed notes to twelve neutral countries reminding them of their responsibility to maintain Russia's isolation with undiminished vigilance. Only three months later, on January 16, 1920, the Peace Conference, then nearing its natural death, lifted the blockade, and announced that it would grant facilities to the Russian co-operatives to import goods in exchange for grain and other commodities.

This significant development in the history of Soviet Russia followed upon an important exchange of view between the French and British Governments which, in turn, led to conversations and negotiations between English and Soviet statesmen on the subject of a trade agreement.

The trade discussions between Russia and England dovetail closely with the military movements in the Polish War. London's mood changed with the fortunes of the Red Army, for England sat on two stools. Lloyd George said 'Thumbs down' one moment and 'Thumbs up' the next.

At the Versailles Peace Conference the Premier advocated peace negotiations with Moscow. Then Kolchak began winning, and Lloyd George bet on the Admiral. But before long it became obvious that the 'White hopes' were a hopeless lot and could never drive the Communists from their capital. At best, they would hold some salients of the Russian periphery.

Convinced of the permanence of the Soviet regime, Lloyd George's mind now turned to business. Britain's strength was her world trade. Russia represented a market. Manufacturers, mer-

THE FRENCH POLICY

chants and workers clamoured against the Government's impracticable policy towards Moscow. Lloyd George accordingly commenced to toy with the idea of a commercial understanding. This did not move him to discard the interventionist strategy of the Government whose chief he was. He continued to support it – or at least not to oppose it. But, while permitting it to run its expensive course, he prepared an alternative policy.

¶ THE FRENCH POLICY OF 'PARALLEL LINES'

The beginnings were small, yet it is interesting that they occurred as far back as September, 1919. The Peace Conference still sat. Anglo-French antagonism had not yet grown to full stature. The British Government consequently went through the gestures of consulting France on her attitude towards this important problem.

In notes dated September 25 and October 23, 1919, Downing Street inquired 'what measures the French Government intended to take to establish its demands against Russia and to protect the rights and claims of its nationals.' The Quai d'Orsay made reply November 3, and emphasized

'the expediency of *co-operation* on the part of the *two* governments with a view to establishing on *parallel* lines, and by similar methods of tabulation, a *common* statement based on *corresponding* principles of right which the *two* countries are justified in asserting against Russia.'¹

The abundance of words stressing the desirability of united action is conspicuous. The Paris Cabinet saw the obvious wisdom of a common front against the Bolsheviks, and pursued tactics which recur again and again in the history of the Western world's dealings with Soviet Russia.

France seemed prepared to destroy the unity of Russia through the agency of the Poles, and in that humour necessarily gave little thought to the collection of pre-war debts or to the interests of her thousands of small bond-holders. But the moment the ques-

¹ *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement.* British White Paper. Russia No. 2 (1921). Cmd. 1456. London, 1921.

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tion arose of normal relations with Moscow, debts became an obstacle.

Great Britain, however, sought trade, and though, for a time she made concessions to the French point of view, there was no intention in London to hang too tightly to Millerand's apron strings. Lloyd George had decided to bridge the gap between his Government and Lenin's. The appointment of Maxim Litvinov was opportune.

¶ LITVINOV'S ACTIVITIES ABROAD

On November 14, 1919, Litvinov received from Lenin credentials to negotiate peace with the succession States of the former Russian Empire and with the other countries. On the same day he was authorized to negotiate with the Powers for the exchange of prisoners. The next morning, Leonid Krassin, Commissar of Trade and Industry, appointed Litvinov his plenipotentiary in the Scandinavian countries. Thus equipped as a diplomat, humanitarian, and State merchant, Litvinov prepared for the West in an effort to establish a *modus vivendi* between the Communist and Capitalist worlds. Lenin felt that Russia's military victories against the Whites might have persuaded the Allies to enter into contact with Moscow. He was not altogether wrong.

Arrived in Copenhagen, Litvinov sent peace proposals to the Allied legations and endeavoured to establish touch with the foreign diplomats in the Danish capital. Soon Litvinov was busily engaged conducting *pourparlers* with a host of Powers.

As an opening wedge to a more ambitious programme, the exchange of civil and military prisoners first occupied attention. Lloyd George had delegated O'Grady, a Labour M.P., to negotiate with Litvinov. Elaborate discussions completed, the two representatives signed an agreement on February 12, whereby England agreed to supply ships not only for her own prisoners in Russia but for those of all the Allies and neutrals as well. During the same period, Litvinov arranged the exchange of prisoners with the Scandinavian States, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Italy, and France. Special interest attaches to this last document because it pledged France to refrain from hostile acts against Soviet Russia. The treaty, signed April 20, 1920, by

LITVINOV'S ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Litvinov and M. Duchesne, contains a supplementary agreement in which 'the Government of France again formally promises that it will not intervene in the internal affairs of Russia and that it will not co-operate in any aggressive measures against the Soviet Republics.' Before long, on July 28, 1920, Litvinov was able to call the attention of M. Puech, of the French Legation in Copenhagen, to the fact that the Paris authorities had broken an international pledge by granting military aid to Poland.

Simultaneously, Litvinov devoted considerable attention to the resumption of trade relations. On one occasion, he handed O'Grady a series of definite proposals. The M.P. returned the envelope unopened. Officially, his functions were limited to facilitating the exchange of prisoners. The unofficial O'Grady-Litvinov discussions, however, played an important rôle as ice-breaker for the subsequent Anglo-Russian trade agreement conferences and for the Supreme Council's decision of January 16, 1920, to lift the blockade.

This fiat sanctioned commercial transactions only with the Russian Co-operatives in order, apparently, to avoid contamination through direct dealings with the Bolsheviks. For Moscow, this was one of the best jokes in ages, and years later Chicherin could not refrain from a chuckle as he talked with me about it. The Soviets had taken over all the co-operatives and state-ified them. When the Peace Conference placed its stamp of approval on the co-operatives, therefore, the Bolsheviks, smiling at the folly of this self-delusion, appointed some of their best diplomats, Krassin, Litvinov, Nogin and Rozovsky, to negotiate with the Allies on behalf of the Centrosoyus, the central co-operative organization. They were to proceed to London. But London refused to receive Litvinov.

This seemed an important matter. At the beginning of their diplomatic relations with the Western Powers the Bolsheviks resented personal discrimination against one of their plenipotentiaries. It was often assumed that Litvinov had been arrested and expelled from England for conducting propaganda. But he actually went to Brixton Jail in August, 1918, as a hostage for Lockhart who had been imprisoned in Moscow. On the door of Litvinov's cell hung a sign which read 'Military Guest of His Majesty.'

Litvinov remained in confinement some eight or ten days. During that time and subsequently until he voluntarily departed for Bergen, Norway, Litvinov was never molested or deprived of the special diplomatic privileges he enjoyed in common with foreign envoys. Accordingly, the *Daily Mail's* agitation against Litvinov as an 'agent' seemed little ground to Moscow for barring him from England in 1920, and instructions were given for the entire delegation to proceed to Copenhagen. If the Allies wished to negotiate with the Russian Co-operatives, that is, with the Soviet Government, they could send representatives to the Danish capital.

This was in April. In the same month a significant little conference took place at Geneva. At the suggestion of France, the neutrals met there to adopt a common policy towards commercial relations with Russia and to enter the united front contemplated by Paris. French diplomacy was eminently successful, and a resolution adopted on April 17, 1920, announced that the delegations of Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were 'convinced that it is of the greatest importance that the countries above mentioned should address their claims to Russia in the same style and showing a complete unity of opinion.'¹ A larger and more important meeting was convoked at Paris on June 10, 1920. Ten countries, including England, were represented. This conference, too, agreed on the advisability of common action with respect to Russia and even outlined the constitution of an 'International Office' which would undertake the task of settling debts and repairing damages.

Such being the dominant atmosphere, the Allies sent a mixed commission to Copenhagen in April, 1920, to deliberate with the Russians. But the varied wishes, policies, and designs of the several States, and the fact that France was too absorbed in the Polish offensive to be interested in Russian trade, made practical achievements unlikely. Mr. E. F. Wise, the chairman of the Allied commission, accordingly hinted that Lloyd George would welcome a personal chat with Krassin.

¹ *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement*. British White Paper. Russia No. 2 (1921). Cmd. 1456. London, 1921.

§ CURZON PLEADS FOR WRANGEL

Here it becomes possible to catch one glimpse of an interesting interplay of forces in British domestic politics. It was April, 1920. The Bolsheviks had destroyed Denikin. A Soviet republic had been set up at Baku. Lord Curzon trembled lest the Russians step over into Persia or attack his garrison in Batum. He would not have been averse to the undermining of Russian strength by means of a joint attack by Poland and by Wrangel who had bottled himself up in the Crimea with the desperate remnants of Denikin's volunteer army. Perhaps, also, Curzon's mind harked back to the Palmerstonian days when Britain's avowed aim was the wresting of the Crimean Peninsula from the rule of the Czar.¹ At any rate, he intervened on behalf of Wrangel at a time when Lloyd George opposed such intervention and stood on the threshold of tête-à-tête negotiations with Soviet spokesmen.

On April 11 Curzon radioed Moscow urging the cessation of operations against Wrangel. The Bolsheviks made quick to welcome this message as the beginning of diplomatic relations (therefore, at best, only trade and prisoners' negotiations had taken place), and suggested that Litvinov be invited to London for a discussion of the entire complex of outstanding problems between the two countries. Chicherin added another bit of characteristic Bolshevik 'humour'; Curzon had requested an amnesty for Wrangel's forces. The Russians asked the release of the Hungarian Communists arrested when the Bela Kun regime fell on August 2, 1919.

In lieu of a reply, the British fleet began shelling Soviet Black Sea towns. Moscow protested and recalled England's declared intention of refraining from granting aid to Wrangel. There was an exchange of notes, but nothing definite developed. By this time Krassin was *en route* to London on Lloyd George's invitation.

All the while Poland hunted for allies. The possibility of finding them was narrowed by the Peace Conference's decision to lift the blockade, by a corresponding United States decision on March 7, 1920, and by Lloyd George's tactics.

Developments in the Baltics further prejudiced Poland's

¹ *Palmerston*, by Philip Guedalla. London, 1926. Page 360.

chances of success in this search. On February 2, 1920, the Soviet Government signed a treaty of peace with Esthonia. But pacts with small countries, history teaches, may have tremendous significance.

§ SOVIET RUSSIA'S FIRST PEACE TREATY

It was Moscow's first peace agreement (Brest Litovsk was not an *agreement*). More than that — 'our treaty with Esthonia,' as Chieherin put it in a report delivered at the February, 1920, session of the Russian Central Executive Committee (VTZIK), 'developed into a dress rehearsal, so to speak, for an understanding with the Entente, into the first attempt to break through the blockade, and into the first experiment in peaceful co-existence with bourgeois States.' The peace with Esthonia thus represents a milestone in the history of Soviet foreign affairs. Esthonia became Russia's window opening towards Europe. Through it, for four whole months, went all of Bolshevik trade with the West.

The Bolshevik-Esthonian pact strengthened the moderates in Britain who urged a more friendly strategy towards Russia. The Soviet negotiators proceeded on the assumption that the words spoken at Dorpat (Juriev), the conference town, were heard on the banks of the Thames and therefore not only paid Esthonia 15,000,000 roubles in gold as indemnity but offered the little republic valuable concessions. The Communists wished to impress the world, more particularly England, with their conciliatory purposes.

At first they found this somewhat difficult, for the Esthonians presented exorbitant demands. But the moment the Supreme Economic Council in Paris sanctioned trade with Russian Co-operatives, Esthonia quickly deflated her claims and agreement became possible.

The negotiations with Esthonia were also a dress rehearsal for the British. It need scarcely be stated that Esthonia's international position did not permit her to act independently of, much less contrary to, the will of the major Powers in so important a matter as relations with Bolshevism. The Lloyd George faction, tired of Churchill's tactics, was bent on trading with Russia, and Esthonia served as a *ballon d'essai*. It proved successful; London

LITHUANIA AND LATVIA IN LINE

accordingly found itself on the threshold of its own negotiations with Moscow.

The Baltic States took their cue from London. Besides, they themselves were weary of war and anxious to set their badly shaken houses in order. Moscow offered them peace. Esthonia broke the ice. And since the succéssion countries sometimes have a tendency to hang together, the example of Esthonia was soon followed by all the rest.

¶ LITHUANIA AND LATVIA FALL IN LINE

Lithuania needed no coaxing. The rumbling of Polish war drums terrified the tiny country which long ago suspected Poland of the desire to gobble her up and the Allies of favouring the up-gobbling. History fed Kovno's fears. Great Britain's recognition of Lithuania – which was followed by general recognition – did not take place till September 24, 1919 – nineteen months after *de facto* recognition of Esthonia and ten months after the *de facto* recognition of Latvia; this despite incessant lobbying in Entente capitals. The Germans had warned Lithuania of the Allies' desire to incorporate her into Poland.¹ Delayed recognition supported the contention, and Warsaw's warlike demeanour early in 1920 necessitated quick diplomatic buttressing.

Foreign Minister Voldemaras accordingly suggested negotiations to Moscow on March 31 on condition of Soviet recognition of Lithuanian sovereignty over Vilna, Kovno, and Grodno. Peace conferences began in the Bolshevik capital on May 7; a treaty was signed on July 12. The Russians acceded to most of Kovno's territorial demands, above all, to the adhesion of Vilna, and agreed to pay Lithuania 3,000,000 gold roubles in consideration of her share in the State funds of the Czarist Government.

Latvia next fell in line. At the conference which opened in Moscow on April 16, both parties found themselves armed with the same scholarly volume by Pastor Billenstein on ethnographic distribution in the border regions. Disputes were therefore few. Moscow consented to grant Riga 4,000,000 gold roubles and a

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley. Vol. VI. Published under the auspices of the British Institute for International Affairs. London, 1924.

100,000 desyatin lumber concession in settlement of all outstanding accounts. The treaty was signed on August 11 and led to the immediate establishment of normal diplomatic relationships.

§ FINLAND SIGNS

Finland offered the greatest difficulties. She had territorial ambitions. In 1918, her delegates met Joffe in Berlin and asked him not only for the entire Murmansk Peninsula but for Petrograd and Petrozavodsk in Karelia as well. And Finland claimed Pechenga on the ground of a promise given by Alexander II to Finnish courtiers back in 1864, and, in particular, on the ground that Moscow had granted Pechenga to Soviet Finland in 1918.

Russia and Finland had been at war and hostilities continued as late as 1920. This too complicated negotiations, but after numerous preliminaries the final conference opened in Juriev on June 12 – in the midst of the Polish War.

The Finns insisted on Pechenga. The Bolsheviks finally acquiesced; the Finns, in return, reconciled themselves to the loss of Eastern Karelia which had organized as a 'Labour Commune' under the paternal attention of Lenin. These territorial adjustments paved the way to the general treaty of October 14, 1920.

Huge breaches had now been introduced into anti-Soviet ranks by the defection of England, half-hearted though it remained, by the defection of Esthonia, and – in the spring of 1920 – by the inclination of practically every one of the Baltic States, Poland's best prospects, to open negotiations with Moscow.

Warsaw, nevertheless, was sanguine. It had not shot its bolt against the new Russian republic. Poland could depend on some assistance; she could trust Petlura but knew his limited power. She was given to understand that Wrangel would seek to divert Bolshevik strength by activities in the Crimea and the Ukraine. The Georgian Mensheviks too had representatives in Warsaw; they were party friends of Pilsudski and Dashinski. Italy, according to Chicherin, sent aeroplanes and uniforms. But Poland's best bet, obviously, was France.¹

¹ The nature and quantity of French aid to Poland in 1920 is discussed in detail in *Pologne, Pologne . . .*, by Olivier d'Etchegoyen. Paris, 1925. Page 300. M. d'Etchegoyen was attached to the French Military Mission in Poland.

ROUMANIA FAILS POLAND

France stood firm though England wavered. On December 24, 1919, Clemenceau was thus quoted by the *New York Times*: 'Not only will we not make peace, but we will not compromise with the Government of the Soviets.' And on February 5, 1920, the *New York Times* said:

'France cannot get away from the theory, of which Marshal Foch is the advocate, that the Allies ought to send a Polish army to Moscow. She wants Roumania and Poland to stage a war against Lenin and Trotzky, not for the primary purpose of protecting Poland, but for the primary purpose of crushing the Soviets.'

ROUMANIA FAILS POLAND

France attempted to mobilize Roumania. But Roumania felt too uneasy about her hold on Bessarabia and too anxious about the enmity of Hungary. Roumania, in fact, listened with one ear to Muscovite peace bids.

Here was Roumania, violently anti-Bolshevik, decidedly pro-Polish, and an ally of France. Yet she could not join the Polish War in 1920. She feared a Soviet push at vulnerable Bessarabia and, more particularly, she had reasons to suspect Budapest of a desire to avenge the seizure of rich Hungarian lands. This complex of problems presented a challenge to French diplomacy. (It still does.)

The French proposed to kill three birds with one stone: to settle Roumanian-Hungarian differences; to sign a profitable pact with Hungary; and to win Hungary for the anti-Soviet war of the Poles. The conversations with these ends in view were of course secret, but one able journalist, Robert Dell, suspected some such deal at the time it was being planned.

'The Quai d'Orsay,' he wrote, 'is making desperate efforts to prevent Roumania from entering that alliance [Jugoslavia's defensive alliance against Hungary] and to reconcile her with Hungary. But the Roumanian Government has discovered that France has secretly promised to Hungary that part of Banat transferred to Roumania by the Treaty of Trianon.'¹

¹ London *Nation*, September 11, 1920.

In consideration of such kindly treatment at the hand of Millerand, Hungary would, Mr. Dell wrote, place herself at the disposal of France and at the side of Poland against Soviet Russia.

What constituted a suspicion years ago is now an established fact. In 1927, Lord Rothermere, the British newspaper king, engaged in a campaign for the modification of the Treaty of Trianon to the advantage of Hungary. That could only be done at the expense of the members of the Little Entente, the special protégés of France. French journals therefore raised a cry of protest. To France the whole chain of Versailles treaties, of which Trianon forms a link, is inviolable. Whereupon, September 28, 1927, *Magyarsag*, a Budapest daily, published the contents of an *aide memoire* dated April 15, 1920, and signed by Maurice Paleologue, General Secretary of the French Foreign Office, as well as by Sir Francis Barker for England, in which the essence of conversations was recorded that had proceeded between the French and Hungarian Governments on this complex of questions: Hungary would march an army of 100,000 men into Poland through Karpatho-Rus. France would equip and lead the force. Hungary would receive twelve important cities seized from her by Roumania. Nevertheless, Paris undertook to effect a peaceful settlement between Budapest and Bukharest. Incidentally, the French were to obtain a lease of Hungary's railroads. *Magyarsag* wished to show that France had not always regarded as sacred the boundaries fixed in the Treaty of Trianon.

Events now took an interesting turn. Diamandi, the Roumanian Minister in Paris, inquired of Paleologue whether the *Magyarsag's* revelations were true. Paleologue replied in the negative. This Budapest could not tolerate, and accordingly caused to be published a theretofore secret document dated June 24, 1920, in which Fouchet, the French envoy in Budapest, outlined to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Teleki, the territorial changes proposed by France and England at the expense of Roumania.

Further doubts were impossible. France definitely did try to align Hungary with Poland against Russia in 1920, and planned to pay for the service with arbitrarily transferred towns and populations. She hoped Roumania could be rewarded in some other quarter.

THE WAR COMMENCES

Roumania suspected and held aloof. Hungary hesitated till it became too late. Mutual hostility paralysed the potential power of both against the great Red enemy. Czecho-Slovakia, moreover, protested against the deal because it threatened to strengthen her enemy, Hungary, and involved the transportation of Hungarian troops through her territory.

THE WAR COMMENCES

Though Roumania and Hungary failed her, Poland, counting on Petlura, on Wrangel and most on Millerand, opened the attack. Nobody declared war. But on April 26, 1920, Pilsudski issued a proclamation which began: 'At my orders, the army of the Polish Republic has moved forward and penetrated deep into the Ukraine.' The offensive thus heralded was eminently and quickly successful.

Kiev, the ancient Ukrainian capital, fell into Polish hands on May 8. The capture of a city so far in the interior of the country so soon after the opening of the campaign meant that Pilsudski had met no resistance. The Bolsheviks were caught unprepared. They were still engaged by the remnants of Denikin's forces.

BRUSILOV, BUDENNY, TUKHACHEVSKY

The Red Army, however, soon struck back.

A defensive war with Poland was a popular cause among almost all classes of the population, and even avowed anti-Bolsheviks enlisted in Soviet regiments. General Brusilov, of World-War fame, himself accepted an appointment in the Russian Staff and issued an appeal to White officers to volunteer their services. The Bolsheviks harnessed the national sentiments of certain groups to their own chariot.

Moreover, Poland is cordially detested in the Ukraine, and for this reason, as well as because the Little Russian mujhik could easily visualize the return of the rich Polish landlord, the Ukrainian peasantry rose up against the invaders. Even the bandits ceased their activities.

The Red Army's blows were quick and sure. On June 13, the Pilsudski legions abandoned Kiev and turned their faces westward. Budenny's cavalry now threatened to cut the Polish line at Zhitomir. His dashing lancers sowed dismay within the enemy

ranks and havoc throughout all Poland. Pilsudski himself declares that Budenny created the impression of some 'legendary and invincible power.'

At the same time, General Tukhachevsky, aged 27, commanding the main Soviet army of 150,000 men on the fields of Smolensk where Napoleon once destroyed the Czar's last bulwark on the road to Moscòw, took the offensive. Success was immediate. The Polish Field Headquarters evacuated Minsk on July 11, and the important railway centre of Vilna fell after stubborn fighting on July 14. The Polish retreat in the direction of Warsaw continued with undiminished haste, and the Red Army, its right flank covered by friendly Lithuania, advanced an average of twenty kilometres a day between July 4 and July 20.

On July 4, too, the Polish southern army, which had taken Kiev and invested the Ukraine, rushed back to the Bug at a daily speed of some ten kilometres.

These rapid developments completely demoralized the Poles. 'The Government trembled,' says Pilsudski.¹ Tukhachevsky's march, the Marshal writes, represented 'a terrible kaleidoscope.' Even before it commenced, Budenny's slashing attacks had driven despair into the highest Polish army quarters, and Pilsudski relates how at a conference in Belvedere Palace during the last week of June, General Sheptitzki, his Chief-of-Staff, declared that the war had been lost and advised an immediate peace at any price.² Despair grew to hopeless panic when the youthful Tukhachevsky's Red flood began to move menacingly towards Warsaw.

At this juncture, Premier Grabski and Foreign Minister Patek rushed to Western Europe to beg on the doorstep of the Allies. The prospective philanthropists were, of course, England and France. But England was in the midst of serious conversations with Moscow representatives.

§ KRASSIN'S 'DECLARATION OF WAR'

E. F. Wise had asked Krassin to come to London. Krassin came in May, and first saw Lloyd George on the last of the month.

¹ 1920, by Joseph Pilsudski. Moscow, 1926. The account in this chapter of the military events of the period follows Pilsudski's own description.

² *Ibid.*

KRASSIN'S 'DECLARATION OF WAR'

It had been announced that these pourparlers would be limited strictly to questions of trade. But that served merely to disarm opposition. In fact, the two statesmen went straight to the heart of the problem – to politics.

Krassin outlined business possibilities but suggested that Soviet Russia could scarcely concentrate on commercial operations while engaged in a war with Poland. Would not England, therefore, refrain from assisting Pilsudski? (The Poles were then in Kiev.)

Lloyd George thereupon enunciated a detailed political programme. The Bolsheviks must not send agents into Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. They must not harm the British garrison in Batum or the Menshevik Government of Georgia. They must not fight against Wrangel in the Crimea or against the Balkan States. They must not help Kemal Pasha. (The British Premier was preparing Greece for a war against Turkey.) In return for these 'must nots' Lloyd George offered the Russians the privilege of buying and selling in England.

On June 9, Krassin met Lloyd George again, and read him a sternly-worded note which contained Moscow's reply to British demands. Krassin affirmed that the Bolsheviks were prepared to discuss Russia's foreign obligations. But there was also Allied indebtedness to be considered. Had not the Powers helped Kolchak, Denikin, etc.? The interests of the widowed and orphaned victims of that intervention seemed more pressing than the claims of the rich European investors in Russian enterprises. Allied operations had undermined Russia's economic strength. This circumstance must be thrown into the balance. At all events, there must first be a peace conference to regulate all political difficulties, a conference at which the Soviet Republic would enjoy equal rights.

Lloyd George interrupted the reading of Krassin's statement with the cry, 'This is a declaration of war.' Nevertheless, the pourparlers continued.

It was now time for Downing Street to type a paper. This it did on July 1, and the memorandum, Lloyd George stated, required an answer before the Allied representatives met at Spa on July 7. The memorandum proposed four things:

- (1) Mutual renunciation of hostile acts and hostile propaganda;
- (2) Mutual repatriation of prisoners;

WHITE POLAND v. RED RUSSIA

- (3) Soviet recognition of Russia's indebtedness; and
- (4) Exchange of trade delegations. The British Government would agree to anybody except Maxim Litvinov.

The Russians accepted these proposals in a brief note dated July 7, and for further negotiations delegated Leonid Krassin, Leo Kamenev, Vladimir Miliutin, and Theodore Rothstein. But the Moscow reply intimated that it preferred separate discussions with England because the inclusion of French problems would simply complicate the settlement with Britain.¹

§ LLOYD GEORGE DISCIPLINES A PRIME MINISTER

Mr. George took Krassin's note with him to Spa. Here Allied and German statesmen were gathered to discuss current problems. Hither, therefore, repaired Grabski and Patek. The British Premier met the Polish Prime Minister alone on July 10. 'Your army is at present on territory which does not appear to be Polish,' the Welshman barked as he opened the conversation. Grabski could do nothing but affirm. At that time the Pilsudski legions still stood approximately 125 miles to the east of their own frontier.

Throughout the conversation, Lloyd George made

'all his observations in curt, peremptory tones. He dwelt with great emphasis on the fact that Poland was surrounded by enemies, Russian, German, and Czech. . . . He recalled to Mr. Grabski that Poland was still dependent on the Allied goodwill for a favourable settlement of the Upper Silesian, Eastern Galician, and Danzig questions. He effectively cowed the Polish Premier, who returned from the interview crestfallen and nervous.'²

Grabski, however, could explain to the British statesman that his country's army was beginning a hasty retreat in thorough demoralization; that his 'Government trembled'; that the Reds would soon be on Polish soil unless stopped by the Allies. This was

¹ The foregoing account of the Lloyd George-Krassin pourparlers is from official Soviet sources.

² These impressions were given to Mr. A. L. Kennedy by Prince Sapieha, Polish Foreign Minister, five days after the interview and are published in his *Old Diplomacy for New*. Page 322.

a cogent argument. For however much Lloyd George may have desired trade, and however much he may have hated to help Poland while she acted under French dictation, he could not permit the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Polish Republic and thus establish contact with Germany.

The upshot of the confrontation of the two Premiers amounted to a promise that Britain would help if Poland's independence and integrity were threatened. Meanwhile, Lloyd George advised, Polish troops should be withdrawn from Soviet soil.

France was more friendly. 'French policy, unlike ours [England's] was consistently and unambiguously pro-Polish,' writes Mr. Kennedy. 'France had, unlike Britain, encouraged Poland's original offensive in May.'

Lloyd George could not remain unaffected by the warmth of French affections for Poland. Nor did Grabski's warning of a Bolshevik invasion leave him indifferent. Accordingly, the British commenced diplomatic intervention, and on July 11, the day after the Grabski-George tête-à-tête, Moscow was informed by radio that England would act if Poland were threatened, and suggesting that the Bolsheviks send representatives to London to negotiate peace.

In Soviet political circles, and subsequently in the House of Commons, sarcastic comments were heard of the eternal readiness of the Allies to support invasions of Russian territory and, in contrast, their sudden pacifism when the Red Army gained a victory. The Kremlin, however, agreed to discuss peace terms with Poland direct, seeing no reason why the pourparlers must take place under Anglo-French supervision. Nor did Moscow agree that the Baltic States, with all of which it was engaged in peace negotiations, be invited to a Polish-Russian conference. Finally, the proposal, contained in the radio, that Wrangel be given an armistice and that his troops be permitted to remain in the Crimea while he came to London to outline his terms, was summarily rejected.

These points of view were elaborated in Chicherin's reply of July 18. 'Impertinent,' said the French Premier on reading it. 'Impudent,' wrote Sir Henry Wilson.

Their wrath notwithstanding, Paris and London advised Poland to enter into direct negotiations – which she did on July 22. Representatives of the two belligerents met at Baranovitchi on the

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1st of August to discuss an armistice and on the same day the Soviet delegation arrived in London. Lloyd George received Krassin and Kamenev on the 4th. While the three were thus closeted, Churchill came to the Premier's door. Mr. George did not admit him (it would have been a strange confrontation), but sent out a note in which he wrote, 'I have told them that if they don't stop their advance in Poland I shall order the British fleet into the Baltic at once.'¹ The next day Winston Churchill told Sir Henry Wilson that Lloyd George was considering the question of giving military aid to Baron Wrangel.

¶ THE CRISIS

The situation became sensationally serious. The structure set up by the Treaty of Versailles seemed to be on the verge of crumbling. If Poland crashed, anything might happen. The French were ready to act. The British threatened to act. London had not even waited for the Bolsheviks to sin. Before the Red Army violated Polish territory, a special official British mission, headed by Lord d'Abernon, ambassador in Berlin, and including Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Cabinet, and General Sir Percy Radcliffe, of the Imperial Staff, arrived in Warsaw. On the same day, July 25, came a French committee led by M. Jusserand and counting as its most important member General Weygand, Chief of Foch's Staff. The French continued to send munitions, as did the British.

Meanwhile the Red forces pressed forward irresistibly. A second Curzon note of July 20 had warned the Bolsheviks not to advance beyond the so-called Curzon line drawn by the Supreme Council on December 8, 1919. The frontier thus demarcated passed from Grodno to Bialostok, to Brest Litovsk, then south along the Bug River. The Russian Army approached this imaginary line on July 24 and crossed it on July 27. Brest Litovsk fell into its hands on August 1.

¶ FOREIGN LABOUR HELPS

Everywhere in Europe the proletariat was aroused. 'Hands off Russia' became a universal slogan. The sentiment for Russia,

¹ *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson . . .*, Callwell. Page 255.

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born in the days when Pilsudski's legions penetrated victoriously into the Ukraine, reached an even higher pitch when the Polish offensive had given place to a Red advance, and fiery appeals from Moscow to 'The Workers of the World' supplied Labour opposition with material for protest.

Campaigns to prevent the forwarding of war materials to Poland developed in all transit countries. Working men in Czecho-Slovakia stopped and searched trains moving in the direction of the Polish frontier and refused to pass them when munitions were discovered. Danzig, the most important port for Polish traffic, witnessed stirring scenes. Longshoremen and sailors went on strike. Ships stood in the harbour for days upon days waiting for navvies who sometimes did not come; and British troops had to be employed in the unloading of supplies. (Bonar Law admitted the fact in the House of Commons.) Often, military supplies had to be sent over the Balkans and across Roumania to Poland, or by other equally devious routes.

Opposition to Allied intervention against Russia grew strongest in England. Here it took the form of a sharp struggle with the established Government. For during the latter half of July, Lloyd George inclined many degrees towards the French thesis of active hostility towards Bolshevism, and he even contemplated military assistance for Pilsudski and Wrangel. The British trade unions, then very Radical and pro-Russian, objected strenuously to such measures. They wanted no war on the Soviet Republic. Not only did they obstruct the shipment of munitions to Poland: they organized a serious movement to paralyse any effort the Government might undertake on behalf of the Warsaw regime.

British Labour talked of 'direct action' and organized the so-called 'Council of Action.' This body openly challenged the Government. It defied the constituted authorities and threatened, by implication at least, to become a national Soviet and replace the regular Cabinet. For a moment it seemed as if England were on the verge of revolution.

¶ PEACE IS UNPOPULAR

The Poles did nothing to help Lloyd George. The meeting in Baranovitchi came to naught because the Warsaw representatives

claimed they were unauthorized to discuss important questions. French advice was against peace. After the Baranovitchi failure, both sides agreed to meet in Minsk. The Poles, however, were not inclined to keep the appointment for August 10, and 'only persistent pressure by the Allies' representatives in Warsaw kept them at their decision to proceed.' Lord d'Abernon exerted most of the pressure, according to A. L. Kennedy.

Meanwhile, Lloyd George tried to persuade the French to agree to an armistice between Poland and Russia. But France still thought she could beat Bolshevism. Millerand, Foch, and Berthelot met Lloyd George at Lympe, England, to discuss the matter (August 8). The British Premier read the draft terms of a truce, but 'Millerand,' writes Sir Henry Wilson, who attended, 'followed with a clear statement that he would not deal with the Bolsheviks, that their word and signature were worth nothing, and that they had neither honour nor laws.'

The French succeeded in impressing the impressionable mind of Lloyd George. Negotiations were scheduled to begin at Minsk on August 10 or 11. Suppose these conversations failed through no reason of the Poles, but because the Russians submitted terms that prejudiced the independence of Poland. Then, Lloyd George finally agreed, the Council of Action notwithstanding, that he would help Warsaw with ammunition and advice, he would support Wrangel, and he would break off the trade discussions with Krassin and Kamenev.

On the 10th of August, an exciting day, the British Prime Minister was back in London. In the morning a Labour delegation waited on him. Bevin, of the Transport Workers' Union, spoke. 'They had no hesitation in laying their cards on the table, and if war were carried on directly in support of Poland or indirectly . . . there would be a match set to explosive material, the result of which none of them could foresee.' This was a frank hint at revolutionary possibilities.

All day the House of Commons talked Russia and Poland. At 5 p.m. Lloyd George appeared to make his statement on the results of the Lympe Conference in the mansion of Sir Philip Sassoon.

Mr. Asquith immediately took him to task. Suppose the negotiations at Minsk broke down as a result of Bolshevik harsh-

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ness? But on such a matter there would always be two opinions. One party would blame the Russians for the failure; the other the Poles. For the rest, the ex-Premier launched into a bitter attack on Poland's aggressiveness and declared that he could well understand the Bolsheviks for wishing to guarantee their country against another attack by the Poles. Lord Robert Cecil, too, criticized the Poles as well as the British Government, which threatened to punish the Russians for invading Poland, but had not tried to stop Poland from invading Russia. Other members sought to prove that British support for the Poles and Wrangel would be nothing new. It had already been given. Polish soldiers had been seen in British uniforms – shipped before the Bolsheviks crossed into Polish territory.

Lloyd George retired from the House to attend various important conferences. For hours the M.P.s continued the debate on the Russian-Polish War. While this battle of words continued, a document came into the Prime Minister's hand signed by Kamenev which contained a summary of the peace terms to be offered to the Poles by the Bolsheviks at Minsk. They appeared moderate. Lloyd George summoned the Cabinet from Parliament and took counsel with them. At 10 p.m. he and his ministers returned to the front bench where he read the Kamenev paper. The Polish Army was to be reduced to 60,000 plus a civilian militia. Arms not required by these units were to be surrendered to Russia. War industries were to be demobilized. War victims or their families in Poland would receive free farms. For its part, the Soviet Government agreed, as it had agreed in its note of July 18, to give Poland more land than foreseen by the Curzon Line decision.

These terms, according to Lloyd George, changed the situation, and he wired Poland to accept. But Kamenev had wilfully omitted from the document a most important item of the Bolshevik demands: that the civilian militia, numbering perhaps 200,000, would consist only of working men. This was revolutionary propaganda and not a peace term, for Moscow obviously knew that no bourgeois government would accept such a condition. The Russians, plainly, did not want peace on August 10. They were on the crest of a wave of victory, and of revolutionary enthusiasm. Throughout Soviet Russia resounded the cry, '*Dayosh Varshavu*,' 'Warsaw must be taken.' The Bolsheviks saw

visions of a Soviet Poland. Kamenev wished to prevent British interference. He felt that Russia's relations with the British Government and even with the British proletariat were too weak to stand the announcement of the workers' militia demand.

Lloyd George's advice to the Poles to consent to Moscow's terms naturally angered the French. They reacted by recognizing Wrangel on August 11 as the Government of South Russia.

The terms which the Muscovites proposed to present for Polish signature at Minsk were intended not as a road to peace but as a stepping-stone to revolution. Yet, though the Poles knew nothing of these conditions, their delegates never appeared at Minsk on the 10th or 11th or thereafter. The fault for the non-occurrence of the Minsk armistice conference was therefore mutual. Neither Warsaw nor Moscow was interested in peace pourparlers. The one felt that dismal defeat could be stayed; the other that glorious revolution waited in the offing.

The issue, accordingly, would be decided on the field of battle. Tukhachevsky's army continued its unopposed march on Warsaw while, to its rear, attempts were being made to lay the foundations of a Soviet regime in Poland.

§ THE FAILURE TO MAKE WHITE POLAND RED

These attempts were directed by a 'Polish Provisional Revolutionary Government' consisting of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the head of the Soviet Cheka, Julian Markhlevsky, Felix Kon, and Unschlicht, now Assistant Commissar of War, who, however, did not participate because of an accident which detained him in hospital. The writer was able to discuss the activities of this 'Provisional Government' of Poland with Kon, its only surviving member.

Dzerzhinsky, Markhlevsky, and Kon moved forward with the Red Army, organizing Soviets as they went. Their greatest success was at Bialostok, a large industrial centre. Here the workers were with them; a government authority was organized, a daily newspaper published, innumerable proclamations issued,¹ and plans

¹ These proclamations and other interesting material on the work of the 'Revolutionary Government' are contained in a pamphlet written by the late editor of the Moscow *Izvestia*, I. Stepanov-Skvorzov, who was then a war correspondent, entitled *With the Red Army in Bourgeois Poland*, Moscow, 1920,



TWENTY KILOMETRES FROM WARSAW

From left to right: Dzerzhinsky, Markhlevsky, Felix Kon

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made for further expansion. But between Bialostok and Warsaw no big proletarian city lay across the Army's path. Poland's industry is concentrated in the capital, in Lodz, Lemberg, Cracow, but not in the district traversed by Tukhachevsky's forces. Thus Kon explains the failure of the Polish working class to seize the opportunity offered it by the presence of the Red Army. On the other hand, the confiscation of grain by the Bolshevik divisions who had been separated from their base in the rapid advance, antagonized the peasant population. The Bolsheviks lost the support of the village without gaining the support of the towns.

To be sure, one reason for the Red invasion, recognized in the House of Commons and elsewhere, was Russia's desire to destroy the Pilsudski's legions and prevent a resumption of aggressive activities. 'Woods incompletely cut down quickly rise again,' wrote General Serge Kamenev, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army – the more so since French and British fertilizers were being supplied. The revolutionary motive, however, predominated. Moscow believed that the Polish masses would rise and overthrow their Government.

For Communists the prospect was indeed maddening. An invincible Red Army marching to the heart of Poland. Russia united behind it, with even the *petit bourgeoisie* supporting the Soviets. The German proletariat still tingling from its victory over the reactionary Kapp-Ludendorff *putschists* by means of a lightning general strike. The British trade unions threatening to call a general strike; staid English Labour leaders using revolutionary phrases. Europe not stabilized. Its World War wounds were open, and balm more distant than ever after the failure of the Peace Conference to establish real peace.

Under the circumstances, Bolsheviks would not be Bolsheviks if they did not wish and try to exploit the situation for revolutionary expansion.

¶ POLAND GIRDS HER LOINS

The Red Army's threat to Warsaw united the Polish *bourgeoisie*. Whole parties had been opposed to Pilsudski's invasion of the Ukraine. If the Russian forces had stopped at the Polish frontier, these internal difficulties, aggravated by a defeated,

demoralized army and a discredited leadership, could conceivably have brought the regime to ruin. But the moment national territory felt the tramp of foreign troops, parties buried their swords, petty differences were forgotten, and a strong government emerged. On July 24, Grabski fell. V. Witos, a popular peasant leader, took his place.

Similarly, thousands rushed to the defence of Warsaw, especially the Polish student youth. If, from a narrow military view-point, these raw recruits constituted very inferior reinforcements, their spirit strengthened the morale of the Polish army.

These factors, taken cumulatively, determined the issue of the struggle between the two contending armies. No military move by Pilsudski and no assistance from French Staff generals can alone account for the precipitate retreat of the Red forces from the immediate vicinity of Warsaw. Pilsudski himself, who is not inclined to minimize his contribution, devotes many pages of *1920* to the details of his counter-manceuvre in the latter fortnight of August, mentioning Weygand only very incidentally, but fails to create the impression that his activities alone forced the Russians to retire. The Red Army's advance towards Warsaw proved a military debacle because it was a political mistake.¹

LENIN ADMITS HIS ERROR

Lenin, who of course always determined the general line of Soviet foreign policy, admitted the error in a conversation, during the winter of 1920, with Clara Zetkin, the German Communist leader, who noted his words faithfully.² Lenin said:

‘Yes, what happened in Poland had to happen . . . our un-

¹ Not a few Bolshevik military experts favoured at least a temporary halt of the Red Army at Poland's ethnographic frontier which was reached about the end of July. Vladimir Melikov, of the Soviet War Academy, presents the arguments of these experts in a forceful volume entitled *Marne, Vistula, Smyrna* (Moscow, 1928), in which, comparing the battle near Warsaw with the battle of the Marne in 1914, he claims that both von Kluck outside the French capital and Tukhachevsky outside the Polish capital should have stopped betimes to straighten their lines and reorganize their rears.

² *Lenin*, by Clara Zetkin. Moscow, 1925.

believably brave, victorious advance guard could receive no reinforcements from the infantry, could receive no munitions, not even stale bread and other prime necessities from the Polish peasantry and *petit bourgeoisie*. These . . . saw in the Red Army soldiers not brother-liberators but foes. . . . The Polish revolution on which we reckoned failed. The peasants and workers, stultified by the partisans of Pilsudski and Dashinsky, defended their class enemies, permitted our brave Red Army soldiers to die of starvation, and ambushed and killed them.'

' . . . all the talents of Budenny and of other revolutionary army leaders could not counterbalance our military and technical shortcomings and, even less, *our false political reckoning: our hope in the Polish revolution*. [Italics mine. — L. F.]

'Incidentally,' Lenin went on, 'Radek foretold how everything would happen. He warned us. I was terribly angry with him, and called him a defeatist — but in the main he has proved to be right. He knows the situation in the West better than we do and he is talented. He is very helpful to us. . . .

'Do you know that the conclusion of peace with Poland in the beginning met with serious opposition in much the same way as the conclusion of the Brest Litovsk Peace? I had to fight a hard battle because I favoured the adoption of peace terms which were undoubtedly favourable to Poland and very difficult for us. Almost all our experts asserted that in view of conditions in Poland, especially in view of her bad financial situation, we could have obtained much more advantageous peace terms if we had continued military activities at least for a short while. In that event it would even have been possible for us to achieve a complete victory. If the war had been prolonged, nationalistic contradictions in East Galicia, and other parts of the country could have appreciably weakened the military power of official, imperialist Poland. Despite French subsidies and credits, the rapidly increasing burden of military expenditures and the miserable financial position would, in the end, have provoked a movement of peasants and workers. Numerous other circumstances were pointed out which would steadily have improved our prospects had the war lasted.

'I myself think,' Lenin continued, 'that our situation made it by

no means necessary to conclude peace at any price. We could have carried on through the winter. But I believed that from a political point of view it was wiser to make concessions to the enemy. The temporary sacrifices of a bad peace seemed to me cheaper than the prolongation of war. In the end, our relations with Poland only gained from this. To be sure, pacifist slogans are only empty excuses. Nothing more than excuses. We are using the peace with Poland in order to descend upon Wrangel with all our strength and give him such a crashing blow that he leaves us alone for ever. However, in this case Soviet Russia can only benefit if it shows by its behaviour that it wages war only to defend itself and to protect the revolution, that it is the only great peace-loving government on earth. . . . But the most important consideration was this – could we, without imperative necessity, burden the Russian people with the horrors and privations of another winter campaign. . . . No, the idea of the horrors of a winter campaign was for me unbearable. We had to conclude peace.’

§ THE ‘MIRACLE OF WARSAW’

This is the whole story. Without the political miscalculations of the Bolshevik leaders, ‘The Miracle of Warsaw’ would never have been possible. For the situation in the capital was so threatening that the foreigners decided to find a safer home, and on August 13, the d’Abernon Mission, the Jusserand Mission, and the entire diplomatic corps, with the exception of the Papal Nuncio Ratti who later became Pope Pius XI, left for Posen. In Warsaw all was chaos. Pilsudski had determined to make a last stand. Much artillery from Allied sources was available; there were thousands of new enthusiastic recruits; French generals supplied plans and advice; British munitions came in broadening streams.

The main Soviet army, far from its base and fatigued by forced marching, stood north of Warsaw. But instead of converging on the capital, Tukhachevsky moved in the direction of Thorn and Danzig in order to cut off the Polish munition supplies. On the 15th the Red Army operated in the vicinity of Plotzk, Novo-Georgievsk, and Vlotslavsk, only about 50 miles from the edge of Warsaw.

THE 'MIRACLE OF WARSAW'

Tukhachevsky, following the strategy of General Paskevitch-Irivansky who took Warsaw for the Czar in 1831, had made the Polish Corridor his main objective and there concentrated his maximum strength. Simultaneously, the Soviet encircling movement against Warsaw continued to develop. The Vistula was reached on August 16. The programme, at this point, called for an uprising of the Warsaw proletariat. Dzerzhinsky, Markhlevsky, and Kon were at Vischkova, quartered in the house of a priest from which they could see the roofs of the capital. In an hour this Provisional Revolutionary Cabinet might have entered the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw and set up a Soviet regime. Might have — but did not. The scheme failed.

As if political failure were not enough, the Bolshevik command was guilty of serious military blunders. In the first place, Tukhachevsky had directed his main force into a vacuum. He marched into an area where the enemy's troops were not. Pilsudski thus won relief from attack and obtained the possibility of freely manœuvring.

Budenny committed an equally disastrous mistake. Warsaw constituted the chief goal. With it Poland would have fallen into Bolshevik hands. The cavalry general, however, had permitted himself to be side-tracked in order to seize Lemberg, the centre of East Galicia. Then, on the 12th of August, he received orders to move on Warsaw. But that was too late. He should have been so instructed two weeks previously. His troops were fatigued, their horses weak, provisions limited. He was unable to obey the order. And he had with him half of the Red Army in Poland. If he had proceeded to Warsaw, Pilsudski's counter-attack would have been impossible. But when the Poles actually commenced operations, they found neither Tukhachevsky nor Budenny. Pilsudski rushed around in an auto all day trying vainly to discover the enemy. He accordingly moved northward, and, advancing from the Ivangorod-Lublin line, took Sedletz on the 17th and Lomzha on the 22nd, thereby outflanking the Soviet Army.

Part of the Red force now stood in danger of capture, and accepted the only other alternative: internment in German East Prussia. Many units, however, fought their way through the Polish lines, suffering heavy losses of men and material in the process.

The change came with lightning suddenness. The Red forces had bitten off more than they could swallow when they marched on Warsaw. It was a gamble, admits General Serge Kamenev, Soviet Commander-in-Chief; a gamble tried in the hope that revolution warranted the risk. And when Labour failed it, the Russian Staff knew defeat stared it in the face even before Pilsudski undertook his counter-attack.

§ THE WAR ENDS

Armistice negotiations now assumed a different hue. The Soviet Government abandoned the demands of Minsk, and took up a more conciliatory attitude. Peace pourparlers opened in Riga on September 21. The Bolsheviks were anxious for a quick settlement. They wished to free their forces for the struggle with Wrangel. To gain an immediate peace, therefore, the Communist spokesmen at Riga offered Poland a better frontier than the Curzon Line – provided the proposal was accepted within ten days. The Russians even agreed to make a serious and perhaps over-hasty sacrifice of far-reaching international importance: they permitted the Poles to run a corridor between the Soviet republic and Lithuania so that to-day these two countries are not coterminous.

These concessions formed the basis of a preliminary understanding on October 5 which was embodied seven days later in a preliminary treaty. During this intervening week, incidentally, the Poles, in defiance of the League of Nations, seized the city of Vilna from the Lithuanians – a move which the defeat of the Bolsheviks facilitated.

Peaceful relations had now been re-established between Russia and Poland, and on March 18, 1921, the final Treaty of Riga was signed by Dombiski for Poland and Joffe for Soviet Russia. It confirmed the territorial settlement of the previous October whereby the Poles obtained a frontier hundreds of miles to the east of the Curzon Line with approximately 3,600,000 inhabitants in the intervening area of whom no more than a million were Poles. (This frontier was more religious than ethnographic and coincides, roughly, with the division of the population into Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics.) It pledged mutual abstention

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from aggression and intervention; it mutually guaranteed cultural and religious rights to national minorities; Moscow promised to return art and cultural treasures stolen from Poland by the Czar at the time of the division of 1772; Poland received 30,000,000 roubles as her share in the Romanov's gold reserve, and locomotives, etc., to the value of 29,000,000 roubles as her share in the railway wealth of the monarchy. But though Moscow thus gave to Poland, as it had to the Baltic states, of the assets of the Empire, it agreed at Riga, as it had in the negotiations with the other secession countries, to liberate Poland from any responsibility for Russia's liabilities and foreign debts. . . . The treaty was ratified at Minsk on April 20.

The Bolsheviks' excessive liberality towards Poland displeased the Powers. Either they were influenced by the Russian Whites who protested against the cession of so much non-Polish territory to the Warsaw Government, or they felt that Poland had received more Ukrainians and White Russians than were healthy for her, or they feared a Poland too strong to be amenable to foreign pressure. At any event, the Allies did not recognize the Riga Treaty boundary till March 14, 1923, about two and a half years after it was demarcated. The United States followed their lead on March 26, 1923.

§ THE BARON IN THE BOTTLE

Baron General Peter von Wrangel was the last of the White Mohicans. The Bolsheviks entertained a special dislike for him because of the harm he had wrought by diverting their attention during the Polish War. When the Poles had agreed to peace, therefore, the Russians threw themselves upon the Baron with all their might and bitterness.

No White general or admiral, least of all Wrangel, could march armed forces against Red Russia without foreign aid. The Crimean army received assistance from Britain and France.

The British Government testified to its interest for Wrangel in Curzon's request for an amnesty and armistice for the General's forces. British ships carried Denikin officers from Georgian to Crimean ports. A British military mission under General Percy attended on Wrangel. On August 19, 1920, Wrangel, and his

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Chief of Staff, according to information presented to the House of Commons by Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy,¹ were 'officially received and entertained at dinner on board His Majesty's ship *Ramillies*.'

The following letter outlines England's Wrangel policy of neutrality in offence and aid in defence:

June 5, 1920.

'YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I beg to inform you that I have received a message from my Commander-in-Chief, Admiral de Robeck, in which he directs that His Majesty's ships are not to take part in any offensive operations which you may commence against the Red forces, but that they may assist your forces in the event of a Red attack on the Crimea. I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your Excellency's Obedient Servant,

(Signed) G. HOPE,

Rear-Admiral.

To His Excellency General Baron Wrangel,

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia.

French support assumed a more intense, less interrupted, and more enthusiastic character. France finally had found a White who, unlike Denikin, Kolchak, Chaikovsky, Miller, and Yudenich, was not a British puppet. She therefore took him to her bosom and nursed his 'On to Moscow' dreams. But more direct motives played the decisive rôle. Wrangel's task consisted in diverting Bolshevik attention from the Poles. Their attacks would synchronize.

Moreover, since nobody in Western Europe at that time foresaw the possibility of a united Russia under Soviet rule, France planned her little independent-coal-and-iron state in the Ukraine. This constituted Wrangel's immediate goal.

When the remnant of Denikin's army sought refuge in the Crimea under Wrangel it was a poorly equipped body of stragglers. A few months later, it had been supplied with the wherewithal for a year's struggle against the Bolsheviks. That the supplies came from England and France is undeniable – much of

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 1920, Vol. 133. August 9–October 29.

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the equipment later fell into the hands of the Red Army and is partly in use still, with the mark of the manufacturer easily discernible.

Wrangel commenced serious military operations in May, 1920, when the Bolsheviks were occupied with the invasion of the Poles. The Baron commanded thousands of experienced Kuban and Don horsemen. In fact, his army consisted almost entirely of highly trained and hardened Denikin officers for whom the Crimea was the last desperate stand. They were at bay with their backs to the deep sea.

The Soviets considered the Crimean southern front of secondary importance as compared to Poland. Wrangel, accordingly, was able to come out of the bottle and advance into the Ukraine in the direction of the Don coal region. He also attempted landings in the Kuban.

By August, he became a menace and the Muscovites began to take him seriously. That month a new cavalry division consisting largely of Communists was organized, and many troops were moved from the Polish theatre. Aeroplanes played their rôle as well as armoured trains – all of them of Entente manufacture and captured in the Denikin or Kolehak debacle.

During August and September, Wrangel continued to attack, but owing to dissensions in his own ranks and disaffection in his rear, success did not crown these efforts. Wrangel had an army 75,000 strong. Its equipment was excellent. He was able to demand the attention of no less than 150,000 Red soldiers, many of whom had to be transferred from the Polish front at the height of the campaign against Pilsudski. This was his outstanding service to the anti-Bolshevik cause.

The preliminary peace with the Poles in October permitted Red concentration against the White Crimean forces and on October 15 the Reds definitely took the offensive. The Bolsheviks planned by a daring coup to capture the neck of the bottle and block Wrangel's retreat into the Crimea. A bloody, seven-day battle ensued in which the Baron lost 20,000 prisoners and much cannon. But Wrangel's strategy was superior to the Bolsheviks' and in the end he maintained his line of communication and withdrew into the flask with the Bolsheviks following hot on his heels.

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One of the most sensational struggles of the Civil War now developed for the command of the neck of the bottle. Both sides fought heroically. Trench warfare was resorted to, and years later the writer could see the dug-outs and the heavy cannon on the surrounding fields. Victory could not go to those whose cause was hopeless. By the 10th of November, the entire Crimean peninsula had fallen into Soviet hands, and Wrangel hastily took to his ships, Russian and Allied ships, which carried his homeless, defeated warriors to Constantinople and various centres of the Balkans where for years they continued to exist as loose units ready to serve counter-revolutionary interests in any part of the world, be it Morocco, China, or the Soviet Union. The Russian vessels, more than a hundred in number, Wrangel turned over to France.

¶ THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR

The end of 1920 thus marked the end of the Russian internecine war. On February 7, 1920, Kolchak was executed in Irkutsk. His army thereupon ceased to play any important rôle. In March, 1920, the remnants of the Chaikovsky-Miller regime at Murmansk and Archangel liquidated or evacuated to England. During the same month, Denikin's army definitely suffered annihilation in the Caucasus, and on April 27 the Bolsheviks took the oil city of Baku.

Then started the war with Poland which closed with the Treaty of Riga in October, 1920. Almost immediately, Wrangel disappeared from the map of Soviet Russia. And then Makhno. By the beginning of 1921, therefore, only the Japanese remained in the Far East. We shall look in the future for hostilities in Siberia as well as Turkestan. But these in no way even remotely threatened the existence of the Soviet regime.

An era of peace now dawned for the Bolsheviks.

THE ARMISTICE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

The victories and defeats of the Red Army governed the progress of trade negotiations in London for many months. At the moment of Bolshevik success, in July, 1920, Lloyd George and Kamenev stood nearest agreement. When Tukhachevsky threatened Warsaw, and London saw the possible necessity of more energetic intervention on behalf of the Poles, negotiations ceased. When the Russians retreated hastily to their own frontier or crossed the Prussian frontier, the British expelled Leo Kamenev on the ground of propaganda. This was on September 10. Presumably political pourparlers with a view to *de jure* recognition were thus suspended while the remainder of the delegation remained for trade conversations.

But it was characteristic of Lloyd George that after making this concession to the Right, he proceeded to inject a strong political flavour into the economic discussions with Krassin.

British public opinion, in October, 1920, urged the resumption of the Anglo-Russian conferences. Some people opposed. In Parliament it was submitted that British war prisoners in the Soviet Republic had not yet been repatriated. The charge of Bolshevik propaganda in the East was heard. But on October 26 Bonar Law announced for the Cabinet that 'Trade relations have been renewed by other Governments, and this Government must do its best to get its share of the trade.'

'Other countries are pinching all the trade,' exclaimed Mr. W. Thorne from his seat in the Commons when he heard Bonar Law's statement. That remark well reflected the attitude of many. Nevertheless, the Government continued to refuse export licences to British merchants and manufacturers. Though officially removed, the blockade remained in force.

The gold blockade was an even more disturbing fact. Famine had spread over Russia. She had no grain to export. Her industries, exhausted by war requirements and other circumstances, produced practically nothing for foreign consumption. The Bol-

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sheviks could therefore pay only with gold for their purchases abroad.

§ BOLSHEVIK GOLD

The Czar's yellow metal reserve amounted to almost a billion dollars. Half of this huge treasure melted away during the World War and the Kerensky regime; about \$500,000,000 remained when the Bolsheviks assumed power. In February, 1918, it will be remembered, the Germans, following on the temporary failure of the Brest Litovsk Conference, opened an offensive into Russia. The Bolsheviks thought von Hoffmann would not stop before he reached Moscow and hastily removed approximately 50 per cent of their gold reserve to Kazan. There it was captured by the Czecho-Slovaks, who subsequently transferred it to Kolchak.

The remaining \$200,000,000 in bullion and coin lay safely within the vaults of the State Bank in Moscow and Petrograd. Sixty million dollars were foolishly paid to Germany in accordance with the Brest Litovsk supplementary treaties. On the other hand, \$230,000,000 of the gold fund seized by the Czechs in Kazan fell into the Bolsheviks' hands when they overthrew Kolchak. Production added tiny quantities as did the confiscation of church ornaments for the relief of famine sufferers. So that, when the outside world began to think of business relations with Soviet Russia in 1920 and 1921, the State held in its possession roughly \$500,000,000 of the precious metal.

Europe suffered from lack of gold. The United States began to pile up a huge reserve at the expense of the Old World. The Bolsheviks thought, accordingly, that the countries of Europe would raise a cry of joy the moment Moscow announced its readiness to ship gold. But a gold blockade began instead – largely on the initiative of France.

France, England, and the United States refused to accept Soviet gold, and the tactics of the powerful banks of these countries were adopted by the financial institutions of smaller nations. France threatened to seize Russian bullion on the high seas.

The Bolsheviks had to deal with petty merchants in Reval who naturally underpaid. Finally, on May 15, 1920, Krassin signed an agreement with the Swedish Nydqvist and Holm Trust accord-

A 'DAWES PLAN' FOR RUSSIA

ing to which, on deposit of 25,000,000 gold kronen, the Soviet Government would buy 100,000,000 kronen worth of locomotives and machines. This broke the blockade but by no means ended it, for the Powers, and especially France, continued to exert pressure against the shipping of Russian gold to Western countries.

Soviet orders now commenced to find ready bidders in Scandinavia, Germany, etc. Other countries were 'pinching' the trade England might have obtained. Lloyd George felt the desire of British manufacturers to compete for the Russian market. But such are the usages of diplomacy that he first sounded the authorities in Paris. Paris, however, proposed common action, a united front, parallel lines, corresponding principles, and co-operation between Britain and France in dealing with Russia.

¶ A 'DAWES PLAN' FOR RUSSIA

France, moreover, had a scheme whose general philosophy, outline, and even terminology, resemble, strangely enough, those of the Dawes Plan of later years. It was elaborated in a note from A. Briand dated November 25, 1920.¹

The French Government stated that it 'has no objection to the resumption of commercial relations between individuals.' But since individuals in Soviet Russia were prevented by the state monopoly of foreign trade from engaging in business with foreign countries, the French Government was actually saying that it *did* have objection to commercial relations with the Russian republic.

Besides, Paris would make the resumption of commercial relations conditional upon the settlement of debts. There could be no dealings with a country which had repudiated its obligations. The Millerand Government failed to consider that Russia had offered, in her answer to the Prinkipo proposal and in her statement to Mr. Bullitt, to recognize her foreign debts. France seemed concerned less with the funding of Moscow's indebtedness than with the control of the economic fate of the country; hence her 'Dawes Plan.' Paris wanted 'international supervision over or intervention in the affairs of Russia' – 'a delicate problem.'

¹ *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement.* British White Paper. Russia, No. 2 (1921). Cmd. 1456. London, 1921.

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Knowing that the Soviet Government was agreeable to a debt settlement, the French submitted that 'without effective guarantees, without a special organization charged to direct the execution of the engagements incurred, all assurances might remain a dead letter.'

The special international organization would:

'Centralize the operations of conversion and transfer,'

'Organize and employ, on the widest possible scale, payment by means of compensation in kind.'

'Whenever it would be practicable,' continued the French note, 'reparation would be carried out by the restoration and restitution in their entirety of the impaired property, rights and interests, in their original shape.'

But if properties could not be restored, or if the actual owner refused such restoration, indemnification would be effected by 'the assignment of unworked assets or of concessions' or by 'the surrender of securities' equal in value to the sum lost by the foreign capitalist through expropriation.

France did not want money. 'Indemnification must therefore be sought particularly by methods which foster the exploitation of the resources of the country.' Here is the crux of the situation. The French Government aimed at the peaceful conquest of Russia's resources. The psychology which lay beneath this plan never forsook the French. In modified and unmodified form, it reappeared at the Genoa Conference and at subsequent direct discussions between Moscow and Paris.

The British, however, paid no attention to what seemed to them a fantastic scheme. They did not even answer this note until June 24, 1921, three months after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, when Hardinge of Penshurst speaking for Curzon of Kedleston stated that 'His Majesty's Government are unable to agree . . . that the resumption of trade with Russia and the recognition of Russian debts should not be dealt with independently.' As to the 'Dawes Plan,' the note declared that 'these principles are so general in nature that . . . considerable discussion will be required as to the details of the procedure whereby they may be given practical effect.'

Meanwhile the statesmen in London proceeded with their

ISLAM SUMMONED TO A HOLY WAR

negotiations with Krassin. The chief incentive was the desire to prevent other countries from 'pinching' all the trade; the chief obstacle was fear lest the Bolsheviks conduct propaganda along the outposts of the British Empire in Central Asia.

¶ THE BOLSHEVIKS SUMMON ISLAM TO A HOLY WAR

Bolshevik propaganda in the East took concrete form in a unique assembly convened in Baku during September, 1920. Zinoviev and Radek, President and Secretary of the Comintern, and Bela Kun came from Moscow to inspire this 'Congress of the Peoples of the East.' It was an odd gathering, a museum of Oriental costumes, a Babel of tongues, a confusion of ideas and aims. Hindus, Turks, Bokharans, Uzbecks, Ingushi, Persians, Chechentzi, Turkomans, Jews, Armenians, Bashkirs, Kalmucks, Ukrainians, Russians, Tadjiks, Georgians – 1,891 delegates belonging to thirty-seven nationalities were present. A battery of interpreters shouted from the platform.¹

Lenin once upon a time took pencil in hand and figured out that the United States, Britain, France, and Japan with a population of about one-quarter billion were ruling countries and colonies with a population of two and a half billion. This is the lesson Lenin's disciples brought to the Baku congress.

Soviet supporters pointed to the freedom and cultural autonomy granted to the Tartars, the Bashkirs, the Kirghizi and all other nationalities in Russia. Other peoples, they urged, must strive towards a similar goal.

The Comintern's policy had been outlined by Zinoviev on the evening of September 1. It was past midnight when his address drew to a dramatic close. 'The Communist International,' he announced, 'turns to-day to the peoples of the East and says to them: "Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British Imperialism."' 'Jehad, Jehad,' the delegates thundered. Every man in the hall jumped to his feet. Studded daggers were drawn, Damascan swords unsheathed, revolvers brought out of

¹ *Stenographic Record of the Congress at Baku of the Peoples of the East*. Moscow, 1920.

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their holsters and lifted on high while their owners yelled 'We swear,' 'We swear.'

Despite this oath of arms, the Holy War was conceived as a non-military offensive directed by the Council of Propaganda and Action created by the Congress to match the Council of Action of the British trade unions. 'The infantry of the East would reinforce the cavalry of the West.'

The eastern nations which concerned the Congress above all were Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. In these, England's rôle was most important. England was most despised. Therefore British Imperialism stood in the foreground of the assembly's attention, while France received only secondary consideration.

This meeting went down into history as the '*First Congress of the Peoples of the East*.' It established a permanent organization on the assumption that annual or periodical gatherings would follow. But the first congress remained the only congress. The establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the Governments of Eastern countries and the Government of Russia began to take precedence over the relations between the revolutionary movements in Eastern countries and the revolutionary movement of Russia. Comintern psychology receded though it fought for its place in the sun, and, more and more, revolutionary possibilities were sacrificed to the Soviets' desire for treaty contacts with non-revolutionary states. The Bolsheviks reconciled themselves to such a compromise of principle in order to level the way towards peace with their chief opponent, Great Britain, to whom Persia and Afghanistan constituted imperial outposts of paramount significance.

Simultaneously, Moscow sought relations with the Governments of neighbouring Asiatic countries. Afghanistan was first.

§ AFGHANISTAN

A Young Afghan movement had developed during the World War which was anti-British and progressive, and which had won the support of the Emir's third son Amanullah. Some of the Young Afghans showed sympathies for a German military mission which came to Kabul in 1916, and Emir Habibullah accordingly sentenced Amanullah to death. The prince evaded the execu-

tioner. In February, 1919, the Emir was killed by an unknown hand, although rumour implicated Nadir Khan, Amanullah's uncle. After the murder, Amanullah reappeared on the political scene, and his mother persuaded the troops to pronounce him king.

Amanullah had Pan-Islamist sympathies. But above all his inspiration came from the Indian revolutionary movement. He was a modernist. He wished to make his country sovereign in foreign affairs, and to introduce content into the nominal independence of his Government in internal affairs. Under the circumstances, Amanullah turned to Moscow. This he did in a flowery letter of greeting addressed to 'His High-Born Mr. President of the Great Russian Republic' on April 21, 1919. Lenin replied from Moscow on May 27, 1919, congratulating the 'independent Afghan people heroically defending itself against foreign oppressors,' and suggesting the exchange of diplomatic officers as opening 'wide possibilities for mutual aid against any attack by foreign bandits on the freedom of others.'

The Bolsheviks were too occupied with their own Civil War to grant assistance of a practical military nature. Moreover, no geographic contact then existed between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. When the Third Afghan War commenced in May, 1919, therefore, Amanullah faced the foe alone. Nevertheless, the Afghans won, though the month's struggle ended with British troops on Afghan soil. England required every soldier and every ounce of energy to cope with her difficulties in Ireland, Egypt, Iraq, and India. The war with Afghanistan, in which Amanullah received encouragement and succour from Hindu nationalists, created much ferment in India. The danger existed that all India would burst into flame. The army, too, had become restive. London consequently withdrew from the conflict and agreed, in the preliminary peace treaty of August 8, 1919, to return Afghanistan her complete independence and her freedom of action in foreign as well as in domestic affairs.

Conversations with a view to the establishment of definite diplomatic relations commenced immediately in Kabul and Moscow. Russia's attitude was elaborated in a letter of November 27, 1919, from Lenin to 'His Majesty the Emir of Afghan-

istan.¹ Lenin wished to encourage the Pan-Islamic tendencies of Amanullah Khan.

‘At present,’ he wrote, ‘flourishing Afghanistan is the only independent Moslem state in the world, and fate sends the Afghan people the great historic task of uniting about itself all enslaved Mohammedan peoples and leading them on the road to freedom and independence.’

Then as to Great Britain:

‘The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of Russia instructs its embassy in Afghanistan,’ said the Bolshevik Premier, ‘to engage in discussions with the Government of the Afghan people with a view to the conclusion of trade and other friendly agreements the purpose of which is not only the buttressing of good neighbourly relations in the best interests of both nations, but together with Afghanistan the joint struggle against the most rapacious imperialistic government on earth – Great Britain, the intrigues of which, as you correctly point out in your letter,² have hitherto disturbed the peaceful and unhindered development of the Afghan people and separated it from its closest neighbours.’

‘In a conference with your extraordinary ambassador, the worthy Mohammed Wali Khan,’ Lenin continued, ‘I learned that you are prepared to enter into negotiations in Kabul on the question of a treaty of friendship and also that the Afghan people wishes to receive military aid against England from the Russian people. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government is inclined to grant such assistance on the widest scale to the Afghan nation, and, what is more, to repair the injustice done by the former Government of the Russian Czars’ . . . by adjusting the Soviet-Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at the expense of Russia.

Quiet pourparlers continued, and on February 28, 1921, the

¹ Copies of this and the Lenin letter cited above were obtained by the writer from the Soviet State Archives. Neither has ever before been published in any language.

² This Lenin communication, the draft of which was prepared by Karakhan, is a reply to a message from Amanullah brought to Moscow by Mohammed Wali Khan.

PERSIA

Soviet-Afghan Treaty was signed in Moscow. It pledged each high contracting party to refrain from entering into a military or political agreement with a third Power to the detriment of the other signatory nation. . . . A pact between Great Britain and Afghanistan was negotiated on November 21, 1921.

¶ PERSIA

The Soviet Government adopted an equally friendly attitude towards Persia. At Brest-Litovsk the Russians promised to evacuate the forces that had been stationed in Persia by the Czarist Government. On January 14, 1918, Trotzky, as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, informed Teheran that the Bolsheviks no longer considered the one-sided treaty of 1907 binding and were prepared to annul all special privileges granted previous Russian Governments by Persia.

These measures encouraged Persian statesmen to ask similar concessions from Great Britain. The Shah's ministers accordingly dispatched a note to London in February, 1919, demanding the nullification of the 1907 agreement, a revision of the customs settlement of 1903, and Persian participation in the Versailles Peace Conference. This move was resented in London, and instead of surrendering her 'sphere of influence' in South Persia, Great Britain proceeded to occupy the former Russian 'sphere of influence' in North Persia, and the Dunsterforce established itself in Enzeli. Persian Cabinets now began to come and go with sensational rapidity. The whole country was held under control by British rifles — 'a Persia picketed on all sides with British forces,' says Lord Curzon's authorized biographer¹ — military, political and financial control by Great Britain. In accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Persian agreement of August, 1919, a British military mission arrived in the country in December, 1919, and three months later the financial mission of Armitage Smith and Balfour appeared on the scene to take charge of Persian fiscal affairs.

Beginning with the spring of 1919, England used Persia as a spring-board for attacks on Russia. Persia was the base for the

¹ *The Life of Lord Curzon*, by the Earl of Ronaldshay. London, 1928. Vol. III, page 212.

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British and Indian troops which operated against the Bolsheviks in Turkestan and Baku. Moreover, British control in Persia enabled the Denikin flotilla to operate freely in the Caspian under the supreme command of Admiral Norris.

It will be recalled that the Bolshevik defeat of Denikin enabled them to push down into the Caucasus. The Red Army entered Baku on April 27, 1920, whereupon the Denikin squadron fled to the Persian port of Enzeli with the Red Fleet, commanded by F. Raskolnikov, hot on its heels. Raskolnikov was a fiery spirit who, after his capture in a Baltic naval battle, had been complimented by England's insistence on exchanging him for no less than eighteen officers.

Raskolnikov arrived outside Enzeli, warned the Persian authorities that he was about to shell the town, and then proceeded to bombard Denikin's vessels and the British military positions on land. Having thus crowned his pursuit with victory, Raskolnikov entrenched himself in the Persian province of Ghilan in order to prevent the return of the British from Kasvin. The Shah felt a new man when he heard the firing in Ghilan, he told Theodore A. Rothstein, the Soviet ambassador in Teheran, on May 26, 1921, and the Medjelis, he added, was encouraged to refuse the ratification of the Anglo-Persian Treaty.¹

But instead of evacuating after a normal period of occupation, Communists rushed across the sea from Baku, and before long a so-called Soviet Republic of Ghilan was established with headquarters in Enzeli and Resht. The Persian Government in Teheran naturally protested against such infringement of its territorial integrity, and in reply Chicherin tried to explain that this was merely a local incident. The fact of the matter is that the Caucasian comrades had got out of hand; Moscow ordered them to withdraw from Persia, but they remained. Indeed, the 'Soviet Republic of Ghilan' continued to exist until October, 1921. In June of that year it even commenced, in concert with prominent Communists in Georgia, to march on Teheran, and both Moscow and Theodore A. Rothstein had to exert unusual pressure to force them to desist from their plan.

This adventure disturbed Soviet-Persian relations for a short

¹ Mr. Rothstein read to the writer from this chapter in his diary.

period but could not destroy the cordial atmosphere established by Moscow's policy towards Teheran, which, in Persian eyes, compared favourably with that of England.

Soviet Russia's policy towards Persia was clearly outlined on June 26, 1919, in a note from Karakhan to the Persian Government which was delivered to the Shah's minister by Kolomietzev, Soviet representative in Persia before official recognition had taken place. This document ¹ is significant because it defined in 1919 the principles and concessions accepted in the treaty of 1921. The Soviet Government, said the note, wished to make good the damage done by the former Czarist State, and hoped that Teheran would find means of collecting compensation for corresponding damage by the 'imperialist Government of England.'

Concretely Moscow announced that, (1) all Persian debts to the Czarist Government were annulled, (2) Russian interference in Persia's income from customs, post and telegraph was at an end, (3) all Russian official and private concessions in Persia were void, (4) the Russian Bank in Persia with all its inventory, branches, land, etc., was declared the property of the Persian people, (5) all the roads, electric stations, port equipment, railway lines, etc., built and owned by Russia were transferred to the Persian nation, and (6) capitulations ceased to exist.

These changes were not merely adumbrated as the basis of future negotiations or of a give-and-take. The Bolsheviks voluntarily made these gifts to Persia without seeking to use them for bargaining advantage.

Persia, however, was in no position to reply to this gesture. For in June, 1919, the country had been completely occupied by Britain, a Czarist consul still lived in the Russian Legation, and Kolomietzev barely escaped from Teheran with his life. (He was later killed by Whites on an island in the Caspian.) The Shah's Government was tied hand and foot. It exercised no freedom of action in foreign affairs, and under the circumstances, a resumption of relations with Russia was unthinkable.

Only when the Caucasus was cleared of the British, when Raskolnikov drove the English forces out of North Persia, and

¹ A copy of the note was supplied to the writer from the archives of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

when, for this reason as well as out of a variety of larger imperial considerations, the British military decided to retire to Kasvin – at about the time of the evacuation of Batum – only then, in July, 1920, did a new Cabinet come to power in Teheran which could dare enter into pourparlers with Soviet Russia. A Persian envoy appeared in Moscow on October 25, 1920.

The negotiations proceeded so smoothly and quickly that on November 28 the Soviet Government appointed Theodore A. Rothstein its plenipotentiary representative in Teheran.

England's prestige rapidly waned with the withdrawal of British troops. The situation thus created encouraged nationalist forces in Persia, and on February 21, Riza Khan, then War Minister, but later self-appointed Shah, engineered a *coup d'état* and set up a Government sympathetic to England. This Cabinet immediately announced the abrogation of the one-sided Anglo-Persian 'Agreement' of August, 1919, and twenty-four hours later (February 26, 1921) its representative in Moscow signed the Soviet-Persian Treaty.

The treaty ¹ opened with a fiery declaration in which Moscow condemned and rejected the aggressive policy of the Czarist regime, and promised to refrain from any interference with the internal affairs of Persia. Nevertheless, it was agreed that if any third Power (read Great Britain) were to violate Persian territory with a view to using it as a base for an attack upon Soviet Russia, Russian troops might temporarily assume positions on Persian soil. This provision appeared necessary to the Bolsheviks because of the admitted inability of the Persian State to maintain its neutrality in the face of British hostility.

Furthermore, Russia renounced all claims arising out of loans made to Persia under the Czarist regime, and, 'in accordance with its declared opposition to the colonial policy of capitalism,' transferred all the effects of the Russian Bank in Persia to the Persian people.

Russian Government property and concessions reverted to the Persian Government on condition, however (Article XIII), that these concessions would not be granted to a third Power or its

¹ Official Russian text, see *International Politics*, Part III. A collection of treaties, notes and declarations by Kluchnikov and Sabanin. Moscow, 1928.

PROPAGANDA

citizens without the consent of the Soviet Government. Free use of the Caspian Sea, the recall of the semi-political religious missions of pre-war Russia, and the nullification of capitulation privileges were likewise written into the treaty.

¶ PROPAGANDA

These negotiations between Soviet Russia on the one hand and Persia and Afghanistan on the other were conducted simultaneously with the London conversations between the British and Krassin, which, for the most part, partook of a commercial character. But the moment a political issue arose, Lloyd George lifted the situation out of the hands of Sir Robert Horne and himself wrestled with the bear.

The whole complex of political questions was condensed into one word: 'Propaganda.' . . . In the autumn of 1920, a group of Whites active in London, conceived the idea of printing imitation copies of the Moscow Bolshevik daily *Pravda* and shipping them into Soviet Russia for anti-Communist agitational purposes. British Government institutions lent their aid to this project, and in the course of events the matter came up for discussion in the House of Commons. Replying to a question directed to the Home Secretary, Mr. Shortt admitted on March 3, 1921, that the Director of Intelligence 'assisted them [the Whites – L. F.] to the extent of arranging for the removal of the English printer's name from the news-sheets and for their being forwarded to an address in one of the countries bordering on Russia.' To match this aid on the part of England to the enemies of the Soviet State, there stands the charge that Kamenev brought diamonds into the United Kingdom which he passed on to the London Labour newspaper, *The Daily Herald*. The propaganda shoe, in other words, fitted on the other foot as well.

Lloyd George was little concerned about propaganda in the United Kingdom. No more were the Bolsheviks terrified by possible effect of some counterfeit newspapers smuggled across the frontier by emigrés monarchists. Downing Street felt more apprehensive about the influence of Bolshevik activities in the Near and Middle East. Here the British were vulnerable by reason of their tactics. Here the Russians were successful because they acted on

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the principle of self-determination, returned concessions, abandoned capitulations, fed nationalist aspirations, and offered comfort to states engaged in a struggle with Western Powers.

Most countries have spies and secret agents in most other countries. This is considered the natural business of civilized government. Employees of Scotland Yard have spent years in underground subversive activity in Soviet Russia, have published their memoirs and received titles for their exploits. Sir Paul Dukes and Colonel Etherton come to mind.¹ We assume therefore that Bolshevik agents, too, operated in Persia and Afghanistan. But their pinpricks must be as ineffectual as the deeds of the Dukes and the Reillys in Russia. Sleuths never impress national policy in normal times. Lenin's letters to King Amanullah, Chicherin's declarations of Soviet policies for the East, or Karakhan's note delivered by Kolomietzev to Teheran were worth more than an army of propagandists and trainloads of propaganda leaflets.

This truth Moscow assuredly realized when it agreed through Krassin to discontinue all propaganda against the British Empire. Yet such agreement would never have been forthcoming had the Soviet Government intended to proceed with its revolutionary crusade in the Near and Middle East on the scale or with the energy of previous years. The Bolsheviks' acquiescence to the non-propaganda clause of the draft Anglo-Russian Trade Treaty amounted to a pledge that they would let events take their normal course in the East rather than force the rate of developments by military and militant means. Moscow's consent to refrain from propaganda was a regretted admission that the conflict with imperialism must now assume a less stormy career.

§ THE LAST PHASE

The road to the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was now cleared of the chief political obstacle, yet certain difficulties remained. While pro-Soviet Members of Parliament and newspapers stressed the importance of Russian trade as a partial cure for British unemployment, opponents submitted that

¹ *Red Dusk and the Morrow: Adventures and Investigations in Soviet Russia*, by Sir Paul Dukes (London, 1922); or *In the Heart of Asia*, by Lieut.-Colonel P. T. Etherton (London, 1925).

THE LAST PHASE

Russia had no money, that her economy was destroyed, and that trade would not develop rapidly enough to solve Britain's domestic problems. Moreover, the question of 'stolen oil' then arose for the first time. 'Will it be competent for Soviet Russia,' asked Major Barnett on November 22, 1920,¹ 'to barter in exchange for British manufactured goods petroleum stolen from British oil companies at Baku?'

Great importance attached to this matter, for business circles feared that goods imported from Russia on which British citizens pretended to have claims might be seized in England. In fact, Mr. Justice Roche actually ruled that products of British plants nationalized by the Bolsheviki, could within the law be attached by their former 'owners.' This would have made commerce between the two countries almost impossible. The Government, therefore, announced that the decision of the worthy judge would lose validity the moment England recognized Russia *de facto* as it would automatically by signing the commercial agreement. This established the principle that even *de facto* recognition of the Soviet State involved recognition too of its legislation and constitution.

Exaggerated claims were made. Sir Donald Maclean stated in the House of Commons ² that 'it is much more beneficial to us to trade with Russia than with the United States.' Several authorities were disturbed by reports of a tremendous lumber and mining concession granted by Moscow to the American, Washington Vanderlip, in North-Eastern Siberia and Kamchatka. Rumour had it that the Bolsheviki offered contracts for the exploitation of the oilfields of Grosni and Baku. It was stated as a fact that the Soviets had contracted with a Swedish firm for the delivery of 10,000 harvesting machines and 1,000 separators.

All these factors tipped the balance in favour of the conclusion of the agreement. England was in the throes of an economic depression. When Krassin, accordingly, placed orders for textiles in Manchester, or arranged with the Armstrong Company for the complete overhauling of 1,500 locomotives in a period of five years, he was making propaganda for a quick settlement between Moscow and London. Krassin himself believed that the circum-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 1920, Vol. 135.

² *Ibid.*, 1921, Vol. 138.

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stance which probably ended all the delays was the contract given German factories in March, 1921, for the delivery to Russia of 600 locomotives. 'Quite likely this very circumstance – the fear of losing big orders, impelled the British Government to instruct Sir Robert Horne to sign the Russian-English Treaty of March 16, 1921.'¹

§ THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN TRADE AGREEMENT

The preamble of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty² made it plain that the two signatory Powers considered it a 'preliminary agreement' 'pending the conclusion of a formal general Peace Treaty between the Governments of these countries. . . .' But even the preliminary treaty was subject to the mutual renunciation of hostile action and official propaganda. More particularly, the Russian Soviet Government promised to refrain 'from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan.' The British Government gave a similar undertaking 'in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent. . . .'

Then followed a mutual renunciation, for all practical purposes a British renunciation, of the policy of blockade or of otherwise obstructing the resumption of trade. England also promised to help Russia clear her waters of mines sowed by the British Navy during the Civil War.

The treaty provided for the exchange of semi-diplomatic and commercial representatives, and in Article IX – the most important in the agreement – created the basis of British-Russian trade by pledging the British Government 'not to initiate any steps with a view to attach or to take possession of any gold, funds, securities or commodities not being articles identifiable as the property of the British Government which may be exported from Russia. . . .' Further, the Lloyd George Cabinet promised not to discriminate

¹ *Questions of Foreign Trade*, by L. B. Krassin. Moscow, 1928.

² Official Russian text in *International Politics* . . ., Part III. Kluchnikov and Sabanin.

A MILESTONE IN SOVIET HISTORY

in any way against the importation, transformation or disposal of precious metals (gold or silver) brought into the United Kingdom from Soviet Russia.

To reinforce Article IX, the statesmen added Article XI by which it was agreed that merchandise imported into Russia or England 'shall not be subjected therein to compulsory requisition on the part of the Government or of any local authority.'

Trade could now begin under the protection and with the good will of both Governments. In Russia, the treaty was welcomed as offering a respite from foreign attack and an opportunity to proceed on the road to economic reconstruction. In England, many circles were relieved, many hopeful, but many sceptical and in a mood to watch zealously for signs of Bolshevik transgression.

The agreement between Communist Russia and Capitalist England brought about a radical change in Moscow's relations to other countries.

'The British trade treaty,' wrote Krassin, 'was a signal to the majority of European states, and towards the end of 1921 Soviet Russia had negotiated commercial agreements and treaties with Sweden, England, Germany, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Norway, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and Italy. Commercial representations in Constantinople, Angora, Teheran, and China opened the possibility of establishing some trade connections with the East.'

The blockade had been broken. Soviet Russia began to make her first feeble steps in the direction of a normal economic life.

§ A MILESTONE IN SOVIET HISTORY

The signing of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement divides the Bolshevik revolution, as far as foreign affairs are concerned, into two periods. It was a truce between two worlds. It said (in effect): 'We are natural enemies. We hate one another. But, though we tried, we failed to destroy one another. The struggle cannot continue. Let us call a halt.'

Such an armistice demanded a mutual grounding of arms. Therefore, the bourgeois state indicated its willingness to refrain from armed attacks on the Soviet Republic and expected in return

ARMISTICE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

that the Bolsheviks would stop their propaganda attacks on the British Empire.

For years Britain had been engaged in the serious business of overthrowing the Soviet Government by means of armies, guns, navies, etc. Now she guaranteed herself against attempts by Communists to overthrow the British Government with leaflets, soap-box orators, newspapers, etc.

Here was the old Lion *v.* Bear competition, with the lion a bit more worried because the bear had a new weapon. Governments can send armies to cope with armies. But they cannot so easily cancel unequal treaties or surrender capitulation privileges.

The most successful chapter of Bolshevik propaganda in Persia was the Soviet Government's cancellation of Russia's special interests in Persia, the return of Russian concessions, and the negotiation of a fair treaty. The worst bit of Bolshevik propaganda in Afghanistan was Moscow's early recognition of Afghan independence.

Such propaganda, of course, nobody could prohibit to the Soviet State. Yet it was easy and very effective. The other kind was considered less important.

By the terms of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, the Bolsheviks promised to refrain from propaganda directed against the British. But that promise gave the British much more than the mere cessation of pamphlet, proclamation and agent activity. It was the Soviet acceptance of the *status quo*. It was a pledge not to spread revolution by armed force.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The question whether the Soviet Government is organizationally connected with the Communist International is of little practical importance until and unless the Soviet Republic admits the fact. The admission, even if it were true, is, however, not likely to be forthcoming.

Of tremendous historic significance, on the other hand, is the influence of Comintern *psychology* on the Soviet Government. In 1917, at the time of the establishment of the Bolshevik regime and even before the Comintern had been founded, the Soviet Govern-

COMINTERN AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT

ment never conceived of the possibility of insular existence in a capitalist sea. The Russian Revolution would be the beginning of the world revolution. Bolsheviks were then ready to sacrifice the best interests of the Red regime in Russia for the sake of the creation of Red regimes elsewhere. This was the essence of Soviet policy at Brest Litovsk. Only the realization, thanks to the hammering logic of Lenin, that the situation abroad did not warrant sanguine revolutionary hopes, impelled the Communist Party to accept a peace that would safeguard the national revolution in Russia instead of furthering an upheaval throughout Europe.

This appreciation of the importance of the Russian Revolution rose with the increasing stability of the Bolsheviks' regime and the reduction of revolutionary possibilities outside. Some leading Communists, especially among those directly responsible for the execution of foreign policy, despaired of world revolution the moment the World War Armistice was signed. But 1919 brought renewed hope. The disturbed state of Europe, the setting up of Soviet authority in Bavaria and Hungary, and the difficulties facing the diplomats at Paris, seemed to improve the prospects of a mass uprising. And the Bolsheviks, who now saw themselves surrounded by White and Allied armies and who knew the awful economic condition of their country, felt that revolution in the West was the only salvation of the revolution in Russia. Therefore the special concern for the Baltic States and the desire to establish military contact with Bela Kun in Budapest. Yet already at that time another tendency existed at Moscow which, inspired with greater confidence in the resistance of the regime, insisted that the interests of the Russian Revolution were paramount. When the Soviets in Russia could be successfully defended against attack by a concentration of energy, the weakening of that defence for the sake of carrying the revolution to other lands was considered a luxury. The Bolsheviks were pained by the necessity of foregoing such a luxury; they were ready to spare something to help other Red Governments. But no harm must be inflicted on the biggest and best workers' and peasants' republic.

Then came the Polish War. Originally, for the Bolsheviks, it was a war of defence. But it developed, when the Red Army entered Polish territory, into an attempt to carry revolution to

ARMISTICE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

Poland and perhaps Germany. The Bolsheviks simply could not resist the temptation of planting the Red Flag in Warsaw which the advance of their army offered them.

The Soviet-Polish War was not a Russian disaster. But it was a set-back for the world-revolutionary tendency in Soviet politics. The year 1920, accordingly, marks the beginning of World Revolutionary diminuendo and of National Revolutionary crescendo. The first did not disappear altogether nor did the second capture control. But a dynamic situation developed in which the one gave way while the other gained ground. This is a generalization. Sometimes, Comintern psychology becomes uppermost. Yet the larger tendency is in the other direction.

The Bolsheviks relegated international revolution to second place. Of prime importance was the strengthening of the revolutionary government already established in Russia. This happened in 1921. And it is no accident that the Soviet-Persian Treaty was signed on February 26, 1921, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on February 28, 1921, and the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement on March 16, 1921, and the Soviet-Polish Treaty on March 18, 1921.

§ THE 'ARMISTICE'

The Western world's condescension to peaceful symbiosis with the Soviet regime arose (1) from that world's failure to destroy the Soviet regime by force, and (2) from the economic necessity of exploiting business opportunities latent in Russia.

The Soviet regime's condescension to peaceful co-existence with the Western world arose (1) from the failure of the international revolution to eventuate, and (2) from the miserable economic situation in Soviet Russia.

From 1918 to the Spring of 1921 Russia had suffered under Military Communism. Its drastic measures had enabled the Bolsheviks to carry the war against the Whites and the Poles to a successful close. Yet these very measures impoverished the country, and introduced economic chaos and political disaffection.

§ NEP

Accordingly, when the hostilities against Poland and Wrangel ceased, Lenin began to plan the elimination of Military Com-

munism. Discussion within Communist Party ranks on this question had proceeded for several months when matters came to a head as a result of an insurrection of the peasant-sailors in the fortress of Kronstadt which commands the sea entrance to Petrograd, and by revolts inspired by similar disaffection in Tambov and other provinces. Clearly, Bolshevik relations with the village needed quick doctoring, and Lenin decided to administer a radical cure. The medicine was called NEP.

The New Economic Policy or NEP, announced in March, 1921 (the month of the Anglo-Russian Treaty), represents a sharp departure from previous methods. Its basic innovation was the legalization of domestic trading by individuals. The peasants won the right to sell their grain and to buy manufactured goods with the proceeds.

The Leninist strategy proposed to lead the city or industry over the NEP bridge of Government ownership or State capitalism or State socialism towards real Communism, and, while easing the peasant situation through the re-introduction of private trade, to move the village slowly forward in the direction of socialization by means of co-operatives and the mechanization or industrialization of agriculture. At the same time, Lenin's policy of concessions to foreign capitalists, adumbrated as early as 1919, now received more serious attention in Moscow.

Just as the recession of Comintern psychology signifies a political retirement after the successful but costly Civil War, so the NEP represents a shifting of the economic front. Both these changes date approximately from the spring of 1921, and, when coupled with the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement and Soviet treaties with Afghanistan and Persia of February-March, 1921, constitute an important turning-point in the history of Soviet internal conditions and of Bolshevik foreign affairs.

All these reforms and events seemed to the Powers of Western Europe to indicate that the Communists were either ready to capitulate and come to terms with foreign capital, or that a bit of pressure, some kindness, and some promises could bring them to such a state of mind. Hence the Genoa Conference of April, 1922.

CHAPTER VIII

AMERICA, JAPAN, AND SOVIET RUSSIA

The attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the United States has always been exceptionally friendly. From the beginning, Moscow believed that America's anti-Soviet sentiments were less deep-seated than those of the other Powers, and that the Far Eastern situation might induce a more cordial relationship in Washington towards the Government of Russia.

Special treatment was therefore accorded American business interests. The properties of the International Harvester Company, the Westinghouse Brake Company, and the Singer Sewing Machine Company, were not confiscated in 1918 and 1919 when all other foreign firms suffered nationalization by Communist fiat – an exemption due largely to the influence of Colonel Robins, who frequently conferred with Lenin. The Russian leader maintained that the United States was best equipped to undertake the gigantic task of exploiting the riches of the Soviet Republic. Hence the policy of 'Don't Antagonize Americans.'

The attitude of Woodrow Wilson for a time encouraged the Bolsheviks in their misconceptions. In June, 1918, Litvinov's observations in London had convinced him that the Soviets could expect only hostile intervention from Britain and France. He therefore requested Lenin to empower him to go to the United States. Such authorization was duly sent, but, on application, Litvinov was refused a visa. (He imputes the refusal to Ambassador Francis.) Nevertheless, he optimistically appealed to Wilson just as the Paris Peace Conference opened, and later evinced a preference for the concentration of Russia's foreign obligations in what were conceived to be the friendly hands of America.

When Washington B. Vanderlip came to Moscow in 1920 he was looked upon by the Russians as the forerunner of a host of billionaire Americans who would apply their capital and capitalist experience to building up a Communist State. Vanderlip bargained for oil, coal, fishing, and forest concessions of an estimated value of \$3,000,000,000 in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia. The

République Fédérative Russe des Soviets.

Le Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple

Tout savoir pour les pouvoirs qu'il a nommés le citoyen russe *Alexandre Litvinoff*
représentant plénipotentiaire de la République Socialiste et Fédérative des Soviets de Russie
dans les États Unis d'Amérique.

A ces causes il faut lire et signer que ces pouvoirs sont de reconnaître le citoyen *Litvinoff*

et qu'il est le seul et unique représentant de la République Socialiste et Fédérative des Soviets de Russie dans les États Unis d'Amérique.

En foi de quoi

Le Commissaire du Peuple pour les Affaires Étrangères

D. Litvinoff
Commissaire du Peuple
pour les Affaires Étrangères

1919

location of the proposed concession areas was significant; the Russian leaders spoke with Vanderlip of their relations towards Japan and China, and intimated to him that Russia supported the Open Door policy in all parts of China – presumably against Japan.

The notion that common interests on the Pacific might constitute the bridge between Washington and Moscow long pursued the Bolsheviki. Interviewed by John Reed, the American correspondent, on September 24, 1920, Trotzky said:

‘Not only can we live with bourgeois governments but we can work together with them within very broad limits. It is perfectly clear that our relation to the antagonisms on the Pacific will be determined by the relation of Japan and the United States to us.’¹

The hint is a frank one. Karl Radek repeated it to the writer in 1922. He saw the possibility of Russo-American-Chinese co-operation in the Far East against Japanese aggression.

America’s objection to Japanese expansion no doubt accounts, in part, for Washington’s insistence on Russian territorial integrity. The State Department consistently refused to follow the lead of Great Britain in recognizing the Baltic and Caucasian republics. More especially, however, United States diplomacy rejected the idea of Japanese aggrandizement in the Russian Far East. Wilson even believed he could serve that purpose by dispatching American troops to Siberia. But Nipponese soldiery remained in Russian Asia long after the United States army departed.

The Bolsheviki disliked the protracted presence of Japanese troops on Russian soil. Their forces, however, were spent after the trying Civil War, and when Tokio intimated in pourparlers with Krasnochekov, the chief of the pro-Soviet factions in Eastern Siberia, that Japan would be ready to evacuate the Trans-Baikal region on condition that no Communist Government were established there, Moscow gladly and cynically instructed its supporters in Siberia to set up a ‘democratic’ republic. This organization, which subsequently became the Far Eastern Republic with

¹ *How the Revolution Armed*, by L. D. Trotzky. Collected Works. Moscow, 1924. Vol. II, Part II, page 283.

capital at Chita, thus constituted a buffer between Russia and Japan.

Japan remained in Vladivostok, the Maritime Provinces, and in the northern half of the island of Sakhalin. She justified her seizure of the last of these on the ground of the so-called Nikolaiev massacre in which, according to one version, a Japanese consul and 700 Japanese citizens were killed by Russian guerrillas.

'On the 28th of July, 1920, the Japanese Government received a note from the United States, indicating that the American Government approved the Japanese decision to evacuate Trans-Baikalia and reserved its opinion regarding Vladivostok because of lack of information concerning the situation there, but failed completely to understand the occupation of northern Sakhalin.'¹

This *démarche* by the Democratic Secretary of State Colby was met by an assurance from Ambassador Shidehara that the occupation would be only temporary. Yet it was not lifted for many months, and on May 31, 1921, the Republican Secretary of State Hughes again protested,² and was again assured of the eventual Japanese withdrawal.

United States intercession in this Russo-Japanese conflict was officially explained by America's concern for Russian territorial integrity. Objective observers may have been inclined to believe that Washington's motives were more anti-Japanese than pro-Bolshevik. In any event, the Soviets rejoiced, and were confirmed in their optimism on the future of American-Soviet relations.

§ HARRY F. SINCLAIR

These considerations probably played a decisive rôle in the Sinclair oil concession. The preliminary concession, granted by the Far Eastern (Chita) Republic on May 14, 1921, and ratified on January 7, 1922, gave the Sinclair Exploration Company the right to exploit the petroleum resources of the northern, (Russian) half of Sakhalin and to construct two ports on its eastern coast.

Here was Russia telling a big American concern with considerable political influence to go in and get the island's oil. Here were

¹ *American Policy Toward Russia since 1917*, by F. L. Schuman. New York, 1928. Page 209.

² *Ibid.*

THE WASHINGTON ARMS CONFERENCE

the Bolsheviks offering an American company the possibility of building two harbours right under the nose of Japan – harbours where, if the necessity arose, ships flying the ‘Stars and Stripes’ might coal and ‘oil.’ Obviously Chita, which of course acted in concert with Moscow, meant this as a bid for an understanding with Washington.

President Harding then sat in the White House. Fall, Denby, and Daugherty were in the President’s Cabinet. Harry F. Sinclair knew them intimately. He promised the Bolsheviks United States recognition – whether by previous agreement with his high-placed friends no one can say. But the fact is that the Bolsheviks made the permanence of the Sakhalin concession, as of the Vanderlip concession, conditional upon the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between themselves and Mr. Sinclair’s Government.

Moscow expected Washington to understand. Moscow supposed Washington would be glad to align Russia on its side in the Far Eastern struggle for a balance of power. Russia, the Bolsheviks reasoned, plays a decisive rôle on the Pacific; so does the United States; but the weakness of America’s position in Asia is her distance from it – and the Philippines, exposed as they are, add to this weakness. A proffer of Russian friendship, Moscow felt, accompanied by the opportunity of opening Siberia’s vast wealth to American capital (and thus keep it closed to Japanese capital) would, therefore, be welcomed in the State Department.

§ THE WASHINGTON ARMS CONFERENCE

America’s protests against Japanese occupation may have encouraged the Soviets in their belief that a *rapprochement* was in the making. But the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (November 12, 1921–February 6, 1922), which was largely a conference on Far-Eastern problems, brought cruel disillusionment. The Soviet Republic received no invitation. Moscow protested its right to participate – but without avail.

A ‘trade’ delegation from the Far Eastern (Chita) Republic, however, received admission to Washington if not to the conference. The Japanese-controlled Merkulov Government in Vladivostok, Russian monarchist groups, and Miliukov Cadets likewise sent representatives.

When, in connection with the Siberian question, the matter of Japanese occupation arose for consideration, Secretary of State Hughes told the conference that the United States Government saw no necessity for continued occupation. Intervention had been undertaken by both states, he declared, for reasons announced at the time, – August, 1918 – but changed conditions had compelled America to withdraw and should have prompted Japan to do likewise.

Baron Shidehara reacted to United States pressure by affirming that ‘it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country. . . .’¹ Also, the ‘military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.’

¶ CHARLES E. HUGHES FIGHTS FOR RUSSIA

Mr. Hughes was not pleased. Japan had promised during more than a year that the occupation was only ‘temporary.’ The formula of a settlement with ‘an orderly Russian Government,’ moreover, permitted of wide interpretation. The Secretary of State submitted that the

‘public assurances given by the two Governments at the inception of the joint expedition [to Siberia] nevertheless required the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from all Russian territory – if not immediately after the departure of the Czecho-Slovak troops, then within reasonable time . . .’

Moreover, the ‘Nikolaiev massacre must be considered an incident,’ and the American State Department ‘has regretted that Japan should deem necessary the occupation of Russian territory as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with a future Russian Government.’

Mr. Hughes added the wish that ‘the divergence of views between the two Governments might be removed with the least

¹ *Conference on the Limitation of Armaments*. Official Protocol of the Sessions. Washington, 1921. Pages 340–54.

HUGHES FIGHTS FOR RUSSIA

possible delay,' and expressed 'the hope that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people.'

Coming from the cautious lips of a high statesman, these declarations cast a shadow of doubt on the sincerity of Baron Shidehara's pledges. Nevertheless, the State Department could do nothing more than take cognizance of these pledges and to give them her own interpretation. But so suspect were Japan's motives in Washington that Charles E. Hughes made bold to express the hope that

'Japan does not seek, through her military operations in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of the Maritime Province.'

The Japanese boiled. Harry F. Sinclair smiled gratefully.

The Far Eastern (Chita) delegation, consisting of A. A. Yazikov, chairman, P. Karavaev and Boris Skvirsky, further embarrassed the Japanese, much to the joy of State Department circles, by publishing documents purporting to prove the existence of an agreement between Paris and Tokio for the use of Wrangel's defeated Crimean army in establishing a permanent, anti-Bolshevik State in Eastern Siberia which would bar Soviet Russia's access to the Pacific. The inevitable denials followed, but anti-Japanese diplomats chuckled.

The net result of all these manœuvres and negotiations, however, amounted to zero. The Japanese pocketed Mr. Hughes's inconvenient insinuations and the Chita delegation's irritating revelations, but showed no intention of leaving Eastern Siberia or Northern Sakhalin.

The Washington Conference had proved the American Government anxious to help Russia rid her territory of foreign troops. Moscow made careful note of this attitude, but no longer put great store in the possibilities of normal Russo-American relations. For if there was some light in the East, the West remained buried in utter darkness.

AMERICA, JAPAN AND SOVIET RUSSIA

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MEDAL

Early in 1920, the United States Government sent food and war supplies to the Poles. 'General Tasker H. Bliss and Secretary of War Baker insisted that such aid was essential to check the spread of Bolshevism and save civilization.'¹ But the Soviet-Polish war had not commenced, and Poland was yet to reject all Bolshevik peace overtures.

While the Polish offensive into the Ukraine was still in progress, 'Hugh Gibson, first American Minister to Poland, then in the United States, sought to refute the charge of imperialism and emphasized the warm friendship of the United States for the Poles. . . . A Polish loan of \$50,000,000 was soon floated successfully with the approval of the State Department.'²

The American Government gave moral comfort to the Poles in addition to financial and material succour. This took the form of a much-quoted note from Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby to Baron Cammillo Romano Avezzeno, Italian Ambassador in Washington, on August 10, 1920, which, some maintain, outlined American policy towards Russia for several years to come.

§ THE STATE DEPARTMENT ENUNCIATES ITS RUSSIAN POLICY

Colby averred in his note that he 'recoils' from the 'recognition of the Bolshevik regime,' and the 'dismemberment of Russia.' The Secretary then urged that all decisions of vital importance to Russia, especially 'those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance,' until Russia is no longer 'helpless in the grip of a non-representative Government, whose only sanction is brute force.'

This was the basis for America's policy. The United States had no faith in the permanence of the Soviet regime. The strategy of Washington, like the tactics of some other states, grew out of the conviction that the present was merely a transitional period in which nothing must be undertaken to prolong the Bolshevik interregnum. The Americans were convinced that a State

¹ *American Policy towards Russia* . . ., Schuman. Page 176.

² *Ibid.*, page 178.

COLBY NOTE ON RUSSIA

which denied the capitalist system would perish by its own blunders.

Colby followed with a warning to Russia not to take herself wholly out of the pale of the friendly interests of other nations by the pillage and oppression of the Poles.' Then a slashing attack:

Mr. Colby ascribes to the Bolsheviks declarations to the effect that 'they have not the slightest intention of observing such undertakings [with foreign Powers. – L. F.] or of carrying out such agreements.' Without, unfortunately, citing his authority for this assertion, the Secretary proceeds to affirm that 'they have not only avowed this as a doctrine, but have exemplified it in practice.'

On August 10, 1920, the date of the Colby note, the Soviet republic stood in treaty relationship with only two countries: Esthonia – agreement concluded on February 2, 1920 – and with Lithuania – agreement concluded on July 12, 1920. The record showed no violation of the two existing treaties.

'Moreover,' wrote Mr. Colby, '. . . the Bolshevik Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction with extensive international ramifications through the Third International, and this body, which is heavily subsidised by the Bolshevik Government from the public revenues of Russia, has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevist revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the Bolsheviks have boasted that their promises of non-interference with other nations would in no way bind the agents of this body.'

This charge that the 'Third International . . . is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevik Government' has been heard on more than one occasion. But Mr. Colby might have been embarrassed had his correspondent, the Italian Government, asked him to adduce proof of his accusation. It would have been difficult to show by facts, circumstances, or logic that the Commissariat of Finance or any other branch of the Soviet Government contributed towards the expenses of the Third International.

The Secretary of State, however, would very likely have maintained that the Communist Party of Russia was the ruling party and controlled the Bolshevik Government; that it was also the largest and most influential constituent of the Communist Inter-

national; that, therefore, the Bolshevik Government controls the Comintern.

Moscow regards this a faulty syllogism. For even the Russian Communist Party itself, whose relation to the State is universally recognized, gets no money from the Soviet Government, and gives no money to the Soviet Government. The two are organizationally completely separate and apart. In much the same way the Republican Party in the United States is distinct from the American Government during a Republican administration. Nor do official channels exist for the passage of State funds to the Republican Party or from that organization to the public exchequer. Bolsheviks frequently make this analogy.

Colby then proceeded to summarize his own note and to define 'territorial integrity' as referring to the area of the former Russian Empire with the exception of Finland, Poland, and Armenia. He omitted Esthonia, Latvia, and, most particularly, Lithuania. The Poles, who had designs on Lithuania, were deeply pleased.

The French Government, which backed Poland, thanked Mr. Colby for his note. So also the Polish Government for his 'valuable moral support.' Whereupon it was announced that the American State Department approved the aims of Baron Wrangel, the Czarist General, and rejoiced in the 'common objective of the French and American Governments.'¹

But the Italian Government, to whom the note was addressed and which consulted Washington because it had already entered into negotiations with Moscow and wished to know America's attitude, calmly continued these discussions despite Colby's fears. Lloyd George, too, deliberately proceeded with his Krassin conferences and ultimately signed the commercial treaty of March 16, 1921.

§ THE BOLSHEVIK REPLY

Bolsheviks love an argument too much to have permitted a note like Colby's to go unanswered. Chicherin as well as Ludwig K. Martens, Soviet diplomatic agent in New York, issued replies.

Martens's statement first drew attention to the circumstance that the policy enunciated by the United States differed from that

¹ *American Policy toward Russia* . . ., page 182.

THE BOLSHEVIK REPLY

of a number of European Governments which, 'yielding to the demands of the workers,' had shown a tendency to 'revise their previous misjudgments of Russia, and to adopt a policy of adjustment.' The attitude of America, Martens affirmed, was conducive to perpetuating in Europe a state of poverty and war. Were it to prevail with the Allies 'there would be no hope of peace in Europe.' 'Fortunately, however . . . the European masses will make peace, in spite of insatiable imperialistic ambitions of their own rulers, and in spite of any interference from the American Government.'

Nor could the Colby declaration change Russia's internal policy. 'The naïve hope,' wrote Martens, 'expressed in some quarters, that this note may affect the purposes and actions of the Russian people, can only arise from ignorance of the facts, and is too ridiculous for serious consideration.'

In offensive tone, Martens proceeds to aver that 'those portions of the note which refer to the internal affairs of the Russian Republic do not merit extended comment. The domestic affairs of the Russian people are no concern of the Government of the United States, and we do not desire to enter into any controversy with American officials upon matters concerning which they are so lamentably ill-informed.'

Then Martens dealt with a problem which from that day to this remains highly important for the question of American recognition of Russia as well as for United States policy in Latin America. International law and international practice do not make recognition synonymous with approval. During Woodrow Wilson's administration, however, America's desires to affect the destinies of Central and South American republics grew apace, and recognition was granted or withdrawn as reward or punishment for conformance or non-conformance with Washington's wishes. President Wilson applied this measure to Soviet Russia as well, and the result, obviously, had to be the refusal to recognize. But 'no Government has ever based its foreign relations upon this principle,' Martens charged, 'and if the American Government now assumed to do so, we repeat that this is a principle which the Soviet Government emphatically repudiates.'

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Moscow was establishing relations with capitalist countries, 'but we do not ask them to approve our institutions nor can they expect us to approve theirs.' Had the American Government approved of the Czar's tyrannical regime, Martens asked, or of the Mikado's?

Colby's reference to the abuse of diplomatic privileges amazed the Soviet representative. He answered cynically, saying:

'As for the alarm of the American Government that the diplomatic service of the Soviet Government might become a "channel of intrigue," against which the American people could not defend their cherished institutions, we cannot repress a smile of amazement at such an expression from anyone who is in the least familiar with the traditional and general practices of the diplomatic agents of capitalistic and imperialistic nations.'

Nor could Mr. Martens accept as sincere America's protested concern for Russia's territorial integrity. Besides, such a policy was scarcely in accord with the self-determination of Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania.

Chicherin's cabled reply, submitted by Martens, likewise made much of this point. Why, Chicherin wondered, had Colby been prepared to offer independence to Poland, Finland, and Armenia, but not to Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania? He could only think that it was 'probably due to lack of information concerning national conditions in Eastern Europe.' As for the Soviet Government, it 'unwaveringly upholds the right of national self-determination of the working class of every nationality, including the right of secession and of forming separate states.'

Satisfied that the outside world was still poorly acquainted with the system of government in his country, Chicherin exploited the Colby challenge to explain the democratic nature of the Soviet regime as opposed to 'the absolute domination of strongly organized political parties which are completely subservient to the leading financial groups' in capitalist countries. He denied that freedom of the Press or assemblage could exist under bourgeois conditions. He asserted that it was the capitalist State that rested 'on brutal force.' Moreover, he rejected the innuendo that the Soviet ruled 'against the will of the masses.' That, he said, is 'sheer

THE BOLSHEVIK REPLY

absurdity.' For how, but for the solid support of the population, he asked, could the Bolsheviks have persisted through a long Civil War in which the united forces of a hostile world were pitted against them?

Then the Commissar for Foreign Affairs turned to the subject of diplomatic privileges. To Mr. Colby's charge of their abuse, Chicherin said, 'Not a single fact can be quoted in support of this calumny.' And as to World Revolution, the attitude of the Soviet Government permitted of the following important summary:

'If the Russian Government binds itself to abstain from spreading Communist literature, all its representatives abroad are enjoined scrupulously to observe this pledge. The Soviet Government clearly understands that the revolutionary movement of the working masses in every country is their own affair. It holds to the principle that Communism cannot be imposed by force but that the fight for Communism in every country must be carried on by its working masses themselves. Seeing that in America and in many other countries the workers have not conquered the powers of government, and are not even convinced of the necessity of their conquest, the Russian Soviet Government deems it necessary to establish and faithfully to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the existing governments of those countries. That the elementary economic needs of the peoples of Russia and of other countries demand normal relations and an exchange of goods between them, is quite clear to the Russian Government, and the first condition of such relations is mutual good faith and non-intervention on both parts.'

These words of Chicherin's represent the Soviet Government's basic thoughts on diplomatic relations and revolution. They apply to-day as they did in 1920.

Finally, in a peroration, Chicherin expressed the hope that the Colby policy would be superseded. He was convinced, in fact, that

'not only the working classes, [whose effect on American foreign policy Moscow of course exaggerated. - L. F.] but likewise the far-sighted business men of the United States will repudiate the policy expressed in Mr. Colby's note . . . and that in the near future

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normal relations will be established between Russia and the United States.'

All this happened in the midst of the election campaign, and one unavoidably suspects that the Bolsheviks foresaw the victory of Warren G. Harding and here, in their rejoinders to Colby, presumed to pave the way for the scrapping of Wilson's policy by the new Republican administration.

§ A RED DIPLOMAT IN NEW YORK

The psychology and ideology reflected in the Colby note explain America's treatment of the Martens Mission.

Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, born of German and Russian parents, had engaged in engineering activities in Germany before the War, but was also known in Bolshevik circles; 1916 found him in the United States.

Moscow came upon the idea of availing itself of Martens's services, and sent him the necessary credentials dated January 2, 1919. These, together with a long memorandum on the origin, character and pacific intentions of the Soviet Government, he forwarded to the State Department on March 19, 1919. The State Department ignored them.

The State Department still recognized and dealt with Boris Bakhmetiev, Kerensky's envoy, as the rightful plenipotentiary of the Russian State despite the fact that the Government which had appointed Bakhmetiev had been dead for sixteen months and that its members had dispersed to the four corners of the earth. Bakhmetiev and Serge Ughet, his Financial Agent, were frankly White. Mr. Ughet admitted in conversation with the writer that he sent locomotives to Vladivostok for Kolchak and to Novorossisk for Denikin. Locomotives and munitions – all paid for by the United States Treasury from credits placed at the disposal of the Kerensky regime.

Since Martens was accorded no diplomatic status, he attempted to perform the second half of his task: the establishment of contacts with American business firms. Offices were opened in New York City, but the State Department hastened to announce that 'the Government of the United States had never recognized the

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Bolshevik regime at Moscow,' and that 'it is deemed proper to warn American business men that any concessions from the Bolshevik authorities probably could not be recognized as binding on future Russian Governments.' Here the speculation on the probable fall of the Soviet Government is patent.

Mr. Martens's sojourn in the United States coincided with what Louis F. Post, Assistant Secretary of Labour, characterized as 'the deportations delirium of 1920' during which thousands of foreigners were exiled, and thousands more, suspected of Radicalism, Anarchism, Bolshevism, etc. – among them Sacco and Vanzetti – thrown into prison on insufficiently substantiated charges. Martens's bureaux were raided, he was arrested, his files searched, his employees examined, and his alleged activities subjected to sensational press attacks.

These activities on the part of the Department of Justice, the New York State 'Lusk Committee,' and private detective agencies severely handicapped the Bolshevik 'ambassador's' endeavours to do business, and, though he succeeded in aligning a number of Senators and intellectual leaders, the inevitable end came on January 22, 1921. On that day Martens and his staff sailed from New York on the *Stockholm*. He left on his own volition and at his own expense, and was not served a warrant of deportation. A large number of Russians and Americans voluntarily booked passage on this 'Bolshevik Ark' with the intention of serving the Red republic.

§ AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIAN TRADE

During the early part of Martens's stay in the United States, business transactions were completely precluded by the Government's refusal to grant licences for goods exported to Russia. In January, 1920, however, the Supreme Council lifted the blockade, and during the spring a thin trickle of goods from Scandinavia, Italy, and England began to flow towards hungry Russia. In the face of these changes the State Department announced on July 7, 1920, that 'the restrictions which have heretofore stood in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia are to-day removed,' but traders were warned 'against the risks incident to the

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acceptance of commodities or other values, the title to which may later be brought into question.'

Trade with Russia suffered from other serious handicaps. The Federal Reserve Board urged American banks not to honour drafts on Esthonian banks through which the Bolsheviks were conducting their foreign trade. Nor would the Federal Reserve System, or the United States Assay Office, accept Soviet gold.

§ HARDING SUCCEEDS WILSON

The election of Warren G. Harding as President and his appointment of Charles Evans Hughes as his Secretary of State introduced into the Russo-American situation little welcome change for the Bolsheviks. But Moscow thought it would. Moscow failed to realize the comparative continuity of American foreign policy. On March 31, 1921, accordingly, exactly seventeen days after the inauguration, Litvinov forwarded to Washington a Soviet plea for the establishment of normal political and business relations between the two countries.

Mr. Hughes soon replied:

'It is manifest to this Government,' he wrote, 'that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade. It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labour.

'If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations.'

§ HERBERT HOOVER ON RUSSIA

The new Secretary of State denied the possibility of an exchange of goods between a capitalist and a non-capitalist nation.

HOOVER FAMINE RELIEF

This was a novel note, unheard of during the Wilson administration and little heeded in Europe. Hughes sent his answer to Litvinov on March 25. Nine days previously the British Government had signed a commercial treaty with Moscow which facilitated the exchange of goods, including gold, and which provided for a final political settlement. Apparently, therefore, the Old World entertained quite different ideas.

The principle enunciated by Hughes may have been Herbert Hoover's. For the newly appointed Secretary of Commerce had declared on March 21, 1921, that

The question of trade with Russia is far more a political question than an economic one so long as Russia is under the control of the Bolsheviki. Under their economic system, no matter how much they moderate it in name, there can be no real return to production in Russia, and therefore Russia will have no considerable commodities to export and, consequently, no great ability to obtain imports. . . . That requires the abandonment of their present economic system.'

Thus, in almost identical phraseology, Hughes and Hoover sought to establish the principle that since a Bolshevik regime was incapable of producing goods there could be no sense in making provision with it for the exchange of goods. Such a proposition is quite logical, and its avowal, moreover, by the Secretary of State and his colleague in the Department of Commerce bespeaks a harmony within the President's Cabinet which found demonstration on other occasions as well. Both Hughes and Hoover obviously formed their judgment on the basis of Communist performances during the Civil and Polish Wars. Hoover reasoned that since Soviet Russia had not exported during the blockade and intervention she could never export. And therefore she would have 'no great ability to obtain imports.' The answer to this argument is contained in Department of Commerce statistics for Russian trade with the United States and other countries since 1921.

¶ HOOVER FAMINE RELIEF

Though Herbert Hoover had an oft-expressed aversion for the political and economic forms of Bolshevism, he nevertheless

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answered immediately to the heartrending cry from Russia for food.

By the summer of 1921 no less than 25,000,000 people suffered hunger in the Volga River region. On July 13, Maxim Gorki, the well-known author, appealed to 'All Honest People' for prompt aid to the Russian nation. 'Give bread and medicine,' he urged.

A conference of European Government representatives, after meeting in Paris and Brussels, declared that it would weigh the question of relief for the starving if the Soviets first acknowledged their debts.¹ The United States made no such condition. Instead Herbert Hoover announced that the American Relief Administration would render assistance forthwith.

Hoover's American Relief Administration (A.R.A.) spent upward of \$60,000,000 for the aid of the sufferers from September, 1921, when actual operations commenced, to July, 1923, when they ceased. Of this sum, \$11,357,000 was supplied in gold by the Soviets. There can be no doubt that millions of men, women, and children, would have died but for the quick, efficiently-organized service rendered by the Hoover organization.

The Bolsheviks suspected Hoover. They knew his anti-Bolshevik bias because he had made no secret of it. They knew also that Captain Gregory of the A.R.A. had been instrumental in overthrowing the Soviet regime in Hungary. Gregory boasted of the achievement.² They said Congress appropriated \$20,000,000 for Russian relief which was really farmer relief. (Middle West corn was being stuffed into fires in lieu of kindling wood.) Most of the A.R.A. food-stuffs came from America despite the fact, the Communists argued, that European prices and transportation costs were cheaper.

Furthermore, the entire personnel of the A.R.A. consisted of United States Army men, and the Bolsheviks suspected the type especially since the relief association's native assistants were fre-

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley. Vol. VI. Published under the Auspices of the British Institute for International Affairs. London, 1924. Page 326.

² *World's Work*. New York, June, 1921. 'Stemming the Red Tide,' by T. T. C. Gregory.

AMERICA'S THREE ARTICLES

quently recruited from elements in the populations not quite sympathetic to the Red regime.

These and other complaints made the rounds. Difference of temperament and language, and the complete failure of the Americans to grasp Bolshevik psychology probably accounted for some of the misunderstanding. On many occasions, the relief workers were not treated with the consideration and cordiality their services entitled them to expect. Yet on the whole, the amount of friction and the number of disputes was very small, and mutual distrust notwithstanding, no serious incidents marred the work.

When the A.R.A. finally departed, the Government tendered its leaders a banquet at which Dzerzhinsky and other prominent Bolsheviks drank the health of the Americans.

§ AMERICA'S THREE ARTICLES OF FAITH

Though the many reports on Soviet economic conditions which the A.R.A. sent to the United States may have influenced the views of Mr. Hoover and other Government officials, there is no indication that America's political attitude was affected in the slightest by the relief organization's activities. Several months after Hoover's men entered Russia to fight the famine, the Washington Disarmament Conference convened. During its sessions, a State Department hostile to Soviet Russia and unalterably opposed to dealing with her representatives, stubbornly fought the battles of the Bolshevik State and insisted on Japanese evacuation of Siberian territory, the consummation of which was Moscow's highest hope.

This action was in consonance with Article I of America's political faith in respect to Russia: territorial integrity. The others were: the Soviet regime is a temporary makeshift, and (3) while it lasts, no agreements or negotiations with the usurpers.

These principles determined America's policy during the Genoa Conference of April-May, 1922. The United States was officially unrepresented at the meeting, yet she played a decisive rôle in its proceedings.

THE GENOA CONFERENCE

Lloyd George is usually regarded as the father and sponsor of the Genoa Conference. He no doubt envisaged it as the crowning glory of his political career, and as the best weapon with which to win Liberal and Labour support for the impending General Election. But Briand may have been equally anxious to issue the invitation.

The policy of joint action along parallel lines, of 'Dawes Plans' and consortiums for Russia belonged primarily to Paris. Lloyd George always preferred direct negotiations by individual countries. Downing Street and British business interests had registered some progress in their discussions with the Bolsheviks and scarcely required French assistance at that stage. General pourparlers, in fact, might interfere with success.

Moreover, Briand wished to arrive at a working agreement which would enable Germany to pay reparations without stops, starts, moratoria, and ultimata. Liberal treatment of Germany, however, would, in his opinion, increase the risk of German recovery and therefore of revenge.

BRIAND'S FALL

Briand, accordingly, made his goal a British guarantee to France against German attack. At Versailles, both Great Britain and President Wilson had expressed a readiness to share such a guarantee. But the rejection, by the United States Senate, of the Paris Peace Treaty ended that possibility, and at Cannes, when the proposition was renewed, England stood alone.¹

Many of the preliminaries of this security pact were discussed between drives on the Cannes golf-course and remain secret. But it is known that while France demanded a many-sided alliance,

¹ Short studies of the Cannes Conference will be found in *The Rise of the German Republic*, by H. G. Daniels (London, 1927); in *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922*, Vol. II, by H. Wickham Steed (London, 1924); and in *Von Versailles zur Freiheit*, by Freiherr von Rheinbaben (Berlin, 1927).

GENOA RESERVED FOR RUSSIA

including provisions regarding Russian-Polish and Russian-German relations, Lloyd George would go only to the length of a guarantee against unprovoked attack.¹ This was far less than Poincaré and his friends desired. Poincaré even contemplated 'a constant entente . . . between the respective General Staffs.'² The anti-Briand opposition in Paris, moreover, and the French Nationalists and industrialists, had for some time weighed the advisability of occupying the rich Ruhr region in Germany. That would be better security, they felt, than any signature of Lloyd George; it would likewise facilitate reparations collections.

Poincaré worked feverishly in Paris, and before long, circumstances warranted a hasty summons to Briand to return from Cannes to Paris. In the capital, the cards were so stacked against him that resignation remained the only choice. With him fell the British guarantee, and as a result reparations disappeared from the Genoa agenda. At a subsequent tête-à-tête with Lloyd George in Boulogne in February, Poincaré made doubly sure that reparations would be reserved for his own solution – Ruhr occupation.

¶ GENOA RESERVED FOR RUSSIA

The proposed Genoa Conference thus became a purely Russian matter. On the second day of the Cannes meeting, the assembled diplomats decided to convene a European Economic Conference at Genoa and to invite the Soviet Republic. Thereupon, on January 7, 1922, the Italian Government forwarded to Moscow a note which especially urged the 'personal participation' of Lenin.³ Russia quickly accepted the invitation 'with pleasure' and assured the Powers that even if the necessity of coping with the famine prevented the attendance of 'Citizen Lenin,' the Bolshevik plenipotentiaries would be armed with sufficient authority to facilitate the work of the conference. Lenin was actually named chief of the delegation to satisfy Lloyd George's wish that 'big men meet big men,' but he never proposed to attend. His

¹ British Blue Book. *Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact*. Cmd. 2169. London, 1924. See especially pages 108–75.

² *Ibid.*, page 131.

³ *Genoa Conference. Stenographic Account, Materials and Documents*. Publication of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Moscow, 1922.

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health had suffered from the bullets lodged in his body in August, 1918. The Bolsheviks, furthermore, feared attempts on his life by the Whites in Europe.

The initiators of the Genoa Conference, notably Lloyd George and, originally, the French, entertained plans for a far-reaching settlement with the Bolsheviks. The economic and political reforms introduced in Russia in 1921 encouraged the outside world in the belief that the Soviets were ready to come to terms, perhaps to capitulate completely and beg for foreign support. The great famine naturally strengthened that conviction. The West was convinced that the Bolsheviks had spent their energy and exhausted their fund of popularity; under the circumstances surrender into the hands of capitalism appeared to represent their only hope.

Besides, the Allies believed that the revision of the Bolsheviks' attitude towards domestic capitalism as evidenced in the New Economic Policy (NEP) entailed a reconsideration of their position towards foreign capitalism. Herein lies the clue to the Genoa Conference. NEP was interpreted as the Russian Thermidore.

It is indeed a fact that the relationship between the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March, 1921, and the proclamation of the NEP in March, 1921, was not merely one of accidental synchronology. NEP might have come six months earlier had Lloyd George not waited for the outcome of the Polish War to conclude the commercial treaty with Krassin. For Moscow felt that it would be unrealistic, to say the least, to offer concessions when no one wanted them.

§ TOP-HATS AND SILK GLOVES

The Bolsheviks were undoubtedly ready to make compromises. Weary as Russia was from three and a half years of world war, two and a half years of civil war and foreign intervention, and two years of a hermetic blockade, she staggered under the blow delivered by the widespread famine. Severe trials faced the Communists; they therefore sought aid beyond their borders. Negotiations and concessions, moreover, would probably paralyse the efforts of interventionists to renew their attacks.

So the Russians thought, and so the Allies divined. The Russians under-estimated their own reserves of strength and internal

THE TRUCE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

goodwill; the Allies over-estimated the weaknesses of the Soviet regime.

Moscow's behaviour fed the high hopes which the Western nations set on Genoa. For when the Communist delegates appeared in Berlin and later in the Italian seaport wearing top-hats and cut-aways, the bourgeois world said, 'These outward forms have a deep and symbolic meaning. They herald a change in conviction.'

§ THE TRUCE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS ON PAPER

This change did not involve the disappearance of the Bolsheviks. That Hughes-Hoover thesis was not shared in Europe. Capitalism and Communism could live side by side in peace. On their own initiative the Allies put this new principle on paper at Cannes. A Cannes resolution declared that

'nations can claim no right to dictate to each other the principles on which they are to regulate their systems of ownership, internal economy, and government. It is for every nation to choose for itself the system which it prefers in this respect.'¹

During the years of intervention, such tolerance was of course inconceivable. But in 1922 a resolution admitting the possibility of the co-existence of two diametrically opposed systems of economy and government spelled progress. It indicated that the Allies meant peace and business.

The 'co-existence' resolution of Cannes was tantamount to saying that the whole intervention had been a mistake. In point of fact, it was an admission of insufficient strength to overthrow Bolshevism and at the same time reflected the conviction, in some quarters at least, that a Red Russia would be less dangerous than a great, 'united' White Russia. This applied especially to England and Poland, and, to the extent that Poland's interests were dear to France, it applied to France as well. Japan would naturally have said 'Amen.' Only the United States disagreed. To America, a weakened Bolshevik Republic was less desirable than a strong, bourgeois Russia that could resist Japan. It need not

¹ British White Paper. *Resolutions Adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January, 1922, as the Basis of the Genoa Conference.* Cmd. 1621. London, 1922.

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follow that America therefore rejected the 'co-existence' theory, yet the circumstance is not altogether unrelated.

¶ FRENCH *v.* BRITISH POLICY

The United States refused to attend the Genoa Conference. France, on the other hand, had agreed to participate while Briand was still in office. Poincaré could scarcely withdraw. But even after reparations had been erased from the agenda as a result of his insistence, he rather rebelled against the idea of sitting at a green table on terms of equality with German delegates. Nor did he – or Mr. Hughes – think the time yet ripe for dealing with Russia on any terms. Barthou consequently represented France. Poincaré made his will known in innumerable long-distance telephone conversations.

It did not require excessive prevision to see that Genoa would be still another battlefield for French and British divergent policies. The whole history of the post-war period had been a series of disputes between the erstwhile blood-allies. Indeed, Anglo-French antagonism began with the Versailles Peace Conference where the two chief victors wrangled over the spoils of war. Subsequently, controversies developed over Russia and over Lloyd George's trade agreement with the Bolsheviks. Mosul was another irritant. The fact that France gave arms to Kemal Pasha while England urged Athens to make war on him drove the two countries further apart than ever. The Washington Limitation of Armaments Conference, moreover, advertised the French militarists' dream of building a navy of small submarines – against whom? The ready answer in London was 'the British Isles.' Finally, France and Britain clashed on the most vital of Western European problems: Germany and reparations.

Anglo-French friction had become a chronic feature of European politics by the beginning of 1922. If Great Britain took one side in a given issue it was a safe assumption that France would take the opposite.

¶ RUSSO-GERMAN 'ALLIANCE'

France, or at least one school of thought in France, desired an alliance with England to prevent Anglo-German co-operation.

THE URQUHART CONCESSION

But a far greater bogey to France was the possibility of a Russo-German union.

On March 25, 1919, Lloyd George secretly circulated a memorandum on this subject among a few members of the Paris Peace Conference. The text remained unknown, except to a very limited circle. In it, the British Prime Minister said:

‘The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera.’

When this secret document came to the desk of Clemenceau in 1919, he declared that it was intended as a means of extracting concessions for Germany from France instead of from England. Lloyd George wished to convince the French that a too stern peace treaty would drive Germany into the arms of Russia. Why, then, did Lloyd George give this document to the British Press on March 25, 1922, on the eve of the Genoa Conference? Presumably for the same reason. But also to warn Poincaré that stern treatment of Russia would drive her into the arms of Germany.

Lloyd George realized that Poincaré’s policy towards Russia would, if it prevailed at Genoa, make agreement with Chicherin impossible. His preliminary manœuvring therefore aimed to induce a more conciliatory attitude towards Moscow in the Quai d’Orsay. Moreover, Lloyd George believed that Russia’s internal difficulties presented the finest opportunity for economic penetration by Great Britain herself.

THE URQUHART CONCESSION

Krassin’s entrance into London in 1920 had been the signal for a large number of concession applications, the most significant of which originated with Leslie Urquhart, the chairman of the Russo-Asiatic Corporation, and from Deterding, the president of the Royal Dutch-Shell Petroleum Company. These received encouragement from the Bolshevik emissary.

In 1921, Mr. Urquhart undertook a trip to Moscow to discuss

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the question of his concession with the Soviet chiefs. Before the revolution, his firm had controlled what was probably the richest mining area in rich Siberia. It covered 4,000 square versts in the Ural and Altai regions and yielded gold, silver, copper, lead, and zinc. It boasted extensive forests and fisheries, coal deposits, and industrial plants. The Bolsheviks had confiscated it. Urquhart wanted it back.

The British Government looked with favour upon Urquhart's negotiations with Krassin, and Mr. Urquhart was attached to the English delegation to the Genoa Conference.¹

§ THE ROYAL DUTCH CONCESSION

Deterding's Royal Dutch-Shell likewise held properties in Czarist Russia. He was one of several huge investors who had been attracted by the country's unfathomable oil wealth.

The Bolsheviks had nationalized the fields and thus dispossessed Deterding and all foreign and Russian owners. Yet the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March, 1921, and the NEP of March, 1921, inspired the hope in British business leaders that this action was not irrevocable, or, at least, that some method could be devised whereby they could save their properties and the Bolsheviks their faces; by concessions, perhaps, which, it was thought, would be a veiled form of restitution.

The Royal Dutch, accordingly, established contact with Krassin. But the Royal Dutch knew that Downing Street's assistance would be not without value. Lord Curzon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was found quite ready to help, and he caused his Under-Secretary Ovey, later envoy to Moscow, to write this letter:²

FOREIGN OFFICE.

19th October, 1921.

Monsieur Krassin,

SIR,

The Marquis Curzon of Kedleston is informed by Colonel J. W. Boyle that the Royal Dutch-Shell group are anxious to obtain a concession from the Soviet Government for the

¹ The writer discussed this matter with Mr. Urquhart in 1926 in London.

² Copied by the writer from the original in the archives of the Soviet Embassy in London.

THE ROYAL-DUTCH CONCESSION

production of oil from their properties in South Russia and the Caucasus.

I am directed to inform you that it is with the full approval and support of His Majesty's Government that Colonel Boyle has addressed himself to you on this subject. His Majesty's Government trust that these negotiations may result in an early and satisfactory settlement.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) ESMOND OVEY.

Such intercession did not leave the Bolsheviki unimpressed. Soon Colonel Boyle, who had served as an intermediary between Rakovsky and the Roumanians in 1918, made a trip to Baku, and before long the conversations with Krassin had apparently reached a point where the Royal Dutch even submitted a draft contract.

The Genoa Conference cannot be understood without full appreciation of the import of the Shell concession. The difficulties it encountered are not only typical of relations between Russia and the outside world: they actually were the difficulties of the conference itself and affected the outcome of the meeting as much as any single factor. A settlement with the former owners of Russian oil properties, however – either through compensation or concessions or through outright restitution – involved the whole principle upon which the larger question of Russian foreign obligations would be solved. This principle had not yet been defined. There were, in fact, several principles proposed by several Powers. The Allies disagreed among themselves. Under the circumstances a concession to the Royal Dutch would have prejudiced the final settlement in a manner inevitably favourable to the British principle. The French, moreover, insisted that Russia's creditors must act in concert and seek a solution along 'parallel lines' rather than square their accounts with the Russians individually as Deterding wished to do.

There was, in addition, very direct opposition to the concession itself on the part of petroleum associations. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey as well as French and Belgium oil men

THE GENOA CONFERENCE

objected to a Deterding concession because it would have weakened their own claims on the Soviet Government. And since the oil firms of America, France and Belgium enjoyed the goodwill of their Foreign Offices, it first became embarrassing and then impossible for the Royal Dutch-Shell or Lloyd George to press the business of the Deterding trust before at least the outline of a general economic settlement with Russia had been fixed by all the conference members.

Finally, Sir Henri Deterding's plan for obtaining monopoly rights to the liquid wealth of the Caucasus was temporarily forced into the background by a larger scheme for exploiting all the resources of Russia and satisfying all the claims of all former Russian investors. Enter the 'Europa Consortium.'

¶ A EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR THE SOVIETS

This 'International Corporation' actually formed the basis of official, inter-government negotiations. At Cannes, in fact, the Supreme Council declared that it 'approves of the establishment of an International Corporation . . . for the purpose of the economic reconstruction of Europe' and the Governments represented agreed to contribute 10,000 pounds sterling each towards financing the work of the organizing committee.¹

At the January 12 session of the Cannes Conference, Walther Rathenau, the German delegate, urged his nation's right to join.

Germany, he submitted, 'was the more fitted to contribute towards the reconstruction since she was acquainted with the technical and economic conditions and with the customs of the East.' . . . 'The path entered upon seems to me the right one,' he added. 'An international syndicate, indeed a private syndicate.' The beginnings should be made with transport; then the sources of production, raw materials.²

This was the scheme in outline. Late in December, 1921, on the eve of the Cannes assembly, important industrialists and

¹ British White Paper. *Resolutions Adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January, 1922, as the Basis of the Genoa Conference*. Cmd. 1621. London, 1922.

² *Cannes und Genua*, by Walther Rathenau. Berlin, 1922.

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bankers from England, France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan met in Paris under the chairmanship of the French Minister Loucheur to discuss it. An investment of twenty million pounds sterling was foreseen. Germany would be invited – to help her pay reparations. American participation was also sought.

Such a far-reaching venture required legal guarantees from the Soviets as well as a modification of the system of justice in Russia. An international body of experts, representing the several Allied Governments, accordingly met in London in March to deal with this problem. The result of their labour was the famous 'London Memorandum' intended as the ground-work on which the structure of Genoa would be erected.¹

In a note dated February 15, 1922, the French Government urged the introduction of 'an actual system of capitulations' for Russia. This suggestion was consonant with the French 'Dawes Plan' for Russia and the solicitude of France not so much for the settlements of her debt with Russia as for the economic exploitation of the country by foreign capital.

'Capitulations,' accordingly, became the cue for the authors of the London Memorandum. For no matter who summoned these experts, or who advocated the 'International Corporation,' any attempt to deal collectively with the Russian problem would obviously proceed under the sign of the French principle of joint action along parallel lines.

The London Memorandum accordingly prescribed the following for Russian acceptance: (1) A foreigner could be arrested only in the presence or with the consent of his consul; (2) no searches could be undertaken in the homes or plants of foreigners; (3) sentences passed upon foreigners by Russian courts could be executed only with the approval of their consuls; (4) Soviet labour laws would not maintain in plants owned or managed by foreigners, but wages might be fixed by joint employer and employee commissions 'if necessary'; (5) foreigners could, when signing a contract, name the country under whose legal code disputes arising under the contract were to be adjudicated; in such instances the Russian court was bound to be guided by

¹ For complete text see British Blue Book, *Papers Relating to the International Economic Conference, Genoa, April-May, 1922*. Cmd. 1667. London, 1922,

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that code.¹ The experts, furthermore, envisaged the creation of free zones in a number of ports or of free 'treaty' ports as in China.

The ground having thus been prepared, Russia having agreed, further, to recognize and pay her debts, to restitute confiscated foreign properties, to grant concessions, to submit her currency to foreign control and, probably, to permit the establishment of a powerful foreign bank in Moscow, the 'International Consortium' could begin its work.

The 'Europa Consortium,' as it came to be styled after America refused to adhere, would grant credits for the stabilization of the rouble, finance concession undertakings, and itself participate in railway operation and construction as well as in the production of raw materials for manufacture in Western European countries.

The Allies had thus sketched their ideal solution of the Bolshevik problem.

Chicherin assures the writer that the Soviet Government was never consulted by the Allied Governments or by Allied business men in this matter, and never received any official or direct information regarding the negotiations preliminary to the Consortium's organization. But on January 27, 1922, Chicherin told the Central Executive Committee in Moscow that the Bolsheviks would not accept co-operation with bourgeois States which 'took the form of economic domination over Russia.'² The consortium, he said, represented a danger to the Soviet Republic.

This expression of Bolshevik policy, however, remained unheeded in the West. Far more serious was American rejection of the idea of the corporation. And before even the Genoa Conference convened, the Germans, who soon began to be accepted

¹ Reference to these questions is made in a *Telegram from M. Chicherin, Moscow, to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy respecting the Genoa Conference*. British White Paper. Cmd. 1637. London, 1922.

² *Genoa Conference. Stenographic Account, Materials, and Documents*. Publication of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Moscow, 1922. Page 17. Chicherin tells the writer that Felix Deutsch, the prominent German industrialist, had sketched the general idea of an international consortium to Krassin long before the Cannes Conference. The Bolsheviks then objected and the Germans never mentioned it again.

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as a most important pillar of the consortium, quarrelled among themselves. Hugo Stinnes, who was regarded as an industrial 'wizard' and who regarded himself as a great statesman (who, therefore, obtained diplomatic assignments from the German Government), had originally favoured the plan of the 'International Consortium.' His participation figured in the preliminary discussions. But as Genoa drew nearer his attitude changed together with that of such gigantic industrial concerns as Krupps, Otto Wolff, etc. The German banks, on the other hand, as well as the light industries, and particularly the electric companies with whose workings and requirements Rathenau, the Foreign Minister, was intimately acquainted, continued in their support of the international project.

This division in the German business world no doubt coloured the deliberations of the German Parliament. We find, for instance, that Gustav Stresemann, then leader of the Volksparty, the party of the heavy industrialists, and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, took issue with Rathenau in a Reichstag debate on March 29, 1922.¹

Stresemann favoured direct negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Rathenau, however, still clung to the proposed 'Europa Consortium' though his advocacy of it as a monopoly concern for Russian business had weakened considerably.

Even the Allies were divided; when Germany wavered, hope of agreement vanished. At Genoa the 'International Consortium' still lingered in the minds of some diplomats, experts, and commission members. It may have been employed as an argument. But as an active political factor and as a big, unprecedented economic possibility it was dead. It was an error therefore to exaggerate the influence of the consortium on the fate of the Genoa Conference as H. N. Brailsford, the British Labour editor, and others have done.² The psychology which had inspired the plan of the consortium naturally lived in the conference halls and villas of the Italian seaport; but as a concrete factor it was non-existent. Too many dissensions and conflicting interests divided Europe to permit of a 'Europa' union.

¹ Official Reichstag stenographic report.

² London *Daily Herald*, October 12, 1927.

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§ BOLSHEVIK NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY

England's relationship towards the consortium was not unaffected by the concessions possibilities which seemed within the grasp of Urquhart, Deterding, and others, and which they naturally had no desire to share with nationals of foreign countries. In the case of the Germans there can be no doubt that commercial offers made by the Russians and considerations of political policy, which became more manifest when the Bolshevik delegation to Genoa arrived in Berlin, were largely responsible for a cooling towards the consortium.

Many ties bound the Russians and Germans in this period. The Bolsheviks branded the Versailles Peace Treaty as unjust, vindictive, imperialistic; neither their Marxist principles nor their interpretation of the secret treaties they had published in 1917 enabled them to accept the Allied verdict written into Versailles of Germany's sole war guilt; they had rejoiced when Woodrow Wilson accepted their 'no annexations, no indemnities' formula, but they rejected a peace which meant to Germany loss of territory and colonies and the payment of reparations. Such a stand was the greatest possible comfort to Germany. It was identical with her own stand though she realized that the Russians started from a premise diametrically opposed to her own.

The Bolsheviks' opposition to Versailles established not merely this sentimental link, whose significance must not be underestimated, but also an economic and political bond between Russia and Germany.

It is almost a formula which holds for all time that when Germany's Western horizon is dark she turns to the East for light. With Bismarck and with other German statesmen, the Eastern orientation was a matter of policy rather than of necessity. Before the War, there were years when the Wilhelmstrasse would deliberately have turned its back on the western half of Europe to court the hand of Czarism. To-day, for very good reason probably, it has become a matter of pure political realism: when one foot hurts you bear more heavily on the other, the less one quarter has to offer the more you seek in the other. Always, since the War,

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the attitude of the Western Powers towards Germany has determined her policy towards Soviet Russia.

In 1921, therefore, when, the Germans believed, France sought their economic and political ruin, the German Government decided to undertake measures which would lead to cordial relations with the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks saw the possibilities which Germany's state of mind and condition offered them. To win her from the 'capitalist united front' against the Soviet Republic, they stressed the plethora of economic opportunities which awaited the country that came to Russia with intentions of a purely business nature. Moscow required foreign industrial technique, experience, and efficiency, and was ready to pay well for them; Germany appeared willing to co-operate.

Such co-ordination of effort might extend to military industries as well. The Russians were especially interested in the development of an air fleet and negotiations initiated during this period ultimately resulted in the establishment near Moscow, very, very quietly, of an aeroplane factory by Professor Junkers, the director of the famous Junkers plant in Dessau, Germany. This arrangement functioned for a number of years – until the Russians felt industrially more independent.

The Bolsheviks had no objection if the Germans reaped benefit from the Junkers contract or from similar agreements. They looked upon Germany as a weakened object of Entente Imperialism, and to strengthen Germany meant not merely the stiffening of resistance against that powerful combination but the buttressing of a force which might act as a check against Poland were Pilsudski to undertake another offensive into the Ukraine – an eventuality that obsessed the Bolshevik brain.

The conversations which ultimately led to the Rapallo Treaty commenced in a Berlin prison cell occupied by Karl Radek in 1920. There he was visited by important German personalities, among them Rathenau and Felix Deutsch. Begun on his own initiative in such surroundings, they were continued by Radek during several visits from Moscow to Berlin after his liberation. The Germans originally proposed to grant credits to Russia in exchange for Russia's renunciation of her claims on Germany under

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the Treaty of Versailles. Moscow objected to this formula on the ground that it could meet the German demand only in consideration of the cancellation of German State and private loans to the Czarist Empire. Germany's relations to the Allies strengthened the Russian position. The reparations problem was an open wound. Ultimata abounded. At the very time the Soviet delegation arrived in Berlin *en route* to Genoa (March, 1922), German public opinion was incensed by the policy of the Allied Military Control Commission which consisted in swamping German ministries with hundreds of notes on every alleged or actual incident in the zone of occupation. The advent of Chicherin, Litvinov, Krassin, Radek, Joffe and Rakovsky, therefore, caused a flutter in the German capital. They were ready to speak with Germany on terms of equality. They offered *quid pro quos*.

The wheels thus oiled, negotiations proceeded quickly and soon German and Russian legal experts were busy drafting a treaty. The fundamental lines of the document which later became known as the Rapallo Treaty were agreed upon then and there – in Berlin during March. Complete accord on the question of the socialization of German properties in Russia (Article 2) and especially on most-favoured nation treatment (Article 4) had not yet been reached, but these serious differences of opinion might have been ironed out had the Germans been prepared to sign in Berlin.¹

Baron von Maltzan, chief of the Eastern Section of the Foreign Office, energetically pressed for the immediate conclusion of the treaty. He found support in numerous influential quarters. But Rathenau hesitated. He still hoped that Genoa would yield some results in the field of reparations. He feared the effect on England. Nor had he lost all faith in the consortium. With his financial

¹ The writer's information regarding the negotiations leading to the Rapallo Treaty is derived from lengthy conversations with Chicherin, Litvinov, and with Herr Gaus, a high official of the German Foreign Office, who wrote the final text of the treaty, as well as from Count Harry Kessler's account in his book, *Rathenau, Sein Leben und Sein Werk*, which, I am authoritatively assured, is based on Baron von Maltzan's notes and on interviews with the leading German negotiators. I was also able to discuss the subject with Mr. E. F. Wise, Lloyd George's secretary at Genoa, and Paul Scheffer, the *Berliner Tageblatt's* correspondent in Moscow.



THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO GENOA

THE GENOA CONFERENCE OPENS

mind, his concentration upon the most immediate problem of war tribute, and with his very Western temperament which could never quite harmonize with Russian manners, Rathenau advocated postponement.

The Russians, for their part, wished to sign the treaty in Berlin. They realized, of course, that such a Soviet-German agreement would have confronted the Allies, on the eve of Genoa, with an unwelcome *fait accompli*. But the Bolsheviks, Chicherin tells me, put very little faith in the outcome of the conference. They felt that it rested on a misunderstanding, on the supposition, in foreign quarters, that the NEP represented the Thermidore of the Communist Revolution. They believed, moreover, that the French would sabotage the assembly and that Lloyd George's chief interest in the meeting was that of saving his Coalition Cabinet, 'the donkey with two heads,'¹ although it is difficult to understand how with his knowledge of Poincaré's attitude, Mr. George could have expected the conference to succeed. Even before it opened, the Russians despaired of reaching an understanding with the Allies at Genoa. They attended in order to assert Russia's natural position on the international stage, and, perhaps, to establish normal relations with individual countries. Little could be lost by participating in the conference. Yet the possible gain, according to Bolshevik conception, was far less than a treaty with the Germans offered. Since it takes two to make a bargain, however, the Moscow-Berlin compact had to wait.

THE GENOA CONFERENCE OPENS

On April 10 the world listened for Chicherin's speech. Other conferences had preceded Genoa, and other statesmen had made ringing addresses. But never before had a Soviet spokesman held the floor of an international assembly. To many minds, a Bolshevik was still a be-whiskered, bomb-throwing villain. How would the commissar act?

Chicherin began by saying that the Soviet delegation had come to Italy in the interests of peace and of European economic

¹ The British Prime Minister's rôle at Genoa is dealt with, 'much too generously,' as he himself says, in *The Genoa Conference*, by J. Saxon Mills. London.

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reconstruction.¹ He spoke a perfect French, and then himself translated his statement into English. He looked the part more of the retiring scholar than of a savage propagandist, and seemed to have unimpeachable manners. But what he said irritated Barthou.

Chicherin emphasized the tremendous and unexploited natural wealth of Russia. The Soviet Government was prepared to 'open its frontiers . . . for the creation of international traffic routes,' and to grant 'concessions of all kinds throughout the territory of the Federated Socialist Soviet Republic of Russia (R.S.F.S.R.),' and particularly in Siberia. Moscow, he announced, had, in conformance with the recently adopted New Economic Policy (NEP), already undertaken measures in the 'domain of international legislation,' which offered 'the legal guarantees necessary for economic collaboration between Soviet Russia and States based on private property.'

But economic reconstruction would be handicapped 'by the menace of new wars,' the commissar feared. Therefore the Soviet delegation 'intend to propose, in the course of the conference, the general limitation of armaments' and the outlawry of the 'most barbarous forms' of fighting 'such as asphyxiating gas and aerial warfare, as well as the use of means of terrorizing peaceful populations.'

This was the passage that infuriated Barthou. The chief French plenipotentiary felt obliged to 'make a short but very definite statement,' which he hoped, however, would not 'give rise to an incident.'

What Chicherin suggested, Barthou declared, was not on the agenda. If therefore 'the Russian delegation propose to discuss this question [of disarmament], they will find themselves faced not only with a reservation and protest, but with an absolute denial, definite, categorical, final, and decisive on the part of the French delegation.'

Chicherin sprang to his feet. At the Washington Disarmament meeting, he stated, Briand had said 'that the reason why France

¹ Complete text in *International Economic Conference of Genoa. Provisional Verbatim Record. First Plenary Session*. (Official conference document in Italian, French, and English.) Genoa, 1922.

IN THE VILLA D'ALBERTIS

opposed disarmament was the state of armament in Russia. We were therefore led to suppose that if Russia did consent to disarm, the reason cited by M. Briand would *ipso facto* disappear.' Hence Chicherin's proposal for a general disarmament congress. He insisted, finally, that this subject had not been excluded from the agenda, and for Russia it was a 'capital question.'

For a few moments it looked as if the Genoa Conference would die on the day of its birth. Indeed, but for a dramatic effort by Lloyd George, which required all his great diplomatic and forensic talent, the Chicherin-Barthou incident may have adjourned the meeting *sine die*. The British Prime Minister, however, skilfully poured oil on the very troubled waters, and then provoked a few laughs which restored outward peace. Yet the episode proved the explosiveness of a situation in which one delegation felt it had nothing to lose, and in which another – the Russian – did not intend to permit conventions and formalities from advocating its unpopular policies.

IN THE VILLA D'ALBERTIS

The Russian question soon dominated the conference completely. Three days after the opening incident, Wickham Steed, editor of the London *Times*, wired his paper that 'Genoa has become a stage for the Bolshevists,' and on the 16th he registered his distress over the circumstances that the Russians 'are the arbiters of the conference.'

The important discussions, however, took place not in plenary session or in the many political and technical commissions that were organized, but privately and secretly in Lloyd George's villa.

'The negotiations in the Villa d'Albertis,' Chicherin said to me, 'are the only thing that happened at Genoa' – as far as Allied-Russian relations are concerned. Then the Commissar for Foreign Affairs gave the writer the following summary of the meetings in the British Prime Minister's home:

Lloyd George participated on behalf of England, Barthou for France, Jaspar for Belgium, Schanzer for Italy, and Chicherin, Litvinov, and Krassin for Russia. The Allied representatives began by placing their views before the Bolsheviks. Then what Lloyd George called the 'Little Soviet' was created – that is,

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Litvinov and Sir Sidney Chapman went down into the garden to discuss rival claims. They tried to find a formula for the negotiations, but, as Litvinov subsequently admitted to the writer, they failed. The Russian discussed debt payments at the end of a rather lengthy moratorium, and concessions and credits. Sir Sidney, however, had not been prepared to listen to stern Bolshevik demands and *sine qua nons*.

Litvinov, furthermore, explained that Russia would recognize her foreign obligations provided her counter-demands of 50 billion francs for damages done by Allied intervention during the Civil War be placed in the scales.¹

'If you came to Genoa with that, you need not have come at all,' Lloyd George said to Chicherin when this declaration was brought to his attention. Nevertheless, the *pourparlers* continued. The Russians submitted that the Allies were responsible for destruction wrought by Allied armies in Russia especially since officially no state of war had existed, and that these Bolshevik claims must be set up against Russia's debts to foreign countries.

The Allied statesmen finally agreed that in view of her services to the Allied cause during the World War and taking in consideration her economic situation, Russia's war debts would be wiped from the slate if Moscow waived her counter-claims.

When this was put in writing, however, the war debts were not completely but only partially erased.

Another cause of discord was Russia's pre-war obligations. These the Bolsheviks consented to pay – assuming considerable reduction – but only on condition that the Allies grant credits. In the sunny halls of the Villa d'Albertis, the Soviet Republic announced the principle that has guided it in debt negotiations from that day to this: We pay if you give.

The Bolsheviks argued that it would be idle for them to accept the burden of foreign debt payments when they were unable to make such payments. But credits from abroad would yield a profit when invested by the Russians in the reconstruction of their country, and out of that profit regular transfers could be made on account of debt settlement.

¹ See *Les Réclamations de la Russie aux Etats responsables de l'Intervention et du Blocus*. Genoa, 1922. Official Soviet Publication.

GERMANS FEAR A CONSPIRACY

The 'Big Soviet' in Lloyd George's villa discussed this question of credits, but the written Allied proposals submitted to the Communist plenipotentiaries contained no mention of them.

The knottiest problem the statesmen were called upon to solve was that of the socialization or nationalization of private property in Soviet Russia. Here no formula or principle could be found to bridge the gap between the French and British points of view and between these and the Russian position. The Bolsheviks refused compensation, and of course restitution.

In the end, therefore, the secret conclave in the Villa d'Albertis ended without a definite agreement but with the understanding, to which the Russians attached great importance, that in a final settlement the Bolshevik counter-claims would be juxtaposed to Russia's war debts and used to cancel them in part if not in their entirety.

THE GERMANS FEAR A CONSPIRACY

Throughout the conversations in the Villa d'Albertis the German delegation was in a state of extreme nervousness – it suspected that Russia would assert her rights under Article 116 of the Versailles Treaty and demand reparations of Germany together with the Allied Powers. 'The Allied and Associated Powers,' reads the pertinent paragraph of Article 116, 'formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the Present Treaty.' Insistence by Russia on this right would have meant not only a heavy increase in Germany's international financial burdens, but, what was almost as important, the political isolation of Germany.

Chicherin and Litvinov assure me that the question of reparations was never even broached in Lloyd George's villa, and prominent Germans with whom I have discussed the matter admit that the suspicion rested on a fundamental misconception of Bolshevik psychology.

At a Press conference in Genoa after the Rapallo Treaty was signed, one journalist asked Rakovsky, the Soviet spokesman, whether the new treaty did not conflict with the Treaty of Versailles. 'Treaty of Versailles?' said Rakovsky as if trying to recapture a vague memory, 'Treaty of Versailles? I know nothing

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about it.' The Bolsheviks had no official knowledge of the Paris Peace, they did not recognize Versailles, they rejected the principles on which it was based, and abhorred its spirit. Under the circumstances, they could not conceivably have attempted to draw advantages from it or from Germany's defeat in the World War.

The Germans, however, suffered under an unenviable psychological pressure during these days; nobody wished to see them or talk with them. A funereal atmosphere filled the Hotel Eden where the German delegation was quartered. From the very beginning of the Genoa Conference the Germans had felt very much alone and as the days of the Villa d'Albertis conversations followed one another, Rathenau and Wirth were so despondent that they even weighed the advisability of requesting Berlin for orders to return home.

On April 13, the first day of the secret conclave in Lloyd George's villa, Rathenau made three requests for an interview with the British Prime Minister; two were in writing, one by telephone. All were refused. Then Chancellor Wirth tried – but in vain.

Rathenau and Wirth were disturbed by rumours that the Russians and the Allies proposed an agreement on German reparations under Article 116 of the Versailles Treaty, and found corroboration of their fears in the circumstances that this article was expressly mentioned in the London Memorandum prepared for the Genoa Conference.

That same day, Baron von Maltzan of the German Foreign Office and Dufour of the German Embassy in London discussed the matter with E. F. Wise, one of Lloyd George's secretaries. The Germans informed Wise of the Berlin draft of the proposed Russo-German treaty (later the Rapallo Treaty). They likewise told him that Lord D'Abernon, the British envoy in Berlin, had been apprised of the progress of these Berlin negotiations and of the fact that the Germans regarded them as a defence against the possible operation of that terrible Article 116.

This was a frank hint for transmission to Lloyd George that the Germans would feel compelled to sign a separate treaty with the Bolsheviks if the meetings in the Villa d'Albertis essayed to give content to Article 116. Yet the Germans were not at all

certain that the Russians would now be willing to enter into a agreement with them.

The next day, April 14, the conference in the Lloyd George villa continued, and the Germans continued distraught. Meanwhile Chicherin and Litvinov saw Wirth frequently and gave him an impression of pleasure with the way in which the pourparlers in the Villa d'Albertis were proceeding.

The situation had now become quite unbearable for the Germans. Again the leaders of the German delegation tried to establish contact with Lloyd George, and again they failed. German isolation was complete. Something had to be done.

RATHENAU AND MALTZAN

The German delegation was divided. At one pole stood Walther Rathenau, Minister of Foreign Affairs; at the other von Maltzan, chief of the Russian division of the Wilhelmstrasse. He found support in Wirth. Maltzan was Rathenau's subordinate, but he made up in energy and will-power what he lacked in rank. Maltzan was a strong, dominating, forward individual with no wish to understand details, legal formulæ or bureaucratic red tape. He accepted responsibility with alacrity; Rathenau with great caution. Rathenau was analytic and meticulous; a student, thinker, orator, and writer.

Rathenau still hoped that some *modus vivendi* on reparations would be found with the Entente. Carl Bergmann, the German expert, was busy discussing the subject in a Genoa hotel with Seydoux, the French delegate.¹ All realized that a compact with the Bolsheviks would torpedo these efforts.

But Maltzan dismissed these, to him minor, considerations. He wished to avoid an agreement between Russia and the Western world. He wanted Russia on the side of Germany and felt that objective conditions favoured such an alignment. He wanted friendship for Russia without sacrificing good relations with England, and saw in this double orientation Germany's only escape from foreign control.

It is not impossible that Maltzan never believed that the Bolsheviks were discussing reparations in the Villa d'Albertis. He

¹ *The History of Reparations*, by Carl Bergmann. London, 1927.

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may never have thought that Article 116 of Versailles would be applied to the detriment of Germany. Yet he used the argument for its effect on Rathenau, who was most susceptible to anything concerning reparations.

The Germans, in any event, realized that an agreement between Russia and the Entente would be disastrous even if Article 116 did not become operative. For it would have created for Germany a state of permanent isolation which would be far more intolerable than the isolation they were experiencing during these very unpleasant days in Genoa.

Rathenau, being an extremely sensitive man, felt the offence of that isolation more keenly perhaps than other German plenipotentiaries. Maltzan played on that feeling. The results seemed to justify further pourparlers with the Russians.

THE RAPALLO TREATY

On the third day of the Villa d'Albertis conversations, Maltzan made an appointment to meet Rakovsky and Joffe at 10 a.m. in a Genoese café. The Germans skilfully sounded the Muscovites on the resumption of their Berlin treaty negotiations. Obviously, he said, there could be no question of German industrial assistance to Russia in case of an understanding with the Allies. Maltzan likewise pressed the point of certain political advantages. Rakovsky and Joffe replied that they attached great importance to co-operation with Germany, and that Russia was not at all averse to signing a treaty with Berlin. (The Germans immediately reported this possibility to members of the British delegation.)

Saturday evening the atmosphere in the Hotel Eden was blacker than ever. For rumour had it that the negotiations in the Villa d'Albertis stood on the verge of successful conclusion. In sour spirit, the German delegation went early to bed.

At one in the morning – it was Easter Sunday – a telephone call from Joffe awakened Maltzan. Would not the Germans come to Hotel St. Margherite, the Russian headquarters in Rapallo, at 11 the next morning, Joffe asked, to resume the Berlin conversations? 'And what about the Villa d'Albertis negotiations?' Maltzan inquired. Those, came the reply across the wire, were proceeding satisfactorily, though no agreement had yet been

THE RAPALLO TREATY

reached. A recess had been declared over Easter Sunday and Monday.

Maltzan now aroused the entire German delegation and the famous 'pyjama party' took place which preceded the Rapallo Treaty. They conferred from one until three in the morning. Rathenau still opposed a separate pact with the Russians, though his opposition had weakened. Maltzan enthusiastically favoured it. Wirth sided with him. One consideration was, 'What will Berlin say?' for they knew in Genoa that President Ebert and the Social Democrats were convinced Westerners and would object to a treaty with the Bolsheviks. (Ebert's objections were ironed out in long telephone conversations later in the day.)

Finally the German delegation decided to motor to Rapallo, and at 7 a.m. they 'phoned the decision to Chicherin. At 7.30, with characteristic caution, the Germans tried to pass on this information to the British. But Mr. Wise could not be reached.

At noon on Easter Sunday, an automobile bearing Rathenau, Maltzan, and State Secretary von Simson drew up in front of the Hotel St. Margherite. Later Wirth came, and Gaus and others. A conference between Chicherin and Rathenau first dealt with general principles, and then Litvinov retired into a quiet chamber with Maltzan and Gaus to formulate the exact text.

Despite a protracted intermission for lunch and several little recesses to permit the two delegations to determine their own policies on disputed subjects, the treaty was ready for signing at 5 p.m., and at 6.30 p.m. Chicherin and Rathenau affixed their signatures to the historic document.¹

By the terms of the Rapallo Treaty, 'Germany and the R.S.F.S.R. mutually renounce compensation for their war damages' and 'for civil damages . . . caused by the forcible

¹ Lord D'Abernon, formerly British ambassador to Germany, relates 'Rapallo Treaty Secrets' in an instalment of his book *An Ambassador of Peace*, which appeared in the London *Daily Telegraph* of December 13, 1928. His description of the events that befell in Rapallo and Genoa is based on a conversation with Maltzan in October, 1926, and differs in many details and, what is more important, in general tone from Count Harry Kessler's story as he compiled it from Maltzan's own notes at the time the treaty was signed, and from the recollections of the principal German plenipotentiaries at Genoa. D'Abernon's account likewise does not agree with information from Russian sources.

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measures of the State authorities of the other party.' Germany thus recognized the Bolshevik act of nationalization and forfeited all claims to compensation for damages resulting from that act.

Article 2 practically repeats the same German renunciation of claims upon the R.S.F.S.R. and the same recognition of Bolshevik expropriatory measures, but adds the highly important condition 'that the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. does not satisfy similar claims of other States.' As long as Russia paid no debts or reparations to other Powers, Germany would present no claims. But the moment Moscow essayed to satisfy the claims of England or France or the United States or even Luxemburg, Germany would be entitled, by this provision, to similar treatment.

Article 3 provided for the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations. No mention is made of *de jure* recognition because that had already been granted at Brest Litovsk.

The most-favoured-nation principle found mutual approval in the next article, while in Article 5 the German Government promised to assist private German firms – with State-guaranteed credits? – in the extension of their contracts with the Soviets.

Subsequently, the Soviet Republic of Ukraine signed a similar treaty with Berlin in which it renounced its special claims on account of damages caused by the German occupation in 1918.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RAPALLO TREATY

Both delegations were extremely pleased with their achievement. Both attached to the treaty tremendous significance. It was significant, first, as an unspoken protest of the anti-Versailles Powers against the Versailles Powers – and herein lies one explanation of the storm which the treaty loosed against Germany. But in the agreement there was likewise implicit close co-operation between Russia and Germany. This constituted the real object of French, Belgian, and other protests.

The treaty robbed the Entente of one of its most effective weapons against Moscow and Berlin: pressure by isolation. Germany, for once since the war, had discarded her rôle of passive object and taken the initiative in foreign policy. That move inter-

ferred with the Allies' plans with respect to Russia; a Russia befriended by Germany, the statesmen argued in their disappointment, could offer greater resistance to Western schemes for economic penetration by means of consortia, concessions, debt collections, 'Dawes' schemes, etc.

The negotiations in the Villa d'Albertis had gone awry. Debts, credits, and property formed the obstacles to an agreement. The Bolsheviks had, in fact, despaired of success from the very beginning, but contrived to create contrary impression on the Germans who were embittered and suspicious by reason of their mistreatment at Genoa.

The Germans might have waited until the complete failure of the Russians in Lloyd George's villa was common property. The British and the French might have informed the Germans of the failure. As it happened, the Bolsheviks adroitly utilized the short moment between the interruption of their discussions with the Allies and the inevitable resumption of the Allies' contact with the Germans to lead the Germans to the ink-well and quill.

The Germans probably lost little thereby. Herr Bergmann maintains that the Rapallo Treaty disrupted his reparations negotiations in Genoa. But what Seydoux, the French technical expert, said in Genoa was one thing; Poincaré's designs on the Ruhr mattered much more. The French Premier had entertained the idea of Ruhr occupation months before Genoa, and in the circumstances reparations agreements were obviously undesired.

The Rapallo Treaty, on the contrary, brought immediate as well as permanent benefits to Germany. Though she was excluded from the conference's deliberations on the Russian question – on the ground that she had already settled her affairs with the Bolsheviks – the Berlin delegation became the intermediary at Genoa between Moscow's representatives and those of the Allies. Germany's independence in concluding the treaty won her respect and consideration from the Versailles nations. As a result of the Genoa Conference, says Count Harry Kessler, Germany once more joined the rank of the Great Powers. This German authority even maintains that Germany was the only country that benefited from the conference. Russia was prevented from joining a concert of Western Powers; England drew closer to Germany and further away

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from France; new confidence inspired German foreign policy. But the chief gain was the bond forged between Moscow and Berlin.

§ THE NEW SITUATION

The Rapallo Treaty created a new and more difficult situation for the Allies. They had come to Genoa for the sole purpose of reaching a working agreement with Soviet Russia. They had presented certain demands in the Villa d'Albertis; Russia had rejected them. But the British, French, Italians and Belgians felt that Chicherin could not, in view of economic conditions at home, return to Moscow without some pledge of foreign assistance. Now, suddenly, he had received it from the Germans. That made pressure on Russia less effective and a one-sided agreement with Russia more distant. Allied assurance that the Communists could be compelled to accept outside help on the outsiders' terms and that the Red Republic would be opened to European exploitation began to wane.

The new situation widened the breach among the Allies. New alignments developed and new strategies were brought into play. After the Rapallo Treaty, negotiations continued between the Allies and Russia on the questions of debts and private property. Another talk over the teacups even took place in the park of the Villa d'Albertis where Lloyd George, Worthington-Evans, and Lord Birkenhead discussed the old problems with Chicherin and Litvinov. But the agreement with the Germans constituted an obstacle to an agreement with the other Powers. In Article 2 of the Rapallo document, Germany recognized the Bolsheviks' nationalization law, and renounced all private and governmental claims arising from it 'provided the Government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic does not satisfy similar claims of other States.' Any understanding with the Allies on debts would therefore, *ipso facto*, cancel this, perhaps the most important stipulation of the Russo-German compact, and, furthermore, constitute a voluntary assumption by Russia of financial obligations *vis-à-vis* Germany which, for all practical purposes, were annulled by the letter of the Rapallo Treaty. The same very weighty consideration still, to this day, plays a highly significant rôle in Soviet Russia's debt discussions with the French Government, with the

ALLIED MEMORANDUM OF MAY 2

British Government and British companies, and with private American creditors.

This new factor, plus an increased sense of assurance on Russia's part, as well as the Russian conviction that 'the idea of reciprocity . . . is not yet sufficiently shared by all the Powers,' in other words, that the Powers expected the Soviets alone to make sacrifices and concessions, prodded the Moscow delegation on to make its classic defence of Bolshevik debt policy.

¶ THE ALLIED MEMORANDUM OF MAY 2

The immediate excuse for this historic justification of the Communists' cancellation of foreign obligations and sequestration of foreign property was the Allied memorandum of May 2. But 'Allied' is somewhat of a misnomer, for Belgium refused to sign and France withheld her full approval; the Entente front was cleft in two.

Early in the Genoa Conference, a serious difference of opinion appeared between the British and the Franco-Belgians. It is succinctly put by Wickham Steed in his wire from Genoa on April 28.

'The British view,' he says, 'seems to be that the Allies can accept the Bolshevik principle of nationalization provided that private properties which have been seized be returned to their owners on a ninety-nine years' lease. The Belgian view is, on the contrary, that the maintenance of the freehold principle is essential. . . .'

Belgium and France demanded full restitution of private property; the British would have contented themselves with a century concession.

There is, undoubtedly, a sharp distinction between the theory of complete ownership and of a limited lease. But in practice in the unique conditions of Soviet Russia, the difference was the same as between six and half a dozen. For if the former owners and their Governments felt that a ninety-nine years contract offered insufficient protection because the Bolsheviks could any day arbitrarily annul it, they surely realized that the Communists would just as arbitrarily annul the unconditional restitution of their property. Yet try as he did, even Lloyd George could not bridge the gap between the two points of view – probably because the difficulty

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lay not so much in the divergence of the formulæ as in the varying motives and purposes of their drafters.

The memorandum of May 2 said: 'France, by reason of the effort which she is obliged to make in order to restore her own devastated areas, cannot at this moment afford direct financial assistance for the reconstruction of Russia.' Here, above the signatures of the Great Powers, is one explanation of French tactics – France had too little money to invest in a grandiose scheme like a 'Dawes' Plan or 'Europa Consortium' or any other form of large-scale economic domination in Russia. She could therefore wait, and in the meantime insist on her maximum demands, safe in the assurance that the Bolsheviks would not accept them. The position, and policy, of Belgium were not dissimilar.

The United States, too, felt that the time was not yet ripe for a general settlement with Russia because the Bolsheviks still refused to capitulate and accept outside dictation. When that day came, America, and France, and Belgium hoped to be in a position to exploit the opportunity. In the meantime, no partial solution must be undertaken which, by bolstering up Bolshevik economy, would retard the downward development in the Soviet Republic.

At Genoa, France was faced with the alternative of accepting Russian proposals to pay debts and grant time-limited concessions, most of which would have fallen to the English, or to demand the freehold principle and complete restitution of private, confiscated properties. In the Bolshevik reply to the memorandum of May 2, the Russian delegation could not

'refrain from expressing its surprise that Powers like France, in which are found the majority of the small holders of Russian bonds, should have insisted most upon the restitution of property, thus subordinating the interests of the small holders of Russian bonds to those of certain groups who demand the restitution of property.'

This, Chicherin observed, indicated that the Paris Government was prepared to sacrifice a large number of petty capitalists for the sake of a small number of big capitalists.

Once again, as in her reaction to the Prinkipo and Bullitt proposals, and in her whole interventionist policy in Soviet Russia, France took up the cudgels on behalf of the heavy industrialists

PETROLEUM POLITICS

rather than of the many hundred thousands of peasant voters who had loaned billions to the Czar's realm. The Bolsheviks emphasized, in their memorandum of May 11,¹ that 'the Russian Government is determined to respect the interests of the small bondholders'; but Poincaré and Barthou were not impressed.

The Quai d'Orsay's position, however, did not lack rhyme and reason. Huge French – and Belgian – investments had been made in the Don and Ukrainian coal and metallurgical industries – the same investments which played their rôle in the geography of French interventionist and *cordon sanitaire* efforts. There was another factor. It was oil.

§ PETROLEUM POLITICS

When the pourparlers in the Villa d'Albertis failed, there followed the memorandum of May 2 which Belgium did not sign and which France did not approve – which, in effect, was accordingly a British product.

The 'Allies' who signed the memorandum could 'admit no liability for the claims' of Russia on account of foreign intervention; nevertheless, they agreed not to press the repayment of war debts 'at present.' In the matter of antebellum debts and obligations, however, the Bolsheviks were required to recognize those contracted by the Imperial Czarist Government, and 'to conclude an arrangement within twelve months . . . for re-starting of the service of the loans and the payment of the bills.'

Assuming an appreciable scaling-down of Russia's pre-war debts, and a definition of the 'at present' phrase with reference to pre-war debts, assuming also the granting of sufficient credits to the Soviet Government to enable it to resume the service and repayment of these obligations, the memorandum's demands may conceivably have proved the basis for further negotiations leading finally to a settlement. But private properties were a stumbling-block.

Article VII of the memorandum of May 2 presented the British proposals for meeting the problem of Soviet nationalization of foreign property. This article, more than any other, frustrated all efforts towards agreement.

¹ Full text in British Blue Book, Cmd. 1667. 1922.

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By its terms, the Soviet Government is required to restore confiscated properties, and, where that is impossible, to pay compensation. This is the general, theoretic scheme. Practically – ‘In cases in which the Russian Soviet Government cannot give back the property it shall not be entitled to hand it over hereafter to other parties.’ The Bolsheviks could not, for instance, give the Royal Dutch-Shell a concession to the entire Baku field and compensate the former owners of parts of that field not previously held by Sir Henri Deterding. No, each plot must be returned to its proprietor, or, where that is impossible, it must lie unused. Since such a scheme might prove unworkable, however, the very next paragraph of the article annuls it. ‘If the exploitation of the property,’ it reads, ‘can only be ensured by its merger in a larger group, the preceding provision shall not apply.’ Now the road was open to merger-concessions of the type which the Royal Dutch proposed to obtain in the Caucasus.

Obviously, Deterding could not adopt the Bolshevik method of dispossessing fellow-capitalists. He, accordingly, planned to absorb them into his concession and permit them to help finance the undertaking. But this arrangement would have obliged him to accept the partnership of the Standard Oil, since it too claimed a portion of Baku. To block such preferential treatment of the Shell’s chief rival in the world oil industry, the British injected yet a third paragraph into the mooted article which defined a ‘previous owner’ as a company controlled by foreign nationals ‘*at the date of nationalization.*’ The date of nationalization was 1917. The Standard Oil had bought its claim in 1920. The claim of the Standard Oil thus suffered cancellation under Article VII, and the American trust was effectively barred from participation in the merger-concession contemplated by the Royal Dutch. French interests consisting of papers purchased on the Paris Bourse subsequent to 1918 were similarly excluded.

¶ DETERDING’S CONCESSION

Article VII, in effect, paved the way to a Soviet concession to the Royal Dutch-Shell in which some small companies might participate but not Deterding’s chief rival, the Standard Oil.

Henri Rollin, special Genoa correspondent of the Paris *Temps*,

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now wired his newspaper a long and sensational story in which he definitely affirmed that the Shell concession had already been signed. Excitement knew no bounds. Denials, affirmations, and declarations filled the air.

'The Press is full of oil to-day,' telegraphed the Paris correspondent of the London *Times* on May 7. 'Movements of oil magnates and alleged draft agreements to sign which the Bolsheviks are only awaiting the end of the conference.' The Quai d'Orsay was aroused.

'... the French have at last awakened to the desirability of being specially represented at Genoa in the matter of oil,' continued the correspondent, 'and M. Laurent-Eynac, Under-Secretary of State for Aeronautics [and in 1920 Chief Commissar for Petroleum Affairs. — L. F.] has gone there to keep an eye on the proceedings of foreign oil negotiations.'

With him went General Gassouin, president of the Standard Franco-Americaine, the Standard Oil subsidiary in France, and M. Pineau, head of the oil section of the French Ministry of Commerce.

But the French, prior to the Bolshevik revolution, had invested very little in the Russian oil industry. The official Czarist figure is 51,115,000 roubles. Belgian participation amounted to 6,812,500 roubles.¹ No large French or Belgian companies operated in the Caucasus before the War. French petroleum efforts at Genoa therefore aroused the suspicion that France acted as the 'Prætorian guard'² for the Standard Oil trust.

This now became the central idea of a hypothesis on which a number of observers essayed to fathom the secret of the Genoa Conference.

The London *News of the World*, owned by Lord Riddell, a personal friend of Lloyd George who himself attended the Genoa Conference and in all probability received his inspiration, if not all his information, from the chief of the British delegation, wrote on May 6:

¹ *Foreign Capital in Russia*, by Professor P. V. Ohl. Petrograd, 1922. Page 105. The compilation is based on the records of Czarist ministries.

² Berlin *Lokal Anzeiger*, May 11, 1922.

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‘The Standard Oil Company, one of the greatest secret forces of the world, is now fighting to prevent a Russian settlement on lines which they believe would give British oil interests virtual control of the great Russian oil industry.’

How?

‘It is believed,’ the paper explains, ‘that before the publication of the story [of the Shell concession. – L. F.] American oil interests had been active in Belgium and Paris, warning the Governments concerned against so-called British greed. Belgium’s demand for the return of private property without leaving Russia the option of compensation, and the French amendment to the Russian memorandum may both have been thus influenced. It is also known that American oil interests brought pressure to bear at Washington to obtain a declaration from the American Government in favour of an open-door policy in Russia.’

Mr. Bedford, of the Standard Oil Company, had declared himself in favour of the open door in Russia. ‘A fair and equal economic opportunity’ was his formula. Mr. Bedford interviewed Mr. Hughes in the Washington State Department at this juncture. A few days later, on May 11, R. W. Child, United States ambassador in Italy, issued a statement in Genoa in which, after referring to the petroleum issue and to America’s policy of protecting ‘in Europe and elsewhere American citizens who have properties and rights that require protection,’ he announced that ‘the United States will never consent that any scheme whatsoever, national or international, shall be applied unless it takes account of the principle of the open door for all and recognized equal rights for all.’

The reference is obviously to the rumoured Deterding concession, ‘Any scheme whatsoever, national or international,’ is quite clear in its connotation. The open door meant, in this instance, equal rights in the Caucasus for Mr. Bedford’s Standard Oil.

The intimate relationship between the open-door principle, the Standard Oil, the Deterding concession in Russia, the State Department and Mr. Child on the one hand, and the French and Belgian attitude towards nationalized private property on the other, naturally did not escape so skilled and experienced an observer as Wickham Steed, the editor of the London *Times*.

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'As regards the Standard Oil,' he telegraphed on May 9, 'which wields great influence in the United States, it must be remembered that its acquisition of the oil rights of the Nobel Brothers in South Russia some time ago gives it a distinct status in Russian oil negotiations.

'This status,' he continued, 'clearly lends point to the *support given by the United States to the French and Belgian attitude in regard to private property in Russia*, as also to the polite invitation which the leading delegations here have received from the American ambassador' concerning the open door. [Italics mine. — L. F.]

Mr. Steed's sequence is: Standard Oil, Shell concession negotiations, French and Belgian policy on property, Mr. Child, open door.

Great Britain knew, from a regretted experience, that the United States must not be defied when it championed the principle of the open door. Downing Street had been taught that lesson in the eighteen months' controversy over the Mesopotamian and Palestinian oilfields, a controversy which ended with victory for the State Department and Standard Oil.¹ America's political and economic influence had become too powerful since the War, and European States were too dependent on financial arrangements with Wall Street and Washington to permit of effective resistance against the serious wishes of the United States Government and United States business interests.

Mr. Child's activity on behalf of the open door was, accordingly, the *finita la comedia* of Genoa. The United States would not tolerate a concession to a British company that barred the Standard; therefore Deterding could accept none. Under the circumstances, a solution of the problem of private property, the most difficult obstacle to relations between Russia and the Western Powers, was impossible. The conversations in the Villa d'Albertis had proven that no *modus vivendi* on debts or credits could be found. The conference was a failure.

¹ British White Paper. *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories*. Cmd. 1226. London, 1921.

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§ COMMUNIST JUSTIFICATION OF DEBT CANCELLATION

There being nothing to lose, the Soviet spokesmen proceeded to give the world the classic Bolshevik justification of the debt annulment policy. It was contained in the Soviet reply of May 11 to the 'Allied' memorandum of May 2.¹

'More than one of the States represented at the Conference of Genoa,' read the Soviet note, 'have in the past repudiated debts and obligations contracted by it; more than one State has confiscated and sequestered the property of foreigners, or of its own nationals, without having been subjected on that account to the ostracism of which Soviet Russia has been the victim.'

Illustrations followed to show that

'Governments and systems that spring from revolution are not bound to respect the obligations of fallen Governments.

'The French Convention, of which France declares herself to be the legitimate successor, proclaimed on the 22nd December, 1792, that "the sovereignty of peoples is not bound by the treaties of tyrants." In accordance with this declaration, revolutionary France not only tore up the political treaties of former regimes with foreign countries, but also repudiated her national debt. . . .'

Other examples were cited.

Therefore, and 'In conformity with these precedents, Russia cannot be obliged to assume any responsibility whatever toward foreign Powers and their nationals for the cancellation of public debts, and for the nationalization of private property.'

But the Bolsheviks had been willing to negotiate on these matters. They had indeed, in 1919, offered to recognize as well as pay their obligations. Why? The Soviet delegation answered this question obliquely by saying that after the French debt repudiation in 1792, 'She [France] consented to pay only one-third of that debt, and that from motives of political expediency.' It was political expediency – and economic and military pressure –

¹ British Blue Book. *Papers relating to the International Economic Conference, Genoa, April–May, 1922*. Cmd. 1667. London, 1922.

SOVIET CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

which prompted the Russians to make their Prinkipo and Bullitt proposals. Political and economic motives likewise actuated them in the early stages of the Genoa Conference. They had hoped, by means of debt recognition and payment, to win peace, credits, recognition, and investments by foreign concessionaires. When these hopes proved illusory, partial withdrawal of their original debt repudiation no longer seemed expedient.

¶ SOVIET CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

As there was historic precedent for debt repudiation, the Russian note submitted, so there was precedent for compensation for damage done by an outside party during civil war. The memorandum cited one instance:

‘the decision of the Court of Arbitration at Geneva of September 14, 1872, condemning Great Britain to pay to the United States \$15,500,000 for the damages done to that country by the privateer *Alabama* which, in the Civil War between the Northern and Southern States, gave help to the latter.’

On this principle the Bolsheviks demanded 50,000,000,000 francs for damage done by foreign Powers during the Russian Civil War.

Yet it is clear now that the Soviets would have dropped these claims had reciprocal considerations been offered. Indeed, the Russian memorandum of May 11 left the door open.

‘Russia is still prepared,’ it said . . . ‘to consent to important concessions to the foreign Powers, but on the absolute condition that equivalent concessions in favour of the Russian people shall be made by the other contracting party. The popular masses of Russia could not accept an agreement in which concessions were not balanced by real advantage.’

I was able to convince myself that the plain folk in the Soviet Republic really felt very strongly on this matter. In 1924, I travelled through numerous villages in Central Russia. The dailies had carried the news of an impending debt agreement with the MacDonald Cabinet in England. ‘And will it not mean heavier taxes?’ the peasants asked. ‘Why should we pay the foreigners?’

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'They are richer than we.' One essayed to explain that credits and perhaps loans might follow the settlement. With these, Russia's agriculture and industries would be rehabilitated the faster. The mujhik sometimes saw the point, but he remained sceptical, and such scepticism certainly exerts a passive pressure on Moscow even when it does not find active expression in Soviet congresses and in meetings of the Central Executive Committee. In 1922, so soon after millions of Russians had seen the destruction wrought by foreign armies and their White subsidiaries and felt the effect of intervention on their own flesh and homesteads, an agreement to reward the Powers by paying debts – so the man on the street would have interpreted it – may have been supremely unpopular. If Russia had consented to pay debts and the Allies to pay counter-claims, the arrangement might have been pronounced fair. If the Allies had refused to repair the damages but granted the credits with which the Russians could do so, a basis for agreement might have been available. But what the Allies offered at Genoa did not seem to the Russians to warrant any sacrifices.

As a reply to the Russian Memorandum of May 11, it was decided by the Allies to summon another conference at The Hague in June to deal with 'all outstanding questions relating to debts, private property, and credits.' This was in effect an admission of the failure of Genoa. *All* questions were outstanding.

The two worlds, to be sure, now had a better understanding of one another. They had worked, dined, and laughed together. Practically, the conference established several principles: that Moscow would recognize and pay pre-war debts; that the Bolsheviks would grant concessions to former owners but would refuse to compensate them directly or restitute their property outright; that the Soviets would withdraw their counter-claims if they received credits; that Great Britain would not demand the restitution of nationalized property; and that the Powers would cancel or reduce Russia's World War obligations in consideration of her counter-claims. This represented an advance. But nothing was definitely settled. Genoa brought no concessions, no credits, no debt agreements, and no *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government.

IN THE ROYAL DUTCH CAPITAL

Following a Bolshevik suggestion, which Lloyd George seized with avidity in an attempt to avoid the political consequences of defeat, the Genoa Conference decided to resurrect itself at The Hague in June.

The United States refused to attend. Germany was not invited. The British Government's attitude on private property remained the same as in Genoa. The French Government's attitude remained unchanged.

Obviously, therefore, the second act of Genoa could achieve success only if the Bolsheviks radically modified their previous position. The Western Powers trusted in the Russian economic crisis to make the Communists more conciliatory. Yet no prominent statesmen ventured the risk of failure by attending the Hague Conference in person. All the countries, except the Soviet Republic, delegated experts armed only with *ad referendum* powers.

The pomp and publicity of Genoa would not be The Hague's. Unlike Genoa, it would not be honoured with the blessing of the Pope or the presence of Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Archbishops. Nor would the world look to it so eagerly for the inauguration of a new era of European economic reconstruction.

§ BOLSHIEVİK POLICY

The Bolsheviks were pessimistic. 'We expected little from The Hague,' wrote Radek.¹ From the beginning we doubted the success of the conference, said Sokolnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation.²

Nevertheless, and in view of their desire to reach an agreement with the Western Powers, Litvinov, the chief of the Soviet representatives to The Hague, took with him to the conference proposals which, the Bolsheviks thought, might pave the way to a settlement.

The Bolsheviks considered their position more moderate than

¹ Moscow *Pravda* editorial, July 18, 1922.

² *Izvestia*, July 25, 1922.

IN THE ROYAL DUTCH CAPITAL

that of the Soviet delegation at Genoa. At Genoa the Bolsheviks demanded Government loans or Government credits. In The Hague 'we changed our demands to such an extent,' said Litvinov at the July 14 session of the Sub-Commission on Credits, 'that we now agree to ask credits only from the industrialists. These, however, must have a Government guarantee.'¹

During the Genoa Conference, moreover, 'we categorically refused to return that [private] property. We even refused to discuss the question of compensation.'² In The Hague, Litvinov accepted the principle of compensation for the former owners of nationalized property.

The non-Russian and Russian sections of the Hague Conference approached the problem from diametrically opposed extremes. Litvinov promised favourable consideration for the interests of former owners if Moscow first obtained credits. Sir Philip Lloyd Greame (later Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister), chief of the British experts and chairman of the Sub-Commission on Private Property, regarded the satisfaction of the former owners a necessary preliminary to the granting of credits.

The non-Russian half of the conference divided itself into three sub-commissions: on Private Property, on Debts, and on Credits. Officially, these commissions worked separately and apart. Accordingly, if a Bolshevik delegate, speaking at a meeting of the Sub-Commission on Private Property, referred to the relationship between that body's task and the subject of credits, he was out of order. Both or all three questions could be discussed only at a plenary session of the entire conference. But the only plenary session took place on the last day of the Hague Conference, at the insistence of the Russians, and when the deliberations of all three sub-commissions had broken down hopelessly.

THE BOLSHEVIK ARGUMENT

The Soviet Government would not hear of unconditional, permanent restitution of private property. 'The question of the restitution of private property . . . is utopian,' said Krassin.³

¹ *Hague Conference: June-July, 1922. Complete Stenographic Report.* Published by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Moscow, 1922. Page 165.

² *Ibid.*, page 164.

³ *Ibid.*, page 48.

THE BOLSHEVIK ARGUMENT

The non-Russians therefore inquired what form of compensation the Bolsheviks contemplated.

Moscow proposed to grant concessions and to make compensation. It consented to grant concessions not because it accepted the principle that the properties belonged to their former owners, but in order to hasten the economic rehabilitation of Russia. The Bolsheviks, however, would under no condition return to each foreign company the plant it had previously held. They would merely open bids for concessions to certain mines, oilfields, fisheries, forestries, factories, etc. Former owners could apply; so could people who had never done any business in Russia. The Soviet delegates at The Hague promised, however, that the former owners would receive favoured treatment in view of their valuable experience. This was no small advantage, Litvinov repeatedly stated at the sessions, and it was obvious from the attitude of the Bolsheviks that many of the properties that would revert to foreign management would be transferred, in the form of concessions, to their former owners. A *Pravda* editorial of June 17 made the same point and explained that once Russia was interested in attracting foreign capital she could have no desire to boycott the former owners.

The Russian delegation at The Hague submitted to the Sub-Commission on Private Property a long list of the plants and natural resources the Soviet Government intended to open to foreign exploitation.¹ It began with oilfields, and listed mines, chemical, electrical, and match industries, and farms. It included property formerly operated by foreigners, but also properties formerly owned by the Russian state. It did not include all properties formerly operated by foreigners. The Bolsheviks argued that some nationalized plant had been completely destroyed in the intervention period, while some was of such special importance that the Soviet Government wished to retain it.

The Bolshevik delegation likewise examined into the question of compensating former owners with money or bonds.² And it wished, even before the Hague Conference closed, to arrive at a concrete debt settlement which would stipulate the total liability and the conditions of payment.

¹ *Ibid.*, pages 218 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, page 46.

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But no concessions would be granted, no compensation paid, and no debts refunded unless the Soviet Government obtained credits.

The Russians, first, justified their claims to credits on moral grounds. Intervention, they argued, did more harm to Russia than the revolution to foreigners. But while revolution resembled a phenomenon of nature governed by its own laws of uncontrollable operation, intervention was a deliberate, voluntary act. Those responsible for it therefore bore an obligation to contribute towards the removal of the debris.

The damage caused by intervention Litvinov estimated at 39 to 50 billion gold roubles. 'The war of 1914-17,' he said, 'and the interventionist wars of 1918-20, swallowed five-twelfths of the national wealth of Russia.'¹ The first stage of reconstruction which the Bolsheviks now contemplated required, according to Communist experts, a foreign credit of 3,224,000,000 gold roubles.²

Credits could be granted by the Western Governments. However, since this seemed a vain hope, the Bolsheviks declared that the credits would have to receive the guarantee of the various Powers. Without such a guarantee, and if financial assistance were obtainable only from private sources, the Bolsheviks saw no advantage in discussing the subject with Governments, or in placing their conditions before official representatives.

Credits were a *sine qua non* for many reasons, the Muscovite delegates insisted. 'How can I answer any question regarding the compensation of foreign owners,' Litvinov asked at the conference, 'without knowing what will be the financial position of the Soviet Government three or five years from to-day?'³ 'If I told you,' he added, 'that we would pay compensation within a year or two, nobody would believe me. But given some knowledge of the probable measure of foreign aid, the Bolsheviks would undertake a detailed consideration of payments to former owners of nationalized properties and to the holders of Russian bonds.'

¹ *Hague Conference. June-July, 1922. Complete Stenographic Report.* Published by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Moscow, 1922. Page 134.

² *Ibid.*, page 133.

³ *Ibid.*, page 69.

POSITION OF THE NON-RUSSIANS

Even concessions depended on credits, the Moscow thesis continued. Only a fraction of the industrial and agricultural units in Russia would be leased to foreigners. The rest would be directed by the State. The Government, for instance, would itself manage the railways. They were considered too important economically and politically to be rented to foreigners. Every concessionaire would therefore have to resort to the state for transport facilities, and if the Government disposed of no funds for railway rehabilitation, the foreigner would be correspondingly handicapped. This applied with equal force to other branches of economy.

But apart from all else, the Bolsheviks must have asked themselves why they should voluntarily assume the burden of payments to foreigners and meet the demands of former owners without receiving something in return.

THE POSITION OF THE NON-RUSSIANS

The non-Russians at the Hague Conference replied that by acceding to the demands of the foreigners the Bolsheviks would re-establish confidence in their good faith and stability and thereby receive something of far greater value than Government-guaranteed loans or credits. The world must know, Sir Philip Lloyd Greame declared, that industry in Russia was being conducted efficiently and profitably; then it would give financial assistance.

‘The entire problem of attracting foreign capital for the restoration of a given branch of industry,’ he said, ‘will depend on two conditions: on the employment of good managers for the exploitation of the plants, and on a guarantee of the viability of these enterprises.’¹

In a word, ‘it was absolutely clear to him,’ to Sir Philip, ‘that it would be impossible to find either Government or private credits as long as private property owners were not granted satisfactory terms.’²

The concessions policy of the Russians displeased the non-Russians. Only a part of the plants of former owners would be leased to foreigners. There was no guarantee that even this part would revert to the former owners; it might be granted in the

¹ *Ibid.*, page 36.

² *Ibid.*, page 44.

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form of concessions to new-comers. Moreover, no concession terms had been announced. Would a concessionaire enjoy the right to sell or rent his concession, could he import and export freely, could he market his produce in the country, would he be excessively taxed? The fact that individual negotiations would precede the granting of each concession likewise failed to satisfy the experts of the Western Powers.

The essence of the non-Russians' programme was: Dispel the uncertainty and distrust with which the outside world looks at Soviet Russia. Then private investment would follow naturally.

§ DIFFERENCES AMONG THE NON-RUSSIANS

During the greater part of the Hague Conference, the relationship of the British and the Italians to the Bolsheviks was more cordial than that of the French and the Belgians. This difference arose from a divergence of opinion on the most important subject which engaged the conference: the question of private property. At Genoa, Lloyd George had accepted the lease or concession principle. The French had insisted on unconditional restitution.

In the interval between Genoa and The Hague, Great Britain reiterated her position. On June 1, the French Foreign Office had dispatched a memorandum to London which resumed the arguments advanced by Barthou at Genoa. On June 10, the British reply took sharp exception to the Paris point of view. 'In the matter of private property . . .' reads the English rejoinder, 'the French Government contend that foreign claimants have the right to demand its return. . . . His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a contention.' The British declared that

'every State has the right compulsorily to acquire private property, whatsoever its nature, on payment of just compensation. . . . Whether the Russian Government makes restitution of private property alienated from its owners, or pays compensation for it, is a matter solely for the Russian Government.'

This written statement was made when the British authorities were in possession of nothing more than the vague promises given by the Russians at the Genoa Conference. Litvinov's concession

NON-RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES

offers in The Hague and the apparent readiness of Moscow to pay compensation and settle debt problems confirmed England's relatively moderate policy.

Nor did Rome insist on restitution. Indeed, M. Venturi, the Italian expert, stated that it was 'useless to distinguish between restitution and concessions because the terms of the concessions may prove completely satisfactory to the former owner.'

Nevertheless, the conflict between the two factions in the non-Russian camp was carefully concealed, and only very infrequently did the tactful words of the diplomatic experts permit the outsider to suspect a lack of harmony.

The problem of 'Restitution or Concession' had torpedoed the Genoa Conference. Rather than yield one inch of the British position, Lloyd George had permitted the conference which was to have been the crowning glory of his political career to end in failure. The British Prime Minister had endangered the Entente and incurred the enmity of France by his insistence. His antagonism to the Franco-Belgian thesis of restitution continued after Genoa. It had undergone no change as late as June 10.

Yet on July 12, during the course of a session of the Sub-Commission on Private Property at The Hague, The British Government executed a sudden *volte face* and adopted the Paris-Brussels viewpoint. Sir Philip Lloyd Greame said:

'it has been perfectly plain to everybody that the only effective form of compensation for seized property within the power of the Russian Government to make at the present moment is the restitution of the property concerned wherever possible. . . . We came here to learn what could be restored.'

Cattier, the Belgian expert, agreed. 'The Russian Government,' he declared, 'must restore the property or give real compensation. There is no other alternative.'

As long as the possibility existed that the British advocacy of concessions might prevail, the negotiations at The Hague enjoyed some prospect of success. But when the intransigent Franco-Belgian policy of restitution was adopted by the British, the situation became hopeless. Immediately, the impasse in the Sub-Commission on Private Property communicated itself to the Sub-

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Commissions on Debts and Credits, and on the 14th of July all three had discontinued their activities. The work of the Hague Conference was at an end.

¶ A NEW BOLSHEVIK PROPOSAL

Although the Russians at The Hague had offered terms far more moderate than those of Genoa, Litvinov would not allow the delegates to disperse without making one more attempt to reach a settlement. He therefore insisted that a plenary session of the conference be convened to listen to a new Bolshevik proposal.

When his request was granted, Litvinov informed the conference that he proposed, if the experts agreed, to request his Government for new instructions – to inquire of Moscow ‘whether the Russian Government consents to recognize the obligations of the former Russian Government to foreign citizens even if credits . . . would not be available at the present time?’ Credits had been the Bolshevik *sine qua non*. Now the head of the Soviet delegation at least admitted the possibility of the withdrawal of this condition. He would likewise inquire whether Moscow would, in the absence of credits, grant compensation, in the form of concessions or of equally concrete values, to former owners of sequestered property.

Litvinov first aired this suggestion at a private dinner at which he, Leslie Urquhart, Sir Sidney Chapman and Krassin were present. In the session, Sir Philip Lloyd Greame attached ‘extraordinary importance’ to Litvinov’s plan and felt that it ‘represented a new epoch in their negotiations.’ But Cattier, who expressed the Franco-Belgian view, gave the Litvinov declaration a different and less favourable interpretation. At this juncture, the chairman, however, interrupted the discussion and asked the Russians when the reply from Moscow might be expected. Within four days to a week, Litvinov answered. Herewith, the first and only plenary session of the Hague Conference adjourned.

The non-Russian representatives had not tried to dissuade Litvinov from consulting his Government. They had, in some instances, declared their interest in his proposal. They knew that not even a telegraphic reply could be placed before them before four days. Yet on July 20, twenty-four hours after Litvinov had

UNITED STATES AND THE HAGUE

appeared before the plenary session, the non-Russians met and declared the Hague Conference closed. At the same time they adopted a resolution recommending that all Governments refrain from assisting their nationals in acquiring properties in Russia which had not belonged to those nationals prior to the Bolshevik act of expropriation. Mr. Cattier, who moved this resolution, stated that the United States Government approved of its contents and had authorized him to make a public announcement to that effect.

¶ THE UNITED STATES AND THE HAGUE

Why should the American Government have been so eager to make known its agreement with the resolution? What was the exact meaning and significance of the resolution? Why did the conference adjourn immediately after receiving an 'epoch-making' proposal from the Russians which may have provided a more promising basis for further negotiations? Why did the British, after persistently defending the concessions policy, unexpectedly accept the restitution principle? – All these puzzles suggest that even more happened at the Hague Conference than is revealed by its stenographic record. . . .

France had loaned most money to pre-war Russia. Yet France was most opposed to the repayment of Russia's pre-war loans as proposed by Chicherin in Genoa and by Litvinov in The Hague. Even to France, whose financial stake in Russian debts was far greater than in Russian private property, the chief issue remained private property.

The United States, on the contrary, lent very little to the Czar's Government. Nor did Americans invest heavily in Russian industry. Moreover, such property as United States nationals had held – the Luberetzky factory of the International Harvester Company and the Petrograd plant of Westinghouse Brake – had never undergone nationalization. The only large American interest involved in the Soviet treatment of private property was the claim to Baku which the Standard Oil purchased from Nobel, a Russian citizen, in 1920. Even those authorities who dispute the right of a State to alienate the wealth of foreigners, concede that law and precedent are on the side of a Government which confis-

cates the property of its own citizens. And the Russians would add that in buying a claim to oilfields subsequent to the decree of nationalization from a seller who was no longer the owner, the Standard Oil speculated on the fall of the Soviet Government or on the cancellation of the Nationalization Act.

The Standard Oil claim was the only American interest involved in M. Cattier's motion of July 20 which the United States State Department had, by procedure uncommon in diplomacy, seen fit to endorse. Several French journalists at The Hague, in fact, suspected that the Cattier resolution had been drafted at Washington and submitted to the American minister in Holland with whom, as the press reported, Cattier had held frequent conferences during the course of The Hague deliberations.

The resolution of July 20 testified to America's enormously increased political prestige after the World War. It specifically provided that in matters relating to foreign private property in Russia 'no decision shall be come to except jointly with those Governments' not represented at The Hague. All important, and many minor countries – Albania, for instance, sent delegates to the conference. Germany abstained, but Germany had settled its differences with Russia by the Rapallo Treaty. 'Those Governments' in the resolution therefore referred solely to the Government of the United States and implied that no solution of the problem of private property in Russia would be undertaken without first consulting Washington. France and Belgium thus assured themselves of the powerful support of America in their struggle against the British policy towards Russian concessions.

The Cattier resolution suggested that the Governments refuse to assist their citizens in acquiring property in Russia which had not belonged to them before the Soviet act of nationalization unless the real owners consented. The 'Allied' memorandum of May 2, which was submitted to the Russians at Genoa without the signature of Belgium or the approval of France and which was therefore a British-Italian document, had provided for the very opposite. Within the phraseology of its pivotal article, Article VII, the oilfields claimed by the Standard Oil might have been granted as a concession to the Royal Dutch-Shell or to some other firm, and the sequestered properties of other foreigners could, 'if the

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exploitation of the property can only be assured by its merger in a larger group,' be handed over to parties who had not previously held them.

Article VII of the Genoa memorandum of May 2 might have been the introduction to a large Royal Dutch merger concession in Baku which would exclude the Standard Oil and forcibly absorb, as minor partners, the foreign companies that previously had mined oil on the shore of the Caspian. The Cattier resolution of the Hague Conference, to which England had subscribed, precluded these possibilities. It represented a victory for France and Belgium, for America's open-door policy, and for the Standard Oil. Great Britain and Italy were so isolated that they had felt constrained to agree, and the Royal Dutch-Shell again saw its alluring concession prospect fade further away into the distance.

§ BEHIND THE SCENES

On June 15, 1922, the very day on which the Hague Conference assembled, the Franco-Belgian Petrol Syndicate organized in Paris. The foundation of this syndicate had been laid at Genoa by M. Laurent-Eynac, an official representative of the French Government.¹ The chairman of the syndicate's first meeting was M. Pineau, director of the Essences and Petroles Service of the French Ministry of Commerce. He had accompanied Laurent-Eynac to Genoa.

The new syndicate immediately sent 'delegates' to The Hague who 'put themselves at the disposal of the French and Belgian experts.'² Mr. H. G. Trew of the British Spies Petroleum Company, Ltd., and Richard R. Tweed of the Baku Consolidated Oilfields, Ltd., likewise proceeded to The Hague, 'and behind the official doors conversations followed with Sir Henri Deterding and other representatives [Mr. Samuel and Colonel Boyle. - L. F.] of the Royal Dutch-Shell combination. One fancies that this was the Hague Conference which really mattered.'³ It was convened, according to the Paris *Temps*, by Sir Henri Deterding 'through the

¹ Paris *Journée Industrielle*, May 20, 1922, and *Matin*, May 19, 1922.

² *Le Courrier des Pétroles*. Paris, July 22, 1922.

³ *The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations*, Davenport and Cooke. London, 1923.

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President of the Hague Conference [the official one. – L. F.] and the various delegations.'

This petrol council held parallel meetings with the Hague Conference, and observers hinted that its deliberations were not without their effect on the official sessions.

The Bolshevik concession proposal at the Hague Conference satisfied none of the oil interests. It certainly did not please Deterding, who, in Genoa, had envisaged the possibility of Shell control over all of Baku and Grozni whereas the Russian offer in the Hague limited him to the lands his company had previously worked. Litvinov, moreover, made no definite pledge that all the expropriated owners would obtain leases to their former properties, nor did he outline concession terms that were concrete and acceptable. The petrol council, conferring behind the scenes in the Royal Dutch capital, accordingly closed its ranks and presented a united front of opposition towards Moscow's concessions policy.

The unanimity in 'the Hague Conference which really mattered' corresponded with the unexpected agreement between the Anglo-Italian and Franco-Belgian sections of the official conference: the Royal Dutch rejected the Bolshevik ideas on concessions, and Sir Philip Lloyd Greame accepted the Paris-Brussels thesis of restitution.

Faced by a new alignment of harmonious forces, the Russians resurrected their Genoa formula of a merger-monopoly concession.

'The Bolshevik spokesman,' reads a Hague telegram to the London *Daily Telegraph* of July 18, 'to-day made an important admission that Russia, instead of returning the various oil properties to their original owners, intended to form one general company to carry on all operations. The oil company which gets the contract to operate all the oil fields will be asked to satisfy the other claimants.'

This announcement has all the earmarks of Soviet concessions policy. Moscow prefers to avoid the responsibility and trouble of negotiating with all the interests which may have claim to a given property. They are rather disposed to grant a monopoly conces-

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sion to a foreign entrepreneur who, since he would not expropriate fellow-capitalists, would presumably reach an agreement with the other claimants. In 1925, the Soviet Government gave such a blanket lease to W. A. Harriman, of New York, for the Chiaturi manganese deposits, leaving Harriman to reach his own settlement with the previous foreign exploiters.

When the Soviet renewal of the merger-monopoly concession offer became known in The Hague, Sir Henri Deterding immediately attempted to win the Franco-Belgian Syndicate and the lesser British companies for the merger. He would readily have amalgamated with these in order to exclude his chief world rival, the Standard Oil.

The Belgians, it was said,¹ received Sir Henri's advances coldly, but the French reacted more favourably. The Royal Dutch-Shell controlled a large fraction of the French internal oil market and could, moreover, influence Parisian political and journalistic circles. France may also have responded to the possibility of debt payments which Litvinov's declaration to the plenary session of the Hague Conference opened for her.

But it was only for a moment. On the 20th, M. Cattier, the Belgian delegate, presented his motion. The State Department proclaimed America's agreement, and France and Britain followed. After the events of Cannes and Genoa, and in view of the Franco-British friction which characterized that period of post-war European politics, a common policy with America conformed more with Poincaré's taste – and offered him greater advantages – than joint action with England.

Throughout the Hague Conference, the question of private property dominated the proceedings. Debts, which involved far greater sums, were subordinated to it. And of the properties concerned, oilfields played the most conspicuous rôle.

§ SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF HAGUE CONFERENCE'S FAILURE

Returning from The Hague, Litvinov told the foreign journalists in Berlin that the reply of the Soviet Government to his in-

¹ *Courrier des Pétroles*. Paris, July 22, 1922.

tended telegraphic inquiry from The Hague would have satisfied England and a number of other countries. For this very reason, he said, the non-Russians dispersed before Moscow's answer could have been received. They did not wish to demonstrate their lack of unity.¹

Lloyd George was, at this period, involved in the Greco-Turkish war situation where France had it within her power seriously to undermine British prestige and perhaps even cause England territorial losses. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, vehemently opposed his Prime Minister's tactics and sought, with some success, to strengthen the Anglo-French entente.² Curzon's policy, therefore, did not tolerate friction with Poincaré on the Russian question. The Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, Curzon's biographer tells us, 'had always been looked on by Lord Curzon with feelings of cold disfavour.'³ The former Viceroy of India never trusted the Bolsheviks to refrain from propaganda in Asia. India was always uppermost in his mind, and the interests of India demanded a settlement with Turkey which Poincaré would not prevent. Co-operation with Paris therefore became a cardinal element in Curzon's foreign outlook. And especially since he attached little value to better relations with Soviet Russia, the failure of the Hague Conference through British agreement with France had no terrors for Curzon; on the contrary, he saw the advantage of such a development.

Lloyd George had lost much influence since Genoa. In October, 1922, the Conservatives, under the leadership of Bonar Law, Curzon, and Austen Chamberlain, would force his resignation. In July, therefore, he was unable to insist on his Russian policy. Even at Genoa, at the height of his power, he failed to overcome Franco-Belgian-American resistance. Now the prospect was nil. Therefore the Hague Conference failed, said the Russians.

The chief economic explanation of the failure at The Hague, the Russians declared, was European bankruptcy. The Governments

¹ *Izvestia*. Moscow, July 27, 1922.

² *The Life of Lord Curzon*, by the Earl of Ronaldshay. Vol. III, Chap. XVII. London, 1928.

³ *Ibid.*, page 354.

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of the West gave Moscow no credits because they had none to give, ran the Bolshevik refrain. 'The collapse of the conference,' said Sokolnikov, 'can be attributed mainly to the utter financial impotence of the reactionary French Government,'¹ and other Communist spokesmen referred to the distressing condition of the French budget and the franc.

Chicherin and Krassin conferred with American diplomats in Europe during this period, and Krassin gathered the impression that the United States would use every means at its command to prevent Britain from exploiting the economic possibilities of Russia.² This, he believed, offered another explanation of their inability to reach a settlement at The Hague.

According to Krassin, German inflation and the fall of the mark likewise affected the situation. A financial catastrophe in Germany, he said, would constitute a menace to all the Powers, but especially to England on account of her maritime trade. London therefore wished to check any aggressive French measures against Germany and could do so best by maintaining the entente with France. To England and to Europe generally, Russia consequently became a problem of only secondary importance.³

It is not impossible, however, that Poincaré fought a settlement with Russia partly out of fear that it would stabilize European politics and prevent French occupation of the Ruhr.

¶ BOLSHEVIK ESTIMATES OF THE FUTURE

The Soviet political world did not always share Krassin's estimate of Russia's secondary rôle on the world stage. But whether the analysis which lay at the bottom of Krassin's opinion was correct or incorrect, his judgment approached the truth. Genoa and The Hague were the best proof. Yet the Bolsheviks persisted in the thought that the prosperity of Europe depended on the exploitation of Russia's natural resources and of her possibilities as a goods and investment market. They may have been right, and they may still be right, but Europe did not or could not agree. The Cabinets of the Great Powers were too occupied with Germany, Turkey, and foreign debt obligations, and with internal

¹ *Izvestia*, July 25, 1922.

S.W.A.—VOL. I.

² *Ibid*, August 8, 1922.

³ *Ibid*.

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industrial and financial difficulties to grant Russia that primary consideration without which a solution of the Russian problem seemed impossible.

The International Consortium had been conceived by some people as the best means of enabling Germany to pay reparations. The Bolsheviks reasoned that in much the same way England would seek an agreement with Russia as an escape from unemployment and stagnant trade, and France in order to rescue the franc and facilitate payments to America. Moscow likewise believed that if the Allies desired the early pacification of Europe, a settlement with the Soviets would contribute most to its consummation.

The Bolsheviks were wrong. The Powers simply permitted the Russian question to drop into the background of their attention.

While the Communists still insisted that Europe depended on Russia, they commenced to feel that they did not depend entirely on Europe. The famine of 1921 had shaken them. The crop had been a failure. During the Genoa Conference the result of the harvest of 1922 was not yet ascertainable. But in June and July, while the Hague Conference sat, the Bolsheviks knew that the agricultural yield would completely satisfy the needs of the country. Two or three more good crops, they said, and we will need no credits from the West. The Soviet Government of course realized in 1922 that the absence of foreign financial assistance would retard the rate of Russian rehabilitation, but no one doubted for a moment that it could be achieved by self-help. The Bolsheviks felt that they were thrown back on their own resources. The task was now greater than they had at first fancied. They had planned to place a fraction of the responsibility of reconstruction upon foreign industrialists, and to finance at least a part of their own lion's share of the undertaking by the attraction of foreign capital. They had miscalculated. They would have to shoulder the entire burden themselves.

Russia in 1921 was a ruin. The World War, the Civil War, the Polish-Russian War, intervention, the blockade, and the famine which was a result of all these and of an unprecedented drought, had undermined industry, trade, and agriculture. The writer first saw Russia in the autumn of 1922. The gradual uphill climb had

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commenced. But the wounds of the recent past were ubiquitous. Trains moved slowly and irregularly. Railway rolling stock was badly in need of repair and replacement, and the station 'hospitals' were overfilled with 'sick' locomotives that had been crippled serving the fronts. The streets of Moscow required paving, and houses wanted plastering and general renovation. People looked haggard and poorly dressed. The outskirts of Petrograd represented a forest of dead smoke-stacks. Hundreds of factories throughout the country were idle and thousands were therefore unemployed. Hordes of homeless waifs, whose life-history rang like a monotone: 'Father killed in battle, mother died in the famine,' combed the cities and the country-side.

Food, however, was plentiful, and each day as one wandered through the streets gathering impressions in the new, strange surroundings, one noted more stores that had shed the boards from their plate glass and commenced to fill their show windows with eagerly sought goods. Most of these shops had been closed since 1918. Every day, too, the newspapers announced the re-opening of more and more mines and plants.

Upbuilding now became Moscow's primary concern. The Bolsheviks riveted their attention on the domestic scene and felt that Allied policy had isolated them.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Government did not despair of an agreement with Great Britain, Italy, and other countries whose attitude at The Hague had impressed the Russian delegation as relatively cordial. As long as France pursued her anti-Soviet strategy, and as long as she found encouragement in Brussels and Washington, joint conferences with a view to collective settlements could achieve no practical results. Acting on this assumption, the Bolsheviks adopted the slogans of separate agreements with governments and separate contracts with private capitalists. These now run like red threads through the declarations of Soviet spokesmen.

Moscow understood that the interplay of forces within the Allied camp would embarrass any country that desired to follow an independent Russian policy. Special attractions would therefore have to be offered the more so since any such state would feel entitled to better terms. The fact that the Russians realized these

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truths and yet pinned their faith on separate agreements seems to indicate that they were prepared to make further concessions.

The Bolsheviks were particularly hopeful about England. But they reckoned without Lord Curzon. They expected that the Royal Dutch, twice thwarted at Genoa and The Hague, would knock at their door again. Instead Sir Henri Deterding joined in a world boycott of Caucasian petroleum.¹ They intended to give Leslie Urquhart a concession to his previous vast holdings in Siberia and believed such action would affect the British Government's policy. But the Turkish situation interfered.

Despite a very expressed Bolshevik desire to agree with the Powers, objective conditions or the policies of those Powers frequently prevented agreement. Moscow hoped, but was not very sanguine. The Soviet Government, as Trotzky said, now intended 'to work and to wait.'

¹ Discussed in detail in Chap. IV of *Oil Imperialism*, by Louis Fischer. New York, 1926.

DISARMAMENT AND BOLSHEVISM

Throughout the greater part of 1922 Lenin was confined in bed by the mysterious workings of a combination of complicated maladies which were destined to demand his life. But in October a marked improvement occurred, and on November 1 he appeared unexpectedly in the throne room of the Czar's palace in the Kremlin where the Central Executive Committee was in session. He entered unobtrusively and, in order not to interrupt Krylenko's report on legal matters, slipped quietly into a chair near the door. Then the delegates discovered him and an ovation followed. With a walk that resembled a run he moved to the platform where, holding a little watch in the hollow of his hand – for his physicians had limited him to an hour's speech – he began his address. 'We greet the Red Army,' were his first words. The Bolsheviks had the day previous taken Vladivostok on the far-off Pacific. 'The last forces of the White Guards,' Lenin announced, 'have been thrown into the sea.' He then welcomed the end of foreign intervention and the cessation of fighting on Soviet soil.

Long negotiations in Dairen and Chang Chun between Russia and Japan had preceded the occupation of the Siberian Maritime Provinces by Red troops. There was no *raison d'être* now for the Far Eastern (Chita) Republic, and on November 14, 1922, this artificial buffer adhered to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). Moscow ruled from the White Sea to the Black, from the Baltic to the Pacific, over a territory that comprises one-sixth of the earth's dry surface. Foreign forces were left only in Northern Sakhalin. And, except for skirmishes in Turkestan with Enver Pasha, the Civil War had drawn to a close.

The gradual diminution of internecine fighting in Russia had warranted a corresponding weakening of the Red Army, and in August, 1922, Leon Trotzky, the Commissar of War, was able to announce to a group of foreign correspondents that the strength of the Soviets' armed forces had fallen from 5,300,000 to 800,000.

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‘Further reduction,’ however, ‘required serious changes in the international situation.’ It required a general reduction of armaments.

After Chicherin’s failure to precipitate a disarmament debate at Genoa, Moscow despaired of drawing the big Powers into a discussion of the question, but hoped, nevertheless, to achieve practical results by convening a meeting of Russia’s immediate neighbours. With this end in view, Litvinov addressed invitations on June 12, 1922, to Poland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Finland to examine with Russia ‘the proportionate reduction of respective armaments.’ Time and place were left open.

While accepting in principle, these states urged postponement in deference to the League of Nations which intended to deal with the subject of disarmament at a forthcoming session. The Bolshevik reply doubted whether ‘the so-called League of Nations’ was anxious or able to effect a limitation of armaments; yet Litvinov consented to delay the opening until November 30 – in Moscow.

Litvinov invited Roumania while at The Hague, but Bucharest demanded Russian recognition of its suzerainty in Bessarabia as a condition of attendance. The Bolsheviks refused: the Moscow Disarmament Conference would not concern itself with political or territorial problems; it must remain unfettered by previous conditions; Bessarabia, moreover, had been seized illegally. Roumania therefore absented herself, agreeing only that Poland make declarations on her behalf at the sessions. The non-attendance of Roumania, according to the Bolshevik view, should have made disarmament more acceptable to Poland, for it meant that while the Polish army would be reduced, the army of Roumania, Poland’s ally, would remain intact. The Russians, on the other hand, were intent on their arms limitation proposals despite the disadvantage arising from Roumania’s absence.

Lithuania, invited on November 23, hastened to accept before the conference opened.

§ THE BOLSHEVIK APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

‘Between 1918 and 1921,’ according to Maxim Litvinov, ‘we made no less than twenty peace proposals to different Powers.’¹

¹ *Pravda*, November 30, 1922.

APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

As chairman of the Soviet delegation to the Moscow Disarmament Conference, he added yet another.

The Bolsheviks believe that international war is an inevitable by-product of capitalism. The overthrow of capitalism is therefore the best way to peace. Meanwhile, however, a palliative may be adopted which can temporarily avert or diminish the danger of armed conflicts. That palliative is disarmament. Sooner or later, if there are armies there will be wars, runs the Soviet thesis. Treaties of non-aggression, peace pacts, neutrality treaties, arbitration agreements, and all the paraphernalia of peace safeguards, the Bolsheviks say, have not prevented hostilities in the past and will not in the future. The only waterproof guarantee of pacific conditions, therefore, is the demolition of troop units, military staffs, ammunition factories, and military equipment. Then 'moral disarmament' will come of itself.

In 1922 the process of Soviet economic reconstruction had commenced, and the Communists wished to devote to it all their energy. They were too weak and poor to fight. The disarmament of Russia's neighbours would not make peace absolutely certain, but it would prejudice the situation in favour of peace. The Red Press, moreover, intimated that Soviet counsels hoped the effect of the Moscow Conference would spread and perhaps lead to general disarmament.

A French blow at Germany – which the Bolsheviks considered not unlikely – might, in their opinion, involve the rest of Europe. A peace move, especially if it were participated in by Poland, a neighbour of Germany and an ally of France, would conceivably exert a formidable influence on the trend of political events on the Continent.

The counter-revolutionary movement within Russia was, for combatant purposes, definitely moribund. But the idea of the *cordon sanitaire* was not dead, and Poland represented a longest and strongest segment of the barrier. Poland had incurred the undying enmity of the Lithuanians by seizing Vilna, which they regarded as their capital and as one of their chief cultural centres. The question of Polish disarmament therefore involved Lithuanian disarmament, and any question that concerned Poland and Lithuania was a life interest to the remaining Baltic States.

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It made little practical differences to Russia whether Latvia had an army of 20,000 or 30,000 men or whether there were 15,000 or 25,000 Esthonians under arms. But without at least the partial demilitarization of all the States just outside the Soviet periphery, no one State would consent to disarm.

Immediately the conference opened on December 2, Litvinov therefore proposed that all the participants reduce their land forces 75 per cent. within the next eighteen to twenty-four months, disband all irregular military formations, and limit armament expenditures.¹

THE OPPOSITION OF THE SECESSION STATES

The invited countries had previously met to determine their policy at the conference. Poland naturally dominated such meetings and her influence sufficed to exclude Lithuania. First Finland, Esthonia, and Latvia gathered in Reval, in August, to decide on a common strategy towards Poland and towards Russia. The next month, representatives of these three nations and Roumania discussed the Moscow disarmament problem with Polish statesmen in Warsaw. In October a similar preliminary conference took place in Reval – without Roumania. It resembled a dress rehearsal for the Moscow deliberations.

'The Polish delegation,' President Norutovitch of Poland told newspaper correspondents, 'will be guided in Moscow by the line of conduct worked out at the Reval Conference of the border States.'² It would also, he stated, approach the question of disarmament in the spirit of the decisions of the League of Nations on the same subject. This was a bad beginning, the Russians commented, and when Prince Janus Radziwill, the Polish plenipotentiary, referred to 'the rich experience of the League of Nations in disarmament projects,'³ they feared that the outlook had been darkened. What, they asked, had the 'so-called League of Nations' ever done to further disarmament? The prince with the

¹ *Conférence de Moscou pour Limitation des Armements*. Edition du Commissariat du Peuple aux Affaires Etrangères. Moscou, 1923. Page 47.

² *Izvestia*, November 28, 1922.

³ *Ibid.*, December 3, 1922.

OPPOSITION OF SECESSION STATES

Lithuanian surname and the Roman Christian name added the pessimistic prediction that 'our work will not be easy,' but it could be 'useful.'

Moscow believed that an agreement with the Baltic States on disarmament was a relatively simple matter. But 'they lack the courage to break with Poland and march their own way. . . . If the Moscow Conference fails, the entire responsibility will fall on Poland's shoulders.'¹

Lithuania could, of course, never follow the same tactics as Poland. She was therefore never considered for membership in a Baltic *bloc* sponsored by Warsaw. Latvia, as a neighbour of Lithuania, cannot, with politeness, show too great enthusiasm for it. In Finland, two parties have always struggled: one favours a pro-Polish orientation, the other inclines towards Scandinavia and feels that Finland's cultural and economic progress command her to turn away from the more primitive Russian East.

Countries like Latvia and Esthonia, furthermore, are, to a considerable degree, economically dependent on Russia. Their manufacturing activity, originally developed to supply the internal Russian market, shrank after their secession on account of Bolshevik determination to meet Russia's finished goods requirements by quickly industrializing the country. Russian transit trade is therefore a principal source of income in Latvia and Esthonia whose ports are free of ice almost all the year round and through which part of Soviet exports must consequently pass. Even if it means a loss to herself, however, Russia can deprive a politically unfriendly nation of its natural share in such commerce.

A permanent, closely-knit Baltic *bloc* is therefore only a distant possibility. But the Baltic Provinces and Poland have, on more than one occasion, adopted a common line of action in the pursuit of an isolated common object. It happened before the Moscow Disarmament Conference, and practically made Poland the arbiter of the deliberations.

Throughout the conference, Poland defended what has since become known as the Fench thesis of 'Security First.' An atmosphere of mutual confidence must be established. Then treaties of non-aggression may be concluded, and arbitration agreements

¹ *Pravda*, December 12, 1922.

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signed. These would, in turn, usher in an era of moral disarmament in which, and only in which, material disarmament would be feasible. All the invited States supported this principle, and Lithuania even argued that since League membership had not prevented her from being invaded nor Poland from invading her, she could trust solely in the strength of her army.

The Baltic countries and Poland consistently refused to discuss land disarmament until all outstanding political issues were solved by negotiation. But they wished to add the question of naval disarmament to the agenda of the conference.

Russia had limited the scope of the conference to armies, just as the United States had limited the Washington Disarmament Conference to fleets. Naval disarmament was not a question the Bolsheviks could discuss with their neighbours only. The Soviet Navy, weak, outmoded, and ill-equipped though it was, could probably have resisted an assault by any of the little Powers on the Baltic or even by a combination of all those Powers. But Russia's coastline is 39,000 kilometres long. On her sea-coast, for every practical purpose, she is the neighbour of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and even the United States, as well as of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, and Roumania. Yet now the Poles and Balts alone demanded the inclusion of naval disarmament into the programme of the Moscow conference.

§ MOSCOW COMPROMISES

Faced with a united front of the invited Powers, Moscow yielded not merely on this point which involved no question of principle, but agreed, after some wrangling, to the priority of political discussions. The Bolsheviks would, in the circumstances, sign new treaties, accept new arbitration regulations, and go through all the motions of moral disarmament whose efficacy they doubted, if, at the same conference, definite steps were taken in the direction of material disarmament which the Russians viewed as 'the first condition of moral disarmament.' Russia, Litvinov repeatedly averred, does not wish the conference to end only with additional affirmations, and another sealed document. She 'does not wish to attach her signature to phrases which hide the absence of real achievement.'

RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

Assuming a subsequent agreement on disarmament that would be included in it, the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland, Latvia, Finland, and Esthonia now adopted a convention providing for mutual abstention from armed aggression, neutrality in case any country not a party to the convention would commit an act of aggression against one of the signatory Powers, and the peaceful arbitration of all conflicts. This was the first and only time in its history that the Soviet Government accepted the principle of international arbitration in political matters. The articles of ratification, it was agreed, would be deposited in Christiania (Oslo) because the Communists objected to Berne.

The conference thereupon settled down to deliberate upon the subject for which it had been convened – land disarmament.

§ RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

Litvinov, and Victor Kopp, the second Soviet representative, stated that Moscow desired to refrain from radical changes and 75 per cent reductions which might meet the disapproval of other States, and therefore proposed, as an initial move, to reduce her army in 1923 from 800,000 to 600,000 if the invited countries made proportional reductions. Military budgets, moreover, would be limited to a sum equal to the number of individuals in the force multiplied by 400 roubles. Such limitation, the Bolsheviks submitted, would prevent the expenditure of huge funds on technical equipment in order to cancel the effect of decreased man-power.

In accordance with the Soviet plan, Poland thereupon declared its intention of cutting her army to a strength of 280,000, Finland to 28,000, Latvia to 19,000, and Esthonia to 16,000, while Lithuania, which originally rejected the scheme on the ground of her dispute with Poland, later accepted without presenting detailed data.

The Moscow Disarmament Conference was now ready for its bomb-shell sensation. When the delegates had all gathered in the conference hall of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Victor Kopp arose, and, reading from a paper, declared that Poland had, in reply to a League of Nations questionnaire, informed Geneva on June 22, 1922, that the number of effectives in her

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army was 275,367 men and 18,377 officers, making a total of 293,744. If she now proposed to reduce her army to 280,000 effectives, the reduction would amount to only 13,000 or 4·5 per cent instead of the prescribed 25 per cent. Poland, Kopp charged, had put her army strength at 370,000 in order to nullify the effect of the reduction proposed by the conference.

Prince Janus Radziwill protested. 'The Polish delegation,' he said, 'did not object to the figure given by the Russian delegation for the reduction of the Russian Army.' A discussion of the Polish figures will bring no results. 'The Polish delegation refuses to answer questions concerning Poland's budget for the present year.' No explanation was offered for the discrepancy between Warsaw's data to Geneva and to Moscow. Radziwill met the dilemma by declining to give evidence.

Information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, moreover, was to the effect that Latvia's army at the time of the conference consisted of 19,500 and Esthonia's of 14,000 men, so that when the former proposed to cut its armed force to 19,000, the reduction equalled only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; while Esthonia, according to Russian data, would actually obtain international sanction for an army increase of 14 per cent.¹

There was another obstacle. The invited Powers wished to postpone the decision on disarmament for several months and, in the meantime, to place the subject into the hands of a commission of technical military experts. The Bolsheviks regarded this as a ruse to evade the aim for which the conference had been called. A disarmament conference, they submitted, must bring disarmament. To refer the problem to a second conference merely amounted to avoiding the issue in the hope, the Russians suspected, that the army experts would destroy the idea in the interval.

On these rocks the Moscow Disarmament Conference foundered. Since it was impossible to find the mathematical basis for reduction of armaments, there could be no reduction, and since Litvinov had emphasized times without number that the non-aggression and neutrality convention had been accepted by the

¹ *Official Report of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Year 1922.* Moscow, 1923.

RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

Soviets conditionally and only in order to win the invited nations for the cause of disarmament, the convention, now that disarmament had failed, remained unsigned.

Thus ended the conference. It produced a better feeling between Russia and Lithuania, and more understanding between Russia and Latvia, Esthonia, and Finland. But Moscow's relations with Poland suffered.

REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA AND
REVOLUTIONARY TURKEY

Is Soviet Russia an Asiatic or a European Power? Westward or Eastward Ho? The name 'Eurasia' supplies the answer. Russia is both Oriental and Occidental, and Moscow is the bridge between two continents.

The World War deprived Russia of her most developed Western provinces – Poland, and the Baltic States. The revolution, under compulsion, moved the nation's capital from Petrograd, 'the Paris of the North,' to Moscow, the Byzantine city. The armed hostility of the West towards the Soviet regime caused the Communists to look eastward for relief – especially since the repercussion of Bolshevism in Asia found expression in a nationalist protest against Russia's imperialist foes.

Simultaneously, however, the Bolsheviks trusted in the European proletariat to rise and overwhelm the interventionist Governments. Moscow's highest hopes were reposed in the 'cavalry of the West.' The 'infantry of the East,' the tens of millions of Moslems, Mongols, and Hindus, would constitute only the rearguard. But the direction of the frontal attack was westward.

Bolshevism, moreover, is essentially a Western movement. Seen philosophically in the perspective of Russian history, the Soviet revolution of November, 1917, reflects the country's need for industrialization and for a partial balance against the predominance of the peasantry. Russia is overwhelmingly a rural nation. But the historic function of Communism is the industrialization of Russia and the mechanization of agriculture. Towards these goals Asia contributes nothing; Europe very much. Every new machine purchased in Europe, every new electric bulb kindled in a peasant hut, binds Russia economically and culturally to the West.

The overthrow of Czarism, the disappearance of the nobility, and the discarding of the Oriental pomp and regalia connected

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with these institutions, as well as the weakening of the Greek Catholic Church, in origin and character Eastern, have served as influences towards Westernization. Further factors operating in the same direction are the introduction of the Latin alphabet and script in Transcaspia and the Caucasus, the fight against the veil in Turkestan, increased literacy, and, above all, the growing industrialization and modernization of the city, and, partly, of the village.

In foreign affairs, too, Russia's orientation can never be wholly Eastern or wholly Western. It must be both. Yet differences of emphasis are inevitable and result from changing circumstances. The Polish War, the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, the prospect of commerce with Europe which opened with the inauguration of the NEP, and the expectations inspired by the Genoa Conference undoubtedly drew Russia's attention to the West, and away from the Middle East, and away from her special interest in developments that could antagonize possible sources of credits, loans, and business. Comintern psychology and Eastern political orientation were in *diminuendo*. But the failure of the Genoa and Hague meetings, the failure even of the Moscow Disarmament Conference, and the distressing difficulty of establishing any sort of normal, regular relations with European states, provoked a reversal of feeling in Moscow. This, together with the remarkable recrudescence of the Turkish nationalist movement under Kemal Pasha at a time when Russian economic rehabilitation had not yet progressed sufficiently to demand the indispensable co-operation with Europe of a later day, produced a definite change of political emphasis. The East was again trump – the inevitable corollary was the renewal of the struggle with England which the attitude of Lord Curzon seemed to encourage.

The rejection of the Urquhart concession on the ground that Great Britain was pursuing an anti-Turkish policy, throws a bright light on the mentality of this period.

§ THE STORY OF ENVER PASHA

The Bolsheviks had, from the very beginning, adopted an extremely cordial and helpful attitude towards Kemal Pasha. And Kemal Pasha displayed an active sympathy for the Soviet

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Government. But the relations between revolutionary Russia and revolutionary Turkey were complicated by the romantic figure of Enver Pasha.

Enver and Kemal nursed an old hatred for one another.

Enver was the Ludendorff of Turkey. During the World War, in fact, he was the actual ruler of the country, and with Talaat Pasha and Djemal Pasha constituted an unquestioned, dictatorial triumvirate. His name was a power to conjure with from Berlin to Bagdad, and his reputation as a vigorous, imaginative leader of men had spread even to the borders of India. Kaiser Wilhelm knew his influence. The Sultan-Caliph did his bidding.

In this period, Mustapha Kemal was merely an army commander. But he was a stormy petrel. He had quarrelled with Enver Pasha during the War of Tripoli and again during the Balkan Wars. In the course of the World War, after Kemal had repulsed the British on the bloodiest sector of the Gallipoli front, a sharp disagreement arose between him and Enver on the subject of army organization, and Kemal, whose military genius could not be spared, was sent to the Mesopotamian-Palestinian front 'in disgrace.' There he came into conflict with the German General von Falkenhayn and, much to Enver's chagrin, resigned from the army. But Liman von Sanders, Falkenhayn's successor, persuaded Mustapha Kemal to return. And when the Sultan's forces were crushed by General Allenby, Kemal received a commission from von Sanders to hold Adana and re-organize the Turkish Army. Here he made the first steps towards his future position as Turkey's national hero.

A week before the armistice between Turkey and the Western Entente, Kemal appeared in Constantinople and soon received the important appointment of Inspector-General of Anatolia.

While Kemal was rising to power, Enver was falling into disgrace. His armies had met miserable defeat in the Caucasus; his policies, it was claimed, had caused the collapse of his country. In 1919, he was condemned to death.

He escaped and tried to reach Odessa. But a storm arose on the Black Sea, broke the mast of his little sailing vessel and obliged him to return to Turkey. Bent on reaching Russia, however, he made his way to Germany, where he secretly boarded his own aeroplane

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in an effort to fly to Moscow. The machine crashed. He spent some time in a prison in Kovno, and a few weeks in another in Riga.¹ Finally, in 1920, he reached Moscow.

Enver had been preceded to the Soviet capital by Djemal Pasha, his colleague in the famous triumvirate, by Halil Pasha and by Semi Bey. What were these prominent Turks seeking in Russia? At the Baku Congress of Eastern Peoples a declaration was read from Enver Pasha in which he protested that he 'hated and cursed German imperialism and the German imperialists as much as he did British imperialism and the British imperialists.' He was a friend of the Soviet Republic and of the Soviet idea, he said; he favoured the revolution and would fight in the interests of oppressed peoples.

But the Congress did not believe Enver, nor did the Bolsheviks. Djemal had been easier to handle. Djemal entertained no immediate anti-Kemalist ambitions. The British were fighting the Communists. A state of active hostility existed between Russia and England. Afghanistan at the time was engaged in a struggle for independence with England. Moscow, accordingly, directed Djemal Pasha's attention towards Kabul.

At Kabul, Djemal immediately won high regard and exercised considerable influence over Amanullah Khan. The constitution of Afghanistan was largely his work. He likewise assisted in the organization of the Afghan army.

Enver had wilder flights of fancy than Djemal. His imagination swept all of Asia. His ambitions were boundless. . . . In Moscow he always wore an unusually high black tarboosh to detract attention from his low stature.

The Bolsheviks knew Enver's talents as a military and political leader. They knew also that he was an adventurer. But Lombroso had taught that of two men born with an instinct for fire, one may become an incendiary and the other a celebrated fire patrol chief. There could be adventurers and adventurers. Enver was violently anti-British. England had destroyed the Turkish Empire and annexed part of Turkey's Arabian domains. England was largely responsible for the defeat of Turkish arms in

¹ *Stenographic Record of the First Congress of Eastern Peoples*. Petrograd, 1920. Page 110.

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the World War. England, moreover, wished to drive 'the Unspeakable Turk' out of Europe.

The Bolsheviks first attempted to reconcile Enver and Kemal. The attempt failed. Then they thought they could use Enver as they had used Djemal. Enver, speculating on the old Russian hatred for Great Britain and on the possibilities of the new hostility between Red Moscow and Imperial London, came to the Soviet capital in the expectation of receiving sympathy and support. An excellent partnership might have sprung up if Enver's dreams had fitted into Bolshevik plans. But the only field for Enver's activities was Afghanistan – far too narrow for a man of his nature.

Enver's mind's-eye swept empires. He dreamt of re-establishing the kingdom of Tamerlane. He saw himself the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan. Then, like Alexander the Great, he would march through the Khyber Pass into India and strike a mortal blow at the British Empire. He would be the Napoleon of Asia.

He hid these ambitions deep in his heart. For while they were anti-British they also involved Soviet territory. Enver felt, furthermore, that the success of his Pan-Turanian Empire depended on his conquest, first, of the centre of the Turanian world – Turkey. He must overthrow Kemal Pasha.

But while Enver chafed under months of idleness in Moscow, the Russians were cementing their relations with Kemal. In the beginning, Enver Pasha tried to act as an intermediary in the Russo-Turkish pourparlers and to put himself in the position of the real representative of Turkey. 'Mustapha Kemal,' he would say, 'is weak. He is known neither at home nor abroad. I, on the other hand, have a reputation throughout Turkey and Europe. Every child in the Moslem world knows the name of Enver Pasha.'

The Bolsheviks did not listen to him, probably because they did not trust him completely. They were thorough Kemalists. Moscow and Angora grew closer and closer together, and when the Soviet-Anatolian Treaty of March 16, 1921, was signed, Enver felt that his chances of supplanting Kemal with Bolshevik assistance were gone.

Early in the summer of 1921, he announced, therefore, that he wished to go to the Caucasus. Enver lived in Russia as the guest



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of the Soviet Government; it could not deny him freedom of movement. He was accordingly given a saloon car in which to travel south. Before he went, however, he gave Chicherin a personal undertaking that he would not get into touch with his friends in Turkey, nor work against Kemal.

Enver's supporters had come across the Turkish border to meet him in Batum. He was still influential in the Turkish Army, in church quarters – for Kemal was an avowed opponent of Pan-Islamism and of the Sultan-Caliph – and with the upper classes. A full-fledged Enverist congress now took place in Batum which, the Russians learned, planned a *coup d'état* against the Kemal regime. Kemal protested to the Bolsheviks, and when, shortly after the meeting, Enver tried to make his way into Turkey, the Soviet authorities detained him by force.

Enver was violently angry and swore revenge, but maintained outwardly friendly relations with the Russians. He said, however, that he would not return immediately to Moscow but go instead to Transcaspia to meet Djemal Pasha who was on his way back from Kabul. He also wanted to hunt in Bokhara – for what he did not say. In the city of Bokhara he still appeared officially to Soviet representatives, and then suddenly he vanished.

Before long, he assumed the leadership of the Basmachi who were in revolt against Bolshevik rule in Bokhara. A Young Bokharan Party, very much akin to the Young Turks and the Young Afghans, had sprung up before the World War. In 1910, and again in 1913, Young Bokharan insurrections took place against the local Emir, who was the Czar's representative in Central Asia. Considerable anti-Russian sentiment actuated the Young Bokharans. When the World War broke out, for instance, they burned a big bull in the streets of Samarkand as a symbol of what they hoped would happen to Czarism in consequence of the conflict, and when Kerensky assumed power, a delegation of rich Bokharan merchants petitioned him to abolish the emirate. Miliukov objected to such a move. The result was a growth of sympathy for the Bolsheviks among the Young Bokharans.

Throughout the early phase of the Communist revolution, Moscow had no contact with Bokhara. But the expulsion of British interventionist troops and the defeat of the Whites in

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Siberia and Turkestan encouraged the Young Bokharans to continue their struggle against the unpopular emir, and in September, 1920, a three-day revolution flared up which forced him and his female and boy harems to flee to Afghanistan. He now trades in karakul fleeces in Kabul.

This upheaval left the feudal khans and the pro-emir party dissatisfied. They could prey on many of the peasants who had suffered economic distress throughout the Civil War from lack of contact with Russia on which Bokhara depends for bread and to which it sells its cotton. The peasants likewise resented the anti-religious ardour of the Bolsheviks. In general, the movement that developed may be regarded as an organized protest against the new order.

Enver Pasha now put himself at the head of these insurgents or Basmachi and opened his war against the Bolsheviks. He tried to infect the Basmachi with his Pan-Turanian ideology, and sent emissaries to Kabul where his cause won the sympathy of those court circles which would not have been averse to the annexation of Bokhara by Afghanistan. Enver mobilized an army and concentrated his great talents on the fulfilment of a life's ambition. It is said he took funds and arms from the British. But one is inclined to doubt the truth of the charge, although the Basmachi were certainly equipped with English rifles and munitions previously obtained from agents operating in Turkestan. Enver likewise enjoyed the assistance of the Afghan minister in Bokhara and of 1,000 Afghan volunteers.

Enver spent almost a year in Bokhara. His movement, however, gathered little momentum. The re-establishment of geographical connections with Central Russia promised to remove the chief grievances of the Basmachi, and Pan-Turanianism struck no root.

Enver was a general of the German school and a master of modern military tactics. But in the mountains of East Bokhara his strategy almost invariably improved the position of the Red forces sent to destroy him.

On the night of June 14, 1922, he attacked in the region of Derbent, where Alexander and the Romans had marched centuries before. General Kakurin, who commanded the Bolshevik force, estimates that Enver had no more than 3,000 men and little cannon, whereas the Soviet division was 8,000 strong and enjoyed

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the advantages of superior artillery and trained cavalry. Enver suffered defeat.

Kakurin now pressed Enver's shattered band deep into the mountains, and before long the Turkish leader had turned south towards the Afghan border. Here the Red Army operated in small patrols which combed the intricate defiles for rebellious Basmachi.

One such patrol of approximately 100 horsemen entered a narrow pass on August 4, 1922, and saw in front of it a large group of Bokharans seated on the ground in a circle. When the Bokharans spied the Red unit they immediately gave battle and repulsed the assailants. But one gunner, assisted by two comrades, carried a single piece of light field artillery to the top of a low hill where he was able to hold the Basmachi at bay. Meanwhile, another Red Army patrol, attracted by the booming mountain echoes of the firing, galloped to the scene, and a struggle ensued which resembled the combats of King Richard the Lion-Hearted and his mediæval knights. The warriors hacked one another to pieces with scimitar and sabre, and wrestled for their lives on the rocky ground. Finally, the remnant of the Basmachi retreated, leaving their dead on the field of battle.

When the Red soldiers examined the corpses, they found that all the Basmachi khans were dressed in long richly coloured Bokharan robes and typical Central Asiatic headgear. But one had worn high military boots, breeches, and a tightly-buttoned blue jacket. On his finger was a valuable signet ring. They examined his papers. There were three letters from Berlin written in a woman's hand, a notebook, and scraps of paper on which orders had been scribbled in Turkish. The dead man was Enver Pasha.

His possessions were taken to Tashkent, photographed, and deposited in the military museum. The body found burial in the distant mountain pass in a grave that is unmarked and now unknown. The assertion that his head was cut off and carried through the streets of Samarkand is untrue as are numerous other unauthoritative versions of the last episode of his romantic career.¹

¹ The writer's information regarding Enver's stay in Russia and his last adventure was obtained from General Kakurin, Chicherin, Karakhan, Zuckerman, the Chief of the Middle East section, and Pastukhov, the Chief of the Near East section of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,

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According to information subsequently obtained, the conference in the defile which the Soviet patrol had discovered was a meeting of the most important Basmachi khans and sheiks. Enver had decided to give up the struggle and retire to Afghanistan – but not for ever. It was his farewell discussion with the fighting chiefs to whom he proposed to transfer the command; it took place near Baldjhan – only 80 kilometres from the Afghan frontier.¹

RUSSO-TURKISH MILITARY CO-OPERATION

The Enver episode indicated clearly how solicitous the Bolsheviks were for the safety of the Kemal Government. The relations between Moscow and Angora had always been extremely cordial. But Mustapha Kemal urged nothing less than a treaty of military and political alliance. Such was the purport of a letter he addressed to Moscow on April 26, 1920, in which he declared his readiness to ‘participate in the struggle against foreign imperialism which threatens both countries.’²

The Bolsheviks felt and feel that permanent alliances with non-Communist states are a dangerous liability. They may involve the Soviet Government in wars for other than defensive purposes or in conflicts arising out of problems alien to its interests and spirit. They could, conceivably, put the Bolsheviks in a position of supporting a State that was persecuting Communists and trade unionists, or adopting other tactics offensive to Soviet citizens.

In the case of Turkey in 1920, an alliance would have required the Red Army to march against the Greeks in Asia Minor. But Russia was tired, and still had its own battles to fight against Poland, Wrangel, and the Mensheviks in Georgia.

Moscow therefore rejected Kemal’s offer of an alliance. Chicherin suggested instead, in a note of June 2, 1920, the establishment of regular diplomatic relations.³ But while the Russians

¹ Djemal Pasha, who had made peace with Kemal, left Moscow for Angora on July 5, 1922. On the 22nd he was killed by Armenians in Tiflis. He was buried, with honours, in Turkey. Talaat Pasha, the third member of the famous triumvirate, met death in Berlin at the hands of Armenians on March 15, 1921.

² *International Politics of Modern Times: Treaties, Notes and Declarations*, by Kluchnikov and Sabanin. Moscow, 1928. Vol. III, Part I, page 26.

³ *Ibid.*

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objected to a regular alliance with all its implications, they saw the advantage of temporary collaboration against the same countries for the same purposes. The negotiations which now commenced were therefore followed with the friendliest attention by the leaders of both countries. Kemal even adopted Communist terminology and addressed a letter to Chicherin on November 29, 1920, which contains strictures against 'international capital' and references to 'proletarian masses of the world' through whose efforts, seconded by the 'oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa,' 'the rule of the *bourgeoisie* would end.' Kemal likewise made mention of 'our close union.'

But Turkey needed more than political collaboration and moral support. Bekir Semi, the Turkish Foreign Minister, himself travelled to Moscow, and there, on November 16, 1920, appealed for material aid.

The Turks were hard pressed. In May, 1919, the Greeks had landed in Smyrna and occupied the city and the vicinity. The invasion of Anatolia, however, inspired a Turkish nationalist protest which the Sultan's Government in Constantinople was powerless to check. Kemalist congresses organized throughout the country, and on April 23, 1920, the Nationalist Assembly, which adopted the famous Nationalist Pact, met in Angora. It was under these circumstances, and under the instructions of the Assembly, that Kemal proposed the alliance which Moscow had been unable to accept.

Turkey now had two parallel governments. While the Constantinople Cabinet existed feebly under Allied guns, and signed the Peace Treaty of Sèvres at Allied dictation (August 10, 1920), the Anatolian regime improved its relations with France and stiffened its resistance to the Greek invasion. By the beginning of 1921, Kemal had organized a regular army.

In these activities, Kemal enjoyed the valuable assistance of the Bolsheviki. 'It need no longer be a secret,' Karakhan said to the writer, 'that we helped Kemal with much cannon, money, arms, and military advice.' Thus reinforced, the Angoran Government succeeded in complicating Greek forward movements, and the result was an Allied summons to both Turkey and Greece to engage in armistice negotiations. But the conference

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which opened in Paris on February 21 closed, without achievement, in London on March 23, and the next day the Greck army in Asia Minor resumed its advance.

Despite Bolshevik military co-operation with Kcmal, however, the Moscow negotiations for a Russo-Turkish treaty did not proceed with the expected ease. Batum barred a settlement.

Batum had been a part of Turkey until the war of 1877-8, when it was ceded to the Czar. Kemal now claimed the city. The Menshevik authorities of Georgia had previously offered him Batum as the price of an alliance with them against the Bolsheviks. Mustapha Kemal saw the obvious disadvantage of such a bargain, yet when the pourparlers commenced in Moscow he insistently demanded the surrender of Batum to Turkey. On one occasion, a three-weeks' rupture of the negotiations occurred on this account, and though the pourparlers were resumed, the problem remained unsolved.

While the fate of the treaty thus hung in the balance, Turkish troops under Karabekir took advantage of the disorder following the fall of the Menshevik Government of Georgia and entered Batum on March 11, 1921.

Batum is the natural port of export for Baku petroleum and is the terminus of the Baku-Batum pipe-line. Batum, too, is the Western World's door to the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks, fresh from their experiences with Allied intervention, feared the renewal of foreign attack and felt that so strategic a city as Batum could not be ceded even to a friendly Power.

For a moment, the issue threatened to provoke armed hostilities between two countries which, in other fields, stood in a relationship of temporary military allies. Red troops closed in on the city, and their commander, Kjubisheff, parleyed politely but firmly over cups of black coffee with the Turkish general. Finally, the counsel of peace prevailed, and five days after Karabekir marched into Batum, the Russian-Turkish Treaty was signed in Moscow which provided for his evacuation. Batum went to the Russians and, in exchange, Kars and Ardagan were ceded to Angora. The treaty likewise took cognizance of 'the solidarity between them in the struggle with imperialism,' regulated the Caucasian frontier between Turkey and Russia, mentioned Con-

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stantinople as a part of Turkey, stipulated the convocation of a conference on the fate of the Straits, and declared the mutuality of interests between 'the nationalist liberating movement of the peoples of the East and the struggle of the workers of Russia for a new social system.'¹ It was at this time that Kemal actually organized his own Communist Party in Turkey and commenced to harass the Communists who adhered to the Comintern.

From March to September, 1921, the Greek Army pushed forward into Anatolia, and in July the Angoran Government was forced to desert its own capital. In August the Greeks had entrenched themselves along the entire line of the Sakaria River. Here Kemal resolved to make his stand, and in September he succeeded in throwing the enemy back from the river. Chicherin immediately wired congratulations.

Kemal had fought the Greeks to a standstill, but victory required the recapture of almost the entire country from the Sakaria to the sea. Again he appealed for Bolshevik aid.

On December 13, 1921, Michael Frunze, then Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in the Ukraine and later Trotzky's successor as Commissar of War, arrived in Angora, where he was received with extraordinarily warm protestations of popular and official friendship. He came, it was announced, to negotiate an agreement between the Soviet Republic of Ukraine – then autonomous in its foreign affairs, and Turkey. But his short visit, of twenty-three days, was used to arrange for heavy shipments of Russian munitions and for the mapping out of a detailed plan of campaign against the Greeks in which, if need be, Red officers would participate.

Shortly after Frunze's departure, Aralov, the new Soviet envoy, came to Turkey. From the day he first set foot on Turkish soil, he later told the writer, till his arrival in the capital, he was welcomed by the population with every mark of affection, and Aralov felt as much at home as if he had never left his own country. Subsequently, he visited the front with Kemal Pasha, took the salute at parades, addressed the soldiers, urged the officers to added efforts, and distributed thousands of comfort bags to the

¹ *International Politics of Modern Times: Treaties, Notes and Declarations*, by Kluchnikov and Sabanin. Moscow, 1928. Vol. II, pages 94-5.

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army. Part of the Allied military equipment captured by the Bolsheviks from Yudenich, Denikin, Miller, Kolchak, and other White leaders was now in use in the Turkish forces. Kemal sent greetings to the Red Army and Aralov praised Kemal's Army. This intimate relationship between Russia and Turkey appreciably raised Bolshevik prestige with Islam and was therefore doubly irritating to Great Britain.

Turkey likewise received French military aid. Franklin-Bouillon's mission, in fact, had established intimate relations with Angora which the Turks even tried to use as a means of bridging the gulf between France and Russia.

Aided by the Russians and the French and strengthened by the rise of national feeling in Anatolia, Kemal began to advance rapidly during the summer of 1922. As each victory became known, Moscow sent a congratulatory telegram.

In September, the Turkish Army recaptured Smyrna after a precipitous Greek retreat, and threw the enemy into the sea. Simultaneously, Kemal reached out in the direction of Stambul, and refused to recognize the neutral zone which the British had declared at Chanak.

These military events cost two monarchs their thrones. On September 27, a revolution broke out in Greece which forced King Constantine to flee. On November 1, the National Assembly at Angora declared that the Sultan-Caliph had 'passed into history.'

The Greco-Turkish War came to a close by the armistice signed at Mudania on October 11. It was clear to the Allies that a victorious Turkey would reject the Treaty of Sèvres which had merely been presented to Constantinople for signature. Now a treaty would have to be negotiated.

Accordingly, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Georgia, and Turkey agreed to meet for a conference to open in Lausanne, in December, 1922. The Soviet republics were invited only after Moscow's sharp protests against their exclusion from deliberations on a subject of vital interest to them, and even then their participation was limited to discussions affecting the future of the Straits and of Constantinople.

RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

Before the Bolshevik revolution, the relations between Russia and Turkey represented an almost unbroken tradition of enmity, due, in great measure, to the Czar's and Miliukov's designs on Constantinople.

The Romanoffs, protectors of the Greek Catholic Church, were bent on liberating Constantinople, the ancient centre of their religion, from the hands of the Turks and from the domination of the infidels. But more important was the political and economic factor. Russia wanted Constantinople to prevent hostile navies from entering the Black Sea and attacking the Crimea or the Caucasus. Constantinople would bring Russia a long step nearer the warm waters and warm countries of the Mediterranean.

The Russians believed, moreover, that they needed the Straits for their export trade. For approximately five months of the year, the port of Leningrad (Petrograd) is closed by ice. Murmansk, although an open port, had no railway connection with the south before 1916, while Riga and Libau were far from Russia's grain belt. It thus lay within the power of the British Navy or of Turkey to prevent Russian exports from reaching the outside world by blocking the Straits during the extended period when Petrograd is closed by ice. Such was the case once during the Turko-Italian War, when Russia lost hundreds of millions of roubles by being unable to ship her surplus grain.

Political and economic motives were frequently hidden under the cover of Pan-Slavic idealism. The Czar strove to reach Constantinople and the Straits by sea, but also to win the friendship of Bulgaria and Serbia in order to approach Turkey by the land route. The protagonists of Pan-Slavism were advocates of the Eastern expansion of Russia; they were generally anti-Westerners and therefore opponents of industrialization.

Before the War, Great Britain fought Russia's southward and eastward tendencies in Afghanistan, Persia, China, Tibet, and the Straits. Turkey resisted them on her own territory, and Austro-Hungary in the Balkans, but the most serious obstruction was England.

REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA AND TURKEY

§ UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES

A summary of the pre-war history of the Straits demonstrates (1) that Great Britain generally preferred closed Straits which prevented Russia from coming out into the Mediterranean, and trusted that in time of necessity her navy could sweep away any legal or military obstructions to passage, (2) that Russia desired closed Straits when she was weak and at such periods sought the support of Turkey, but set her heart on open Straits for herself and did not hesitate to antagonize Turkey when she felt more conscious of her power, and (3) that Russia and England are the two countries most interested in the status of the Straits.

The World War radically changed the entire situation for Russia. France and England depended on Russian military efforts, while Sazonov felt that Turkey's position as an ally of the Central Powers gave him the moral right to demand the cession of Constantinople and the Straits to the Russian Empire.¹

On November 13, 1914, the day after Turkey entered the World War, Count Benckendorff, Russia's ambassador to the Court of St. James, broached the matter in an audience with George V. 'Constantinople must be yours,' King George agreed.

Several months later, Czar Nicholas drew aside M. Paleologue, the French ambassador, at a royal reception, and said to him:

'I feel that I have not the right to impose the terrible sacrifices of war on my people without granting them, in recompense, the realization of their age-long dream. Therefore, Monsieur Ambassador, I have made my decision. I will effect a radical solution of the problem of Constantinople and the Straits. The solution which

¹ *Constantinople and the Straits*, by E. A. Adamov. Vol. I, page 16. Moscow, 1925. This book of two volumes, published by Professor Adamov, the Keeper of the Archives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, contains hundreds of hitherto unpublished documents taken from the files of the Czarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs which throw precious light on the diplomatic history of the period from 1908 to 1917. Although these volumes, and the companion volume, *The Partition of Asiatic Turkey*, by E. A. Adamov (Moscow, 1924), are known to a few scholars on World War origins, they are, unfortunately, not available in translation to Western countries, despite the fact that they constitute a treasure-house of unknown and unquestionable source material.

UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES

I indicated to you in November is the only possible and practical one. The city of Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated into my Empire. . . . You know [Nicholas continued], that England has already informed me of her agreement. King George has said to my ambassador: "Constantinople must be yours." ¹

King George's acquiescence notwithstanding, Great Britain proposed to bargain and delay. Powerful influences in England objected strenuously to the emergence of Russia into the Ægean and Mediterranean.

Impatient to witness the 'realization of age-long dreams,' Sazonov reduced Russia's demands to paper, on March 4, 1915, and in an *aide memoire* to Paleologue and to Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador in Petrograd, declared that every solution of the Straits problem would be

'insufficient and temporary if the city of Constantinople, the western coasts of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, as well as Southern Thrace to the line of Enos-Midia, will not be included into the Russian Empire.'

Sazonov likewise asked, 'in view of strategic requirements,' for 'a part of the Asiatic shore limited by the Bosphorus, the Sakaria River and a point on the coast of Ismid Bay yet to be determined, as well as the islands in the Sea of Marmora and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos . . . ' ²

These Russian claims marked the beginning of Allied partition of the Ottoman Empire. France replied on March 8 to Sazonov's *aide memoire* promising that the 'Imperial Government could fully depend on the friendly attitude of the Government of the Republic in the solution of the problem of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance with the wishes of Russia.' But on the 14th of March, Paleologue informed Sazonov that France wished, in exchange for this kindness, 'to annex Syria, including the district of the Gulf of

¹ *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*, by Maurice Paleologue. Paris, 1921. Vol. I, page 314.

² Copied by the writer from the copy in the archives of the Czarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Alexandretta and Cilicia as far as the Taurus Mountains.' The French ambassador, who went to see the Czar at General Headquarters to press the matter, subsequently explained that Syria, according to the French conception, included Palestine.

The Greeks would gain Smyrna – against which the Italians protested – and Great Britain asked first for small benefits and then for far-reaching territorial acquisitions. On March 12, 1915, Sir George Buchanan handed Sazonov an *aide memoire* which accepted Russia's proposal for the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits and the territory on both shores of the waterway, but in a second *aide memoire* submitted on the same day, the British Government pointed out that this assent 'involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government and is in direct contradiction to the opinions and sentiments which at one time universally held in England and which have still by no means died out.' Sir Edward Grey urged, in consideration of these circumstances, that Constantinople be declared an open port for the transit of goods and that the Straits be always open to mercantile vessels. The British Foreign Office likewise presented territorial demands: that the Moslem Holy Places and Arabia be constituted an independent Mohammedan dominion, and furthermore, that the neutral zone in Persia be converted into a British zone.

But since these territorial bargains might make it difficult to maintain the public impression that the Allies were fighting against Imperialism and for the safety of world democracy, Sir Edward felt that 'it is most desirable that the understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French and British Governments should remain secret.'¹

The Petrograd diplomats consented with alacrity to Grey's request for secrecy and to the extension of the British 'sphere of influence' in Persia so as to include the neutral zone, merely adding the condition that Ispahan and Jezd be joined to the Russian sphere.

These territorial exchanges, however, paled in significance compared with the real compensation Britain and France ex-

¹ Copy supplied to the writer from the archives of the Czarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE STRAITS

pected as reward for their delivery of Constantinople and the Straits to Russia. London and Paris aimed at nothing less than the division of Turkey's empire in Asia, and before long (February 1916) Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot, the former French consul in Beirut, were in Petrograd explaining to the Russian Government the partition of Turkey's Arab domains which, later adopted and outlined in the famous Sykes-Picot Treaty, formed the basis for the decisions of the Paris Peace Conferences.

§ SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE STRAITS

When the Czar abdicated and was supplanted by the Provisional Government, Miliukov, the new Foreign Minister, indignantly denied that the republic would surrender any of the privileges granted it by the secret agreements with Britain and France with respect to Constantinople and the Straits. He considered them to conform to the 'life interests of Russia.'¹

The overthrow of Kerensky by the Bolsheviks scrapped all these secret understandings. 'Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Moslems,' said a proclamation issued over the signatures of Lenin and Stalin on December 7, 1917 – exactly one month after the Communist *coup d'état*. This sentiment, repeated subsequently on numerous occasions, was fundamental to Soviet foreign policy. The Bolsheviks not only renounced all claims on the Turkish capital, Turkish waters, and Turkish territory in both Europe and Asia, but actually pursued a policy of friendship towards Turkey calculated to prevent the Powers from consummating that partition which London, Paris, and Petrograd had secretly agreed upon.

The natural and political geography of the Black Sea and the Straits was left unchanged by the revolution of November, 1917. Yet the Bolsheviks felt that the 'life interests of Russia' no longer required the extension of Russian territory to the edge of the Mediterranean.

The Bolsheviks had enough trouble and enough territory. Nicholas II wished to guarantee his battle fleet free passage through the Dardanelles for purposes which can have been only

¹ *Constantinople and the Straits*, by E. A. Adamov. Vol. I, page 479.

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aggressive. The Communists wanted to close the Straits to prevent the aggression of others.

As a measure against Czarist expansion, Great Britain, and other Powers too, had wished to close the Straits to Russia. Now, in the period of revolutionary Russia, when Russia was unable and unwilling to expand, they advocated open Straits. Lord Curzon, in fact, admitted at the Lausanne Conference that, 'The respective policies of Europe and Russia have now been reversed.'¹ But foreign relations are never static. They depend to a great extent on geography, but very much on economic policies, on modified ratios of military strength, and on new conceptions of the nature of the 'life interests' of a country.

At the time of the Lausanne Conference, England believed that Soviet Russia was so weak and so unlikely to build a strong navy that open Straits would not possibly tempt the Bolsheviks to venture out into the Mediterranean, but would, given the proper situation, enable Great Britain to penetrate into the Black Sea without violating international conventions or the neutrality of Turkey.

Soviet Russia, on the other hand, was sincerely gratified by the hostility of Turkey towards the Entente and therefore drew closer to Angora in much the same way as a parallel feeling in Germany created a bond between Moscow and Berlin. The Bolsheviks, weak or strong, would have violated every one of their principles had they advocated open Straits and demilitarization as Curzon did in Lausanne.

¶ GEORGE CHICHERIN v. GEORGE CURZON

'In M. Chicherin,' says the *Manchester Guardian*, 'he [Curzon] for the first time met a foeman whose rapier was sharper and quicker than his own.'

The classic struggle between Chicherin and Curzon took place at the Lausanne Conference which met in 1922-3 to substitute for the Treaty of Sèvres a new agreement based on Kemal's smashing victory over the Greeks. Chicherin was at his best. His brilliance

¹ British Blue Book. *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs*. 1922-3. Records of the Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. London, 1923. Cmd. 1814. Page 139.

and deftness of argument and his lightning repartee in all Western tongues astonished the conference and the world that watched it with concern. Equalled only by Curzon among post-war statesmen in his command of the historical, ethnographical and geographical facts of the situation under discussion, Chicherin enjoyed the advantage of humour and of impersonal approach.

Curzon's personal and political sensitiveness made him especially vulnerable. He resented most the blow which he could not immediately return twofold. The very presence of Chicherin provoked the first British delegate at Lausanne. Curzon could assume no cultural superiority *vis-à-vis* the commissar. But Chicherin, more perhaps than any plenipotentiary Russia might have sent, personified everything he detested in Bolshevism as well as everything he hated in Russia. Chicherin, to Curzon, stood for Communist doctrine and the history of Russia – a combination which acted like a red rag on a bull.

Curzon felt, moreover, that Soviet Russia separated him from an agreement with the Turks. He had conceived of Lausanne as one of the greatest triumphs of his career. It would bring him the office of Prime Minister.¹ It would make him the first Englishman to be Viceroy of India and Premier of England. This double distinction, Curzon's biographer explains with much pathetic detail, was the outstanding ambition of his life. He dreamed, wrote and spoke of it. Everything he did centred around it. And here was Chicherin preventing him from forcing the easy submission of the Turks, from winning the enthusiastic praise of the British Press – he was peculiarly susceptible to unfavourable criticism – and from concluding a treaty with Angora which he hoped would unlock the door to the highest honour his King and country could grant. In the circumstances it would have been only too human to hate.

If Chicherin distressed Curzon, Curzon indubitably irritated the Turks. The British Foreign Secretary wished to sign the death warrant of Turkey in Europe. 'For nearly five centuries,' he had written, 'the presence of the Turk in Europe has been the source of

¹ *The Life of Lord Curzon, being the Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.*, by the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay. London, 1928. Vol. III, page 328.

distracted, intrigue, and corruption in European politics.' Curzon, his biographer tells us, therefore proposed 'the ejection of the Turk from Europe and the establishment of a much-reduced but compact and homogeneous Turkish state in Asia Minor.'¹ Constantinople would then be brought under 'some form of international authority.'

But though, in his opinion, it was 'inevitable and desirable' 'that the Turk should be deprived of Constantinople,' he did not agree that 'the fugitives are to be kicked from pillar to post and that there is to be practically no Turkish Empire and probably no Caliphate at all.' Such radical changes, the ex-Viceroy feared, would kindle most dangerous Moslem passions and 'sullen resentment which may easily burst into savage frenzy.' Curzon was thinking of the 70,000,000 Mohammedans in India, and of the faithful in Afghanistan, Egypt, and Arabia. The Empire always took first place in his mind. Therefore, while he would have excluded the Turks from the European continent, he did not wish to deal too severely with them in Asia. Britain having taken her share of the Turkish Empire, Curzon wanted the Greeks and Italians to leave the remainder intact.

Curzon found support in Lord Balfour, and in Lloyd George, who would only have urged the Greeks and the Italians to take more of Asiatic Turkey than Curzon thought expedient in view of Islam's possible disaffection. Nevertheless, a British Cabinet meeting of January 6, 1920, rejected the plan of expelling the Turks from Constantinople. They preferred a 'respectable and docile Turkish Government at Constantinople, preserved from its hereditary vices by a military cordon of the Powers.'² Curzon called this a 'chimera,' but it was the policy he consented to effect at the Lausanne Conference.

The Turkish situation, essentially, thrust Lloyd George out of office. 'The Prime Minister,' Curzon wrote to his wife, 'is as convinced a Venizelist and phil-Hellene as ever.' Lloyd George encouraged the Greeks to land in Smyrna and furnished Athens with the moral support and material aid for its war against Kemal

¹ *The Life of Lord Curzon, being the Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.*, by the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay. London, 1928. Vol. III, page 262.

⁵ *Ibid.*, page 270



CHICHERIN WALKING DOWN A STREET WITH GEORGE SLOCOMBE, CORRESPONDENT OF THE LONDON 'DAILY HERALD',
Facing page 403

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Pasha. France, on the other hand, supported Angora. Yet Curzon had persuaded Poincaré to work hand in hand with the British at the meeting in Lausanne. At the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9, 1922, Curzon delicately linked reparations with the Near East and hinted at his agreement with the French Premier.

§ THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

But for the change in Poincaré's attitude achieved by Curzon, the Lausanne Conference might have witnessed the strange spectacle of a resurgent Turkey, reinforced by France and Soviet Russia, facing an England in comparative diplomatic isolation. For with Paris leaning sympathetically towards Angora, Signor Mussolini, then only recently risen to prominence, would scarcely have sided with Curzon.

The conference opened in Lausanne on November 20, 1922; Curzon expected that the deliberations would last only two or three weeks. The prospect did not charm the French. They chose to complicate the discussions and retard their progress until the occupation of the Ruhr Basin in January. During that period the French, their slightly obstructive tactics notwithstanding, put great store on common action with Lord Curzon. Thereafter, too, Anglo-French co-operation continued, the French delegation even going to the length of permitting the Mosul problem to become a purely Turko-British affair, yet Poincaré's course zigzagged wildly on one or two occasions.

The Turkish delegation, seconded by the representatives of Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine, and Soviet Georgia, generally faced the united opposition of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Greece, and, at times, of Jugoslavia. Mr. Child, in his capacity of neutral United States observer, undoubtedly strengthened the hand of Ismet Pasha in the matter of Mosul where the American Admiral Chester held concession rights, but agreed with the Allies on the Straits and on those cognate issues which concerned Russia.

§ THE SOVIET STAND AT LAUSANNE

The attitude of the French Government and the decision of the British Cabinet made it a foregone conclusion that Lord

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Curzon would not insist on the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople. Angora might have desired more; the closing of the Dardanelles, for instance, and the fortification of the Straits zone. But Turkey had been at war for twelve years and was exhausted. The defeat of the Greeks had required a tremendous effort. Insistence on Turkey's maximum demands would have involved her in hostilities with the Allies, and Kemal felt that his movement was too Asiatic and peasant to arouse any enthusiasm for a question which, after all, impressed villagers from the Anatolian plateau as distant and somewhat academic. Constantinople had ceased to be the actual capital of the country, and it was no longer looked upon as the religious or spiritual or commercial centre. The nationalists did not wish to lose the city, but complete control over the Straits no longer represented a *sine qua non*. There is indeed a suspicion that even before the Lausanne Conference convened, Turkey promised the Allies to open the Straits.

The Anatolian masses would have resented the re-introduction of capitulations. Mosul was near and dear to them. On these issues they might have been stirred to further armed assistance. But not on the Straits.

This became apparent to the Soviet delegation a few days after its arrival in Lausanne. The battle of the Straits would therefore be fought between Russia and Britain.

It devolved on the Russians at Lausanne, therefore, to be 'more Turkish than the Turks,' and Chicherin, actually, defended Turkish sovereignty over the Straits with greater zeal than Ismet Pasha.

The Bolsheviks took over a weak Black Sea fleet from Kerensky. It suffered further heavy losses in the Civil War and especially during and after the Wrangel episode in the Crimea. What remained was of course no match for any British squadron, and when, for instance, English men-of-war shelled Black Sea towns during the Polish-Russian conflict in 1920, the Communists' only weapon was verbal protest. The only guarantee against a repetition of such naval raids and, in general, of the safety of the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Ukraine was the closing of the Straits. Chicherin accordingly informed the Territorial and Military Commission of the Lausanne Conference on December 4,

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1922, that, in Soviet Russia's opinion, 'the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be permanently closed both in peace and in war to warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey.'¹

The chief Bolshevik delegate contended that the closing of the Straits would grant equality on all nations, 'whereas the opening of the Straits to warships would confer a preponderant position on the strongest sea Power.' Russia, he declared, 'had liberated all the States of the Mediterranean from the threat of the century-old ambitions of Tsarism; but it was never her intention to acquiesce in a solution of the Straits problem aimed directly against her own safety.' That her safety could be menaced, he explained, was clear from the progress of the Civil War; there would never have been a serious Denikin or Wrangel movement had the Straits remained closed to Allied warships.

'Russia is at the beginning of a new era,' Chicherin pleaded, 'and we wish to start this by creating stable conditions of peace around us, whereas you,' he charged, 'wish to put us in a situation which will force us to arm.' The 'international deal' proposed by the Allies at the conference, Chicherin reiterated, 'means the necessity for Russia to arm, arm, arm.'

But Lord Curzon's programme included likewise the demilitarization of the Straits and of the territory bordering them. Ismet Pasha, who had not objected to the opening of the Straits, raised a mild protest against this measure; it 'amounts to leaving the most vulnerable and important districts of Turkey defenceless and at the mercy of a sudden attack,' he said. 'None of the Powers represented at this conference is deprived of the right to defend her capital.' The treaty draft, as introduced by Curzon, would take that right from Turkey.

Demilitarization would confirm the freedom of the Straits which, Trotzky told a London *Observer* correspondent, 'is nothing but a military dictatorship of the Black Sea for the country possessing the biggest fleet.' The Panama Canal, on the other hand, was strongly fortified, the Russians submitted; likewise Gibraltar; and

¹ British Blue Book. *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-3*. London, 1923. Cmd. 1814. Page 129. All subsequent quotations from the proceedings of the Conference sessions are taken from this volume.

the Suez Canal, technically under the control of an international commission, was guarded only by the British who justified their protectorate over Egypt on the ground of its defence.

'Peace,' Chicherin propounded, 'is consolidated by the separation of conflicting forces.' By converting the Straits into a strong military barrier between Russia and England which Russia promised to respect ('Russia is ready to undertake of her own free will not to send her Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean') the cause of peace would be well served. Of course, Chicherin affirmed, 'the ideal solution would be to put a stop to all naval armaments on every sea. But in the present situation the only possible compromise between the conflicting interests is for Turkey, as sovereign, to close the Straits to warships.'

The Allies were willing to grant certain small concessions to Turkey, which, Russia argued, were designed to drive a wedge between the Angoran and Muscovite delegations. They agreed, for instance, to limit the time any warship might spend in the Straits to the twenty-four hours required for passage. This, the Soviet plenipotentiaries submitted, was proof, if proof were needed, that the proposed Straits regime was designed more with a view to giving foreign fleets access to Russian coasts than to menace Turkish territory. A second concession would permit Turkey to fortify the southern shore of the Sea of Marmora from which ships passing through the centre of the waterway could not be shelled. Other Turkish demands were summarily rejected, although Lord Curzon did assure Ismet Pasha that if he wished to guarantee his country's territorial integrity he had only to join the League of Nations – whereupon Chicherin referred to Vilna. 'The impotence of the League,' the commissar commented, 'has become proverbial.'

§ THE ALLIED POSITION

The Allies advanced two reasons for open Straits: the necessity of safeguarding the Black Sea nations – Bulgaria and Roumania – against Russian attacks, and their obligation to protect commercial vessels in the Black Sea.

'It is apparently forgotten,' Chicherin retorted, 'that Bulgaria has been deprived of all her means of defence on land and sea by

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a treaty to which Russia was not a party – a treaty which she will never recognize.’ (The Treaty of Neuilly.) If the Allies were so solicitous for Bulgaria’s safety, Chicherin hinted, why did they rob her of the means of self-protection? ‘As to Roumania, has she been Russia’s neighbour since yesterday only?’ Chicherin inquired rhetorically. Before the War, ‘she never protested against the regime of the closing of the Straits.’ Soviet Russia’s relations to Roumania, moreover, are governed by what happens on land. Russia has no aggressive intentions against Roumania; but if she had, Roumania would prepare to defend herself by means of arrangements on land which are well known to us.’ (The commissar probably referred to Bucharest’s alliances with Poland and France.) Subsequently, Chicherin hinted broadly that Roumania’s advocacy of open Straits resulted from Allied pressure.

To Curzon’s second reason Chicherin replied that the same disadvantages to foreign commerce in the Black Sea existed before the War when Great Britain had always demanded closed Straits, and that piracy was practically unknown on the Black Sea since Wrangel quitted its waters. Nevertheless, and in view of the general desire that warships perform peaceful missions in the Black Sea, the Russians agreed to give the Turkish Government ‘the right to permit the passage of light war vessels in individual cases and for definite purposes [as, for instance, when United States destroyers carried Colonel Haskell to Odessa at the time he directed the work of the A.R.A. in the Soviet Republic. – L. F.] but on no account with a military object.’

This was inadmissible. The Allies desired the permanent privilege of entering the Black Sea, no matter what the purpose. They objected to any control whatsoever.

The Allies proposed that in time of peace and in time of war, Turkey being neutral, the maximum naval strength each Power might send into the Black Sea was not to exceed the Black Sea fleet of the largest Black Sea Power – Russia. Turkey, at Russian instance one feels, suggested modifications: that in time of peace ‘the total force of foreign fleets passing through the Straits at the same time must not exceed the force of the Turkish fleet’ in the Straits; that in time of war the provision of the Allies would remain, but ‘the warships of one belligerent Power may not enter

the Straits before the warships of the other belligerent Power shall have quitted the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.' For the Russians contended that if each Power sent in a fleet not larger than the Russian, and if the Soviet naval strength in the Black Sea equalled say 30,000 tons, then Britain could send in 30,000 tons, France 30,000 tons, Italy 30,000 tons and so on *ad infinitum*, with the result that the foreign forces might triple or quadruple the Russian. The Turkish amendment would have made the Black Sea accessible to the warships of only one foreign nation at a time.

Curzon, however, pronounced the Turkish attempt to 'lump the ships of all Powers together' . . . 'a quite impracticable arrangement.' Nor did the Allies accept Turkey's protests against the flight of military aircraft over the Straits.

§ TURKEY ACCEPTS, BUT THE CONFERENCE BREAKS UP

The Allies were adamant. The Bolsheviks declaimed against Curzon's proposals but the force of their arguments was located in another field than the British and depended too much on logic or law.

Undoubtedly, one highly important and easily intelligible consideration actuated the Allies at Lausanne. M. Barrere, the chief French delegate, emphasized it when he referred to the Anglo-French defeats at Gallipoli during the World War; 'on the day of their victory,' he said, 'the Allies resolved that the dangers of this situation must never be allowed to recur.' Militarized, closed Straits had handicapped the Entente in fighting Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey; they could prove an obstacle again. Now the Allies had the power to force a change. Their fleets were anchored in the Straits. Their troops held Constantinople. The Turks could not oppose military force to this force, nor could the Bolsheviks.

Under the circumstances, the Turks acquiesced to the Allied propositions with few modifications and few reservations.

The difficulty arose as a result of disagreements on questions which involved Soviet Russia less directly – on Greek reparations, and capitulations. Even on the Mosul question a compromise formula was reached postponing the decision for a year. Never-

AN OBJECTIONABLE PACT

theless, the Turkish delegation, having admitted defeat in all else, stood its ground stubbornly in the question of the legal position of foreigners and on capitulation generally. Curzon threatened Turkey with war as he had on several previous occasions during the conference. He brought the Angora representatives to his private hotel room on February 4 and warned that 'if within the next two hours we do not conclude peace, there will be no peace.' Curzon's train was waiting. 'Did it mean that Allied and Turkish soldiers would begin fighting again?' the British Foreign Secretary asked. But the suave Ismet was 'calm and certain.' He had learned that Poincaré did not stand solidly behind Curzon. 'He knew what war meant,' he said, 'but Turkey could not be deprived of her economic and judicial liberty.' No further concessions could be expected from Turkey.

The French, Italian, and British plenipotentiaries argued, cajoled, threatened. But at 7.45 p.m. Ismet Pasha and Riza Nur 'rose and took their leave,' and this made it possible for Lord Curzon to be in his train 'soon after nine o'clock.'

Chicherin had seen Ismet Pasha practically every day during this period. In Chicherin's view, a break would only strengthen Turkey's position. He felt that in case of war, France would not fight by the side of England. In the end, when rupture brought greater benefits, Ismet agreed that Chicherin's counsel had been wise – and helpful. He never forgot.

§ MOSCOW SUBSCRIBES AN OBJECTIONABLE PACT

The conference thus closed without any decision on the future regime of the Straits. In April, however, there was a resumption of the negotiations with Turkey. Vatzlav Vorovsky, the Soviet political envoy in Rome, protested Russia's title to participate in the discussions regarding the still undetermined question of the Straits, and on April 27 he himself, accompanied by two attachés, arrived in Lausanne to assert his country's rights.

Vorovsky was seated at the dinner-table in the restaurant of his hotel on the evening of May 10 when a counter-revolutionary named Conradi entered, fired, and killed the envoy and wounded both his companions.

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The Allies were somewhat stirred by this incident, but continued to deny Russia the privilege of debating the terms of the Straits convention. They did, however, invite Moscow to sign the finished document.

The treaty was finally signed by all the Allied Powers and Turkey in Lausanne on July 24. Jordansky, Vorovsky's successor, appended his signature on behalf of the Soviet republics on August 14, 1923, in the Palazzo Chili, in Rome.

The convention¹ contained all the features and regulations which Chicherin had fought during the Lausanne Conference. In time of peace, complete freedom of navigation was stipulated by day or night, under any flag, with any kind of cargo and without any formalities, or tax, or charge. Even pilotage remained optional. The same conditions would maintain in time of war, Turkey being neutral. In such a situation, Turkey might not interfere with navigation through the Straits, 'the waters of which, and the air above which, must remain entirely free' to merchant vessels of all kinds.

Should Turkey become a belligerent she would exercise all the rights of a belligerent under international law without, however, impeding the passage of neutral commercial craft.

Warships, too, must, in time of peace, be accorded complete freedom of passage through the Straits 'by day and by night, under any flag, without any formalities, or tax or charge whatever,' but no single foreign Power could send into the Black Sea a force exceeding that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea (Soviet Russia) – yet, even if all the Black Sea nations disarmed completely, the Powers could still dispatch into the Black Sea three or less ships, none of which would exceed 10,000 tons.

In time of war, Turkey being a neutral, warships and commercial vessels would be allowed to pass unhindered, and if Turkey were a belligerent, the ships of neutral nations would not be interfered with by Turkey. Submarines must at all times pass through the Straits on the surface. Warships would under no condition remain in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus longer than was required to traverse them.

¹ British Blue Book. *Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and other Instruments signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923*. London, 1923. Cmd. 1929. Pages 109 *et seq.*

AN OBJECTIONABLE PACT

The Straits, according to the convention of July 24, 1923, are demilitarized. 'The Straits' applies to the waters of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the islands situated in them, in the Sea of Marmora (except the island of Emir Ali Adasi), and Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and Rabbit Islands in the Ægean Sea, and the shores of the Dardanelles, including the Peninsula of Gallipoli, and a strip of territory about fifteen kilometres wide on either side of the Bosphorus (including Constantinople). The Turkish Government, nevertheless, was authorized to maintain a garrison of 12,000 men in the neighbourhood of Constantinople as well as an arsenal and naval base.

A commission consisting of representatives of the signatory Powers would supervise the regime thus provided for.

This is the regime now in force at the Straits. The arrangement violated Soviet sentiments and principles – as it did Turkey's, no doubt. But if hard circumstances compelled Angora to sign, and if the rôles of the diplomatic game made acceptance of the Allied terms unavoidable, no such factors operated to influence Moscow's decision. The Bolsheviks might have refrained from approving principles and regulations which did violence to every one of their policies, declarations and interests. The opponents of signing were not few in Soviet circles. But Russia subscribed to the Straits convention partly because this would be the first international instrument to bear her name and would thus give her a recognized political status in world politics, and, partly, because, with all its limitations and prejudiced position, the International Commission would still exercise some jurisdiction over the Straits.

'Our refusal to participate in it,' ran the official Bolshevik explanation,¹ 'can only do harm, and will, in any case, rob us of the possibility to control the acts of other Powers, anticipate abuses, demand reforms, and, when necessary, appeal to the entire world in defence of our own and Turkish interests.'

Yet despite such convincing argumentation the Soviet Government refused in the end to enter the International Commission or to ratify the Lausanne Straits Convention. Moscow still has the

¹ *Annual Report of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Year 1923*. Moscow, 1924.

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possibility of reversing its position on this matter; the treaty is still open for ratification. Meanwhile, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, through the Turkish Government, supplies information regularly to the International Commission on the status of the Soviet Republic's armed strength on the Black Sea. In the absence of such data, the Bolsheviks now aver, the Powers, which by the terms of the agreement may not send into the Black Sea a naval force larger than Russia's, would have the excuse of ignorance for ordering an unlimited number of ships through the Straits.

§ ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY AT LAUSANNE

The Bolsheviks frequently exaggerate the rôle they play in a given international situation. Thus, with respect to Lausanne, they argued that Lord Curzon's Straits programme was directed against them. It was also directed against Turkey. It robbed Turkey of prerogatives she had exercised before the World War when she was stronger and bigger. Turkey ceased to be sovereign in the waterway that connects the Ægean and Black Seas.

Chicherin has written that the gigantic forces of England were not thrown against Turkey after the February rupture of the Lausanne Conference 'because of Soviet Russia.'¹ But just on the eve of that break Poincaré wired an encouraging message to Angora which to Lord Curzon was very embarrassing. Paris, now that her legions sat securely in the Ruhr, once more thought of a separate pact with Kemal. The British were distressed and became less bellicose.

Moreover, a war against Turkey in 1923 might have thrown India and the whole Moslem world into convulsions. Here Soviet Russia's rôle might have proven important. The fear of what Moscow could do in such an eventuality, probably, sobered Lord Curzon who, judging from his mood on the night of February 4, when Ismet Pasha frigidly defied him, would have been only too ready to order the Mediterranean fleet to Smyrna. Bolshevik prestige with Islam was then very high. For if Great Britain, before the War, won sympathy among Mohammedans by emphasizing the evils of Czarist oppression, she put a similar weapon into defer

¹ *International Life*. (Official Journal of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.) Moscow, 1923. No. 2.

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hands after the Communist revolution. A war against Turkey might therefore have shaken the British Empire.

In the event of Anglo-Turkish hostilities, England would have stood alone. For neither Poincaré nor Mussolini were then prepared to fight Britain's battles in the Near and Middle East even though they did on occasions support her policies at the green table. Had Turkey been stronger or had the Bolsheviks taken the grave responsibility of interrupting Russia's economic reconstruction by a war that may have been world-wide, the Straits regime would perhaps have undergone modification. But London, Moscow, and Angora fought shy of activity, and as a result, the passive weight of Britain won the day.

Although the situation was somewhat more complicated than the Russians supposed, their presence at Lausanne no doubt interfered with Lord Curzon's management of the conference. They strengthened the Turks morally and inspired them to make not a few of their cleverest moves. Curzon resented this bitterly.

And, although the Lausanne Straits convention brought innumerable disadvantages to Turkey's position, the Bolsheviks could with reason contend that it was designed with a view to their detriment. 'There is no gain to us in this' [the British Straits programme. – L. F.], wrote the *Manchester Guardian* on December 21, 1922, 'beyond the possibility of attacking the southern coast of Russia if we should be at war with her.' Liberal opinion in Britain wished to dull the point of the spearhead aimed against Russia, for 'Russia in this matter,' the *Manchester Guardian* declared, 'matters a good deal more than Turkey. . . . On any large view our relations with Russia matter far more than our relations with Turkey and it would have been infinitely worth while to explore the possibility of an agreement.'

A few days later the same newspaper complained that Curzon never tried to come to an understanding with Russia or to treat her envoys at Lausanne 'with the sort of courtesy which was never denied them at Genoa.' England's diplomats, the *Guardian* affirmed in its issue of January 10, 1923, 'still regard the power of bombarding Odessa as more important than a peace with Russia which would relieve us for many a long day and perhaps for ever of any such necessity. . . . The primary means to peace' – the

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editorial continued, echoing the sentiments of the Lloyd George party, – ‘is a rational agreement with Russia.’

Curzon, however, had wider interests and more far-reaching aims than the mere preparation of the bombardment of Odessa or some other Russian Black Sea port. He was not concerned with bridging the difference between the Empire and Bolshevism. Perhaps therefore the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* was right in suggesting that ‘the chief and most enduring result of the [Lausanne] conference may be the worsening of our relations with Russia.’

During the Lausanne Conference a highly interesting interview took place between Lord Curzon and Chicherin. On one occasion, the two statesmen met in the ante-rooms of the conference hall. They shook hands and Curzon expressed the hope that they might see one another again. It had not occurred to the commissar that this constituted an invitation, but it did, and Mr. Armstrong, a British business man who brought this information, subsequently arranged an interview. Sir William Tyrrell was the only other person present.

Curzon talked to Chicherin in the same tone the ex-Viceroy had adopted towards Ismet Pasha. Communist propaganda, he said, could not be tolerated. Chicherin referred to anti-Soviet acts and statements by British representatives. Curzon denied the fact. Thereupon the Russian proceeded to explain that the Bolsheviks were prepared to guarantee that the Soviet Government would indulge in no propaganda hostile to Great Britain, and that no Soviet agents would engage in anti-British activities abroad. But the Soviet Government, he submitted, could not accept responsibility for every person who stood up in some corner of the world and criticized England.

Curzon, in reply, made a significant statement. ‘If an agreement,’ he said, ‘meant that there would be only 50 per cent Bolshevik propaganda instead of 100 per cent, no Minister of the Crown would accept it.’

Curzon rejected a half-solution though he could not have a whole one. Subsequently, after his famous ultimatum of May, 1923, he himself submitted to the Soviets a new formula which, Chicherin declares, ‘embodied in its mutual pledge no more than my formula at Lausanne.’

CHAPTER XIII

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Hatred for Russia – and love of India – were the inspiring passions of Curzon's career. While yet a *Times* correspondent and a plain M.P., he styled Russia 'the mammon of unrighteousness.'¹ The monumental literary works of his early manhood (*Russia in Central Asia* and *Persia and the Persian Question*) reveal a fear of the Colossus of the North and abhorrence for the 'bear that walks like a man' which demonstrably determined his policy as Viceroy of India and Foreign Minister of England. Spiritually he lived in Central Asia, where the menace of Russia loomed larger and blacker as the decades of the latter half of the nineteenth century rolled by.

'Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia,' he wrote in the introduction to his *Persia*, 'to me . . . they are the pieces of a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world. . . . The future of Great Britain . . . will be decided not in Europe . . . but in the continent whence our emigrant stock first came, and to which as conquerors their descendants have returned.'

The struggle he saw in Asia involved the two greatest empires of the world – Russia and Britain. The prize was India. 'Without India the British Empire could not exist. The possession of India is the inalienable badge of sovereignty in the eastern hemisphere.'

That his anxiety for the safety of India was more than a hallucination is clear from the undisguised declarations and deeds of Czarism. 'The stronger Russia is in Central Asia,' affirmed the famous Skobelev, 'the weaker England is in India and the more conciliatory she will be in Europe.' Taking this statement as their text, military experts and Central Asiatic politicians drafted plans

¹ *Persia and the Persian Question*, by the Hon. George N. Curzon, M.P. London, 1892. Vol. I, page 221.

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for the Russian invasion of India which are typically Slav in their frankness and their incomplete exactness.

The physical and military feasibility of a conquest of India by Russia requires only the proof piled high in historic records. Twenty-six times India was invaded. Twenty-one invasions ended in conquest. Many of the immortal heroes of antiquity crowned their careers with the subjugation of India. Semiramis, the Queen of Assyria, conquered the country in the twenty-second century B.C. Cyrus the Great of Persia repeated the deed in 530 B.C. Alexander of Macedonia spent seven of the thirty-three years of his life in bringing Central Asia under his sway. Leaving Greece in 334 B.C., he moved at the head of an immense army from Babylon into Persia, and thence to Herat and Kandahar, thus completing the seizure of Afghanistan. But before venturing toward the Indus, he turned his back on the goal of his biggest campaign, marched to the Oxus and Samarkand, and crushed the power of the Scythians. Then, in 327 B.C., he moved south, crossed the Hindu Kush, and penetrated into India as far as Lahore. But discontent grew in his army. So, taking whatever tribute he could exact and booty he could carry, he crept back, via Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan, to Babylon.

Jenghis Khan, the greatest and most cruel of all the world's warriors, likewise made himself the master of India in the first quarter of the thirteenth century A.D., and destroyed Lahore and neighbouring districts before the danger of annihilation by passive circumstances forced him to seek a hasty exit. Tamerlane, son of a tribal prince in Bokhara, first reduced Turkestan, the Caucasus, Persia and Bagdad, then defiled through the Khyber Pass and penetrated as far as Delhi, after which he too, the mighty conqueror, preferred a rapid retreat.

Baber and other renowned sons of Asia followed in the tracks of Alexander, Jenghis Khan, and Tamerlane, until the long line was closed by Nadir Shah, the most illustrious of Persian rulers, who reached the River Indus in 1738.

Although Nature provided India with the protection of the earth's highest mountains on the north, while granting her a long easily accessible coast-line, all her conquerors before the advent of the Portuguese and the British chose the difficult approach across

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passes 12,000 to 16,000 feet above sea-level. With the single exception of Nadir Shah, every invader of India marched over the Hindu Kush into Central Afghanistan, and from there, generally through the narrow Khyber, to the Sulciman Range and the Indus.

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The mythical testament of Peter the Great is said to have bade the Russian people to acquire far-off India. Russian mystics through the centuries and Pan-Slavists of more modern times urged the expansion of Czarism to the treasure house across the River Ind. But although the realms of the Romanoffs extended in all directions, no Russian move to take India developed before the close of the eighteenth century.

Mirabeau, the French revolutionary, suggested the idea to Russia in 1786, and another French leader laid a plan for an advance on India before Catherine the Great in 1791. The 'Semiramis of the North' weighed the scheme and granted it her approval. The year 1796 was designated for the opening of the offensive, but in that year the empress died.

Napoleon's offensive in Egypt was conceived as the first step to India. But when the Corsican's campaign on the Nile ended in failure, he applied to St. Petersburg. Knowing the Czar's anti-British inclinations, he felt that Russia would be a natural partner in his contemplated attack on the Achilles heel of the British Empire — India. He accordingly wrote to Paul I, who accepted enthusiastically and laid his plans. But Bonaparte failed him. The First Consul needed all his men in Europe, against the many Powers that combined against him. The Czar, however, persisted. Or perhaps it was at Napoleon's suggestion that he undertook the task alone. At any rate, Paul wrote in 1801 to General Orlov, ataman of the Don Cossacks, instructing him to start out with 22,500 horsemen. 'All the wealth of India,' read his letter, 'will be yours as a reward for the expedition.' Russia would 'acquire treasure and commerce, and would strike the enemy in the heart.' But Orlov had no complete maps and Paul could send him none. 'I am enclosing all the maps I have,' said the Czar. 'They go only to Khiva and the Oxus.'

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Later the Czar found a map of India and dispatched it by courier to the Don. Nevertheless, an expedition so poorly prepared and equipped was doomed. The men suffered terrible privations even within the confines of European Russia, and when Alexander I succeeded Paul he ordered the Cossacks back to their steppes.

Napoleon returned to the idea of the invasion of India in his famous interview with Alexander I at Tilsit. Subsequently, in a letter dated February 2, 1808, and now deposited in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he urged the Romanov to help organize a Franco-Russian army of 50,000 men. 'England will be enslaved,' he promised. The Czar would have Stockholm as a token of gratitude.

The Russian Emperor communicated his approval in writing. He volunteered the services of his Black Sea fleet, and suggested that Bonaparte lead the expedition himself. But once again the plan remained on paper. France's energies were occupied elsewhere – and before she was relieved the Czar had broken with the Corsican.

Like Napoleon, so the Romanovs resurrected the scheme of invading India whenever England threatened in Europe. The idea was to deflect Great Britain's interests and to divide her strength. In 1854, for instance, on the eve of the Crimean War in which England headed a coalition against Russia, St. Petersburg planned to march on India. But before the expedition could get under way, Russia had been defeated, humiliated, and weakened on the borders of the Black Sea.

Extension towards Constantinople and the Straits thus interrupted, Czarist expansionist tendencies took the line of least resistance leading to Central Asia. Russia could not expand westward because of the barrier represented by Germany. In stretching northward she soon reached the Arctic and therewith the limits of a poor possibility which offered neither great natural wealth nor markets. In the south, England had temporarily stopped her advance towards the warm waters of the Mediterranean by defeating her in the Crimean War. Remained the Middle East and the Far East.

Russia now sought new fields to conquer in Central Asia, and Alexander II 'mapped out a strict programme for the gradual approach to the borders of India in order to strike the sworn

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enemy of Russia a death blow whenever it became necessary.’¹ The Russian Empire actually began its advance towards Afghanistan immediately after 1856. In 1864, the city of Turkestan was taken, in 1865 Tashkent, in 1868 Samarkand, in 1869 Krasnovodsk, in 1873 the emirate of Khiva, and in 1876 the khanate of Ferghana on the edge of Chinese Turkestan.

The next logical step would have been an alliance with Afghanistan as the preliminary to the long-desired invasion of India. Such indeed was the plan laid by Skobelev before the counsels of the monarchy in 1876. And now, strangely enough, the events of 1854 were repeated. Whether the parallelism was accidental, or whether in both cases Britain learned of Russian designs on India and forestalled them by fomenting trouble around the Black Sea, no one knows. But just as the Crimean War prevented a Russian raid into India, so in 1877 a Russo-Turkish conflict flared up which, the Slavs charged, had been prepared and provoked by the British to make Skobelev’s project impracticable. The struggle ended with victory and minor territorial gains for Czarism, but the great prize – Constantinople and the Dardanelles – were denied Russia through the interference of England. Great Britain’s conduct at the Berlin Congress which followed the War moreover aroused a wave of uncontrolled bitterness in upper Czarist circles which found expression in a move towards India. A Russian army was to have advanced in three columns, one from Transcaspia in the direction of Merv and Herat, the second from Bokhara south to Kabul, and the third across the lofty Pamirs into Chitral and Kashmir. But only 20,000 soldiers participated in all these difficult operations and they therefore achieved nothing more significant than the taking of Merv in 1884 and the activization of Britain’s policy towards Afghanistan.

This advance in three weak columns, and the ‘invasion’ of India by Ataman Orlov in 1801 represent the full extent of Russia’s active campaigns for the conquest of India. The other ‘invasions’ remained confined to meticulous paper schemes carefully filed away in the archives, and to indignantly patriotic lectures before officers’ training classes.

¹ *To India : Military-Statistical and Strategic Memorandum. Plan for a Future Invasion*, by V. T. Lebedev, St. Petersburg, 1898. Page 10.

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Professor A. E. Snesev, Russia's best pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary authority on India, tells the writer that the Czarist Government never looked upon an invasion of India as a serious matter and only permitted the military governors in Turkestan to toy with the idea. In his *India as the Chief Factor in the Central Asiatic Situation*, published in St. Petersburg as far back as 1906, Snesev wrote in a similar vein, contending that Russia extended her influence into the Caucasus and Turkestan as long as it met no resistance, but no sooner was England seen standing athwart the path of progress, than the movement in Central Asia halted at an unfavourable boundary – the Oxus – when it would have been only natural to push on to the Hindu Kush.

Pre-war Russia kept alive the threat of invading India largely as a means of exerting pressure on Britain in Europe. France, moreover, influenced St. Petersburg in the same direction by concrete proposals for joint action as in the case of Napoleon and by financing the construction of strategic railways in Turkestan.

Russian statesmen knew that India could be conquered, but never held. Only one invader had remained to rule; the others were too happy to leave with their loot before army dissension and Hindustani disaffection undermined their strength. Even the staunchest Czarist imperialist, therefore, could never have dreamt of making India a Czarist province. At best, it might be taken from Britain and left to its fate with the result that England would lose a market on which her banks and industries prospered.

Her own industrial development was so weak in the 'seventies and 'eighties of the nineteenth century that Russia could not have exported heavily to India even had political and geographic conditions been propitious, and in the 'nineties when industrialization commenced, the advance towards India ceased. Economic motives played a minor rôle in Russia's dream of Indian conquest.

Czarism sought to grow longitudinally and latitudinally. It tried to acquire new territories while keeping their inhabitants in a state of primitive-agricultural poverty. The law which requires growth of every living thing made it incumbent on Czarism to register new conquests. If these gave Russia cotton and semi-tropical fruits as in Turkestan, or offered employment to a large standing army, sinecures to the scions of the nobility, and larger

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holdings to the landowning class, the conquests were doubly and triply welcome.

But Russia's motives with respect to India were largely negative. Germany, France, Japan, and Russia have at one time or another in their history harboured designs against India in an effort to destroy Great Britain's economic prowess by robbing her factories of 300,000,000 prospective buyers and her shipping of a far-flung Asiatic commerce. If any of these nations proposed subsequently to exploit India themselves, that intention was secondary to the main wish to disrupt the British Empire.

The fall of England would have given Czarist Russia that which she coveted more than all else: new territories and an exit to warm waters. History had established the principle that Russia's growth in Europe would not be tolerated. In Asia she could attempt to register conquests where she met minimum resistance; if the path to the Near East was closed, the forward push would be in the direction of Afghanistan or Manchuria; when Central Asiatic developments stagnated, as in 1895, St. Petersburg concentrated on the Pacific sphere, and when the Russo-Japanese War called a halt in that region too, compensatory pressure in the direction of Afghanistan became so likely that Great Britain pressed more than ever for the conclusion of the truce of August 31, 1907. Thus held fast in Manchuria and Turkestan, Russia tried the third exit—the Near East, and in 1908 Izvolsky started secret negotiations for the acquisition of the Straits.

Between Russia and the fulfilment of her expansionist dreams stood a wall that was England. For decades, Czarism kept tapping at the wall to find the weakest spot. She tried the Near East, the Middle East, the Far East, and found the wall uniformly strong.

Czarism's failure to assert itself in even one of its three possible lines of expansion suggests an important cause of its ultimate disappearance from the historic scene, and its supercession by a regime whose aim was intensive rather than extensive development. Atrophy followed the organism's failure to grow.

This circumstance, and the fact that Britain barred the way wherever Monarchist Russia turned, produced that holy hate for England which dominated Russian politics. Russian political

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literature between 1870 and 1907 was characterized by a violent dislike for Great Britain. It was always 'perfidious Albion.' The morals of her statesmen were beneath contempt. She was the nation of money-loving merchants. So much venom filled these pre-revolutionary books, so much bitterness and rancour! Compared to their spirit, that of Bolshevik declarations is mild and measured.

§ CURZON'S BUFFER STATES

Long before the 1917 revolution, Curzon advocated the erection of buffer States between Russian Turkestan and India so as to diminish the threat of a Slav thrust at the keystone of the Empire. These buffers were Afghanistan and Persia.

The struggle for supremacy in Persia and Afghanistan fills many lively pages of Russo-British relations during the nineteenth century. Without essaying to apportion exactly the relative guilt and innocence of the two nations, it is probably correct to say that Russia was the greater offender. England was engaged in consolidating her position within India proper, in subduing recalcitrant sections, suppressing great and small mutinies, and in extending her influence to the natural borders of the country. Russia sought to exploit this preoccupation to establish for herself positions in the buffer States, and particularly in Afghanistan. England could not be expected to look on with equanimity. No Power bent on the political and economic domination of so rich a colony as India could permit a rival, who made no secret of his unfriendly designs, to gain a strong foothold on the very borders of India.

The fear that Czarist Russia would dominate Afghanistan forced Great Britain to try to bring that backward country under her own influence. The endeavour was crowned with relative success after the second Afghan War of 1878-9.

The war gave Great Britain control of Afghan foreign affairs and of the tribes on the Afghan-Indian frontier. The passes leading from Peshawar to Afghanistan were transferred to British India. A British Resident was appointed for Kabul.¹

¹ *Afghanistan: the Buffer State. Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia*, by Captain Gervais Lyons. Published with the official sanction of the Army Council. London, 1910.

CURZON'S BUFFER STATES

A few months later the Resident was murdered. The war reopened. The British occupied the greater part of Afghanistan and appointed their own candidate, Abdur Rahman, as emir with an annual subsidy of 120,000 pounds sterling.

When Curzon published *Persia* in 1892 he identified British with Afghan interests. 'British, i.e. Afghan' interests, he wrote, in exactly the same way as he referred to 'British, i.e. Indian' interests. Afghanistan was considered a British colony. The emir even undertook military expeditions northward into Russian territory and attempted the conquest of the Pamirs while the British pursued the same purpose from Northern India and Chinese Turkestan. Afghan-British units occasionally met Russian troops in bloody contest on the 'roof of the world' and the danger existed that the conflict would not remain localized.

In 1895, however, a delimitation of the Pamir boundary took place which assigned to Afghanistan a tiny tongue of land 15 to 30 kilometres wide between Russia and India so that the two countries might never become contiguous.

This agreement, as well as Russia's acquiescence in England's domination in Afghanistan, point to the lost confidence of Czarism in its ability to overcome British resistance. England, by that time, had so fortified herself in India, and her protectorate in Afghanistan was so secure, that it would have required a powerful army even to attempt a march on India or any advance in her direction. All the conquerors of antiquity met difficulties *en route* to India, but the moment they reached the Khyber Pass the territory across the Indus lay helpless at their feet. India was weak, disunited, passive. With the coming of the British, however, a radical change intervened. In the twenty centuries between Alexander of Macedonia and Nadir Shah twenty invading armies marched over Indian soil. But since 1738 the forces of no hostile Power have as much as threatened India. With the consolidation of British rule in India the task of occupying the country becomes more and more gigantic. To-day – what with the strong British and native garrison and the protection of British naval and air fleets, the undertaking would be wellnigh impossible. The Bolsheviks could never hazard such a venture even if their psychology and principles permitted it.

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St. Petersburg's acceptance, in 1895, of the new Pamir frontier which set a limit to Russian expansion is to be attributed not only to Russia's weakness but to the diversion of her interests towards the Far East, where the Chinese-Japanese War of 1895 and events leading to the Boxer uprising of 1900 encouraged Czarism's hopes of winning new laurels on the Pacific. Work had begun on the Trans-Siberian Railway which was conceived as a link with distant markets and with possible territorial gains. In 1898 Russia obtained the Port Arthur lease. A period of foreign pressure on China now dawned through which, with the assistance freely offered by Kaiser Wilhelm, Russia expected to come into her own. Nicholas II therefore accepted the *status quo* in Central Asia and directed his attention further east.

Russia's adventures in Manchuria and Mongolia brought her into conflict with Japan and provoked the war of 1905 which checked her growth in the Pacific theatre. The war was followed by a menacing internal revolution. The resulting weakness enabled England to press for the legalization of the *status quo* in Central Asia. Russia might utilize her energy, drained though it was, to renew the rivalry in Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Persia. London, moreover, needed allies for the world-rocking struggle with Germany then already casting its shadow before.

The interplay of these circumstances produced the treaty of August 31, 1907, signed in St. Petersburg by Sir Arthur Nicholson for His Majesty's Government and by Izvolsky on behalf of the Czar. In it the Russians 'engaged that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan.' England, on the other hand, promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan or to annex any part of its territory.

The treaty, furthermore, admitted the sovereignty of China over Tibet and both contracting parties pledged themselves to refrain from sending representatives to Lhasa, but London recognized Russia's right to trade with Tibet and thus, by implication, her special position in Chinese Turkestan on the borders of the Indian province of Kashmir.

With respect to Persia, a Russian sphere of influence was

CHANGED STATUS

created in the north, a British sphere in the south, a neutral sphere between them. Hereby Czarism for ever renounced its dream of reaching the Persian Gulf.

A period of passive rivalry now dawned during which Great Britain enjoyed the advantage of bigger financial and commercial resources, better diplomacy, and the presence of an armed force in India stronger and more mobile than the Czar's army in Turkestan.

During the decade that intervened between the ratification of this treaty and the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, the tug-of-war continued for domination over the Shah's Government and over Afghanistan. Russia had been reduced to a more distant threat. Nevertheless, the British looked askance at the extension of Turkestan and Caucasian railways to the Afghan and Persian boundaries, and would on no account permit the building of railroads by Russia in either of the buffer States. The Czarist State, which would have welcomed railroads in Afghanistan, strenuously objected to the granting of a construction contract in Persia to British subjects or to the nationals of a power friendly to Great Britain. The famous Reuter concession will be recalled.

Thus the effect of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia was to confirm both buffer States in their backwardness, poverty, and dependence.

§ CHANGED STATUS

With the advent of the Soviet revolution the black threat that had hung over these States from the north disappeared.

Great Britain took advantage of the new situation to occupy all of Persia in 1919 and use it as a base for operations against the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus and Turkestan. But in the same year, the disloyalty of the Anglo-Indian army, the unsettled state of affairs in India, the Pan-Islamic agitation in the Moslem world which England necessarily feared, and the passive influence of the Bolshevik upheaval, afforded a favourable conjuncture for the seizure of power by Amanullah Khan, the leader of the Young Afghans and Pan-Islamists – and the assertion of Afghanistan's independence.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN ASIA

The existence of the Soviet State encouraged the growth of nationalist movements in Persia under the leadership of Riza Khan and in Afghanistan under Amanullah Khan. Just as the political and social influences of the French Revolution overleapt boundaries and ultimately made themselves felt in different parts of the world, so the establishment of Bolshevism in Russia produced very apparent effects on the history of numerous Eastern peoples. The granting of cultural, political and economic autonomy to the national minorities in Russia and the Kremlin's sermons on the right of Eastern peoples to national self-determination, provoked in those peoples a natural yearning for these privileges.

The Russo-Afghan frontier, which extends over a thousand kilometres, divides the Uzbecks and Tadjiks in Soviet Turkestan from their blood brethren in Afghan Turkestan. The boundary is not even a physical obstacle to passage, much less an insulator of ideas. The fact that a new regime dominated by new policies had been instituted on the northern side soon communicated itself below the line.

It is more than an accident that the movement for the liberation of Eastern women and for the discarding of the veil appeared in Soviet Russia, Turkey, and Afghanistan in the same decade. Even as the revolutionary nationalism of Turkey reflected developments in Russia, so the nationalism of Amanullah fed at Russian and Turkish sources. The East respects geographical boundaries less than the West. Ties of blood and religion are more real. Soviet reforms, accordingly, quickly provoked in adjacent countries a demand for similar changes. Thus a bond was established between Soviet Russia, Afghanistan, and Turkey which is far more significant than a political entente because it is stronger and more permanent. It is this influence that the British dread in Central Asia.

Except in a period of great social unrest when the Anglo-Indian army would be disaffected, India is militarily impregnable. Since the World War, the British have set up a series of concrete forts in the North-West Frontier, erected numerous aerodromes and increased their forces in India near the Afghan border, and have surrounded Afghanistan on the west, south and, in part, on the east with important strategic railways and highways. The

Soviet army, on the other hand, is weaker than the Czarist. It is, moreover, politically too enlightened to engage wholeheartedly in a war of aggression against India. Nor would Soviet economic and financial resources permit of such a move for many years to come. In 1923 Curzon certainly did not fear the physical expansion of Bolshevik Russia in the direction of India. He did fear the repercussion of Soviet social ideas on the peoples of the British Empire.

Against their influence, Britain now needs a buffer in the shape of Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, of Persia. Curzon wished to create a physical geographical buffer against Russian expansion before the revolution. To-day the Empire requires a social barrier to obstruct the penetration of the new nationalism of the north.

Despite Hindu-Moslem differences, both the Mohammedan and Buddhist populations of India have in the past shown concern for and interest in Afghan events. The sympathy between India and Afghanistan is undeniable. And the British are quite right in suspecting that the entrenchment of a forward-looking regime in Kabul directed by an assertive, modern monarch might exert a disastrous effect on British rule in India. London and Delhi, however, realize that it is far more difficult to establish a social buffer than a physical buffer.

Amanullah's attempt to set up a strong central government, introduce schools for boys and girls, organize an army to succeed the tribal military system, collect taxes, and to free women from the veil and from everything mediæval it recalls, is an echo of developments in Soviet Turkestan and Caucasia. But it also challenges Indian complacency.

The English realize that the Bolsheviks are powerless to stop the workings of the ideas they have let loose in the East. What does it benefit the British Empire if Moscow withdraws all its agents from Afghanistan and promises never to send an army or agitators into that country, when the germs of Red policy in Turkestan are carried by every shepherd and merchant who approaches its frontier? Even a British Labour Government would be faced with this difficulty. Its fundamental liberalism would demand acceptance of a Soviet suggestion for mutual abstention from outside

interference in Afghan affairs. But its inevitable desire to safeguard British Imperialism would dictate a policy of defence against Soviet social ideas. A Labour Cabinet must watch over India with the vigilance of a Conservative ministry or fail in its duty to bourgeois society.

Curzon sought to destroy the menace or weaken the efficacy of the menace that was Soviet Russia. His fight at Lausanne had a double purpose: to deal a blow at Bolshevik prestige and to undermine the strength of nationalist Turkey through which the whole Moslem and Eastern world might be infected with anti-imperialist virus. He failed to accomplish these objects at the Lausanne Conference. That meeting, moreover, added to his inveterate hatred for Russia the personal irritation of Chicherin's presence, and the personal chagrin over his failure to achieve his life's ambition by becoming Prime Minister.

Curzon now decided to strike a direct blow at the Soviet Government. It took the form of his famous ultimatum of May 2, 1923, which revolved around the problems of Persia and Afghanistan.

§ SOVIET RELATIONS WITH PERSIA. 1921-3

The Soviet-Persian Treaty of February 26, 1921, laid the foundation of a cordial relationship between Moscow and Teheran. Factors tending to complicate and cloud Russo-Persian affairs nevertheless remained. Red troops still occupied the Persian province of Ghilan, and British influence had not completely disappeared.

Moscow wavered, torn between two desires. The British Empire shook with dissension in Ireland, India, Egypt. There were indications that London would be forced to shorten the imperial line of communication by withdrawing its troops from Persia in the direction of Iraq which was itself in a disturbed state. The Bolsheviks saw a golden opportunity. Lenin weighed the plan of 'sovietizing' Khorosan but was quickly dissuaded. Other Communists urged military penetration into Persia, using Ghilan as a base.

The treaty of February 26, 1921, made the evacuation of Russian troops contingent on the departure of the British forces in

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Persia. The weakened position of the British prevented the control of all Persia. Their alternative appeared at the time to be a division of Persia similar in effect to that outlined in the Czarist agreement of 1907. British policy, accordingly, inclined to favour the continued stay of Red battalions in Northern Persia. It would, by the indirect implication of the treaty of February 26, 1921, permit them to prolong their own occupation.

Captain E. Noel, a British agent, was sent to Persia early in 1921 to help erect a Southern Persian Confederation in the event of the establishment of a Soviet State in the north. Only July 6, 1921, he wrote to Sir Percy Cox, one-time High Commissioner of Iraq, revealing the nature of Downing Street policy.

‘DEAR SIR PERCY,’ reads his letter:

‘I was sent to Persia by the F.O. [Foreign Office. – L. F.] in January when it looked as if the withdrawal of our troops would be followed by a Bolshevik armed incursion and the establishment of a Soviet which would free our hands to take action in the South. The forecast proved incorrect. Instead of advancing the Bolsheviks have retired. They consider it premature to force the situation. Their policy is to hold Persia together and to prevent at all costs our starting a Southern Federation. . . .’

When the retirement of the British Army was followed by the withdrawal of the Soviet soldiery in Ghilan in May and June of 1921, the British could no longer hope that Russian entrenchment in the north would enable them to dig in in the south. Sir Percy Lorraine, the British minister in Teheran, accordingly hinted to Theodore Rothstein, the Soviet envoy, that the Soviets and England divide Persia into spheres of influence after the time-honoured pre-revolutionary practice. Rothstein ignored the offer.

The evacuation of the Soviet force from Northern Persia did not, however, close the so-called ‘Ghilan episode.’ Some Communists in Bakù and Moscow still urged the ‘sovietization’ of Persia. But the Soviet Government was in possession of information from Rothstein which would have prevented it from supporting the cause of Red revolution in the Shah’s kingdom. Moreover, as Rothstein once wrote:

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN ASIA

'You may rest assured that any attempt on our part . . . to start a revolution in any part of Persia would immediately throw it into the arms of the British, who would be received as the saviours of the Fatherland.'

Lenin shared this view, as did the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Chicherin gave expression to his opinion in a letter to Eskhanullah Khan, one of the leaders of the Ghilan movement, in which he congratulated the Persian on his 'rejection of the policy of partisan activity, of foreign penetration into Persia, and of attempts to capture Teheran.' Such activity must, 'in view of the absence of serious preparatory work among the masses for an historical situation of this kind,' lead to exploits by adventurers such as Kuchuk Khan, scheming feudal chiefs, heads of primitive tribes and British spies 'like Mr. Hawk.'

The Bolsheviks, with few exceptions, felt that Persia could be no fruitful field for Communist work, and that a Soviet move in Ghilan would be followed by the establishment of a British protectorate in the south. The Soviets preferred to strengthen the hands of the Nationalist Government in Teheran and therefore refused to aid Kuchuk and Eskhanullah Khans. Soon Riza Khan was able to march an army against Kuchuk and drive him into the mountains where, it is said, he froze to death. Other Ghilan leaders were amnestied at the request of the Soviet Government and permitted to go to Baku.

The 'Ghilan Episode' proved conclusively that the Bolsheviks did not intend to promote their own brand of revolution in neighbouring countries. Some Communists did wish to carry forward the banner of Marx with fire and sword, but they could not determine for any length of time the policy of the Soviet Government. Moscow was far more interested in reinforcing the independence of Nationalist Persia. Theodore Rothstein was frequently summoned to the Shah for advice in time of political crises, and Riza Khan and the Premier appeared at the Soviet Legation on numerous occasions to consult the Russian envoy.

Rothstein had dissipated any thought in the minds of prominent Persians that he favoured an imported revolution of the Socialist kind. When, in 1921, the Teheran authorities sought to

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prevent his entrance into the country and later into the capital on the ground that his mission was to foment revolution, he protested that if the Soviet Government really intended to precipitate a revolution it would have sent Budenny with his cavalry instead of himself – who came armed with Curzon's *Persia* as his Baedeker and Soviet declarations as his political guides. Subsequently, Zi ed Din, the Premier, responsible for the delay in Rothstein's arrival, fled to Bagdad in a British automobile.

The influence of the British had not been completely eclipsed. They sat securely in the south, where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a creature of the British Government, operated an invaluable petroleum concession. Its royalties to Teheran covered one-fourth to one-third of the annual expenditures of the Persian State. British officers, moreover, still held posts in the Persian Army, and great feudal khans, especially in Luristan, Kurdistan, and Southern Arabia were continually made aware of the special interest of the British in their territories.

Riza's Khan's first task was the organization of a loyal national army with which he could break the power of the khans who resisted the central government, refused to pay taxes, or to approve of his reforms. Neither Zi ed Din nor his successor were exactly anti-British. The Medjlis had strongly feudal inclinations. Nevertheless, Riza introduced his militant nationalism.

In 1921 he dismissed the British and Swedish instructors of the Persian Army and disbanded and disarmed the South Persian Rifles who had been an undisguised British weapon. The result was a rich crop of feudal insurrections during 1922 and even 1923 in Ghilan and Khorosan in the north, in Luristan and Kurdistan – these he quickly suppressed with merciless ruthlessness – and in Arabistan and the Bakhtiari region where the sheiks and khans, grown rich on subsidies of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and well supplied with foreign arms, were able to force Riza Khan to negotiate with them. Before the end of 1923, however, the War Minister had forced even the recalcitrant South to pay taxes and to contribute recruits to his battalions. The economic power of feudalism was not broken but it bowed to the military dictator; he had crushed its political omnipotence.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN ASIA

With the decay of the might of the feudal lords, the position of Britain weakened. 'Lost influence in Persia,' read a London *Times* headline on August 21, 1923, over an article which declared: 'It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that the British are unpopular in Persia at present . . .' And popularity of the Soviets grew in proportion to the unpopularity of the British.

On October 29, 1923, Riza Khan became Prime Minister. The whole country hailed him as its national hero. He had united the nation and asserted the authority of the central government throughout the land. The future held defiance and difficulties in store for him, but Persia's national independence could no longer be questioned by the foreign or domestic foe. Early in 1924 the new Medjlis convened; Riza's words became its laws.

As the power behind the throne in 1922 and 1923, Riza Khan was far greater than the figure on it in 1925. He had conquered under the sign of nationalism and centralization; both were products of necessity and echoes of the revolution in the vast State of the north.

During this period Soviet-Persian diplomatic relations remained undisturbed, and Soviet commercial contacts – especially with North Persia and Teheran, whose export, import and transit trade depend on Russia – continued to develop. It was the trading bourgeoisie and the rising intelligentsia on whom Riza Khan depended for support of his centralization programme. And on his army.

§ SOVIET-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS. 1921-3

The tug-of-war between British and Soviet influence developed in Afghanistan as well, and ran parallel with Amanullah's attempt to mould a group of warlike tribes into a united nation. But Afghanistan's economic development lags behind that of Persia. Its bourgeoisie is younger and weaker. Its resources are fewer. Britain's strategic position with respect to Afghanistan, moreover, is far more favourable than in the case of Persia. Above all else, Afghanistan's destiny is determined by the fact of its neighbourly proximity to British India.

SOVIET - AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

Having won independence in 1919, Afghanistan was free to enter into a political treaty with the Soviets, which was signed on February 28, 1921. England could not, in view of her preoccupation with problems of empire, prevent the conclusion of this agreement, but she sought, in 1921, 1922, and 1923, to obstruct its operation.

The treaty entitled Soviet Russia to establish consulates in Herat, Meimen, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, and Ghazni. On November 21, 1921, however, Raskolnikov, the Soviet minister in Kabul, informed the Afghan Foreign Office that Moscow would temporarily refrain from opening consulates in Kandahar and Ghazni in order not to embarrass the Afghan Government. The embarrassment would have arisen from British India's opposition to the settlement of a Soviet official near the Indian border.

Amanullah felt keenly the effect of Great Britain's special interest in the North-west Frontier region and of the new 'Forward Policy' which was introduced after Afghanistan obtained her independence. The Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 had thrown the tribes of the North-West Frontier into a turmoil that lasted long after peace was officially declared, and the process of pacification cost the British more than any other similar enterprise in the history of their rule in India. To prevent a recurrence of that situation and as a prophylactic against repercussions of Afghan independence in India, British India sent the regular army into the North-West Frontier – nominally independent under the Sir Mortimer Durand agreement of 1893 – and proceeded, in 1921, to construct a railway through the Khyber Pass and motor roads in the direction of Kabul. At the same time, the pacification of Waziristan went on apace.

The corollary of greater firmness in British policy towards the warlike tribes of the North-West Frontier was greater British firmness in relation to Afghanistan and increased resistance to Soviet influence at Kabul.

The Soviet-Afghan Treaty of February 28, 1921, provided not only for Russian consulates in Kandahar and Ghazni, but also for the 'granting of financial and other material aid to Afghanistan by the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.' The British, who were of course acquainted with the contents

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN ASIA

of the treaty, naturally tried to obstruct the execution of this provision.

During 1921 and the early part of 1922, British efforts to cloud the horizon of Soviet-Afghan relations received support from the circumstance of Afghan sympathy and aid for Enver Pasha's adventures in Bokhara. The Kabul Government even undertook military measures calculated to comfort the anti-Soviet insurgents. But when Enver disappeared, Russo-Afghan affairs returned to their normally smooth course. Towards the end of 1922, Russian engineers commenced preliminary surveys for the construction of a telegraph line from Kushk on the Turkestan-Afghan border to Kandahar and Kabul. And in December, Kabul suggested that the Soviet Republic might fulfil the promise of 'financial and other material aid.'

The year 1923 found all of Afghanistan stirred by British military activities in the North-West Frontier province. Amanullah could only suffer from an improvement of Britain's position in Waziristan.

A Turkish mission had previously arrived in Kabul to train Amanullah's new army. Afghanistan's policy became more active. The Moslems of India, and the Hindus too, were in a black mood. Russia welcomed the new developments.

England fought back. Air bombing in Waziristan was one of her weapons. The stopping of munitions purchased by Afghanistan in Italy and Germany was another. The Curzon ultimatum was yet another.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CURZON ULTIMATUM

Curzon's ten-day ultimatum of May 2, 1923, rested on British displeasure with the situation in Central Asia. The other subjects it discussed were of very minor importance. The seemingly important question of debts and confiscated private property was not as much as alluded to. Yet the disappointment of British business quarters with the results of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, undoubtedly played a rôle in the submission of the ultimatum.

The British had supposed that the New Economic Policy signaled the scrapping of Communism, the reintroduction of private capitalism, and therefore readmission of foreign capital into Russia on easy terms. They had assumed that the Soviet Government would not defend its original principles in the matter of concessions, compensation, and foreign trade. But Genoa and The Hague created a contrary impression, and the following year confirmed the belief that the Bolsheviks would avoid far-reaching compromises.

THE URQUHART CONCESSION

The Urquhart concession episode offered concrete proof of the Soviets' intransigent attitude towards foreign capital. Throughout 1921, Urquhart had conducted negotiations with Communist officials in London and Moscow with a view to the return of his vast holdings in Siberia. He was present in Genoa and The Hague, and as the latter conference failed, he expected to benefit from the Bolshevik desire to break the hostile Allied front by signing separate agreements with States and private groups. Actually, negotiations between Krassin and Urquhart now entered their final stage, and on September 9, 1922, they signed the concession contract in Berlin.

But Moscow's ratification was required. Lenin changed his mind three times: first he approved, then he disapproved, then he approved, and in the end he laid his veto on the agreement. The

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Soviet Press announced the final rejection of the concession on October 7, 1922. From an economic point of view, the papers said, the concession was not favourable to Soviet interests. It had been considered largely as a means of winning the goodwill of the British Government and of strengthening the *rapprochement* begun in Genoa and The Hague. But British policy in the Greco-Turkish situation and London's attempt to bar Russia from Lausanne indicated that Downing Street would persist in its hostility towards the Soviet regime despite the signing of the Urquhart contract.

This official reason received most prominence in Bolshevik editorials. Yet the industrial patriotism of Soviet engineers and economists who believed that they could operate Urquhart's former properties without him influenced the deliberations. And Urquhart's insistence on compensation for minerals taken from his holdings during the Civil War and for damages wrought in that chaotic period provoked the opposition of many Bolshevik elements who did not wish to establish a precedent which would reinforce the compensation claims of other former owners and entitle the Germans to make similar demands under the Rapallo Treaty. The same difficulty complicated conversations between Urquhart and the Soviets after the rejection of the 1922 agreement. Mr. Urquhart insisted on compensation even as late as 1928 and 1929, when he approached Bolshevik representatives in Paris. But while this defence of the capitalist principle is extremely laudable, it does not seem to be commercially expedient, as the Russians continue to exploit his former properties and not unnaturally show a diminishing inclination to take Mr. Urquhart's approaches seriously – particularly since they have gained the impression that he has lost much of his financial and political might.

Urquhart believed that the Curzon ultimatum should have presented demands for compensation and for payment of debts. 'They are the pivot of Anglo-Russian relations,' he wrote in a letter to the London *Times* of May 26, 1923. Nevertheless, he regarded the ultimatum as 'the first touch of sense and firmness we have imported into our diplomatic dealings' with Russia. He thus set his stamp of approval upon Curzon's policy and indirectly criti-

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cized Lloyd George's, forgetting that the Bolsheviks might not have rejected his concession had they expected a continuation of the relatively conciliatory policy of Lloyd George.

¶ THE PRELIMINARY BARRAGE

The Curzon ultimatum, significantly, omitted any reference to the principles for which Lloyd George had fought in the Genoa and Hague periods. Nor did it argue the claims of Urquhart and the Association of British Creditors he had organized. This may have been a studied slight to the deposed Coalitionist Premier. Or it may have been an attempt to place the dispute on a political basis and thereby avoid issues on which the Bolsheviks might have been prepared to compromise. It was, at any rate, characteristic of Curzon that he paid no attention to economics.

¶ RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

The diplomatic barrage which preceded the Curzon ultimatum, however, dealt neither with economics nor with politics – but with anti-religious persecution.

In March, 1923, Cardinal Cieplak, Monsignor Butkevich, and a number of priests of the Polish Roman Catholic Church in Russia were brought to trial in Moscow on the charge of espionage and other treasonous activities during the Civil and Russo-Polish Wars.

At the time when the policy of the Bolsheviks *vis-à-vis* the Church was far more active than it is to-day, the Roman Catholics received milder treatment than the Greek Catholics. Moscow even conducted pourparlers with a representative of the Pope. For the Communists wished to undermine the power of their leading domestic enemy, the Greek Catholic Church, by direct propaganda and repression, but also by encouraging schisms in that institution as well as by temporarily giving a relatively freer rein to its rivals, of whom the Roman Church and the Baptists seemed the most promising. The Soviet Government therefore argued that the trial against Cieplak, Butkevich and their colleagues was in no wise anti-religious but rested purely on their counter-revolutionary, political actions.

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On March 27 Cardinal Cieplak was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and Mgr. Butkevich to death. Protests poured in from every corner of the world, from Catholics, Episcopalians, Protestants, Jews, Moslems, etc. The Polish Government undertook a diplomatic *démarche*, and on March 30 Mr. R. M. Hodgson, England's official representative in Moscow, acting under instructions from Curzon, made 'an earnest and final appeal for a stay of execution,' which, his note assured, 'cannot fail to produce throughout the civilized world a feeling of horror and indignation.'

Moscow replied the very next day, but, in a premeditated and unwise effort to offend, the rejoinder bore the signature not of Chicherin or Litvinov but of Gregory Weinstein, the chief of the Anglo-American section of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The contents of the note, however, aroused more indignation than this slight. It pointed out that

'Russia, being an independent country and a sovereign State, has the undeniable right of passing sentences in conformity with its own legislation on people breaking the law of the country, and that every attempt from outside to interfere with this right and to protect spies and traitors in Russia is an unfriendly act and a renewal of the intervention which has been successfully repulsed by the Russian people.'

Not content with this sternly-worded restatement of an accepted principle, Moscow touched England roughly on what, at the moment, was her sorest wound: Ireland. The Black and Tans were engaged in the unpleasant task of taming the wearers of the Shamrock and did not hesitate to adopt some rather doubtful means of achieving that end.

The Weinstein message referred therefore to the

'hypocritical intervention of the British Government which is responsible for the assassination in cold blood of political prisoners in Ireland, where 14,000 men, women and young girls are treated in a barbarous and inhuman fashion. . . . If similar facts which have taken place under British rule in India and Egypt are taken into consideration, it is hardly possible to regard an appeal, in the name

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of humanity and sacredness of life, from the British Government as very convincing.’¹

‘In bourgeois diplomacy but particularly in British diplomacy,’ wrote the *Izvestia*, ‘when it is written Butkevich you must read oil, when it is written Cieplak you must read Russian fisheries, and when they say Tikhon they mean British interests in the East.’

Poland protested in the name of humanity: ‘Hypocrisy,’ the Bolsheviks replied. ‘Do they not persecute the Greek Catholic Church in Poland? Did they not provoke the war of 1920 which cost thousands of lives?’ France protested in the name of civilization; ‘Hypocrisy,’ they replied. ‘Did she not invade the peaceful Ruhr and use coloured Colonials in order to add insult to injury?’ England protested in the name of the ‘affronted moral sentiment of mankind’; ‘Amritsar,’ they shouted back, ‘Black and Tans.’

Unmindful of all foreign appeals, the Soviet Government denied clemency to Butkevich or commutation of sentence to Cieplak. The Archbishop was released less than a year after the trial and permitted to journey to Rome.

The British Government refused to accept Mr. Weinstein’s offensive note, whereupon he signed another in which the Soviet Government reiterated the hope that Great Britain would in the future ‘refrain from attempts of any kind at interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic.’

Military intervention had made the Soviet Government extremely sensitive to foreign interference in its affairs. Any attempt from abroad to modify Soviet policy was doomed in advance to failure. It could, conceivably, exert an effect diametrically opposite to what had been intended.

§ THE ULTIMATUM

A month after the Weinstein notes episode, Mr. Hodgson placed the Curzon ultimatum in the hands of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. ‘The tone and character’ of those notes, read

¹ British White Book. *Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government respecting the Relations between the Two Governments*. London, 1923. Cmd. 1869.

² *Ibid.*

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the ultimatum, had induced the British Government to examine whether 'it is desirable, or indeed possible, that the relations between the two Governments should remain any longer upon so anomalous and indeed unprecedented a footing.'

Commerce with India was far greater concern to Curzon than trade with Russia. He attached little importance to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1921. Its cancellation might, he thought, give England freedom of action. For it is clear from the contents and spirit of his ultimatum that he wanted or expected a break. The Weinstein notes may have encouraged his hope that the ultimatum would produce the effect he desired. If Moscow replied in the rude manner of the Weinstein communications, British public opinion would be aroused and the Foreign Office would feel justified in severing relations.

The bulk of his ultimatum dealt with alleged Russian 'pernicious activities' in Persia, Afghanistan, and India. 'Upon unimpeachable authority,' the British Government had information that would fill many pages. 'Such a narrative would doubtless provoke, as it did before, an indignant denial from the Soviet Government with allegation as to false information and spurious documents.' His Majesty's Government therefore 'have no intention to embark upon any such controversy.'

The British case was said to rely exclusively on communications between the Soviet Government and its 'agents' in the East. Assuming their genuineness, these communications would have been considered highly secret and confidential; many Governments would have hesitated to commit their contents to paper. Yet Curzon asserted that the originals or copies had come into his possession without, however, revealing the method. He thus exposed himself to the accusation of maintaining 'agents' in Persia, Afghanistan, and India who watched the Soviet legations, bought or otherwise acquired their archives, and who were therefore guilty of anti-Bolshevik acts.

Where the Government of one Great Power insists on the authenticity of a given document, and a second Great Power categorically rejects the document as a forgery, the outsider is at a loss unless, as in the case of the 'Zinoviev Letter' of 1924, a lengthy and detailed examination of the paper is undertaken in public,

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Even large newspaper concerns have at times published documents incriminating United States senators and other statesmen which subsequent revelations have proved to be the work of counterfeiters and paid private detectives. Anti-Bolshevik *émigrés* in Europe and America have especially distinguished themselves in such pursuits, and their best-known example, Drushelovsky, made a detailed, documented, and undisputed confession of his counterfeiting activities at his public trial before the Soviet Supreme Court in Moscow in June, 1927.

On September 27, 1921, Maxim Litvinov, replying to charges of propaganda and subversive activities preferred by the British Government in a note of September 7, gave the address and bankers of the 'Ostinformation,' a correspondence bureau in Berlin of counter-revolutionary tendencies, which he said was responsible for scores of falsifications.

'It is surely no mere coincidence,' Litvinov wrote, 'that the majority of the apochryphal reports and speeches of Stalin, Eliava, Nuorteva, Karakhan and Lenin are to be found in the bulletin of the German detectives practically in the same wording as they are cited in the British note.'

Litvinov attached photographs and excerpts from the 'Ostinformation's' publications.¹ But Curzon forthwith rejected the Litvinov 'conjecture,' declaring that he possessed 'better and more reliable sources of information.'

Everybody who has worked in European capitals knows that Foreign Offices, embassies, newspaper men and even private individuals are regularly offered documents, alleged treaties, letters or oral information by persons of varied repute who demand their fee. Such material may or may not be authentic, but where the proof is lacking, as it usually is, one must rely on one's own estimate of the plausibility of the information thus made available.

In his ultimatum, Curzon stated that the British knew the exact sums sent by Moscow to Shumiatsky, the Soviet minister in

¹ British Blue Book. *A Selection of Papers Dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, 1921-7*. London, 1927, Cmd. 2895. Pages 14 and 18.

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Teheran, that they had 'seen the instructions that have passed between him and his superiors and between him and his subordinate agents,' and he quoted from a telegram to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in which Shumiatsky is purported to have requested funds for anti-British work in North Persia.

Raskolnikov, the Soviet minister in Kabul, was the subject of a more vehement attack. 'He had distinguished himself by exceptional zeal,' Curzon declared, in conducting activity against the British in Afghanistan and among the tribes on the North-West Frontier.

'The Russian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,' read the ultimatum, 'will no doubt recognize the following communication dated the 21st February, 1923, which they received from M. Raskolnikov: "I am making arrangements for giving help to Waziristan, probably to the extent of the outlay of 3,000 roubles and ten boxes of cartridges."'

Curzon then cited a number of documents he declared to have in his possession which offered proof of Soviet arms shipments to India, of Communist contacts with revolutionary Hindus, and of heavy subsidies from the Third International (Comintern) to the Indian and British Communist parties.

These were but a 'few selected examples' which testified that the Soviets had consistently flouted the non-propaganda pledge of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. 'Unless,' therefore, 'such acts are repudiated and apologized for, and unless the officials who have been responsible for them are disowned and recalled from the scene of their maleficent labours,' the agreement would be discontinued.

Further, the ultimatum discussed 'a series of outrages inflicted upon British subjects in the past few years,' the most conspicuous of which were the murder of Mr. C. F. Davison, in January, 1920, and the arrest and imprisonment of Mrs. Sten Harding on the charge of espionage. 'His Majesty's Government are unable to allow the matter to be trifled with any longer.' Curzon demanded 'equitable compensation' and noted incidentally that these were not the only personal claims.

Followed the question of the British trawlers off the coast of

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Murmansk. The Soviet Government had extended the regular, international three-mile limit to a twelve-mile limit on her Arctic seaboard. British trawlers nevertheless continued to fish within the territorial zone. The Red Navy endeavoured, accordingly, to interfere with their operations, and Curzon charged that the result had been the sinking of the *Magneta*, the confiscation of the *St. Hubert*, and the seizure of the *James Johnson*. The British Government insisted on compensation, release, and a promise of non-interference with fishing outside the three-mile limit.

The final ultimative British demand was the withdrawal of the two Weinstein notes.

THE IMPRESSION IN RUSSIA

The Curzon ultimatum reached the Soviet authorities on May 8 and produced a painful impression. The question of propaganda and anti-British activities in the Middle East had been the subject of a long correspondence. There had been no new or unexpected developments in the recent past to prepare the Bolsheviks for London's threat of a rupture of relations.

Davison was killed in 1920, Mrs. Harding incarcerated soon after, and the exchange of notes had continued for years.

Moscow did not believe the trawler issue serious enough to justify drastic English action. Moreover, that problem too had been weighed in unfinished negotiations. Did Curzon then intend to force a break because of the Weinstein notes? the Bolsheviks wondered.

Indignation spread throughout the country. It was a threat. Alarmists saw the menace of a new intervention or of an international war. Britain, said the Press, wished to kill Russian economic reconstruction in the bud. England, Chicherin declared at a public protest meeting in Moscow, thought the illness of Lenin presented a favourable moment for the overthrow of the Soviets.

Meanwhile the statesmen deliberated calmly in the Kremlin. The temper of Curzon's note and the fact that it was a ten-day ultimatum made it clear that London could no longer be trifled with. If Russia permitted a break, Poland and Roumania, it was said, would be encouraged, and Europe, already disturbed by the Ruhr invasion, might conceivably burst into flames. But the

Bolsheviks could not afford a war. They did not want to fight. 'Cursed be any one in this country who favours hostilities or a future war,' Trotzky declared. 'We will not take a single step or say a single word that could make the situation more acute or close the path to a peaceful situation through pourparlers. We want peace most and above all,' the Commissar of War affirmed.

Communist councils decided to return the soft answer that turneth away wrath. 'He [Curzon],' Trotzky said at a meeting on June 19, 'cooked [coughed] his note in strong phraseology hoping to receive a sharp answer that would insult the English Philistines and thus arouse public opinion against us.' But 'we understand this clumsy trap.'

Some Soviet leaders, moreover, had been distressed by the obvious crudity of the Weinstein notes. And while all Bolsheviks agreed that in principle Russia was within her rights in urging that the longer range of modern guns justified the widening of the three-mile into a twelve-mile limit, some nevertheless submitted that she could not well put the change into practice upon the basis of her own unilateral declaration, even if Great Britain had set a precedent for such action by establishing a twenty-mile limit around Ceylon in order to protect the island's pearl fisheries.

The Russians believed, however, that Curzon's demands for compensation to Mrs. Harding and Mr. Davison's family were entirely unreasonable. 'We must wonder,' Trotzky said sarcastically, 'at Curzon's moderate claims. We must wonder that he does not insist on pensions for the families of those fifteen British soldiers who died throwing Russian workers into the ice and robbing Russian forests.' Thousands of Russians, the papers stated, had been killed as a result of British intervention. Mr. Davison, they affirmed, was a spy and belonged to the secret service organization of Paul Dukes. He had been killed in January, 1920, when England and Russia were engaged in actual warfare. The arrest of Mrs. Sten Harding belonged to the same period, and she had been detained, the Bolsheviks contended, on the charge of espionage and on the basis of information supplied by Miss Margaret Harrison, an American journalist.

Finally, the Soviet leaders insisted that the accusations respecting anti-British acts in Central Asia lacked all foundation.

THE RUSSIAN REPLY

'They dream of secret agents,' Chicherin told a Moscow audience on May 12, 'when they are faced with the effects of an historical process.' Curzon's ultimatum, he continued, was 'a collection of false charges.' The 'quotations concerning Persia were entirely invented.' Curzon's demand for the recall of Russia's ministers from Teheran and Kabul was 'unheard of.'

The Bolsheviks, nevertheless, feared the political and economic consequences of a break to such an extent that they decided to do what was not consonant with right and national honour. They would satisfy claims which, in their opinion, had not the remotest justification. They would accede to demands which they thought were exorbitant. They bowed to a stronger force and proceeded on considerations of expediency. 'Our relations to capitalist countries,' Trotzky had told an interviewer, 'are based on expediency. Our only aim is to secure peace and normal economic relations.' If peace and Bolshevik reconstruction required the acceptance of a humiliating defeat, Moscow did not hesitate.

THE RUSSIAN REPLY¹

Mr. Hodgson received the Soviet reply on May 13, just five days after he presented Curzon's ultimatum to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

The ultimatum, read the cabled version of the rejoinder, 'was for Soviet Government greatest surprise on account of its sharp and unjustified hostility.' After a reminder to British commercial interests of the growing importance of Russian trade – indirectly an appeal to them to frustrate Curzon's efforts towards a scrapping of the commercial agreement – the Soviet reply, which was written by Trotzky, proceeded to elaborate on British hostility towards Soviet Russia in the questions of the Straits, Eastern Galicia, Memel, Bessarabia, etc.

But this was not all. The Russian Government 'has plenty of reports and documents pointing to intense activity of agents of British Government against interests of republics in Caucasus and in particular in localities bordering on Central Asian

¹ British White Paper. *Reply of the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government respecting the Relations between the Two Governments*. London, 1923. Cmd. 1874.

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parts of Soviet republics, to support given to bandit and Bassi (Basmachi) movement in Turkestan and Eastern Bokhara, to assistance given by British consul to White Guard in recruiting officers and sending them to Vladivostok during its occupation by Whites.'

One of these charges subsequently found corroboration from the British officer who supervised anti-Soviet moves in Central Asia. Lieutenant-Colonel P. T. Etherton, the British Resident and Consul in Kashgar, Chinese Turkestan, admits in his *In the Heart of Asia*, published in London in 1925, that he intrigued against the Bolsheviks in Turkestan, that he assisted the Emir of Bokhara, that in fact the purpose of his mission was subversive activities against the Communists – and that he continued his work after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement. Some of the documents referred to in Moscow's reply to Curzon dealt with Etherton's work.

'Similar material,' the Soviet note submitted, 'is at disposal of all Governments, and if they use them for creating conflicts and as a foundation for protests, then friendly relations between any two Governments could hardly exist.' This argument carried an especial appeal to Liberal circles in England.

The note then attempted to explain that Great Britain misunderstood Soviet policy in the East which consisted of establishing friendly contacts with independent nations. Surely the British do not expect that 'the Russian Republic should have no policy of its own in the East, but should everywhere support English aspirations.'

On the most important issue raised in the Curzon ultimatum, therefore – on the question of Soviet activity in Central Asia – Moscow gave the British Foreign Office no satisfaction.

Moscow, however, agreed to pay compensation to Mrs. Harding and to the family of Mr. Davison. The note, nevertheless, named Russians for whose death the British were responsible and protested that during the intervention 'an immeasurably greater number of Russian citizens suffered both physically and materially from actions of English authorities in north and south Soviet republics and in sphere of English influence.'

THE ANTI-CLIMAX

The Russians likewise satisfied Curzon's demands respecting trawlers. And the two Weinstein notes 'can . . . be considered as non-existing.'

¶ THE ANTI-CLIMAX

The Soviet reply had a good press in Great Britain. The fact that it met the British on three of the four issues raised by the ultimatum offered effective ammunition to the English opponents of a break. The Conservative thesis that the Russians could not be budged from their intransigent position had been weakened. Relations, the Liberals argued, opened the way to diplomatic gives and takes; a rupture gave the Bolsheviks a free hand and robbed London of the possibility of exerting pressure on Moscow. Business men, moreover, feared the loss of the Russian market. For although the high hopes of some had been disappointed, the business turnover of the two countries, which amounted to 4,876,000 pounds sterling in 1921, rose to 11,760,000 pounds sterling in 1922,¹ and thus inspired hopes of rapid geometrical progress. The bondholders and concession seekers may have felt that Curzon's tactics would force the submission of the Bolsheviks, and therefore welcomed it. Yet it is doubtful whether they desired an irrevocable rupture which, obviously, could yield them nothing but lost opportunities. The commercial interests certainly had nothing to gain from a severing of relations, and the Bolsheviks' 'soft answer' enabled them to argue their case with greater cogency. Labour too opposed the nullification of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, and the cumulative weight of all these influences was not without its effect on the Baldwin Government of 1923.

The break, moreover, would have come in May or June – just at the time when the French invasion of the Ruhr and the devaluation of German currency threatened to draw Germany to the brink of a national upheaval which would throw all Europe into turmoil. The interruption of Anglo-Russian relations would further prejudice the continental situation in favour of social disturbances. Cooler heads in London accordingly advised against any too brusque move that would antagonize Russia. Moreover,

¹ *Statesmen's Yearbook*, 1925. Page 1259.

THE CURZON ULTIMATUM

even the Conservative Press could not explain, objectively and analytically, how England might benefit from a rupture.

Accordingly, the British answer to the Russian note was couched in far more gentle phraseology than the original ultimatum. It admitted that three of the issues 'have now been removed from the arena of controversy.' But there remained 'the all-important question of hostile propaganda.'

After a further exchange of memoranda,¹ however, both Governments agreed to sign a formula respecting propaganda which was somewhat more precise than the first article of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, and Moscow, while protesting that no third Power was entitled to interfere in the relations between two states, nevertheless recalled Raskolnikov from Kabul but kept Shumiatsky in Teheran. A British note of June 13 therefore declared the correspondence closed, and on the same day Curzon wrote to Lord Crewe saying, 'I think I may claim to have won a considerable victory over the Soviet Government, and I expect them to behave with more circumspection for some time to come.' The Bolsheviks, too, congratulated themselves: they had prevented a crisis and the accompanying dislocation of trade and industry; they had obviated even the remote possibility of renewed intervention.

Thereafter, until the rise of Ramsay MacDonald to power, the course of Russo-British relations remained uneventful. But it was only natural that Curzon should have exploited the victory he had achieved over the Soviets in order to strengthen British interests in Afghanistan. The occasion arose in September, 1923, when two British officers were murdered by frontier tribes. The Foreign Office applied pressure on Amanullah and tried to wrest certain concessions from him, particularly the discontinuance of diplomatic relations with Moscow. As the king proved unyielding, however, the Indian Government threatened him with war and sent him an ultimatum in December, 1923. But before the situation was ripe for action, Curzon had given way to MacDonald in Downing Street.

¹ British Blue Book. Cmd. 2895. Also, *Anglo-Russian Relations (1921-7.)* Notes and Documents. Moscow, 1927. Official publication of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

The fact, however, that Curzon followed his ultimatum to Moscow with another to Kabul is not accidental. It points to the conclusion that until Afghanistan is much stronger than she is to-day and until she ceases to be regarded as a buffer state, the weakening of Soviet Russia's international position reacts on her own. Pre-war history shows that when economic, political, or labour situations robbed Czarism of the power to assert itself in Central Asia, Afghanistan became a vassal of Great Britain. When army and popular disaffection undermined England's position in India, Amanullah dared to make his country independent of Great Britain. Afghanistan and Persia are too close to new centres of national energy in Central Asia and to sources of British power in India to remain unaffected by variations in the temperature of Anglo-Russian relations and by changes in the social, economic, political and cultural status of the tribes and nationalities of the Caucasus, Turkestan, India – and even China.

Great Britain and Soviet Russia are the chief political factors in Asia (Japan and America play secondary though highly important rôles). The Bolsheviks advocate the establishment of buffers between the territories of these great rivals. Just as the Bolsheviks reversed Czarist Russia's traditional Straits policy and began to support England's and Europe's pre-war principle of closed Straits, so in Central Asia, the Communists adopted Curzon's pre-war doctrine of Afghan and Persian buffers. But Afghanistan and Persia, the Soviets argue, can protect Russia against aggression only in a condition of reinforced national unity, modern government organization, unfettered economic development, cultural progress, and undisputed political independence. On these terms, an agreement between Bolshevism and British Imperialism in Central Asia is altogether feasible. Raskolnikov adumbrated such a truce in conversation with the writer during MacDonald's first term of office and other Bolshevik spokesmen have suggested it on more than one occasion. If Moscow and London could come to terms on this subject, both Afghanistan and Persia would rise from their condition of relative backwardness and thus encourage similar movements in adjacent parts of Asia. Non-interference by Great Powers in the affairs of Afghanistan and Persia would, moreover, be one of the best guarantees of peace in the Orient.

RUHR, RUSSIA, AND REVOLUTION

Thousands of workers marched through the streets of Moscow on January 15, 1923, demonstrating against the French occupation of the Ruhr a few days previously. 'Down with Imperialist Slaughter,' their placards read: 'Down with French Imperialism.' Bukharin and other Bolshevik leaders addressed meetings that afternoon protesting against the use of Poincaré's '800,000 arguments in the form of 800,000 soldiers' for the purpose of 'enslaving Germany.'

Two days prior to this popular outburst, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs issued an appeal to the nations of the earth which declared the action of the French Government 'a crime.' The Bolsheviks considered the occupation of the Ruhr an illegal attempt to suppress the independence of Germany, and a natural result of the spirit in which the Versailles Treaty was drafted. 'Our sympathy is with Germany, as it is with any oppressed nation,' Litvinov told the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent on January 27.

But apart from their interest in the integrity and stability of Germany, the Russians, as Chicherin stated,¹ felt that the 'Ruhr adventure had administered a shock to the political and economic life of all Europe and thus brought a great harm upon the Soviet republics which require economic relations with other countries. . . .'

Moscow saw in Germany a barrier against the aggression of France. 'The complete domination of Germany,' the *Izvestia* therefore suggested, 'is a sharp threat to Soviet Russia. It would make French imperialism our immediate neighbour.' It would give Poincaré control over the territory from the Seine to the Rhine, from the Rhine to the Vistula, and – Poland being an ally of France – from the Vistula to the Soviet frontier. Accordingly, says the *Izvestia*, 'the political balance in Eastern Europe will depend on the position assumed by Poland in the coming conflict.'²

¹ *Pravda*, February 15, 1923.

² *Izvestia*, January 21, 1923.

FRENCH AND POLISH POLICIES

The Moscow *Pravda* echoed the same official view.

'It is necessary to watch events in Poland closely,' read an editorial on January 19. 'Poland long ago coveted poorly-protected sections of Germany. . . . If the Polish bourgeois will follow the example of his French patron a European upheaval is inevitable. On the Polish Government rests a heavy responsibility.'

§ POLISH AND CZECH POLICIES TOWARDS GERMAN REVOLUTION

These and similar published statements were intended as direct intimations to Warsaw that Russia would not tolerate Polish military moves against Germany. With the French in the Ruhr and Rhineland, and the Poles in East Prussia and German Upper Silesia, Germany's unity would be ruined, German economic co-operation with Russia precluded. And the danger existed that a grand French sweep through Germany into Poland would gather too much momentum *en route* to stop before it reached Moscow. The *Izvestia* therefore warned that 'if, on some excuse, the Polish imperialists find the moment suitable for military action, the Soviet Government, notwithstanding its desire for peace, will not be able to allow the Polish imperialists freedom of action. . . .'

French and Polish policies towards the German revolutionary situation caused alarm in Moscow. In the latter half of 1923, Roman Knoll, then Polish chargé d'affaires in Moscow and subsequently a member of the Polish Cabinet, came to Radek and declared that his Government would not interfere with a Communist Germany provided Poland could annex East Prussia. Chicherin was informed, and in a subsequent interview with Knoll the commissar several times reiterated his belief that neither France nor Poland would violate German soil. The belief was in truth merely a hope, and the hope was not a very firm one, for, apart from Knoll's intimations to Radek, Moscow disposed of very positive information that Czecho-Slovakia too was considering the possible results of sovietization in Germany. The cautious and almost simultaneous *démarches* in Moscow by representatives of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia aroused a suspicion among Russians that France would connive at the establishment of a German Com-

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munist regime in the expectation that economic collapse and territorial disintegration might follow.

Soviet Russia's rôle in the Ruhr conflict consisted, therefore, in paralysing Poland by the tacit threat of moving the Red Army. At a time when separatist movements were rife in Bavaria, the Rhineland, and the Palatinate, when the foreign invader had seized the heart of Germany's coal and metallurgical industry, when, moreover, financial difficulties and economic crises multiplied with lightning speed, the Bolsheviki saved the situation for Germany by keeping her eastern neighbour in inactivity.

In this mood, the *Pravda* hinted to Wilhelmstrasse on January 11, 1923, that 'only a closer economic and political contact with Russia will strengthen the position of the present German Government.'

Such sentiments moved the Soviet Press and the Soviet leaders throughout the first five or six months that followed the invasion of the Ruhr. The attitude still prevailed in May when the Curzon ultimatum thoroughly frightened the Bolsheviki and led them to believe that the British Foreign Office's stern note was merely the forerunner of more concrete anti-Soviet measures which events on the Rhine seemed to favour. Moscow's reply to Curzon would never have been so meek had the Bolsheviki expected or planned a Red revolution in Germany at that juncture.

On March 22, as a matter of fact, Radek hurled his scintillating literary lance at Poland once more, and, dissecting statements carried to Moscow regarding a Polish mobilization and a French loan of 400,000,000 francs for this purpose, repeated the hint of Russia's intimate relation to such an eventuality.

During all this time, diplomatic and trade relations between Soviet Russia and Germany continued undisturbed. The sense of mutual interests and common enemies, and the political benefits and commercial gains that had accrued to both sides as a result of the favourable beginnings made in 1922, tended to cement the friendship reflected in and reinforced by the Rapallo Treaty. German business with Russia increased.

Much of the credit for the smooth course of German-Russian relations in 1922 and 1923, as well as in subsequent years, belongs to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Wilhelmstrasse's ambassador in

Moscow. A man of high culture, wide political experience, and deep psychological understanding, he not only established warm personal ties with Chicherin and other Soviet leaders, but knew how to bridge the gap between his own capitalist country and Bolshevik Russia. Though the task of dovetailing was difficult, he proved that it could be done. He alone, of all the official envoys sent by foreign States to Red Moscow, rose above the small physical discomforts, the social deprivations, and the innumerable irritations incident to life in the Communist capital, and saw the possibilities of relations with Bolshevism in the light of his broad political horizon.

Rantzau owed his success in no small measure to his extraordinary position. Originally suggested for the appointment by President Ebert, who was under obligations to him, he accepted his mission to Moscow with the assurance that he could, if it proved necessary, appeal to the Reichspresident over the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He made more use of this arrangement after Hindenburg came to office than during the incumbency of Ebert.

The strongest and most lasting impression of Count Rantzau's political life was probably given him by the Versailles Peace Conference. Representative of a defeated, humiliated nation, he appeared in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles on May 7, 1919, to receive a neatly-bound copy of the Paris treaty from the hands of Clemenceau.

The ceremony was solemn and important. Clemenceau addressed the delegates and called on Rantzau. The German remained seated. Colonel House suggests that he may have been too nervous to stand. The Count was certainly white and shaken. But his words echoed honour and dignity.

'It is demanded of us,' he said, 'that we confess ourselves the sole guilty ones in the war. Such a confession would be a lie in my mouth. . . . During the last fifty years the imperialism of *all* European States has poisoned the international situation. The policies of revenge, of expansion, and disregard of the self-determination of nations brought about the sickness of Europe which saw its crisis in the World War.'

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That historic scene in Versailles imprinted itself indelibly on Rantzau's sensitive personality. He could see no salvation for Germany from the West, from those Powers whose representatives gazed at him as he accepted the peace treaty which he regarded as cruel and unjust. Inevitably, he turned to Russia. From the East, from the nation which was as anti-Versailles as Germany, his fatherland could obtain the political strength required to resist the pressure of the Allies. He believed, likewise, in the great business potentialities of Russia and in the possibilities they offered to Germany.

Guided by these views, Rantzau succeeded in establishing a *modus vivendi* with the Bolsheviki which produced appreciable results in 1922 and the first half of 1923. The moral support Moscow gave Germany in the Ruhr crisis and its very concrete aid in the form of periodic warnings to Poland would have been inconceivable had Rantzau failed in his mission.

§ RUSSIA AND REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

Very soon, however, Moscow's policy underwent a complete reversal, and from seeking to buttress a national, bourgeois Germany as was implicit in the Rapallo Treaty, the Russian Bolsheviki commenced to further the German revolution.

The blow delivered by the French on the Ruhr struck the entire German people. The Cuno Cabinet encouraged the Ruhr industrialists to practise passive resistance against the invaders and subsidized them to the extent of several hundred million gold marks for that purpose. As a result of this and contributing circumstances the mark began to fall catastrophically, thus not only dislocating manufacturing, commercial, municipal, and communal undertakings but introducing a fiscal inflation which rapidly impoverished the small *rentiers* of the petty bourgeois class, reduced the standard of living of State officials, teachers, the intelligentsia, and workers to the minimum of malnutrition, and put a premium on *valuta* speculation which demoralized business and large sections of the population.

This complex of intolerable conditions stimulated the growth of Communism among the workers and Fascism at the other extreme, while ambitious generals, misguided intellectuals, Nationa-

list-Monarchist leaders, and the French saw in the situation an opportunity to build up separatist movements and thus break up the Reich.

In the Ruhr, the working-men were caught between two fires: their employers refused to grant wage increases and even, at times, to pay wages at all, yet appealed to their patriotism to resist the French and co-operate with capital. The occupational authorities, on the other hand, suppressed their strikes, prohibited their meetings, proscribed their propaganda, and arrested their leaders. A proletarian struggle therefore developed 'against Poincaré on the Rhine and Cuno on the Spree.'

Objectively, the state of affairs warranted revolution. Both the Left and Right elements in Germany felt the urge to decisive measures. Late in September, the Conservatives started trouble in Bavaria; on October 1, a Fascist *putsch* took place at Kuestrin which, had it worked according to plan, would have marched on Berlin with the help of the Reichswehr. In the latter part of October, the Voelkische under Hitler, Ludendorff, von Kahr and von Lossow, staged a *putsch* in Munich, and during the same period, loyal German troops were engaged in fighting down separatist attempts in the Rhineland and other parts of the country.

The same wave of unrest and dissatisfaction which inspired the Rights to action, stirred the workers to seek a radical solution of their problems. In August, the German Communists called a general strike, and in the same month a number of cities witnessed serious food riots. During September, bloody battles took place between the police and hungry strikers and unemployed poor. The situation had become highly explosive.

On October 11, Left Social Democrats and Communists formed a Cabinet in Saxony with Zeigner as Premier. Two days later, the Reichstag granted the Federal Government extraordinary powers to cope with the unrest that had now become general. This move, ironically or logically, was followed by sanguine clashes with the authorities. The 15th and 16th saw food disturbances in Western Germany, the Rhineland, and Berlin, where haggard housewives, weary working-men and boys and girls threw themselves on the police; a few days later there was fighting in

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Munich, and in the Palatinate and Rhineland with pro-French separatists.

The climax of this incipient civil war was enacted in Hamburg. Here, on October 23, the working-men, led by German Communists who, in turn, had been encouraged and advised by Comintern agents sent from Moscow, opened a battle which they conceived as the beginning of the German revolution. Barricades were erected. The Communists fought with clubs, war-time rifles, revolvers, but also with high-power guns and armoured vehicles. The State directed the regular army and large police forces against the revolutionists. On the 24th two cruisers approached the scene of fighting. That same day, Soviets were proclaimed and actually seized control of some of the precincts of Hamburg.

But the working-men were too poorly organized. The bulk of the trade unionists still adhered to the moderate, anti-Communist Social Democrats who, on October 6, had joined the Stresemann Cabinet and lent their influence to the suppression not only of the Hamburg uprising but of the Radical Government in Saxony. Hamburg, moreover, remained an isolated episode; no parallel upheavals occurred in other cities; no general strike accompanied it. The authorities were therefore able to concentrate against the Communists and to liquidate their abortive attempt three days after its commencement.

Moscow watched these events with interest and concern. Both the Soviet Government and the Communist International would have welcomed a revolution in Germany. But while the Comintern participated actively in the preparations for the upheaval, the Soviet State waited in the background for developments.

The attitude of the Soviet Government was stated succinctly by Leon Trotsky, Commissar of War, in a conversation with United States Senator King which appeared in the *Izvestia* of September 30, 1923.

‘We do not interfere in civil wars abroad,’ he said. ‘This is very clear: we could interfere only by making war on Poland. But we do not want war. We do not hide our sympathies for the German working class in its heroic struggle for its liberation. In order to be more precise and frank I will say: if we could bring victory

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to the German revolution without incurring the risk of warlike activities we would do everything we could. But we do not want war. War would harm the German revolution. Only that revolution is capable of life which succeeds by its own strength, especially when a great people is concerned. We are entirely on the side of the victims of rapacious and bloody French imperialism. We are with the German working class with all our soul in its struggle against foreign and domestic exploitation. But at the same time we are entirely for peace.'

This statement of the Russian War Commissar, as he certainly knew in advance, was spread broadcast through Germany by the enemies of revolution. To the extent that the German proletariat had depended on the assistance of the Red Army in case of a revolutionary situation, these cold showers disillusioned them. But Trotsky spoke from considerations of statesmanship rather than revolution. The Soviet Government did not want war, and since that was the price of revolution, it left the German workers to their fate. Trotsky's policy did not remain unopposed. But for many months his views were those which the Government put into practice.

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The rôles of the Comintern and Soviet Government in such a situation might be defined as follows: the Communist International is the organizer of revolutions. The business of the Soviet Government is to safeguard the interests of the revolution in Russia and of already established revolutions abroad. It goes almost without saying that the Soviet Government of Russia would be strengthened in its international position by the creation of another soviet regime and that it would support such a regime to the extent of its power in much the same way as France, for instance, sees in Poland a pillar of strength, and therefore has in the past granted loans to Warsaw for military and construction purposes.

A Soviet regime in Germany, or in South Africa, or in Siam would, moreover, adhere to the Soviet Union which, officially called into existence on July 6, 1923, is based on the theory that

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not only the soviet republics founded on the territory of the former Czarist empire, but soviet states organized at any time in the future and in any corner of the world could, and, presumably, would become members of that Union. When the Soviet Union, accordingly, prepared to extend aid through legal channels to a future Soviet Government in Germany it was, in fact, doing the normal thing. The Bolsheviks had decided that a Communist regime in Germany was a matter of months; they felt it their duty, therefore, to be ready to offer a helping hand.

Until the summer of 1923 the state of affairs in Germany was far too complicated and inchoate to warrant sanguine hopes in a successful revolution. Nevertheless, it was the task of the Comintern to fortify the movement and to prepare it for revolutionary possibilities. Not everybody in Moscow, however, expected the situation to ripen, and prominent Russians left Berlin in August on leisurely vacations because they looked for no exciting developments.

But the coalition of the Left Socialists and Communists in Saxony, the illusion that the Right Social Democrats would desert their leaders who had compromised themselves by joining the capitalist government, the mounting economic distress, increasing unemployment, the apparent inability or unwillingness of the Allies to deal satisfactorily with the German crisis, and the 'dress rehearsal' enacted by the Hamburg workers, encouraged German and Russian Communist leaders to believe that the suppression of the revolutionary outburst in September–October, 1923, was not yet the end. Higher and stronger waves of revolutionary spirit, they maintained, would follow. The *petit bourgeoisie*, which had lost its investments and real earning power and now had nothing more to lose, might conceivably send reinforcements into the proletarian ranks or at least remain passive in the inevitable internecine struggle between Capital and Communism.

Even the Comintern, however, was not convinced that the time to strike had arrived. Radek was accordingly sent to Germany to study the facts and to decide whether the potential revolutionary situation warranted immediate action.

In the event of a seizure of power, the German Communists would be faced with two dangers: foreign blockade and starvation,

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and foreign intervention. The Soviet Government could not raise the blockade by the use of its navy, but it could send bread to Germany. It could not prevent France from seizing more German territory but it could guarantee Poland's passivity and hope that national, even bourgeois resentment against French aggression might react favourably on the Communist regime.

With a view to possible bread shipments to Germany, and to securing the neutrality of Poland, the Soviet Government accordingly undertook a well-planned diplomatic *démarche* in August, 1923, when it instructed Victor Kopp to sound the foreign offices of the Baltic States and Poland.

These countries had entertained what was probably a very genuine fear that the Red Army would be ordered to Germany across their frontiers to assist a Communist Government in Berlin. 'Such thoughts, in that absolute form, we actually did not have,' wrote the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. But, 'the only thing that could have compelled us to interrupt peaceful labour and take up arms was Polish interference in the revolutionary affairs of Germany.' ¹ If Poland promised to remain passive, Red Germany would be spared an additional enemy and Red Russia the necessity of going to war. Kopp therefore suggested that Soviet Russia and border States sign a treaty in which all parties would pledge themselves to neutrality towards Germany no matter what crisis arose. The proposed agreement would likewise grant free transit to Russian grain destined for Germany.

In Reval, Riga, and Kovno, says the Foreign Commissariat's report for 1923, 'the success of Comrade Kopp's mission, it seemed, exceeded all expectations.' Even in Warsaw 'complete sympathy was expressed' for the idea. But difficulties were encountered as soon as the diplomats attempted to formulate the arrangement in a written protocol. Poland, says the official report, refused to sign, because of French pressure. The Baltic countries therefore hesitated, and Lithuania, which agreed in principle, would not sign alone. The *pourparlers*, nevertheless, continued. In December, Riga suggested a conference to discuss the subject. Latvia and the other succession nations found the Soviet formula acceptable;

¹ *Annual Report of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for 1923*. Moscow, 1923. Pages 41 *et seq.*

objecting, however, to the procedure. Poland, on the contrary, proposed different terms and less binding pledges. But before the conversations on these issues had been concluded, the German bourgeois Government regained control of the internal situation, the Ruhr crisis became less threatening, indications multiplied in England and the United States that many influences desired a more peaceful solution of the reparations problem, and the prospects of the German revolution consequently grew dim.

The year 1924 introduced a relatively pacific atmosphere into Europe, and that fact plus the improvement of Russia's economic position opened a new era of more normal relations between Soviet Russia and the rest of the world.

THE PASSING OF LENIN

The year 1924 began sadly for Soviet Russia. At 6.50 p.m. on January 21 Lenin died in Gorki, near Moscow. The nation, the Government, and the Communist Party lost its 'leader, teacher, friend.' Rarely has any man in any generation been the object of so much love and veneration – in life and death.

In the perspective of passing years, Lenin's wisdom, as expressed in his deeds, writings, and addresses, stands out much more clearly than when it awed the co-workers, supporters, and enemies of the living man. His leadership was rarely questioned; his opinion, except in a few instances, was law.

Lenin combined a mastery of general principles, not unusual – in less developed form – among Russians, with an unusually keen ability to grasp details. But perhaps the outstanding quality of his mind was its agility. He could smell the wind from afar and, like a seasoned captain, realistically trim his sail to it. Held within relatively narrow limits by the principles and morals in whose name he and his party made the revolution, Lenin nevertheless found sufficient room for manœuvring and for avoiding those rocks on which less gifted statesmen would have broken their ships – and their heads.

No important government decision was adopted before he was consulted, and no move was carried out except under his close watch. In foreign affairs, he helped to outline policy, he wrote or edited notes, directed *démarches*, and kept himself *au courant* even of negotiations concerning exchange of prisoners. Between 1917 and 1922 the lines of Soviet foreign policy lay firmly in his hand.

Most of the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy between 1917 and 1923 originated with Lenin, but, in the final analysis, with the Bolsheviks' conception of capitalism and imperialism. Lenin's tactics consisted in exploiting the contradictions between capitalist governments and within capitalist countries. When the German offensive threatened in 1918, he advised appealing for assistance to the 'Franco-British imperialist brigands'; when Allied

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intervention commenced he weighed the possibility of German aid against the French and British. He tried to use the antagonism between Japan and the United States, and between England and France. His policy was to win the support of business elements within capitalist countries by offering them concessions and trade, and of proletarian elements abroad by emphasizing the necessity of defending the revolution.

This strategy of defence was perhaps the most marked characteristic of Lenin's foreign policy. It aimed to divide the forces of the enemy and weaken the united front against Bolshevism. It aimed, in like manner, to win time even at the expense of serious loss of territory or apparent loss of honour.

Lenin and Chicherin co-operated closely in the direction of foreign affairs.

'In the first years of our republic,' Chicherin wrote a few days after Lenin died,¹ 'I spoke with Lenin over the telephone several times a day; some of these conversations were very long. Besides, we had private personal interviews and frequently I discussed with him all the details of current diplomatic affairs that were at all important. . . . In his conversations, Lenin always gave the most brilliant analysis of diplomatic conditions, and his advice – frequently he immediately drafted the text of a reply to the foreign Power – could serve as models of diplomatic art and agility.'

Lenin could agree to compromises if they appeared absolutely necessary, but he was adamant when the situation required and permitted. Sometimes he would decide that 'these demands are stupid' as he did after Count Mirbach's death when the Germans wished to send armed troops to Moscow. On such occasions, writes Chicherin, he waited for the result with 'complete calm.'

When the Allies had definitely decided on war against Bolshevism, Lenin, while directing both the military and diplomatic defensive, sought to refrain from any measure that might excessively antagonize the enemy. And throughout the era of intervention, according to Chicherin, Lenin insisted 'on making peace proposals to our enemies. He never feared creating an impression of weakness by so doing. On the contrary, he regarded it as one

¹ *Izvestia*, January 30, 1924.



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of the finest means of applying pressure on the militant interventionism of Entente countries.'

The invitation to attend the proposed conference in Prinkipo first gave Lenin the occasion to outline his policy of 'appeal to the Entente in the name of economic advantages.' We have Chicherin's authority for saying that 'this idea became one of the most outstanding in Lenin's foreign policy.' In this connection, the Premier declared his readiness to recognize and pay the debts which an early decree had cancelled – a position he embodied in the document handed Mr. Bullitt for Woodrow Wilson. 'Each word of the proposal to Bullitt was meticulously weighed by Lenin.' But he set a time limit for its acceptance. 'If they do not accept now,' he said, 'they will not receive such favourable terms next time.' This, too, became a guiding principle for the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: moderate offers made at the Hague Conference, for instance, were recalled a few months later, and concessions suggested in the early part of the revolution were subsequently withdrawn.

Lenin attached little importance to territorial losses or gains. When Finland insisted on Pechenga he forced the Soviet agreement through Government councils against the opposition of a number of prominent comrades. It was Lenin's idea to give Poland more than the Curzon Line granted her. He likewise insisted on demarcating a frontier favourable to Turkey.

One of the pillars of Lenin's foreign policy was friendship for the nations of Asia. The aim of the Soviet Government, he wrote, must be to 'group around itself all the awakening peoples of the East and fight together with them against international imperialism.' He advocated co-operation with Kemal Pasha and regularly interfered when more militant Bolsheviki tended to overlook the interests of a united, nationalistic Persia. He wrote personally to the King of Afghanistan, received numerous Moslem and Mongolian delegations, and frequently underlined the decisive importance of Chinese nationalist developments.

In 1921, Lenin's fatal sickness began to make itself felt, and more and more he delegated his tasks to others. In the realm of foreign affairs, his personal participation, Chicherin writes, 'gave way to collective deliberations' in which the members of the pivotal

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Political Bureau (Politburo) of the party – Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Tomsky, Trotzky, and Zinoviev – consulted with spokesmen of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Lenin, nevertheless, devoted his special attention to the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, to the treaty negotiations with Turkey, and to the pourparlers with Hoover's A.R.A. and with the Nansen relief organization.

Illness now commenced to make ever-increasing inroads on Lenin's energy, and during the winter of 1921-2 he spent much time on the outskirts of Moscow, where his participation in affairs of State was necessarily intermittent. The Genoa Conference, however, called forth a series of memoranda which he sent into town and which formed the basis of the Russian delegation's offers and claims. Chicherin discussed with him the text of his speech at the opening session of the conference, and 'when, in that connection, certain accusatory phrases were suggested in the spirit of our former declarations, Lenin wrote much to this effect: "We don't need big words."'

On one of the slips of paper Lenin directed from Gorki to Moscow for Chicherin's guidance, he wrote, 'We go to Genoa not as Communists but as merchants.' 'They need trade,' he added, 'and we need trade.' But if the conference brought no solution of outstanding problems, then the Soviets would take advantage of the differences in capitalist ranks and reach separate agreements with *some* of the conference nations. After Genoa, Lenin threw the weight of his inspired influence against the ratification of the Italian trade agreement which Chicherin negotiated there, and in October, 1922, he forced the rejection of the Urquhart concession against the will of the entire Politburo, which favoured its approval.

Chicherin's last interview with Lenin took place in the autumn of 1922 on the eve of Lausanne. The lines of the Soviet mission's programme at that conference were discussed and fixed with 'the lively participation of Lenin.' Lenin's last contribution to Soviet foreign affairs took the form of instructions to the Bolshevik representatives at the Moscow Disarmament Conference in December, 1922. Thereafter, throughout the year 1923, his participation in domestic affairs and in foreign politics was reduced by illness almost to zero. In January, 1924, Lenin died.

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